I believe in that system of religion which produces, in its practical
operation, the best man and the best woman, the best husbands and the
best wives, the best fathers and the best mothers, the most affectionate
and obedient children, and the more honest and patriotic citizens and
public functionaries. I care not what you may call it; by its fruit or
practical results it should be judged. This is the Bible rule, and it is
eminently practical and just.
I further believe in the existence of an allwise Creator of all
things--the Supreme Ruler of the Universe. I do not believe in him as a
Supreme Ruler located at some distant point in an immense Universe, but
as an omnipresent God.
I believe in the immortality of man--not of his physical nature, but of
that divine emanation breathed into the nostrils of man by his Creater
that made him a living soul. It was an emanation from God and cannot
die.
I do not intend to state more than one reason among many for my belief
in the existence of God; but the immortality of man, founded on reason,
outside of the Scriptural declarations, I shall present more
elaborately.
When I take a survey of the Universe and find all things running in the
rhythm of order and harmony, I ask myself the question: What is it that
produces this universal order and harmony? No answer can be given other
than that it is the result of law. Now, we can have no more conception
of law outside of a lawmaker, than we can have of an agent without a
principal or an agency. Law and lawmaker, as well as agent and
principal, are inseparably interlocked. The one cannot exist without the
other. Therefore since we must admit the existence of law, the existence
of a lawmaker is a necessary logical sequence: that lawmaker, is God. As
to the immortality of the soul, I offer the following reason, founded
principally on grounds outside of the Bible's declaration of the fact.
Ever since the poetic Job uttered the profound question, "If a man die
shall he live again?" the inquiry has been ringing down the pathway of
time with increasing interest. Man's immortality is usually proven by
the declarations of the Bible, which are supposed to reveal it as an
ultimate truth. The immortality of the soul is susceptable not of
demonstration, but of reasonable proof by reason itself. If we concede
the existence of God with the attributes usually ascribable to such a
being, and which He must necessarily possess in order to be God, such as
infinite wisdom, goodness and Almighty power, and if we concede further
that He is the Creator of man, man's immortality results as a logical
sequence from such concessions. The desire of immortality, if not
universal among all conditions of men, at least approaches universality.
This universal desire may be called an innate property, or attribute of
man's moral constitution implanted in him by his Creator. It can not be
true that a being with the attributes which we ascribe to God, could
create man with such a desire, to tantalize him through life, and to
disappoint him in death. Consider the fact that nowhere in nature, from
the highest to the lowest, was an instinct, an impulse, a desire
implanted, but that ultimately were found the conditions and
opportunities for its fullest realization. Consider the wild fowl that,
moved by some mysterious impulse, start on their prodigious migrations
from the frozen fens of the Pole and reach at last the shining South and
summer seas; the fish that from tropic gulfs seek their spawning-grounds
in the cool, bright rivers of the North; the bees that find in the
garniture of fields and forests the treasure with which they store their
cells; and even the wolf, the lion, and the tiger that are provided with
their prey. Look in this connection to the brevity of life; its
incompleteness; its aimless, random, and fragmentary carreers;
tragedies; its injustices; its sorrows and separations. Then consider
the insatiable hunger for knowledge; the efforts of the unconquerable
mind to penetrate the mysteries of the future; its capacity to
comprehend infinity and eternity; its desire for the companionship of
the departed; its unquenchable aspirations for immortality--and let me
ask: "Why should God keep faith with the beast, the bee, the fish, and
the fowl, and cheat only man?" But the logical sequence from the
concessions mentioned above is not the argument in proof of man's
immortality which I desire to present.
The account of the creation of man as given in the Bible is remarkable
for its statement of the distinguishing difference between man and the
rest of creation. When man was created, God breathed into his nostrils
the breath of life, and man became a living soul. He created the beasts
of the field, the fowls of the air, the fishes in the sea and the
creeping things on the earth, but none of these became living souls.
