CHAP. XVII.

_Those Ideas which are true, or founded upon Nature, are the only

Remedies for the Evils of Man.--Recapitulation.--Conclusion of the first

Part._

Whenever man ceases to take experience for his guide, he falls into

error. His errors become yet more dangerous, assume a more determined

inveteracy, when they are clothed with the sanction of superstition; it

is then that he hardly ever consents to return into the paths of truth;

he believes himself deeply interested in no longer seeing clearly that

which lies before him; he fancies he has an essential advantage in no

longer understanding himself; he supposes his happiness exacts that he

should shut his eyes to truth. If the majority of moral philosophers

have mistaken the human heart--if they have deceived themselves upon its

diseases--if they have miscalculated the remedies that are suitable--if

the remedies they have administered have been inefficacious or even

dangerous--it is because they have abandoned nature--because they have

resisted experience--because they have not had sufficient steadiness to

consult their reason--because they have renounced the evidence of their

senses--because they have only followed the caprices of an imagination

either dazzled by enthusiasm or disturbed by fear; because they have

preferred the illusions it has held forth to the realities of nature,

_who never deceives_.

It is for want of having felt that an intelligent being cannot for an

instant lose sight of his own peculiar conservation--of his particular

interests, either real or fictitious--of his own welfare, whether

permanent or transitory; in short, of his happiness, either true or

false. It is for want of having considered that desires are natural,

that passions are essential, that both the one and the other are motions

necessary to the soul of man,--that the physicians of the, human mind

have supposed supernatural causes for his wanderings; have only applied

to his evils topical remedies, either useless or dangerous. Indeed,

in desiring him to stifle his desires, to combat his propensities, to

annihilate his passions, they have done no more than give him sterile

precepts, at once vague and impracticable; these vain lessons have

influenced no one; they have at most restrained some few mortals whom a

quiet imagination but feebly solicited to evil; the terrors with which

they have accompanied them have disturbed the tranquillity of those

persons who were moderate by their nature, without ever arresting the

ungovernable temperament of those who were inebriated by their passions,

or hurried along; by the torrent of habit. In short, the promises of

superstition, as well as the menaces it holds forth, have only formed

fanatics, given birth to enthusiasts, who are either dangerous or

useless to society, without ever making man truly virtuous; that is to

say, useful to his fellow creatures.

These, empirics guided by a blind routine have, not seen that man as

long as he exists, is obliged to feel, to desire, to have passions,

to satisfy them in proportion to the energy which his organization has

given him; they have not perceived that education planted these desires

in his heart--that habit rooted them--that his government, frequently

vicious, corroborated their growth--that public opinion stamped them

with its approbation--that--experience render them necessary--that

to tell men thus constituted to destroy their passions, was either to

plunge them into despair or else to order them remedies too revolting

for their temperament. In the actual state of opulent societies, to say

to a man who knows by experience that riches procure every pleasure,

that he must not desire them; that he must not make any efforts to

obtain them; that he ought to detach himself from them: is to persuade

him to render himself miserable. To tell an ambitious man not to desire

grandeur, not to covet power, which every thing conspires to point out

to him as the height of felicity, is to order him to overturn at one

blow the habitual system of his ideas; it is to speak, to a deaf man. To

tell a lover of an impetuous temperament to stifle his passions for the

object that enchants him, is to make him understand, that he ought to

renounce his happiness. To oppose superstition to such substantive, such

puissant interests is to combat realities by chimerical speculations.

Indeed, if things were examined without prepossession, it would be found

that the greater part of the precepts inculcated by superstition, which

fanatical dogmas hold forth, which, supernatural mortals give to man,

are as ridiculous as they are impossible to be put into practice.

To interdict passion to man, is to desire of him not to be a human

creature; to counsel an individual of a violent imagination to moderate

his desires, is to advise him to change his temperament--is to request

his blood to flow more sluggishly. To tell a man to renounce his habits,

is to be willing that a citizen, accustomed to clothe himself, should

consent to walk quite naked; it would avail as much, to desire him

to change the lineament of his face, to destroy his configuration, to

extinguish his imagination, to alter the course of his fluids, as to

command him not to have passions which excite an activity analogous with

his natural energy; or to lay aside those which confirmed habit has made

him contract; which his circumstances, by a long succession of causes

and effects, have converted into wants. Such are, however, the so much

boasted remedies which the greater number of moral philosophers apply to

human depravity. Is it, then surprising they do not produce the desired

effect, or that they only reduce man to a state of despair by the

effervescence that results from the continual conflict which they excite

between the passions of his heart and these fanciful doctrines; between

his vices and his virtues; between his habits and those chimerical fears

with which superstition is at all times ready to overwhelm him? The

vices of society, aided by the objects of which it avails itself to what

the desires of man, the pleasures, the riches, the grandeur which

his government holds forth to him as so many seductive magnets, the

advantage which education, the benefits which example, the interests

which public opinion render dear to him, attract him on one side; whilst

a gloomy morality, founded upon superstitious illusions, vainly solicit

him on the other; thus, superstition plunges him into misery; holds

a violent struggle with his heart, without scarcely ever gaining the

victory; when by accident it does prevail against so many united forces,

it renders him unhappy; it completely destroys the spring of his soul.

