explicable only by the character of Philip. He was in constant
correspondence with high state officials and was frequently entrusted
with important negotiations. Sometimes he was under salary, but it was
irregularly paid and for the most part he had to struggle with poverty.
When the Infanta María Ana Vitoria was sent back to Spain from France,
in 1725, he was commissioned to attend her to the border and from there
he went as plenipotentiary to the Congress of Cambray, with the
comforting assurance that the king was endeavoring to put an end to the
affair of the Inquisition--an effort apparently frustrated by the
influence of Père Daubenton.[791] It was possibly with a view to
overcome this fatal enmity that he occupied his leisure, between 1734
and 1736, in composing a defence of the Inquisition from the attacks of
Dr. Dellon and the Abbé Du Bos. In this he had nothing but praise for
its kindliness towards its prisoners, its scrupulous care to avoid
injustice, the rectitude of its procedure and the benignity of its
punishments. Beyond these assertions, the defence reduces itself to
showing that, from the time when the Church acquired the power to
persecute, it has persecuted heretics to the death and that the heretics
in their turn have been persecutors--propositions readily proved from
his wide and various stores of learning and sufficient to satisfy a
believer in the _semper et ubique et ab omnibus_.[792] Ten years later,
when Fernando VI ascended the throne in 1746, Macanaz addressed him a
memorial on the measures requisite to relieve the misery of Spain and in
this he superfluously urged the maintenance of the Inquisition in all
its lustre and authority.[793] In spite of all this it was unrelenting
and his entreaties to be allowed to return were fruitless.
In 1747 he was sent to the Congress of Breda where he mismanaged the
negotiations, deceived, it is said, by Lord Sandwich. Relieved and
ordered, in 1748, to present himself to the Viceroy of Navarre at
Pampeluna, after some delay he was carried to Coruña and immured
_incomunicado_ in a casemate of the castle of San Antonio, a prison
known as a place of rigorous confinement. Even the authorities there
compassionated him and, at their intercession, he was removed to an
easier prison and permitted the use of books and writing materials.
Here, during a further captivity of twelve years, the indomitable old
man occupied himself with voluminous commentaries on the _Teatro
crítico_ of Padre Feyjoo and the _España sagrada_ of Florez, with many
other writings and memorials to the king. It was not until the death of
the latter, in 1760, that Elisabeth of Parma, the regent and the cause
of his misfortunes, liberated him with orders to proceed directly to
Murcia. At Leganes he was greeted by his wife and daughter, with whom he
went to Hellin, his birth-place, where he died on the following November
2d, in his ninety-first year.[794]
[Sidenote: _THE INQUISITOR-GENERALSHIP_]
There is no record of any further exercise of royal control over
inquisitors-general until, in 1761, Clement XIII saw fit to condemn the
Catechism of Mesengui for its alleged Jansenism in denying the authority
of popes over kings. The debate over it in Rome had attracted the
attention of all Europe and the prohibition of the book was regarded as
a general challenge to monarchs. Carlos III had watched the discussion
with much interest, especially as the work was used in the instruction
of his son. He expressed his intention of not permitting the publication
of the prohibition but, by a juggle between the nuncio and the
inquisitor-general, Manuel Quintano Bonifaz, an edict of condemnation
was hastily drawn up of which copies were given to the royal confessor
on the night of August 7th. They did not reach the king at San Ildefonso
until the morning of the 8th, who at once despatched a messenger to
Bonifaz ordering him to suspend the edict and recall any copies that
might have been sent out. Bonifaz replied that copies had already been
delivered to all the churches in Madrid and forwarded to nearly all the
tribunals; to suppress it would cause great scandal, injurious to the
Holy Office, wherefore he deeply deplored that he could not have the
pleasure of obeying the royal mandate. Carlos was incensed but contented
himself with ordering Bonifaz to absent himself from the court; he
obeyed and, in about three weeks, made an humble apology, protesting
that he would forfeit his life rather than fail in the respect due to
the king. Carlos then permitted him to return and resume his functions
and, when the Suprema expressed its gratitude, he significantly warned
it to remember the lesson.[795] He took warning himself and, on January
18, 1762, he issued a pragmática systematizing the examination of all
papal letters before issuing the royal exequatur which permitted their
publication.[796]
Carlos III had no further occasion to exercise his prerogatives but it
was otherwise with Carlos IV. His first appointee, Manuel Abad y la
Sierra, Bishop of Astorga, who assumed office May 11, 1793, had but a
short term, for he was requested to resign in the following year. His
successor, Francisco Antonio de Lorenzana, Archbishop of Toledo, who
accepted the post September 12, 1794, was not much more fortunate,
although his enforced resignation, in 1797, was decently concealed under
a mission to convey to Pius VI the offer of a refuge in Majorca. He was
followed by Ramon José de Arce y Reynoso, Archbishop of Saragossa, who
resigned March 22, 1808, four days after the abdication of Carlos IV in
the "tumult of lackeys" at Aranjuez, probably to escape his share of the
popular odium directed against the favorite Godoy.[797] During the
short-lived revival of the Inquisition under the Restoration, its
dependence on the royal power was too great for differences to arise
that would provoke assertions of the prerogative.
* * * * *
[Sidenote: _THE SUPREMA_]
The relations of the crown with the Suprema were originally the same as
with the other royal councils. The king appointed and removed at will
although, as the members came to exercise judicial functions, it was
necessary for the inquisitor-general to delegate to them the papal
faculties which alone conferred on them jurisdiction over heresy.
Ferdinand exercised the power of appointment and removal and, as his
orders were requisite for the receivers of confiscations to pay their
salaries, it is scarce likely that anyone had the hardihood to raise a
question.[798] We have seen how he forced the members to accept as a
colleague Aguirre though he was a layman, how Ximenes when governor of
Castile removed him and Adrian reinstated him. The earliest formula of
commission that I have met is of the date of 1546; it bears that it is
granted by the inquisitor-general, who constitutes the appointee a
member and invests him with the necessary faculties, and it is moreover
countersigned by the other members.[799] In this there is no allusion to
any nomination by the king, although the appointment lay in his hands.
In 1573 the Venitian envoy Leonardo Donato so states, adding that the
popes felt very bitterly the fact that they had no participation in it;
they had repeatedly tried to secure the membership of some one dependent
upon them, such as the nuncio, but Philip would not permit it; the
council did nothing without his consent, tacit or expressed.[800] At
some period, not definitely ascertainable, the custom arose of the
inquisitor-general presenting three names from among which the king made
selection. At first the number of members was uncertain, but it came to
be fixed at five, in addition to the inquisitor-general. To these Philip
II added two from the Council of Castile; as these were sometimes
laymen, he finally had scruples of conscience and, in his instructions
to Manrique de Lara, in 1595, he tells him that when there are fitting
ecclesiastics in the Council of Castile they are to be proposed to him
for selection; if there are not, it is to be considered whether a papal
brief should be procured to enable them to act in matters of faith.[801]
These adventitious members came to be known as _consejeros de la tarde_,
as they attended only twice a week and in the afternoon sessions of the
body, where its secular business was disposed of, and thus they took no
share in matters of faith. Their salary was one-third that of the
others.
