CHAPTER XXX

THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS--UNION OF HOLLAND AND BELGIUM, 1815-1830

The autocratic powers that were conferred upon King William by the

Fundamental Law rendered his personality a factor of the utmost

importance in the difficult task which lay before him. William's

character was strong and self-confident, and he did not shrink from

responsibility. His intentions were of the best; he was capable,

industrious, a good financier, sparing himself no trouble in mastering

the details of State business. But he had the defects of his qualities,

being self-opinionated, stubborn and inclined, as in the matter of the

vote of the Belgian notables, to override opposition with a high hand.

He had at the beginning of his reign the good fortune of being on the

best of terms with Castlereagh, the British Foreign Minister. To

Castlereagh more than to any other statesman the kingdom of the

Netherlands owed its existence. The Peace of Paris saw Great Britain in

possession by conquest of all the Dutch colonies. By the Convention of

London (August 13, 1814), which was Castlereagh's work, it was arranged

that all the captured colonies, including Java, the richest and most

valuable of all, should be restored, with the exception of the Cape of

Good Hope and the Guiana colonies--Demerara, Berbice and Essequibo. In

the latter the plantations had almost all passed into British hands

during the eighteen years since their conquest; and Cape Colony was

retained as essential for the security of the sea-route to India. But

these surrenders were not made without ample compensation. Great Britain

contributed £2,000,000 towards erecting fortresses along the French

frontier; £1,000,000 to satisfy a claim of Sweden with regard to the

island of Guadeloupe; and £3,000,000 or one-half of a debt from Holland

to Russia, _i.e._ a sum of £6,000,000 in all.

One of the most urgent problems with which the Sovereign-Prince had to

deal on his accession to power was the state of the finances. Napoleon

by a stroke of the pen had reduced the public debt to one-third of its

amount. William, however, was too honest a man to avail himself of the

opportunity for partial repudiation that was offered him. He recalled

into existence the two-thirds on which no interest had been paid and

called it "deferred debt" (_uitgestelde schuld_); the other third

received the name of "working debt" (_werkelijke schuld_). The figures

stood at 1200 million florins and 600 million florins respectively.

Every year four millions of the "working debt" were to be paid off, and

a similar amount from the "deferred" added to it. Other measures taken

in 1814 for effecting economies were of little avail, as the campaign of

Waterloo in the following year added 40 million florins to the debt.

Heavier taxation had to be imposed, but even then the charges for the

debt made it almost impossible to avoid an annual deficit in the budget.

It was one of the chief grievances of the Belgians that they were called

upon to share the burden of a crushing debt which they had not incurred.

The voting of ways and means for ten years gave the king the control

over all ordinary finance; it was only extraordinary expenditure that

had to be submitted annually to the representatives of the people.

The dislike of the Catholic hierarchy in Belgium to Dutch rule had been

intensified by the manner in which the king had dealt with the vote of

the notables. Their leader was Maurice de Broglie, Bishop of Ghent, a

Frenchman by birth. His efforts by speech and by pen to stir up active

enmity in Belgium to the union aroused William's anger, and he resolved

to prosecute him. It was an act of courage rather than of statesmanship,

but the king could not brook opposition. Broglie refused to appear

before the court and fled to France. In his absence he was condemned to

banishment and the payment of costs. The powerful clerical party

regarded him as a martyr and continued to criticise the policy of the

Protestant king with watchful and hostile suspicion. Nor were the

Belgian liberal party more friendly. They did not indeed support the

clerical claim to practical predominance in the State, but they were

patriotic Belgians who had no love for Holland and resented the thought

that they were being treated as a dependency of their northern

neighbours. They were at one with the clericals in claiming that the

Belgian representation in the Second Chamber of the States-General

should be proportional to their population. But this grievance might

have been tolerated had the king shown any inclination to treat his

Belgian subjects on a footing of equality with the Dutch. He was, as

will be seen, keenly interested in the welfare and progress of the

south, but in spirit and in his conduct of affairs he proved himself to

be an out-and-out Hollander. The provision of the Fundamental Law that

the seat of government and the meetings of the States-General should be

alternately from year to year at the Hague and at Brussels was never

carried out. All the ministries were permanently located at the Hague;

