THE PLAN OF ATTACK
The first bombardment of the Turkish forts at the entrance to the
Dardanelles by British and French squadrons started at 8 a.m. on 19th
February 1915, and at dusk the warships had to be withdrawn, with the
Turkish Kum Kale batteries still firing. On the 25th operations were
resumed with the _Queen Elizabeth_, _Agamemnon_, and _Irresistible_
in the fight. By 4th March the outer forts had been silenced, and
the way lay clear to the inner ring of forts in the vicinity of
Dardanus. Meanwhile, the Turks had brought down howitzer batteries,
which they carefully entrenched amongst the hills round the shores of
Erenkeui Bay, and peppered the warships. For the next week there was a
systematic bombardment from the ships inside the Straits, with indirect
fire from the _Queen Elizabeth's_ 15-in. guns, and the _Agamemnon_ and
_Ocean_, from the Gulf of Saros near Gaba Tepe, across the peninsula.
Though the Turkish forts (9-in. and 10-in. guns) at Seddul Bahr,
Morto Bay, and Kum Kale had been destroyed, the Turks had entrenched
themselves round the ruins of the forts, and no landing was possible.
Now, about this time there arose what will probably be recorded in
after years as the great conflict of opinion between Admiral Carden and
Admiral De Robeck as to the advisability of forcing the Dardanelles
with the ships now assembled. To this conference of Admirals came
General Sir Ian Hamilton, having travelled by the swift destroyer
_Phaeton_ to the Dardanelles, arriving on 17th March at Tenedos, the
headquarters of the fleet at that time. There he was met by General
D'Amade, who had also arrived with 20,000 French troops to join the
Army Expedition. One may picture that council of three Admirals and
two army leaders. Admiral Carden the same day resigned for "health
reasons." He did not favour the direct attack, and Admiral De Robeck,
who did, took command. General D'Amade had sided with the retiring
Admiral, while General Hamilton and the French Admiral, Guepratte, were
in favour of the immediate strong attack.
[Illustration: THE 29TH DIVISION ON THE RAMLEH ROAD REVIEWED BY GENERAL
HAMILTON AND GENERAL D'AMADE ON 6TH APRIL, 1915.]
[Illustration: PRESENTATION OF COLOURS TO FRENCH COLONIAL TROOPS PRIOR
TO THEIR EMBARKATION FOR THE DARDANELLES.
To face p. 92.]
Consequently, the following day this operation was launched. General
Hamilton saw it from the decks of a destroyer, on which he went into
the thick of the fray. Later I heard his description of that fight, and
the manner in which the _Bouvet_ had steamed to her doom in two minutes
as she left the firing line, while the British ships _Irresistible_ and
_Ocean_ sank more slowly and their crews were rescued.
Close as had the ships crept to the towering forts of Point Kephez,
there was no silencing the forts, and the attempt was given up--a
failure. The _Gaulois_ and _Inflexible_ had both been badly damaged,
and sought refuge near Rabbit Islands.
It was not till after the campaign that the Turks were prepared to
admit that a little more force and the forts would have fallen--a
little greater sacrifice of ships; yet I learned from General
Hamilton's Staff that the Allies expected, and were prepared, to lose
twelve ships.
So under such inauspicious circumstances the military operation
began: yet not immediately. With all speed General Hamilton returned
to Alexandria, having found in the meantime--I have, no doubt, to
his chagrin and disgust--that the ships ready to embark troops
contained certainly the equipment and gear, but all wrongly packed. A
rearrangement was essential. This delay caused a revision of the whole
of the plans of the Allies. Instead of there being a force immediately
available to support the action of the ships which had battered the
forts and crushed down the Turks, an intermittent bombardment, as
the weather permitted, had to be kept up for a month, to prevent the
Turks repairing effectively their destroyed forts, while the whole of
the army was properly arranged and the transports collected. General
Hamilton's army, therefore, became an invading host instead of a
supporting force, landed to hold what the fleet had won. It was very
patent to the War Council that now to force the Dardanelles by sending
ships forward alone (even with the mine fields cleared) was impossible,
and, committed to a campaign, resort had to be made to a landing.