The royal authority was emphatically asserted when, in 1614, Philip III
ordered that a supernumerary place should be made for his confessor Fray
Aliaga, with precedence over his colleagues and a salary of fifteen
hundred ducats; also that when the royal confessor was a Dominican he
should always have this place and, when he was not, that it should be
given to a Dominican. The Suprema accepted Aliaga but demurred to the
rest, when Lerma peremptorily ordered it to be entered on the records;
there were murmurings followed by submission. After the accession of
Philip IV, he ordered the Council to make out a commission for his
confessor, the Dominican Sotomayor, to which there was ineffectual
opposition.[802] The rule held good. Soon after the Inquisition was
reorganized under the Restoration, Fernando VII, July 10, 1815,
appointed his confessor, Cristóbal de Bencomo, a member to serve without
salary for the time but with the reversion of the first vacancy and all
the honors due to his predecessors; he had the seat next to the dean and
when the latter died, February 16, 1816, he took his position and
salary.[803] Philip V ordered that a seat should always be occupied by a
Jesuit; this of course lapsed with the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1767,
after which Carlos III, in 1778, provided that the Religious Orders
should have a representative by turns.[804]
[Sidenote: _THE SUPREMA_]
The royal power of appointment was not uncontested and gave rise to
frequent debates. Philip IV sometimes yielded and sometimes persisted;
occasionally the question was complicated and papal intervention was
hinted at.[805] A decisive struggle came in 1640, in which the Suprema
chose its ground discreetly. It suited Olivares to appoint Antonio de
Aragon, a youthful cleric and the second son of the Duke of Cardona.
Anticipating resistance, Philip announced the nomination imperiously;
Don Antonio must be admitted the next day as he was about to start for
Barcelona and any representations against it could be made subsequently.
The Suprema replied that the inquisitor-general could not make the
appointment and if he did so it would be invalid; Don Antonio was less
than thirty years old; the canons require an inquisitor to be forty,
although Paul III had reduced for Spain, the age to thirty; members of
the Suprema were inquisitors and it was only as such that they sat in
judgement without appeal in cases of faith. To this Philip rejoined that
Olivares would report the efforts he had made to quiet his conscience in
view of the great public good to result from the appointment, wherefore
he expected that possession would be given to Don Antonio without delay.
Matters went so far that the Duchess of Cardona wrote to her son to
abandon the effort but the royal command prevailed; he obtained the
position and in the following year he was made a member of the Council
of State; he was already a member of the Council of Military Orders and
the whole affair gives us a glimpse of how Olivares governed Spain.[806]
Having thus asserted his prerogative, Philip, in 1642 and the early
months of 1643, made four appointments without consultation. The
remonstrances of the Suprema must have been energetic for Philip yielded
and, in a decree of June 26 (or July 2), 1643, he agreed that the old
custom of submitting three names should be renewed, with the innovation
that the Suprema should unite in making the recommendations. Against
this the inquisitor-general protested, but in vain. It was probably to
make an offset to these royal nominees that, November 10, 1643, the
inquisitor-general and Suprema asked that their fiscal should have a
vote, which Philip refused.[807] The rule continued of submitting three
names for selection, but the participation of the Suprema in this seems
to have been dropped. The royal control, moreover asserted itself in the
case of Froilan Díaz when, by decree of November 3, 1704, Philip V
reinstated three members, Antonio Zambrana, Juan Bautista Arzeamendi and
Juan Miguélez, who had been arbitrarily ejected and jubilado by
Inquisitor-general Mendoza, ordering moreover that they should receive
all arrears of salary.[808]
* * * * *
While thus the crown continued to exercise the right of selecting the
heads of the Inquisition, its practical control was greatly weakened by
one or two changes which established themselves. Of these perhaps the
most important was the claim of the Suprema to interpose itself between
the king and the tribunals, so that no royal commands to them should be
obeyed unless they should pass through it, thus rendering the
inquisitors subject to itself alone and not to the sovereign. In a
government theoretically absolute this was substituting bureaucracy for
autocracy and, when the example was followed, though at a considerable
distance, by some of the other royal councils, it at times produced
deadlocks which threatened to paralyze all governmental action.
We have seen that, towards the end of Ferdinand's reign, his letters to
the tribunals were sometimes countersigned by members of the Suprema,
but that this was not essential to their validity and, when there was an
attempt to establish such a claim, he was prompt to vindicate his
authority. A royal cédula of October 25, 1512, gave certain instructions
as to the manumission of baptized children of slaves whose owners had
suffered confiscation. There was no question of faith involved, but
when, in 1514, Pedro de Trigueros applied to the inquisitors of Seville
to be set free under it, they refused on the ground that it had not been
signed by the Suprema. He appealed to Ferdinand who promptly ordered the
inquisitors to obey it; if they find Pedro's story to be true they are
to give him a certificate of freedom and meanwhile are to protect him
from his master, who was seeking to send him to the Canaries for
sale.[809] The claim which Ferdinand thus peremptorily rejected was
persistently maintained during the period of confusion which followed
his death. Whether it received positive assent from Charles is more than
doubtful, although the Suprema so asserts in a letter of July 27 1528,
ordering inquisitors to examine whether a certain royal cédula had been
signed by its members, for the kings had ordered that none should be
executed in matters connected with the Inquisition unless thus
authenticated--thus basing the claim on the royal will and not on any
inherent right of the Holy Office.[810] So complete was the autonomy
thus established for the organization that a _carta acordada_ or
circular of instructions May 12, 1562, tells the tribunals that, if an
inquiry from the king comes to them through any other council, they are
to reply that if the king desires the information it will be furnished
to him through the inquisitor-general or the Suprema.[811]
[Sidenote: _THE SUPREMA_]
The far-reaching importance of this principle can scarce be exaggerated.
One of its results will be seen when we come to consider the complaints
and demands of the Córtes and find that _fueros_ directed against
inquisitorial aggressions, in purely civil matters, when agreed to by
the king were invalid without confirmation by the inquisitor-general. A
single instance here will suffice to show the working of this. In 1599
various demands of the Córtes of Barcelona were conceded by Philip III.