and of the seven ministers who held office in 1816 only one, the Duke

d'Ursel, was a Belgian, and he held the post of Minister of Public Works

and Waterways. Fourteen years later (at the time of the revolt) six out

of seven were still northerners. The military establishments were all in

Holland, and nearly all the diplomatic and civil posts were given to

Dutchmen. Nor was this merely due to the fact that, when the union took

place, Holland already possessed an organised government and a supply of

experienced officials, while Belgium lacked both. On the contrary, the

policy of the king remained fixed and unwavering. In 1830 out of 39

diplomatists 30 were Dutch. All the chief military posts were filled by

Dutchmen. Nor was it different in the civil service. In the home

department there were 117 Dutch, 11 Belgians; in the war department 102

Dutch, 3 Belgians; in finance 59 Dutch, 5 Belgians. Such a state of

things was bound to cause resentment. Parties in the Belgic provinces

were in the early days of the Union divided very much as they have been

in recent years. The Catholic or Clerical party had its stronghold in

the two Flanders and Antwerp, _i.e._ in the Flemish-speaking districts.

In Walloon Belgium the Liberals had a considerable majority. The

opposition to the Fundamental Law came overwhelmingly from Flemish

Belgium; the support from Liège, Namur, Luxemburg and other Walloon

districts. But the sense of injustice brought both parties together, so

that in the representative Chamber the Belgian members were soon found

voting solidly together, as a permanent opposition, while the Dutch

voted _en bloc_ for the government. As the representation of north and

south was equal, 55 members each, the result would have been a deadlock,

but there were always two or three Belgians who held government offices;

and these were compelled, on pain of instant dismissal, to vote for a

government measure or at least to abstain. Thus the king could always

rely on a small but constant majority, and by its aid he did not

hesitate to force through financial and legislative proposals in the

teeth of Belgian opposition. It is only fair, however, to the

arbitrary king to point out how earnestly he endeavoured to promote the

material and industrial welfare of the whole land, and to encourage to

the best of his power literary, scientific and educational progress. In

Holland the carrying-trade, which had so long been the chief source of

the country's wealth, had been utterly ruined by Napoleon's Continental

System. On the other hand, Belgian industries, which had been

flourishing through the strict embargo placed upon the import of British

goods, were now threatened with British competition. The steps taken by

the energy and initiative of the king were, considering the state of the

national finances, remarkable in the variety of their aims and the

results that they achieved. The old Amsterdam Bank was transformed into

a Bank of the Netherlands. A number of canals were planned and

constructed. Chief among these was the North Holland Canal, connecting

Amsterdam with the Helder. The approaches to Rotterdam were improved, so

that this port became the meeting-point of sea-traffic from England and

river-traffic by the Rhine from Germany. But both these ports were

quickly overshadowed by the rapid recovery of Antwerp, now that the

Scheldt was free and open to commerce. Other important canals, begun and

wholly or in part constructed, during this period were the

Zuid-Willemsvaart, the Zederik, the Appeldoorn and the Voorne canals.

Water communication was not so necessary in the south as in the north,

but care was there also bestowed upon the canals, especially upon the

canal of Terneuzen connecting Ghent with the western Scheldt, and many

highways were constructed. To restore the prosperity of the Dutch

carrying-trade, especially that with their East Indies, in 1824 a

Company--_de Nederlandsche Handekmaatschappij_--was founded; and at the

same time a commercial treaty was concluded with Great Britain, by which

both nations were to enjoy free trade with each other's East Indian

possessions. The _Handekmaatschappij_ had a capital of 37 million

florins; to this the king contributed four millions and guaranteed to

the shareholders for 20 years a dividend of 4 1/2 per cent. The Company

at first worked at a loss, and in 1831 William had to pay four million

florins out of his privy purse to meet his guarantee. This was partly

due to the set-back of a revolt in Java which lasted some years.