This language, whether inspired or not, states the difference which now
exists and which has ever existed between man and the other created
things. What do we understand by soul? By soul is meant the power to
think, to reflect, and to judge of the moral quality of actions and
thoughts. Let me take the sceptic's standard of what we should believe,
and what we should not believe; that is, we ought not to believe that of
which we have no evidence, and for which we can give no satisfactory
reason. I proceed by a process of elimination, as will be readily seen.
My first proposition, interrogatively stated, is this. Is the power to
think and reflect and to judge of the moral quality of thoughts and
actions, a property of matter or not? If it is a property of matter,
then the sands and rocks and the earth think and reflect and judge of
the moral quality of actions and thoughts; but we have no reason to
believe that sand, or rock, or earth thinks, or that either possesses
the ability to judge of the moral quality of actions or thoughts; hence
we ought not to believe it. Thus we see that the general proposition is
not true, and ought not to be believed.
Secondly--Is thought and the power to judge of the moral qualities of
thoughts and actions a property of organized matter? The grass and
shrubs and trees are organized matter; but we have no reason to believe,
and no evidence upon which such a belief can be founded, that the grass,
or trees, or shrubs think, or possess any power to judge of the moral
quality of things; therefore, according to the standard which we have
adopted, we ought not to believe it; hence the more limited proposition
is not true.
Thirdly--Is the power to think, to reflect and to judge of the moral
quality of actions and thoughts a property of animal organization? If it
be, clams and oysters as animal organizations think; possess the power
to reflect and to judge of the moral quality of thoughts and actions,
but we have no evidence that they possess any of these powers, and
consequently we ought not to believe it.
Fourthly--Are the powers we have been considering essential to the
existence of soul-life, possessed by the higher animal organizations,
such as lions and tigers and domestic animals?
Here an important distinction must be noted. There is a thing,
universally recognized as existing, called instinct. All of the actions
of animals and many of the actions of human beings spring from instinct.
Instinct was given for self-preservation and defense. It is a sort of
semi-intellect, and sometimes in the perfection of its action is equal
to the highest development of soul-power; for instance, the action of a
bee, purely the result of instinct, in the economy of space in the
fitness of all its contrivances in making the comb, is wonderful; no
improvement can be made upon it by the highest development of inventive
genius. How does instinct act as contra distinguished from actions based
upon the exercise of soul-power? Instinct acts in a straight or direct
line with its object. As an illustration,--a tiger is hungry, a man is
hungry; the tiger sees a lamb--the man sees a loaf of bread in the
baker's window; both, left to the impulse of instinct, would go directly
to the object desired by each; the man, although cruelly hungry, as he
approaches the object of his desires, says to himself, "This bread does
not belong to me; it is the property of another, and I have no right to
take it without his consent." Here we see, in the case of the man, a
soul-power acting at right angles with the impulse of instinct and
controlling and governing the action of the man. It is only when men
are controlled by soul-power, as against instinct, that they really are
men in the higher sense of the term.
With this principle thus briefly stated, and carefully separating the
actions of men as well as animals springing from instinct from the
actions of men springing from the soul-power, we are prepared to make
the declaration that the tiger is incapable of acting on the
considerations that influenced the action of the man; the rightfulness
or wrongfulness of his act in seizing the lamb did not, nor could it
enter at all into his action; he was affected by no consideration of
right or wrong, and indeed could not be; hence we are prepared for the
conclusion that the power to think, to reflect and to judge of the moral
quality of acts and thoughts, is not possessed by the higher animal
organization, or, in other words, that they have no soul such as we have
defined it. Having thus briefly shown by a process of elimination that
man alone possesses the power that we have described as soul-power, we
have established the first part of our argument.
Man alone being possessed of soul qualities, the question arises, what
are the duration of these qualities? We argue that, being an emanation
from God, they must of necessity partake of the nature of God, and are
therefore indestructible, and eternal. But it is objected that when the
body dies we see no more manifestation of soul-life. Concede it, for the
sake of argument. Does it follow that the soul is extinct? The body was
the instrument through which the soul manifested itself, just as the
piano is the instrument through, or by which, a certain class or kind of
music is manifested. Is the impairment or destruction of the particular
piano, a destruction or extinction of that music? Who would thus reason?