One regulated the number of familiars, which Philip promised that he
would induce the inquisitor-general to put into effect, within two
months if possible. Another provided that all officials, save
inquisitors, should be Catalans; he agreed to charge the
inquisitor-general and Suprema to observe this and he would get it
confirmed by the pope. Another was that, in the secular business of the
tribunal, the opinion of the Catalan assessor should govern, because he
would be familiar with the local law; this he accepted and promised, in
so far as it concerned the inquisitor-general and Suprema, to charge
them to give such orders to the tribunal. Another was that commissioners
and familiars should not be "religious," to which his reply was the
same. Another required the inquisitor-general to appoint a resident of
Barcelona to hear appeals in civil cases below five hundred libras;
this he said was just and he would charge the inquisitor-general to do
so. After this, in fulfilment of his plighted word, he addressed the
inquisitor-general in terms almost supplicatory "I charge you greatly
that for your part you condescend and facilitate that what they have
supplicated may be put in execution, in conformity with what I have
conceded and decreed in each of these articles, which will give me
particular contentment." Not the slightest attention was paid to this
request and, on May 6, 1603, Philip repeated it "As until now it is
understood that not a single thing contained in it has been put in
execution and, as I desire that it be enforced, I ask and charge you to
condescend to it and help and facilitate it with the earnestness that I
confidently look for."[812] This second appeal was as fruitless as the
first and the Catalans gained nothing. It is true that, in 1632, the
Barcelona tribunal, in a memorial to Philip IV, asserted that Philip III
had only assented to these articles to get rid of the Catalans and that
he wrote privately to the pope asking him not to confirm them.[813]
This case may have been mere jugglery and collusion, but in general it
by no means followed that royal decrees sent to the Suprema for
transmission were forwarded. If it objected, it would respond by a
consulta arguing their impropriety or illegality, and this would, if
necessary, be repeated three or four times at long intervals until,
perhaps, the matter was forgotten or dropped or some compromise was
reached. The privilege that all instructions must be transmitted through
the Suprema was therefore one of no little importance and it was
insisted upon tenaciously. There was a convenient phrase invented which
we shall often meet--_obedecer y no cumplir_--to obey but not to
execute, which was very serviceable on these occasions. In 1610 the
Suprema argued away a cédula of Philip III as invalid because it had
been despatched through the Council of State and the king was repeatedly
told to his face that the laws required his cédulas to be countersigned
by the Suprema in order to secure their execution. This was done to
Philip IV, in 1634, when he intervened in a quarrel and, in 1681 to
Carlos II when there were difficulties threatened with foreign nations
arising from abuses committed in examining importations in search of
forbidden books.[814] As the questions calling for royal interposition
as a rule affected only the wide secular and not the spiritual
jurisdiction of the Inquisition, this created conditions unendurable in
any well-organized government.
* * * * *
Another change which conduced greatly to the independence of the
Inquisition was the control which it acquired over its finances. We have
seen that, under Ferdinand, the confiscations and pecuniary penances
belonged to the crown and that the salaries and expenses were paid by
his orders. The finances of the Inquisition will be discussed hereafter
and meanwhile it suffices to say that, after his death and the exuberant
liberality of Charles to his Flemish favorites during his first
residence in Spain, the diminishing receipts from these sources caused
them to be virtually assigned to defraying the expenses of the
Inquisition and they were no longer regarded as a source of supply to
the royal treasury. Still, the money belonged to the crown and the
Inquisition enjoyed it only under the authority and by virtue of the
bounty of the sovereign.
[Sidenote: _FINANCIAL INDEPENDENCE_]
The growth of control over income and of virtual financial independence
was gradual and irregular. Even Ferdinand, in his watchful care over his
receivers of confiscations, felt the need of some central auditor and it
seemed natural that he should be an official of the Suprema. Accordingly
as early as 1509 we find a "contador general" in that position. In 1517
there are two officers, a contador and a receiver-general and, in 1520,
the two are merged into one.[815] When, in 1513, Bishop Mercader was
made inquisitor-general of Aragon he desired a statement from all
receivers of their receipts and payments and of the property remaining
in their hands and Ferdinand ordered them to comply, alluding to it as
usual on the entrance of a new inquisitor-general.[816] This inevitably
ripened into the transfer to that official of the control over receivers
which Ferdinand had exercised, so that in place of being royal officials
they became virtually officers of the Inquisition and eventually were
designated as treasurers. By 1544 we find the Suprema to be the final
court of revision of all the receivers of the local tribunals, whose
accounts were rendered to it and audited by it.[817]
Still, in theory the money belonged to the crown and its disbursement
could only be made under royal authority. The order for the payment of
the _ayuda de costa_ of the Suprema, July 21, 1517, was drawn in the
name of _la reyna y el rey_--Juana and Charles.[818] After Charles
reached Spain, in September of that year he made grants from the
confiscations with a profusion that threatened to bankrupt the
Inquisition, and if we find Adrian and the Suprema also occasionally
issuing orders for payments it was undoubtedly under powers granted by
Charles.[819] When Charles left Spain, May 20, 1520, he gave Adrian a
general faculty for this purpose, but it seems to have been called in
question, for he found it necessary to send from Brussels, September
12th, a cédula to all receivers confirming it and stating that Adrian's
orders, signed by members of the Suprema, would be received as vouchers
by the auditor-general. Under this the Suprema exercised full authority
over the funds collected by all the receivers and disposed of them at
its pleasure. When Charles returned he presumably resumed control and,
after his marriage with Isabel of Portugal, during his frequent
absences, he left the power in her hands until her death May 1,
1539.[820] When he saw fit, moreover, he claimed and received a share of
the spoils. A letter of Cardinal Manrique, June 17, 1537, shows that a
portion of the proceeds of a certain auto de fe had been paid to him and
another of October 11th, of the same year, addressed to him at the
Córtes of Monzon, reinforces an appeal not to sacrifice the interests of
the Inquisition to the Aragonese demands, with the welcome news that the
receiver of Cuenca had arrived with the ten thousand ducats for which he
had asked from the confiscations of that tribunal.[821]
Charles's hasty departure in November, 1539, to quell the insurrection
of Ghent left matters in some confusion. The Suprema, on March 20, 1540,
wrote to Chancellor Granvelle that cédulas for the salaries, under the
crown of Aragon, were always signed by the emperor and that the
inquisitor-general could not do it; they had sent him a power for
execution similar to that given to Cardinal Adrian but he had refused to
sign it, saying that they could do as under Cardinal Manrique,
forgetting that there had been the empress who always signed the
cédulas, wherefore they ask him to get the emperor to sign the power. He
doubtless did so, for an order, June 12th, on the receiver of Valencia
to send fifteen hundred ducats for the salaries of the Suprema purports
to be by virtue of a special power granted by their majesties. On
Charles's return he again assumed control and when he went to Italy, in
1543, he left Philip as regent, while during the absence of Philip there
were successive regents who signed cédulas as called for by the
Suprema.[822]
Yet, in spite of these formalities, the control of the crown was
becoming scarcely more than nominal. It is true that, in 1537, Cardinal
Manrique declared that he could not increase salaries without the royal
assent but, when the crown undertook any exercise of power, the little
respect paid to its commands is seen in the fate of an application made
in 1544, by Juan Tomás de Prado, notary of the tribunal of Saragossa, to
Prince Philip for an _ayuda de costa_ of three hundred ducats. Philip
ordered his prayer to be granted, but the death of Inquisitor-general
Tavera served as a convenient pretext for disregarding the command. It
was repeated, for the same amount, January 11, 1548, and finally, on
June 4th, Inquisitor-general Valdés authorized the payment of a hundred
ducats.[823]
[Sidenote: _FINANCIAL INDEPENDENCE_]
To perfect the absolute control of the confiscations, thus gradually
assumed, it was necessary to keep the crown in ignorance of their
amount. Its right to them was incontestable, and the Inquisition
deliberately abused the confidence reposed in it when their collection
was left in its hands. The less the king was allowed to know, the less
likely he was to claim his share and the policy was adopted of deceiving
him. As early as 1560 we have evidence of this in a letter to the
inquisitors of Sicily instructing them, when reporting autos de fe to
the king, to suppress all statements as to the confiscations, but to
report them to the Suprema so that it may determine how far to inform
him. This was doubtless a general mandate to all the tribunals; it was
repeated in instructions of 1561 and we shall see that it became a
settled practice.[824] This systematic concealment was the more
indefensible from the fact that the Inquisition was now obtaining funds
from other sources than confiscations. We shall see hereafter how it
utilized the scare caused by the discovery of Protestantism in
Valladolid and Seville in 1558, with the plea of additional expenses
thus caused, to obtain from Paul IV a levy of a hundred thousand gold
ducats on the revenues of the clergy and the more permanent endowment of
a canonry to be suppressed for its benefit in every cathedral and
collegiate church. A large portion of the inquisitors, moreover already
held canonries and other benefices for which, under a brief of Innocent
VIII, February 11, 1485, they were dispensed for non-residence.[825] The
burden of the Holy Office was thus thrown largely on the ecclesiastical
establishment, which remonstrated and resisted but was compelled to
submit. It could thus look with equanimity on the shrinkage of the
confiscations. In Valencia, an agreement was reached, in 1571, by which
the Moriscos compounded for them with an annual payment to the tribunal
of twenty-five hundred ducats.[826] The Judaizing heretics had been
largely eliminated, especially the more wealthy ones, and it was not
until some years after the conquest of Portugal, in 1580, that the
influx of Portuguese New Christians brought a new and profitable
harvest.