The Turks during the month's respite, in March-April, commenced
thoroughly to entrench the Gallipoli Peninsula against the execution
of the Allies' plans. These plans, speaking broadly, may be thus
briefly described, leaving the story of the landing to explain the
details: The peninsula, regarded from its topographical aspect, was
naturally fortified by stern hills, which reduced the number of places
of possible landings. So in the very nature of things it was necessary
for the leader of such an expedition to attack at as many landings as
possible and to push home only those which were most vital. This would
prevent the enemy from being able to anticipate the point where the
attack was to be delivered and concentrate troops there. During April
the army was assembled at Lemnos--British, Australian, French, and
Indian troops, drawn from Egypt. To the British was assigned the task
of taking the toe of the peninsula; to the French the feint on the Kum
Kale forts and the landing along the Asia Minor coast. The Australians
were to thrust a "thorn" into the side of the Turks at Gaba Tepe, which
was opposite Maidos, the narrowest portion of the peninsula. Certain
other troops, mostly Australians, were to make a feint at the Bulair
lines, while feints were also planned by warships at Enos and Smyrna.
Two attacks only were to be pushed home--the Australians at Gaba Tepe
and the British (afterwards to be supported by the French) at Cape
Helles, at the toe of the peninsula.
Officers of all the forces inspected the coast-lines in the various
sections allotted them, from the decks of the warships bombarding the
entrenchments and fortifications, which it was only too apparent that
the Turks had effected in the months of warning and interval that had
been given them. It looked, as it was, a desperate venture. Everything
certainly hung on the successful linking up of the two landed armies
round the foot of the great Kelid Bahr position, that lay like another
rock of Gibraltar, protecting the Turkish Asiatic batteries at Chanak
and Nagara from direct fire from the warships hammering at the entrance
to the Straits and from the Gulf of Saros. But once the communications
to this fortified hill were broken, it was regarded as certain that the
Narrows would be won, and once field guns began to play directly on the
rear of the forts at Kelid Bahr, unable to reply behind them up the
peninsula, that the position would be gained.
Anxious not to miss the scene of the landing, I had made plans
with my friend Mr. W. T. Massey, the correspondent of the _Daily
Telegraph_, to reach an island nearest to the entrance to the
Dardanelles--Imbros. It was while trying to make these plans that
one day we saw General Hamilton, from whom we had already received
courteous replies to letters asking for permission to witness the
landing. The Commander-in-Chief told us it was outside his power to
grant this request. What he told us later is worthy of record. The
same wiry leader, energetic, yet calm, his voice highly pitched, as I
had remembered it during many trips with him as the Inspector-General
of the Oversea Forces, round the camps of Victoria, he now greeted
me cordially and spoke of his regret at being unable to offer us his
help. As he spoke he paced up and down the bare room, with just a
writing-desk in it, in a building situated in the centre of the town
of Alexandria, which was the first base of the great Mediterranean
Expedition.
"I believe that the Press should have representatives with the
forces," he began, "to tell the people what is being done. If the war
is to succeed, you must interest the democracy first, for it is the
democracy's war. By all means have censorship, but let your articles
be written by a journalist, and not literary men who think they are
journalists. The trained man who knows how to interest people in things
that cannot matter to the army is the fellow needed. However, it has
been decreed otherwise, and I can do nothing. You are free British
subjects, nevertheless, and can always take a ticket to the nearest
railway-station. If it is possible, I shall do all I can to help you."
We wished the General success and left him, receiving then, as always,
the greatest courtesy in all our dealings with the General Staff. It
was an encouraging attitude, we felt, and for this reason we decided
to land on Imbros and wait an opportunity to reach the mainland after
the troops had advanced. I may say here that General Hamilton, true
to his promise, did make a great exception for me later, and I was
enabled to spend July and August on the peninsula itself. For the
present, on a Greek steamer of uncertain tonnage, carrying a mixed
cargo that included onions, garlic, and much oil and fish, I left for
the islands lying round the entrance to the Dardanelles. I quitted the
vessel at Castro, the capital of Lemnos Island (if a wretched little
township with a decayed fort dominating it might be called a capital);
and curiously enough, just afterwards that vessel was boarded by a
British destroyer and sent to Malta for carrying flour to Dedeagatch,
a Bulgarian port. Flour had been declared contraband since we had left
Alexandria, for Turkey had obtained enormous supplies, 500,000 tons I
was told it was estimated at, through the agency of King Ferdinand.
My experiences of being in "The War Zone" were only beginning. At
Castro I was arrested on landing, and asked if I did not know that
the island was under the command of the Admiral. This was the British
Admiral, Admiral de Robeck, though I did not know, but might easily
have guessed, for the whole of the assembled fleet of transports, as
well as the Allied battleships, were sheltered at Mudros at this time,
waiting for the day to be determined on for the landing--this event
subject now to the weather. Once already plans had been postponed. It
was not until the 25th it was agreed that it would be possible to have
a sufficiently long and fine spell of calm seas and a favourable phase
of the moon to make the attempt. I had already experienced something of
the storms of the Mediterranean on my journey north. For two days the
sea had been running high and we were tossed about like a cockleshell.