The music manifested through that piano had an existence in the mind, or
soul of some person anterior to the existence of the signs made on paper
by the use of which the music on the piano was produced, or manifested;
and it is evident that the impairment or destruction of the piano did
not destroy the music. What force, then, is there in the claim that,
simply because the instrument through which the soul manifested itself
is dead, the soul itself is dead, or extinct? There are many
illustrations of this thought in actual life. The wonderful, almost
inspired, conception of beauty, passion and anguish transferred by the
artist's brush to canvas, as enduring monuments of the immortality of
genius, existed in the mind of the artist before a single line of the
grand conception was transferred to canvas. If there be any defect in
the picture it is usually a defect of execution, not of conception. The
canvas is but the means by which these conceptions of beauty, passion or
anguish are manifested to the souls of others. Who will argue that the
destruction of the frail canvas is the destruction of these conceptions?
They existed before they were transferred to canvas; its destruction
does not extinguish them.
It is said again, that soul-attributes are the results of that
mysterious power called life, operating in connection with animal
organization. But a tiger has life and animal organization, yet it is
clear that he possesses no soul-qualities. Besides, if soul-qualities
are the result of such life and organization, the manifestation of
soul-power would be in exact proportion to the strength of the forces
operating to produce this resultant; hence the elephant, in which these
forces exist in the larger degree, would give us the grander
manifestation of intellectual and moral qualities. I have stated the
objection and given a brief answer, but full enough to show the logical
absurdity of the objection.
But it is said that soul-qualities are the active manifestations of gray
matter in the human brain. We have already seen that the power to think,
to reflect, and to judge of the moral quality of thoughts and acts, is
not a property of matter. None of it, by itself or in combination,
possesses this power. Wonderful have been the combinations and
resultants of the operations of chemists, but life even in its simplest
form is beyond their power. How much further beyond their power must be
the production of the soul-power mentioned above! Besides, this gray
matter has been analyzed and its constituent elements ascertained; none
of these elements in its simplest form show any trace of this power. How
is it possible, then, by combination to produce that of which no trace
even existed in the elements? Then too, if this power is resultant, it
is a law of chemistry that all resultants may be reduced back to its
constituent elements. It would indeed be a wonderful achievement to
reduce the power to think as a resultant, back to its constituent gases.
Again, take the case of a strong and healthy man suddenly killed by a
bullet penetrating both ventricles of the heart; this gray matter exists
intact in the brain immediately after the extinction of life. Decay does
not immediately affect its power. Does the man think, reflect and judge
of the moral qualities of thoughts and acts after the extinction of
life? If so, then this soul-power exists after death, and the argument
answers itself.
This argument has proceeded far enough to show its line of thought.
Much might be added by way of illustration, details and further
supporting propositions, but it is not deemed necessary.
I conclude, then, that the soul is not only a unit with the power
ascribed to it, but that it is also an invisible, immaterial and eternal
entity or being. This is but the enumeration of the attributes of a
spirit or spirit-existence. I will not attempt to repeat the reasons
found in every text-book of mental philosophy and moral science to show
its unity. We have seen that it is not matter; yea, more, that it is not
a property of matter; therefore that it is immaterial. If immaterial and
possessing the power to think and reflect, and endowed with moral
sensations and perceptions--the highest and best evidences of life--it
is a spirit-existence. As such, what evidence have we that a
spirit-existence was ever destroyed? That it exists in manifest.
Existing with no evidence of its destruction or of its destructibility,
we ought to believe in its immortality; hence, I conclude, if a man die,
he will live again.
I have had a controversy on religious subjects but once in my life. I
have always desired to avoid such controversies. Fixed religious
opinions in the minds of others, especially of the old, I regard as
sacred. To create a doubt, is to loosen them from their moral and
religious moorings and to set them hopelessly adrift.