All this tended to the financial independence of the Inquisition
although the crown by no means abandoned its claim on the confiscations.
A book of receipts given by the royal representative in Valencia for the
proceeds of the confiscations in 1593 shows that, under the financial
pressure of the time, Philip II was reasserting his rights.[827] The
treasury was empty when Philip III succeeded to the throne in 1598 and,
among his expedients to raise money, he ordered the receivers of the
tribunals to send to him all the funds in their hands, promising speedy
repayment. The Suprema had no faith in the royal word and instructed
the tribunals to retain enough to meet their own wants. The obedience of
the tribunals was by no means prompt and the Suprema was obliged to
order Valencia to comply with the royal demand and to furnish an oath
that no money was left.[828]
In the earlier years of Philip IV the tendency of the Inquisition to
emancipate itself from royal control grew rapidly. We shall see
hereafter that when, in 1629, the king called for a statement of
salaries and perquisites the Suprema equivocated and suppressed nearly
all the information required. Still more significant was its attitude
respecting the colonial tribunals, which the king supported under an
annual expenditure of thirty thousand pesos, with the understanding that
this should cease when the confiscations should become sufficient.
These, which had been small at first, rapidly increased in the
seventeenth century and were enormous between 1630 and 1650, when the
whole trading communities of Peru and Mexico were shattered, enabling
the tribunals to make permanent investments that rendered them wealthy,
besides sending heavy remittances to the Suprema, which moreover seized
the goods and credits in Seville of the colonial Judaizers. In addition
to this, in 1627, a prebend in each cathedral was suppressed for the
benefit of the tribunals. Yet the salaries were still demanded of the
royal treasury and the repeated efforts of Philip III and Philip IV,
from 1610 to 1650, to obtain statements of the receipts from
confiscations and pecuniary penances were completely baffled. That was
an inviolable secret which no royal official was allowed to penetrate.
It is true that the colonial tribunals, on their side, adopted the same
policy in concealing, as far as they could, from the Suprema the extent
of their own gains.[829]
[Sidenote: _DEMANDS OF THE CROWN_]
Yet, in the ever-increasing distress of the crown, demands were made
upon the Inquisition, as on all other departments of government, demands
which it was forced to meet. Thus, for the ten years, 1632 to 1641
inclusive, an annual sum of 2,007,360 mrs. was required of it, to aid in
defraying the cost of garrisons and fleet, and a statement of October
11, 1642, shows that it had paid the aggregate of 11,583,110 in vellon
and 18,700 in silver, leaving a balance still due of 8,474,790.[830]
Evidently there was good reason for concealing its revenues. In the
frightful confusion of the finances which followed the revolution of
Portugal and the revolt of Catalonia, in 1640, while Spain was
heroically battling for existence against France and its rebellious
subjects, the demands were varied and incessant--sometimes for sums so
small as to reveal the absolute penury of the State--and Philip's
impatient urgency, as he chafed under the dilatoriness of the responses,
shows the desperate emergencies in which he was involved. In 1643 a
royal decree of February 16th ordered all officials to send their silver
plate to the mint, a watch being kept and a report made so as to see
that each sent a quantity proportioned to his station. To a complaint of
delay in performance the Suprema replied that those who had sent in
their silver could get no satisfaction from the mint--the delays were
such that the promptitude required by the king was impossible.[831]
Even more arbitrary was the seizure, in 1644 at Seville, of a remittance
of 8676 ducats in silver, a remittance from the colonial tribunals to
the Suprema. In protesting against this the Suprema, February 29th, gave
a deplorable account of its condition, owing to the demands made upon it
by the king. On the 10th he had called upon it for 16,000 ducats which
it would be wholly unable to raise if deprived of the silver that had
been seized. It was already short in 7,724,843 mrs. of its annual
expenses and the provincial tribunals were short 5,318,000, for it had
impoverished them to meet the royal demands. Last year it had sold a
censo of 18,000 ducats belonging to the tribunal of Saragossa, which was
beseeching its return. It had also given the king 10,000 ducats for the
cavalry and to raise this amount it had taken the sequestrations in the
tribunal of Seville--a sacred deposit--including 20,000 ducats' worth of
wool, the owners of which, having been acquitted, were besieging it for
their money. This dolorous plaint was effective in so far that the
seizure at Seville was credited on account of the demand for 16,000
ducats.[832] How much of it was true we can only guess, for the
Inquisition had means of raising money outside of its judicial
functions. When, in 1640, the king summoned its familiars and officials
to render military service like the nobles, the Suprema arranged that
they should buy themselves off, and from this source was chiefly raised
40,000 ducats expended on two companies of horse, in return for which,
by a cédula of September 2, 1641, the king promised to maintain
inviolate the privileges and exemptions of the familiars and
officials.[833]
These instances, out of many, will suffice to show how the crown, in its
days of distress, was recouping itself for abandoning the spoils of the
heretics. In time these special and arbitrary demands were systematized
into an annual requirement of fifty horses, estimated at an outlay of
about 5500 ducats and the raising and equipping of two hundred foot,
costing 8000 ducats. The Suprema was in no wise prompt in meeting these
demands; a cédula of June 24, 1662, tells it that what is due for the
present year as well as the previous arrears, must be paid at once,
otherwise an inventory of its property must be given to the president of
the treasury, who will raise the money on it.[834] Subsequently there
was a feeble attempt to return some of these contributions and, in each
of the years 1673 and 1674, a trifling payment was made of 10,000 reales
vellon, but, in 1676, the Suprema stated to Carlos II that in all it had
furnished for remounts of horses 90,000 ducats vellon and 10,000 in
silver and that its total assistance to the crown had amounted to no
less than 800,000 pesos, equivalent to over 500,000 ducats, to
accomplish which the salaries in many tribunals had been unpaid and
vacancies of necessary offices had remained unfilled.[835] Still, as we
shall have occasion to see, the Suprema always had money, not only for
an undiminished pay-roll but for perquisites and amusements.
[Sidenote: _CLAIM ON THE CONFISCATIONS_]
The crown could not accept this assistance, however grudgingly rendered,
without a sacrifice of its supremacy and the Inquisition came to treat
with it as with an independent body. About this time the Suprema happens
to mention, in a letter to the tribunal of Lima, that it had lent the
king 40,000 pesos, of which 10,000 came from Peru and 30,000 from Mexico
and that the Count of Medellin had become security for the return of the
loan, as though it were a banker dealing with a merchant.[836] Yet all
parties knew that these colonial remittances were derived from
confiscations, the ownership of which the crown had never relinquished.