What, then, of small destroyers and landing-barges! By the time,
however, we had passed the Dardanelles on our way to Lemnos the sea had
grown perfectly calm again, and in the distance I could hear the boom
of the guns--a solemn, stately knell it seemed at that time, as of a
Nation knocking at the door of another Nation, a kind of threat, behind
which I knew lay the power of the army.
[Illustration: MARCHING ORDERS FOR THE FRONT.
Men of the 3rd Brigade leaving Mena Camp in March for Mudros Harbour.]
[Illustration: LEADERS AT THE LANDING.
Brigadier-General M'Cay (commanding 2nd Brigade) having a final chat
with Brigadier-General Sinclair-Maclagan (commanding 3rd Brigade), on
the right.
To face p. 96.]
I managed at Castro to assuage the worst fears of the British
officer, that I was a spy, and to assure him that I had a friend in
General Hamilton, and that I had merely come for a "look round." Yes,
I was told, I might go to Mudros Harbour, since I seemed to know the
fleets were there, but I should be detained there pending the pleasure
of the authorities, who were to determine when it would be safe to
release me with the news I might obtain. The Greek gendarmes heartily
co-operated in detaining me under observation until the next morning,
and then I was permitted, on giving an undertaking not to visit Mudros,
to set out for the hot springs at Thermia with the object of taking a
bath.
At this spot was a mountain, Mount Elias, and from it I, marvelling at
the sea power of Great Britain, looked down on to the wonderful crowded
harbour of Mudros. I saw the vast fleet lying placidly at anchor. With
powerful glasses I could detect the small boats and the men landing
on the slopes and dashing up the shore for practice. How far the real
from this make-believe! Reluctantly, after hours of watching, I left
this grandstand, having seen trawlers, warships, transports, coming and
going along the tortuous channel to the harbour, which was protected by
skilfully placed nets and guarded by active little patrol-boats.
I found trace of the 3rd Australian Brigade round this charming valley
at the foot of the mountain, for they had visited the springs for the
same purpose that I had done--the luxury of a warm bath--and left a
recommendation with the proprietor, which he treasures to this day, as
to the value of the mineral waters. In the distance I could always hear
the slow booming of the guns at the Dardanelles. I returned to Castro,
satisfied that the time was nearly ripe, and forthwith determined to
leave the island, where, obviously, I was cramped and would find no
means of seeing the landing.
It rained, to make matters more miserable; but my stay was not without
interest. One day the Greek Admiral came ashore in his yacht and was
received by the Governor of the island. From the inhabitants, many of
whom were Turks, who knew all about the peninsula, having tended their
flocks for many years at the Dardanelles shores, I gained my first
knowledge of the fields of battle I was later to visit. These Turks
were mostly taken up with living in the cafés and singing and dancing
to curious rhythmic music, not unpleasantly tuned, but played by some
execrable violinists. Most of the dances showed a distinct Russian
trait.
Let me remark here in passing that the Greek caïques, or sailing-boats,
were all this time leaving this harbour for Bulgarian and Turkish
ports along the coast (one offered to land me on the Gulf of Saros).
The British officer at Castro told me he was there to stop the leakage
of news. I asked if he thought it possible for information to be
smuggled from the island. He replied in the negative; but I told him
that I thought he was mistaken; for I had obtained much information
of a general character about the fleet and about other correspondents
interned at Mudros at the time, from various Greeks who had come across
as traders to the capital, and it seemed to me to have been an easy
matter for news to have been taken by the caïques to the Bulgarian
coast. In fact, one man I now suspect of having been a spy (he was
selling wine and came back with me when I left the island). I said so
to the British officer, but he only smiled and advised me to leave
for Salonika, as being the most suitable spot for me in the Ægean. As
a matter of fact, I half-suspect that he had orders to "remove the
correspondent," and that satisfied me that, as the Tommies would say,
"there was something doing." I left for Mitylene, an island close to
the Asia Minor coast, where I had learned that more news was to be
obtained and could be got away. Moreover, it enabled me to write what I
had learned on the undelectable island of Mudros. Long will I remember
those four days.
I knew now, however, that the plans were ripe, that the day was close
at hand for the landing. The whole island knew it, and I have no doubt
(having watched the officers travelling on the warship up and down the
coast of Gallipoli while the bombardment continued, by which means the
leaders learned the nature of their task) that the Turks gained the
same information as well, if, indeed, the actual plans had not been
already betrayed by the Queen of Greece into the hands of her august
and Germanic brother, William.