After I had left school and was recuperating at my father's house, a
gentleman of the name of Wellover, who had known me all my life, and who
was a plain man of the common people, came to my father's house to see
me. His residence was in what was called the Burr Oak Settlement,
distant about six miles from the town of Sturgis. He was a member of the
Methodist Church and a very exemplary Christian. He seemed to be much
troubled. He said to me: "Orange, you know I have been a believer in the
Bible and its doctrines for many years. A man has been delivering a
course of lectures in the school-house in our settlement. He claims to
be a Greek and Latin scholar, and he is attempting to show that the
priests have so translated the Bible that it is a deception and a fraud.
Now, Orange," he said, "I want you to go down with me to listen to one
of his lectures, and afterwards to tell me whether his translations are
true or not." I said to him, "You go up to town and see William Allman,
who is a graduate of Greenbury College, Indiana, and is reputed to be a
good Greek scholar, and ask him to go with me. Tell him to bring with
him his large Cooper's Greek Dictionary, and if he will go, I will
also." He departed, and soon returned with Allman. I took my large
Cooper's Latin Dictionary; we got into Wellover's carriage and we went
to his fine residence, took supper with him, and then went to hear the
lecture of that evening. We found a good-sized audience in attendance at
the school-house. The lecturer, who had passed the middle age in life,
stated in his introductory remarks that he would pursue the same course
as theretofore, and show, by reference to the Greek and Latin languages,
how the priests had translated the Scriptures; sometimes correctly, but
in most cases, where their interests were involved, so as to create a
dismal terror in the present, and perpetuate by fear, their power in the
future. He said that if there were any present acquainted with these
languages, he would be glad, if he made an incorrect statement, to be
interrupted, and if the statement was incorrect he would correct it. He
denied the existence of a God and the immortality of man. He further
declared that religion, on account of its doctrine of hate and
vengeance, made men crazy. I interrupted, and asked him what was the
proof of the last statement; he said the proof was manifest, for that
men babbled of religion, of God, immortality and hell, after they became
crazy. I answered by saying that I had heard men babble of snakes in
their boots, snakes in the bed and snakes everywhere in the room, but I
never knew that snakes had anything to do with their madness; in fact, I
said, such madness had a well-recognized and efficient cause. He said:
"Don't attempt to be smart, young man," and I took my seat. He further
declared that if man were immortal, beasts were also, for the Romans had
used the word "animus" indiscriminately as to both, and that the priests
had translated "animus" to mean intellect and what was called by them,
the soul of man. I told him I thought he was mistaken. He rather
uncourteously asked me what I knew about Latin. I told him that I had
some knowledge of it and that the Romans used the word "mens" from which
we derived our word mind, mental, and many other words of the same
character, to signify the soul of man; and did not use the word "animus"
for that purpose, or with that meaning. I read to him and to the
audience from the Dictionary the definitions of "animus" and of "mens."
This drove him out of the Latin language, and he and Allman had a
spirited and sharp and somewhat personal dispute, about some Greek or
pretended Greek word. The controversy showed that he had no knowledge,
or only a very limited knowledge, of what he was talking about. He said,
after the wrangle with Allman was ended, that he had been interrupted so
much by the two young men from town, that he would not proceed with his
lecture on that evening, but would close by telling his experience. He
said that he had been a minister for eighteen years--nine years in the
Methodist Church, and nine years in the Christian or Campbellite Church.
He divided all ministers into two classes--knaves and fools. I
interrupted him again and asked him, inasmuch as he had been a minister
for eighteen years and classed all ministers as knaves and fools, what
class he belonged to. He hesitated a moment and said: "I am willing to
confess that I belong to the class of fools." "Then," I said, "that
confession proves the Bible to be true, for it says, 'the fool hath said
in his heart, "there is no God."'" The meeting dissolved, and he lectured
no more in that settlement. His pretended knowledge of the Greek and
Latin languages was a deception and fraud.