This is the more noteworthy because, about this time, the king suddenly
asserted his claims on some large sums which could not be wholly
concealed. In 1678 the tribunal of Majorca unexpectedly made a
successful raid on the whole New Christian population of Palma and, in
the early months of 1679, there were more than two hundred penitents
reconciled. As they constituted the active trading element of the place
the confiscations were enormous and the affair attracted too much
attention to be hidden. As soon as the news came of the arrests, the
king wrote, May 20, 1678, to the viceroy to look carefully to the
sequestrations because, in case of confiscation, the proceeds belonged
to the treasury. The Suprema, however, made him hold his hands off with
direful threats and kept control of the liquidation. After the
condemnations, a consulta of July 5, 1679, shows that 50,000 pesos had
already been paid to the king, but that the Inquisition was resolved to
have its full share. In November the king acceded to a compromise under
which 200,000 pesos were to be used to endow certain tribunals and to
cancel certain loans made to him by the Inquisition--probably those just
alluded to. The balance coming to him was estimated at 250,000 pesos
but, in the handling of the assets and the settlements with creditors,
the property melted away till the Suprema reported that it barely
sufficed to meet the portion assigned to the Inquisition and finally, in
1683, the king had to content himself with 18,000 pesos spent on the
fortifications of Majorca and the payment to him of 2000, which the
Suprema assured him that it advanced at considerable risk to
itself.[837]
The secretiveness so carefully observed undoubtedly had its advantages
or it would not have been so persistently claimed as a right. In a
consulta of 1696 the Count of Frigiliana states that, when he was
viceroy of Valencia, he had in vain endeavored to get from the tribunal
a statement of its affairs and he asked the king whether or not the
Inquisition possessed the privilege of rendering no account of its
assets and income.[838] At length the quarrel between Inquisitor-general
Mendoza and his colleagues, in the case of Froilan Díaz, and his
banishment to his see in 1703, gave opportunity for royal intervention
and investigation. The War of Succession had deranged the finances of
the Inquisition and it had appealed to the king for help. He required a
statement of the pay-rolls, investments and revenues of all the
tribunals, which was furnished March 9, 1703, after which, on May 27th,
he issued a decree declaring that he must put an end to the abuses and
disorders which had crept into the administration and disbursement of
its property, in order to relieve the embarrassment of which it
complained. He therefore annulled all commissions and appointments
without obligation of service, granted by the inquisitor-general,
whether within or outside of Spain. The papers of all jubilations, new
places and gratuities created or granted since the time of Valladares
(1695) were to be placed in his hands. In no case thereafter should the
inquisitor-general jubilate any official of the Suprema or local
tribunal without consulting him, and any such act issued without a
previous royal order was declared void. No _ayuda de costa_ or grant
exceeding thirty ducats vellon, for a single term, was to be made
without awaiting his decision and this decree was to be placed in the
hands of all receivers or treasurers for their guidance. It was so
transmitted June 8th, with strict orders for its observance. This was a
resolute assertion of the royal control over the finances of the
Inquisition and it held good, in theory at least, however much it may
have been eluded in practice. About the middle of the eighteenth century
a systematic writer describes it as still in force and states that no
salaries can be increased without the royal approval. It so continued to
the end and, under the Restoration, an order from the king,
countersigned by the Suprema, was requisite for any extraordinary
disbursement.[839]
[Sidenote: _FINES AND PENANCES_]
Philip also reasserted and made good the right of the crown to the
confiscations, by claiming a percentage of the rentals of all
confiscated property, but he listened to appeals from the tribunals and,
in 1710, we hear of Saragossa and Valencia being practically restored to
their enjoyment, a liberality which was doubtless followed with regard
to the others. In 1725 Valencia expressed its fear that the alliance
with Austria against England, France and Prussia would result in its
having to restore the confiscations, and the blow seems to have fallen
for, in 1727, the suprema, in a consulta of December 9th, describing the
poverty of Saragossa, attributes it to the king having taken away the
confiscations which he had granted. With the gradual amelioration in the
Spanish finances, this source of revenue must have been restored, for,
in 1768, the Inquisition is described as enjoying the confiscations
which the pious liberality of the monarchs had bestowed.[840]
* * * * *
There were other sources of revenue--rehabilitations or dispensations
from the sanbenito and disabilities, commutations of punishment and the
pecuniary penances known as _penas y penitencias_. All these will be
considered hereafter, but a few words may be said as to the latter in
their relation with the royal authority.
The penitents who were reconciled under Edicts of Grace were not subject
to confiscation, but were punished with fines under the guise of
pecuniary penance, at the discretion of the inquisitor. We have seen
(pp. 169-70) how numerous these were and we can conjecture how large
were the sums thus exacted, for penances of a half or a third of the
penitent's property were not uncommon. Similar fines also usually
accompanied sentences that did not embrace confiscation and formed a
continual although fluctuating source of revenue. Sometimes there were
special officials for their collection but, when this was entrusted to
the receivers of confiscations, they were instructed to keep a separate
account of them, as the two funds were held to be essentially different
and, as a rule, were to be employed for different purposes.