Passions are the true counterpoise to passions; then let him not seek

to destroy them; but let him endeavour to direct them; let him balance

those which are prejudicial, by those which are useful to society.

_Reason_, the fruit of experience, is only the art of choosing those

passions to which for his own peculiar happiness he ought to listen.

_Education_ is the true art of disseminating the proper method of

cultivating advantageous passions in the heart of man. _Legislation_ is

the art of restraining dangerous passions; of exciting those which may

be conducive to the public welfare. _Superstition_ is only the miserable

art of planting the unproductive labour--of nourishing in the soul

of man those chimeras, those illusions, those impostures, those

incertitudes from whence spring passions fatal to himself as well as to

others: it is only by bearing up with fortitude against these that he

can securely place himself on the road to happiness. _True religion_

is the art of advocating truth--of renouncing error--of contemplating

reality--of drawing wisdom from experience--of cultivating man's nature

to his own felicity, by teaching him to contribute to that of his

associates; in short it is _reason, education_, and _legislation_,

united to further the great end of human existence, by causing the

passions of man to flow in a current genial to his own happiness.

_Reason_ and _morals_ cannot effect any thing on mankind if they do not

point out to each individual that his true interest is attached to a

conduct that is either useful to others or beneficial to himself; this

conduct to be useful must conciliate for him the benevolence, gain for

him the favor of these beings who are necessary to his happiness: it is

then for the interest of mankind, for the happiness of the human race,

it is for the esteem of himself, for the love of his fellows, for the

advantages which ensue, that education in early life should kindle the

imagination of the citizen; this is the true means of obtaining those

happy results with which habit should familiarize him; which public

opinion should render dear to his heart; for which example ought

continually to rouse his faculties; after which he should be taught to

search with unceasing attention. _Government_ by the aid of recompences,

ought to encourage him to follow this plan; by visiting crime with

punishment it ought to deter those who are willing to interrupt it.

Thus the hope of a true welfare, the fear of real evil, will be passions

suitable to countervail those which by their impetuosity would injure

society; these last will at least become very rare, if instead of

feeding man's mind with unintelligible speculations, in lieu of

vibrating on his ears words void of sense, he is only spoken to of

realities, only shewn those interests which are in unison with truth.

Man is frequently so wicked, only, because he almost always feels

himself interested in being so; let him be more enlightened, more

familiarized with truth, more accustomed to virtue, he will be made more

happy; he will necessarily become better. An equitable government,

a vigilant administration, will presently fill the state with honest

citizens; it will hold forth to them present reasons for benevolence;

real advantages in truth; palpable motives to be virtuous; it will

instruct them in their duties; it will foster them with its cares; it

will allure them by the assurance of their own peculiar happiness; its

promises faithfully fulfilled--its menaces regularly executed,

will unquestionably have much more weight than those of a gloomy

superstition, which never exhibits to their view other than illusory

benefits, fallacious punishments, which the man hardened in wickedness

will doubt every time he finds an interest in questioning them: present

motives will tell more home to his heart than those which are distant

and at best uncertain. The vicious and the wicked are so common upon

the earth, so pertinacious in their evil courses, so attached to their

irregularities, only because there are but few governments that make

man feel the advantage of being just, the pleasure of being honest, the

happiness of being benevolent on the contrary, there is hardly any

place where the most powerful interests do not solicit him to crime, by

favouring the propensities of a vicious organization; by countenancing

those appetencies which nothing has attempted to rectify or lead

towards virtue. A savage, who in his horde knows not the value of money,

certainly would not commit a crime, if when transplanted into civilized

society, he should presently learn to desire it, should make efforts to

obtain it, and if he could without danger finish by stealing it; above

all, if he had not been taught to respect the property of the beings who

environ him. The savages and the child are precisely in the same

state; it is the negligence of society, of those entrusted with their

education, that renders both the one and the other wicked. The son of

a noble, from his infancy learns to desire power, at a riper age he

becomes ambitious; if he has the address to insinuate himself into

favor, he perhaps becomes wicked, because in some societies he has been

taught to know he may be so with impunity when he can command the ear

of his sovereign. It is not therefore nature that makes man wicked, they

are his institutions which determine him to vice. The infant brought up

amongst robbers, can generally become nothing but a malefactor; if he

had been reared with honest people, the chance is he would have been a

virtuous man.

