Esau sold his birthright, with all that it implied, for a mess of
pottage. Infant communities, whether territorial or municipal, feeling
the pressure of present want, are always tempted by money-sharks to
mortgage, sell, or surrender, for a mere song, rights and franchises of
a constantly increasing income, and relinquish political power necessary
for a legitimate assertion and protection of their rights in years to
come. A striking exemplification of this short-sightedness appears in
what is said above as to the formation of only three States to cover the
whole Pacific Coast. The supplicant for this birthright, and all its
prospective enormous income, finds his most congenial and hospitable
host in a municipal legislature. He is usually, but not always,
accompanied by the fascinating Miss Graftis.
There are two cases in our municipal history that I will briefly note as
illustrations of this tendency. In neither, so far as I know and
believe, was there any graft. In both I was to some extent officially
connected; in the Rams-Horn case painfully so; in the Railroad Avenue
case simply as an officer and protestant. Many years ago--the dates are
not important--the Columbia and Puget Sound Railroad Company asked the
City Council of Seattle for the grant of a right-of-way for a railroad
track down and over West Street. This was the historic Ram's-Horn. I and
a few others opposed the grant. The City Council hesitated. Its members
desired the approval of the grant by the people, and especially by the
lot-owners along the street, before they acted. A meeting was called at
the Pavilion to secure, if possible, such approval. The meeting was
fairly attended. Mr. James McNaught, a shrewd and able man and lawyer,
was attorney for the Company. He read the proposed ordinance and
explained its provisions, and then, with a glowing eulogy on the
advantages of a railroad, closed amid the vociferous applause of the
audience. I arose to oppose the grant; but as there was a continuous and
determined cry of "Vote!" "Vote!" "Vote!" "Vote!" I resumed my seat. The
proposed ordinance was approved by about a two-thirds vote of those
present, and the City Council speedily enacted it into law. The Railroad
Company built its road from the south end of the town and laid its track
down to Columbia Street; there it stopped, to await the result of
certain condemnation proceedings. The wearers of the shoe, although
voting for its purchase, soon felt its pinch, and they wanted
compensation for its pain. The Company threatened to go across Columbia
Street. It was stopped by a judicial restraining order. Having been
elected Corporation Counsel, I came into the case a short time before
the hearing on the motion made by the Company for the vacation of this
order. The former legal adviser of the City, and who had commenced the
suit, I asked to continue in the case and to argue the pending motion.
He did so, and made a technical and very ingenious argument against the
validity of the grant. I must confess that I believed the ordinance
valid, and that the objections urged against it were unsound, and I was
fully convinced the Court would so hold. In the mean time Columbia
Street had been graded and macadamized. Its surface was fully eighteen
inches above the railroad track. Being fully informed by a careful
personal inspection, and thorough measurement by experts, of the exact
fact, I proposed to compromise. I first proposed to allow the Company to
cross Columbia Street, but to cross at the existing grade. This would
require a reconstruction of the tracks already finished, and subject the
Company to many suits for damages in case of their change of grade.
Secondly, I agreed to withdraw the pending suit if this proposal was
accepted by the Company. This all took place in open Court, and the
compromise was approved in open Court; the ordinance, at the request of
the Company's attorney, was declared valid by the Court. The compromise
was also approved.
The next morning, to my astonishment, a large force of men was put at
work by the Company to cut through Columbia Street; basing its action on
the alleged ground that the compromise was null and void because of a
mutual mistake of the facts by the parties. There was no mutual mistake.
I fully knew and understood all of the facts.
An incipient riot was in progress; but the interference of the police
and the issuance of a restraining order soon put an end to operations.
The newspapers emptied their vials of wrath on me as the principal
sinner.
An appeal was taken by the Company to the Supreme Court, and that
learned and unimpassioned tribunal affirmed every position taken by me
in the case; it held the ordinance to be valid and the compromise
binding. Thus, ended the somewhat celebrated Ram's-Horn case, and with
it that railroad across Columbia Street.
On the publication of the decision of the Supreme Court, it was amusing
to see my calumniators retreat to cover; still damning, however, with
faint praise.