In the earliest Instructions of 1484, these pecuniary penances are said
to be imposed as a _limosna_, or alms, to aid the sovereigns in the
pious work of warring with the Moors, but, in the Instructions issued a
few months later by Torquemada, this is modified by ordering them to be
placed in the hands of a trustworthy person and reports to be made to
him or to the king, in order that they may be spent on the war or in
other pious uses or in paying the salaries of the Inquisition.[841]
Both the destination and the control of these funds were thus left
undetermined and they so continued for some years. In 1486 we find
Ferdinand giving orders for sums from this source for various uses--for
the war with Granada, to pay the salaries of a lay judge, to pay
expenses of a tribunal of the Inquisition, to repay Luis de Santangel
for advances made to tribunals; in one case his tone is apologetic and
he asks Torquemada to confirm the order, in others his command is
absolute.[842]
This indicates the uncertainty which existed both as to the use and the
control of the pecuniary penances. So long as lasted the war with
Granada, whatever was taken by the crown might be regarded as devoted,
directly or indirectly, to that holy object, but when the conquest was
achieved, in January, 1492, that excuse no longer existed and doubtless
the inquisitors looked with jealousy upon the diversion to secular
objects of the proceeds of their pious labors. The confiscations
unquestionably belonged to the crown, but the penances were spiritual
funds which for centuries had always enured to the Church. There must
have been a sustained effort to withhold them from the royal
acquisitiveness, to which Ferdinand was not disposed to yield, for he
procured from Alexander VI, February 18, 1495, a brief directing the
inquisitors to hold all such moneys subject to the control of the
sovereigns, to be disposed of at their pleasure. Even this was resisted
and Ferdinand and Isabella complained to the pope that they were unable
to compel an accounting of the sums received or to collect the amounts,
to correct which Alexander issued another brief, March 26, 1495,
commissioning Ximenes, then Archbishop of Toledo, to enforce accounting
and payment by excommunication and other censures.[843]
[Sidenote: _FINES AND PENANCES_]
This was equally ineffective. There was a privacy and simplicity in the
imposition and collection of a penance very different from the procedure
of sequestration and confiscation, and Ferdinand, at least for a time,
abandoned the struggle. This is manifested by a clause in the
Instructions of 1498, enjoining on inquisitors not to impose penances
more heavily than justice requires in order to insure the payment of
their salaries,[844] and the principle was formally recognized by
Ferdinand and Isabella in a cédula of January 12, 1499, reciting that,
although they held a papal brief placing at their disposal all moneys
arising from penances, commutations and rehabilitations, yet they grant
to the inquisitors-general all collections from these sources, both in
Castile and Aragon, to be used in paying salaries, disbursements being
made only on their order.[845]
Ferdinand, however, was not disposed to relax, on any point, his control
over the Inquisition and, on April 10th of the same year, we find him
forbidding the levying of penances on the members of a town-council for
fautorship of heresy--doubtless a speculative infliction for some
assumed neglect in arresting suspects. In 1501 his renunciation is
already forgotten and he is making grants from the penances as
absolutely as ever--even empowering Inquisitor-general Deza to use those
of Valencia, to the extent of a hundred ducats a year for the salary of
Jaime de Muchildos, the Roman agent of the Inquisition.[846] So, in
1511, we find him granting to Enguera, Inquisitor-general of Aragon, a
thousand libras out of the penances to defray the expenses of his bulls
for the see of Lérida and authorizing him to pay from them an _ayuda de
costa_ of two hundred ducats to Joan de Gualbes, a member of the
Aragonese Suprema. Then, in 1514, he places all the penances
unreservedly at the disposal of Inquisitor-general Mercader to be
employed on the salaries and other necessary expenses of the Inquisition
of Aragon. This seems to have been final. After his death, instructions
sent to the tribunal of Sicily assume that the inquisitor-general has
sole and absolute control. It was the same in Castile. Instructions
issued by Ximenes, in 1516, direct the receiver-general, who was an
officer of the Suprema, to collect the penances from the receivers of
the tribunals, who were to keep them in a separate account and not to
disburse them without an order from the inquisitor-general. After this
we find the Suprema in full control.[847]
There is virtually no trace of any interference subsequently by the
crown, and the Inquisition found itself in possession of an independent
and by no means inconsiderable source of revenue which it could levy,
almost at will, from those who fell into its hands. The only exception
to this that I have met is that Philip IV, in his financial distress, by
a decree of September 30, 1639, claimed and collected twenty-five per
cent. of fines, but he scrupulously limited this to those inflicted in
cases not connected with the faith--that is, in the exercise of the
royal jurisdiction, civil and criminal, enjoyed by the Inquisition in
matters concerning familiars and other officials.[848]
* * * * *
[Sidenote: _IRRESPONSIBILITY_]
Though, as we have seen, the independence of the Inquisition, as a
self-centered and self-sustaining institution in the State, varied with
the temper and the necessities of the sovereign, there was a time when
it seemed as though it might throw off all subjection and become
dominant. But for the prudence of Ferdinand, in insisting upon the power
of appointment and dismissal, this might have happened in the temper of
the Spanish people, trained to an exaltation of detestation of heresy
which to us may well appear incomprehensible. There is no question that,
under the canon law, kings, like their subjects, were amenable to the
jurisdiction of the Inquisition and that they held their kingdoms on the
tenure not only of their own orthodoxy but of purging their lands of
heresy and heretics. The principles which had been worked so effectually
for the destruction of the Houses of Toulouse and of Hohenstaufen and
under which Pius V released the subjects of Queen Elizabeth from their
allegiance, in 1570, were fully recognized in Spain as vital to the
faith.[849] But beyond this the Spaniards, in the exuberance of their
religious ardor, boasted that their national institutions conditioned
orthodoxy as necessary to their kingship. Even when the seventeenth
century was well advanced, a learned and loyal jurisconsult tells us
that, from the time of the sixth Council of Toledo, in 638, their
monarchs had imposed on themselves the law that, if they fell into
heresy, they were to be excommunicated and exterminated; that Ferdinand,
in 1492, had renewed this law and that he had instituted that most
severe tribunal the Inquisition and had sanctioned that, in view of the
Toledan canon, all kings in future should be subject to it.[850] Even
Spanish loyalty could not have been relied upon to sustain a king
suspect of heresy, against the claims of the Holy Office to try him in
secret, and suspicion of heresy was a very elastic term. Impeding the
Inquisition came within its definition and any effort to curb the
arrogant extension of its powers could readily be so construed, as
Macanaz found to his sorrow. The fact that the Inquisition possessed
such power must have had its influence more than once on the mind of the
sovereign when engaged in debate with his too powerful subject and
perhaps explains what appears to us occasionally a pusillanimous
yielding.
The monarchs had guarded the Inquisition against all supervision and all
accountability to the other departments of government. Within its own
sphere it was supreme and irresponsible and its sphere, owing to the
exemption from the secular courts accorded to all connected with it in
however remote a degree, covered a large area of civil and criminal
business, besides its proper function of preserving the purity of the
faith. In this self-centered independence it stood alone. Even the
spiritual jurisdiction of the Church, so jealously guarded, had become
subject to the _recurso de fuerza_, which, like the French _appel comme
d'abus_, gave to those who suffered wrong an appeal to the Council of
Castile.[851] But even from this the Inquisition was exempt. A decree of
Prince Philip, in 1553, was its ægis and was constantly invoked. This
was addressed to all the courts and judicial officers of the land and
affirmed, in the most positive terms, the sole and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Inquisition in all matters within its competence,
civil or criminal, concerning the faith or confiscations--and faith was
a convenient term covering the impeding of the Inquisition in all that
it wanted to do. Philip recited that repeated cédulas of Ferdinand and
Isabella and of Charles V had asserted this and now he reaffirmed and
enforced it. No appeals from its tribunals were to be entertained, for
the only appeal lay to the Suprema, which would redress any wrong, for
it, by delegation from the crown and the Holy See, had exclusive
cognizance of such matters. If therefore anything concerning the
Inquisition should be brought before them they must decline to entertain
it and must refer it back to the Holy Office.[852]
The Inquisition was not content to enjoy these favors as a revocable
grace from the crown but, in a consulta of December 22, 1634, it
advanced the claim that this decree was a bargain or compact between two
powers which could not be in any way modified without mutual