If the source be traced of that profound ignorance in which man is with

respect to his morals, to the motives that can give volition to his

will, it will be found in those false ideas which the greater number of

speculators have formed to themselves, of human nature. The science of

morals has become an enigma which it is impossible to unrevel; because

man has made himself double; has distinguished his soul from his body;

supposed it of a nature different from all known beings, with modes of

action, with properties distinct from all other bodies, because he

has emancipated this soul from physical laws, in order to submit it to

capricious laws emanating from men who have pretended they are derived

from imaginary regions, placed at very remote distances: metaphysicians

seized upon these gratuitous suppositions, and by dint of subtilizing

them, have rendered them completely unintelligible. These moralists have

not perceived that motion is essential to the soul as well as to the

living body; that both the one and the other are never moved but

by material, by physical objects; that the want of each regenerate

themselves unceasingly; that the wants of the soul, as well as those of

the body are purely physical; that the most intimate, the most constant

connection subsists between the soul and the body; or rather they have

been unwilling to allow that they ate only the same thing considered

under different points of view. Obstinate in their supernatural,

unintelligible opinions, they have refused to open their eyes, which

would have convinced them that the body in suffering rendered the soul

miserable; that the soul afflicted undermined the body and brought it to

decay; that both the pleasures and agonies of the mind have an influence

over the body, either plunge it into sloth or give it activity: they

have rather chosen to believe, that the soul draws its thoughts, whether

pleasant or gloomy, from its own peculiar sources, while the fact is,

that it derives its ideas only from material objects that strike on the

physical organs; that it is neither determined to gaiety nor led on to

sorrow, but by the actual state, whether permanent or transitory, in

which the fluids and solids of the body are found. In short, they have

been loath to acknowledge that the soul, purely passive, undergoes

the same changes which the body experiences; is only moved by its

intervention; acts only by its assistance, receives its sensations, its

perceptions, forms its ideas, derives either its happiness or its misery

from physical objects, through the medium of the organs of which the

body is composed; frequently without its own cognizance, often in

despite of itself.

By a consequence of these opinions, connected with marvellous systems,

or systems invented to justify them, they have supposed the human soul

to be a free agent; that is to say, that it has the faculty of moving

itself; that it enjoys the privilege of acting independent of the

impulse received from exterior objects, through the organs of the body;

that regardless of these impulsions it can even resist them, and follow

its own directions by its own energies; that it is not only different in

its nature from all other beings, but has a separate mode of action; in

other words, that it is an insolated point which is, not submitted to

that uninterrupted chain of motion which bodies communicate to each

other in a nature, whose parts are always in action. Smitten with

their sublime notions, these speculators were not aware that in thus

distinguishing the soul from the body and from all known beings, they

rendered it an impossibility to form any true ideas of it, either to

themselves or to others: they were unwilling to perceive the perfect

analogy which is found between the manner of the soul's action and that

by which the body is afflicted; they shut their eyes to the necessary

and continual correspondence which is found between the soul and the

body; they perhaps did not perceive that like the body it is subjected

to the motion of attraction and repulsion; has an aptitude to be

attracted, a disposition to repel, which is ascribable to qualities

inherent in those physical subsistances, which give play to the

organs of the body; that the volition of its will, the activity of its

passions, the continual regeneration of its desires, are never more than

consequences of that activity which is produced in the body by material

objects which are not under its controul; that these objects render

it either happy or miserable, active or languishing, contented or

discontented, in despite of itself,--in defiance of all the efforts it

is capable of making to render it otherwise; they have rather chosen to

seek in the heavens for unknown powers to set it in motion; they have

held forth to man distant, imaginary interests: under the pretext of

procuring for him future happiness, he has been prevented from labouring

to his present felicity, which has been studiously withheld from his

knowledge: his regards have been fixed upon the heavens, that he might

lose sight of the earth: truth has been concealed from him; and it has

been pretended he would be rendered happy by dint of terrors, always at

an immense distance; by means of shadows, with whose substances he

could never come in contact; of chimeras formed by his own bewildered

imagination, which changed nearly as often as the governments to which

he was submitted. In short, hoodwinked by his fears, blinded by his own

credulity, _he was only guided through the flexuous paths of life, by

men blind as himself, where both the one and the other were frequently

lost in the maze_.

The System of Nature, or, the Laws of the Moral and Physical World. Volume 1 · 第 30 / 32 题