consent.[853] This was emphasized in a printed argument in 1642,
asserting that that transaction could only become of binding force by
the consent of both parties--the king and the inquisitor-general--and
the king had no power to change it of his own motion, as it was an
agreement. Even were it admitted to be a concession granted by the
crown, this would make no difference, for a privilege conceded to one
who is not a subject (as the Inquisition in the present case) and
accepted by the latter becomes a contract which the prince cannot
revoke.[854]
[Sidenote: _EFFORTS AT INDEPENDENCE_]
We shall see hereafter the use made of this by the Inquisition in its
daily quarrels with all the other jurisdictions, but a single case may
be cited here to indicate how it utilized this position to render itself
virtually independent. There was a long-standing debate over canonries
in the churches of Antequera, Málaga and the Canaries, which it claimed
to be suppressed for its benefit under the brief of January 7, 1559, but
which the royal Camara asserted to belong to the patronage of the king,
whose rights of appointment were not curtailed by the brief. A suit on
the subject, commenced in 1562, was not yet decided when, about 1611,
the king filled vacancies in Málaga and the Canaries. This provoked a
discussion, during which, without awaiting settlement, the inquisitors
excommunicated the appointees--and an inquisitorial excommunication
could be removed only by him who had fulminated it, by the
inquisitor-general or by the pope. In 1611 the king ordered the
appointees to be absolved and mandates signed by him to that effect were
addressed to the inquisitors of Málaga and the Canaries. The Suprema
complained loudly of this as an unheard of violation of the rights of
the Holy Office and refused obedience. In 1612 it declared that, when
the appointees abandoned the prebends which they had usurped, they
should be absolved and not before. On February 12th, in a consulta to
the king, it argued that its power had always been so great and so
independent of all other bodies in the State that the kings had never
allowed them to interfere with it, directly or indirectly; it determined
for itself everything relating to itself, consulting only with the king
and permitting no interference of any kind. Its determination prevailed
over the weakness of the king who ordered the Camara to desist from its
pretensions and not to despoil the Holy Office.[855]
These somewhat audacious assertions of independence were chiefly
stimulated by the perpetual quarrels arising from the exclusive
jurisdiction, civil and criminal, exercised by the Inquisition over its
thousands of employees and familiars and their families, which kept the
land in confusion. This is a subject which will require detailed
consideration hereafter and is only referred to here because of its
development into the exaggerated pretensions of the Inquisition to
emancipate itself from all control. When Ferdinand granted this _fuero_
it was understood on all hands to be a special deputation of the royal
jurisdiction and as such liable at any time to modification or
revocation. Ferdinand himself, in a cédula of August 18, 1501, alluded
to it as such--the inquisitors enjoyed it just as the corregidors
did.[856] So, in the Concordia of Castile, in 1553, defining the extent
of this jurisdiction, the inquisitors are specially described as holding
it from the king, and Philip II, Philip III and Philip IV repeatedly
alluded to it as held during the royal pleasure.[857] There was no
thought of disputing this until the seventeenth century was well
advanced. The Suprema itself, in papers of 1609, 1619, 1637 and 1639
freely admitted that its temporal jurisdiction was a grant from the
king, while its spiritual was a grant from the pope.[858]
Apparently the earliest departure from this universally conceded
position was made, in 1623, by Portocarrero in an argument on a clash of
jurisdictions in Majorca, wherein he sought to prove that the civil and
criminal jurisdiction of the Inquisition over its subordinates was
ecclesiastical and derived from the pope.[859] About the same time, in
an official paper, a similar claim was advanced, based on the papal
briefs authorizing Torquemada and his successors to appoint, dismiss and
punish their subordinates.[860] These were mere speculations and
attracted no attention at the time. We have just seen that as late as
1639 the Suprema made no claims of the kind but two years later, in
1641, it suddenly adopted them in the most offensive fashion. There was
a _competencia_, or conflict of jurisdiction, between the tribunal of
Valladolid and the chancillería or high royal court; the Council of
Castile had occasion to present several consultas to the king, in one of
which it said that the jurisdiction exercised in the name of the king by
the Inquisition was temporal, secular and precarious and could not be
defended by excommunication. Thereupon the Suprema assembled its
theologians who pronounced these propositions to be false, rash and akin
to heretical error; armed with this opinion the fiscal, or prosecuting
officer, accused the whole Council of Castile, demanded that its
consulta be suppressed and that its authors be prosecuted. Theoretically
there was nothing to prevent such action, which would have rendered the
Inquisition the dominating power in the land, but the Suprema lacked
hardihood; even the habitual subservience of Philip IV was revolted and
he told the inquisitor-general that he had done ill to lend himself to a
question contrary to the sovereignty of the monarch and to the honor of
the highest council of the nation.[861]
[Sidenote: _EFFORTS AT INDEPENDENCE_]
In spite of this rebuff, having once asserted the claim that its
temporal jurisdiction was spiritual and not secular, the Inquisition
adhered to it. The prize was worth a struggle, for it would have put the
whole nation at its mercy. It would have deprived the king of powers to
check aggression and to protect his subjects from oppression for, as
Portocarrero had pointed out, although princes have authority to relieve
their subjects when aggrieved by other secular subjects, they have none
when the oppressors are ecclesiastics, exempt by divine law from their
jurisdiction.[862] To win this the Inquisition persisted in its claim.
In 1642, on the occasion of a _competencia_ in Granada, there appeared,
under its authority, a printed argument to prove that the temporal
jurisdiction of the Holy Office was a grant from the Holy See, which had
power to intervene in the internal affairs of States and that it had
merely been acquiesced in and confirmed by the kings.[863] Again, in a
notorious case occurring in Cuenca in 1645, the inquisitors argued that
their temporal jurisdiction was ecclesiastical and papal, with which the
king could not interfere.[864] But the audacity with which these
pretensions were pushed culminated in a consulta presented by the
Suprema, March 31, 1646, to Philip IV, when he was struggling against
the determination of the Córtes of Aragon to curb the excesses of the
Inquisition.
In this paper the Suprema asserted that the civil and political
jurisdiction is inferior to the spiritual and ecclesiastical, which can
assume by indirect power whatever is necessary for its conservation and
unimpeded exercise, without being restricted by secular princes. The
royal prerogative is derived from positive human law or the law of
nations; the supreme power of the Inquisition is delegated by the Holy
See for cases of faith with all that is requisite, directly or
indirectly, for its untrammelled enjoyment; this is of divine law and,
as such, is superior to all human law, to which it is in no way subject.
The very least that can be said is that princes are bound to admit this,
and though they have a right to concede no more than is requisite, the
decision as to what is requisite rests with the ecclesiastical
authority, which is based on divine law. Any departure from these
principles, under the novel pretext that the king is master of this
jurisdiction, with power to limit or abrogate, is dangerous for the
conscience and very perilous as leading to the gravest errors.[865] It
would be difficult to enunciate more boldly the theory of theocracy,
with the Inquisition as its delegate and the crown merely the executor
of its decrees.
These pretensions were not realized and the king was not reduced to
insignificance, but his power was seriously trammelled by the
bureaucracy of which the Suprema was the foremost and most aggressive
representative. Its quasi-independence led to emulation by the other
great departments of the State and though their success was not so
marked, it was sufficient in all to render the government incredibly
cumbersome and inefficient and to paralyze its action by wasting its
strength in efforts to keep the peace between the rival and warring
bodies. In these bickerings and dissensions the power of the crown
decreased and the theoretically autocratic monarch found himself unable
to enforce his commands. Philip IV recognized this fatal weakness, but
his efforts to overcome the evil were puerile and inefficient. October
15, 1633, he sent to the Suprema, and presumably to the other councils,
a decree setting forth emphatically that the slackness of obedience and
disregard of the royal commands had been the cause of irreparable damage
to the State and must be checked if the monarchy were to be preserved
from ruin. It was his duty, under God, to prevent this; he had
unavailingly represented it repeatedly to his councillors and now he
proposed to make out a schedule of penalties, to be incurred through
disobedience, scaled according to the gravity of each offence. This was
to be completed within twenty days and he called upon the Suprema to
give him the necessary information that should enable him to tabulate
the matters coming within its sphere of action.
[Sidenote: _EFFORTS AT INDEPENDENCE_]
This grotesque measure, calling upon offenders to define their offences
for the purpose of providing condign punishment, was received by the
Suprema with a cool indifference showing how lightly it regarded the
royal indignation. There was nothing, it said in reply, within its
jurisdiction which imperilled the monarchy, for its function was to
preserve the monarchy by preserving the unity of religion. As for
obedience, it was of the highest importance that the royal commands
should be obeyed and the laws provided punishments for all disobedient
vassals. But the canon and imperial laws and those of Spain deprived of
their places judges, who executed royal cédulas issued against justice
and the rights of parties, for it was assumed that such could not be the
royal intention and that they were decreed in ignorance, so that they
were suspended until the prince, better informed, should provide
justice. Therefore when councillors opposed cédulas which would work
great injury to the jurisdiction and immunities of the Holy Office, it
was only to prevent innovation and it was in the discharge of duty that
this was represented to the king. The Suprema therefore prayed him that,
before determining matters proposed by other councils, they should be
submitted to it as heretofore so that, after hearing the reasons of both
sides, he might determine according to his pleasure.[866] Thus with
scarcely veiled contempt the Suprema told him that it would continue to
do as it had done and the very next year, as we have seen, it boldly
informed him that none of his commands respecting the Inquisition would
be obeyed until it should have confirmed them--commands, be it
remembered, that in no case affected its action in matters of faith, for
all the trouble arose from its encroachments on secular affairs.
The character of Philip IV ripened and strengthened under adversity and,
in the exigencies of the struggle with Catalonia and Portugal, he
developed some traits worthy of a sovereign. Although he meekly endured
the insolence of the Suprema in 1646 and labored strenuously with the
Córtes of Aragon to prevent the reform of abuses, he yet, as we have
seen, insisted on the right to supervise appointments. He doubtless
asserted his authority in other ways for the Suprema abated its
pretensions that its civil and criminal jurisdiction was spiritual and
papal. In an elaborate consulta of March 12, 1668, during a long and
dreary contest, in which the tribunal of Majorca was involved, it
repeatedly refers to its enjoying the royal jurisdiction from the king,
showing that it had abandoned the attempt to render itself independent
of the royal authority.[867]
[Sidenote: _REASSERTION OF ROYAL SUPREMACY_]
Under the imbecile Carlos II and his incapable ministers, the
domineering arrogance of the Inquisition increased and, as we shall see
hereafter, it successfully eluded a concerted movement, in 1696, of all
the other councils, represented in the Junta Magna, to reduce its
exuberance. With the advent of the House of Bourbon, however, it was
forced to recognize its subordination to the royal will in temporal
matters, in spite of the temporary interference of Elisabeth Farnese in
favor of Inquisitor-general Giudice. We have already seen indications of
this and shall see more; meanwhile a single instance will suffice to
show how imperiously Philip V, under the guidance of Macanaz, could
impose his commands. In 1712 there was an echo of the old quarrel over
the so-called suppressed canonries of Antequera, Málaga and the Canaries
(p. 342). The suit, commenced in 1562, had never been decided and had
long been suspended. The trouble of 1612 had been quieted by allowing
the Inquisition to enjoy the canonries, not as a right, but as a
revocable grant from the crown; excesses committed by the inquisitors in
collecting the fruits led to the resumption of the benefices and then,
by a transaction in 1622, they were restored under the same conditions.
Such was the position when a violent quarrel arose in the Canaries
between the tribunal and the chapter. The former questioned the accuracy
of the accounts rendered to it and demanded the account books. This the
chapter refused but offered to place the books in the accounting room of
the cathedral, allowing the officials of the tribunal free access and
permission to make what copies they desired. There was also a subsidiary
quarrel over the claim that, when the secretary of the tribunal went to
the chapter, he should be entitled to precedence. With their customary
violence the inquisitors publicly excommunicated and fined the dean and
treasurer of the chapter and moreover they took under their protection
the Dominican Joseph Guillen, Prior of San Pedro Martir, who was a
notary of the tribunal. He circulated a defamatory libel on the chapter
which laid a complaint before his superior, the Provincial; the latter
commenced to investigate, when the tribunal inhibited him from all
cognizance of the matter. Then there came a mandate from the Dominican
General to the Provincial, relegating Fray Guillen to a convent and
ordering a president to be appointed for San Pedro Martir, whereupon the
tribunal required the Provincial to surrender this mandate and all
papers concerning the affair, under pain of excommunication and two
hundred ducats. The sub-prior of San Pedro Martir was forced to assemble
the brethren, whom the inquisitors ordered to disobey the commands of
the General and not to acknowledge the president appointed under his
instructions, thus violating the statutes of the great Dominican Order
and the principle of obedience on which it was based. They further
excommunicated the Provincial in the most solemn manner; they took by
force Fray Guillen from the convent and paraded the streets in his
company; the whole community was thrown into confusion and to prevent
recourse to the home authorities they forbade, under heavy penalties,
the departure of any vessel for Teneriffe, through which communication
was had with Spain. In all this there was nothing at variance with the
customary methods of asserting the lawless supremacy of the Inquisition
over the secular and spiritual authorities, but Philip V ordered
Giudice, September 30, 1712, to put an end to these excesses and, on
October 11th, the Suprema reported that it had ordered the inquisitors
to desist. If it did so, they paid no attention to its commands. Then,
June 11, 1713, he addressed a peremptory order to Giudice to revoke all
that had been done in the Canaries, to recall the inquisitors, to
dismiss them and give them no other appointments. The Suprema replied,
July 18th, enclosing an order which it proposed despatching; this
displeased him as not in compliance with his commands and he insisted on
their complete fulfilment. Still there was evasion and delay and when,
in July, 1714, the Canary chapter presented to the tribunal royal orders
requiring the removal of the excommunications and the remission of the
fines, the inquisitors not only refused obedience but commenced
proceedings against the notaries who served them. The Suprema professed
to have sent orders similar to those of the king, but it evidently had
been playing a double game. Philip therefore, November 1, 1714,
addressed the inquisitor-general, holding the Suprema responsible for
the prolonged contumacy of the inquisitors; he ordered it to deliver to
him the originals of all the correspondence on the subject and required
the inquisitor-general to issue an order for the immediate departure
from the islands of the inquisitors and fiscal, without forcing the
governor to expel them, as he had orders to do so in case of
disobedience. Moreover, if the Suprema should not, within fifteen days,
deliver all the documents, so that the king could regulate matters
directly with the tribunal, the old suspended suit would be reopened and
such action would be taken as might be found requisite. This was a tone
wholly different from that to which the Inquisition had been accustomed
under the Hapsburgs; the evasions and delays of the Suprema, which had
so long been successful, proved fruitless. The struggle was prolonged,
but the royal authority prevailed in the end, although, when the
inquisitors reached Spain, in the summer of 1715, Giudice had been
restored to office and Philip weakly permitted them to be provided for
in other tribunals and to curse fresh communities with their lawless
audacity.[868]
We shall hereafter have occasion to see how, under the House of Bourbon,
with its Gallican ideas as to royal prerogative, the subordination of
the Inquisition became recognized, while its jurisdiction was curtailed
and its influence was diminished.