Agriculture received equal attention. Marshy districts were impoldered

or turned into pasture-land. More especially did the _Maatschappij van

Weldadigheid_, a society founded in 1818 by General van den Bosch with

the king's strong support, undertake the task of reclaiming land with

the special aim of relieving poverty. No less zealous was the king for

the prosperity of Belgian industries; Ghent with its cotton factories

and sugar refineries, Tournai with its porcelain industry, and Liège

with its hardware, all were the objects of royal interest. The great

machine factory at Seraing near Liège under the management of an

Englishman, Cockerill, owed its existence to the king. Nor was William's

care only directed to the material interests of his people. In 1815 the

University at Utrecht was restored; and in Belgium, besides Louvain, two

new foundations for higher education were in 1816 created at Ghent and

Liège. Royal Academies of the Arts were placed at Amsterdam and Antwerp,

which were to bear good fruit. His attention was also given to the

much-needed improvement of primary education, which in the south was

almost non-existent in large parts of the country. Here the presence of

a number of illiterate dialects was a great obstacle and was the cause

of the unfortunate effort to make literary Dutch into a national

language for his whole realm.

Nevertheless the king's political mistakes (of which the attempted

compulsory use of Dutch was one) rendered all his thoughtful

watchfulness over his people's welfare unavailing. Great as were the

autocratic powers conferred upon the sovereign, he overstepped them.

Plans, in which he was interested, he carried out without consulting the

States-General. His ministers he regarded as bound to execute his

orders. If their views differed from his, they were dismissed. This was

the fate even of Van Hogendorp, to whom he owed so much; Roëll and Falck

also had to make way for less competent but more obsequious ministers.

The chief difficulty with which the king had to contend throughout this

period was the ceaseless and irreconcilable opposition of the Catholic

hierarchy and clergy to the principle of absolute religious equality

established by the Fundamental Law (Articles CXC-CXCIII). Their leader,

Maurice de Broglie, Bishop of Ghent, actually published a _jugement

doctrinal_ in which he declared that the taking of the oath to the

Constitution was an act of treason to the Catholic Church. In this

defiance to the government he had the support of the Pope, who only

permitted the Count de Méan to take the oath on his appointment to the

Archbishopric of Malines on the understanding that he held Articles

CXC-CXCIII to refer only to civil matters. From this time to take the

oath "dans le sens de M. Méan" became with the ultra-clerical party a

common practice.

Other measures of the government aroused Catholic hostility. In this

year, 1819, a decree forbade the holding of more than two religious

processions in a year. In such a country as Belgium this restriction was

strongly resented. But the establishment in 1825 by the king of a

_Collegium Philosophicum_ at Louvain, at which all candidates for the

priesthood were by royal decree required (after 1826) to have a

two-years' course before proceeding to an episcopal seminary, met with

strenuous resistance. The instruction was in ancient languages, history,

ethics and canon-law; and the teachers were nominated by the king. The

first effect of this decree was that young men began to seek education

in foreign seminaries. Another royal decree at once forbade this, and

all youths were ordered to proceed either to the _Collegium_ or to one

of the High Schools of the land; unless they did so, access to the

priesthood or to any public office was barred to them. This was perhaps

the most serious of all the king's mistakes. He miscalculated both the

strength and the sincerity of the opposition he thus deliberately

courted. His decrees were doomed to failure. The bishops on their part

refused to admit to their seminaries or to ordination anyone who

attended the _Collegium Philosophicum_. The king, in the face of the

irrevocable decision of the Belgian hierarchy, found himself in an

untenable position. He could not compel the bishops to ordain candidates

for Holy Orders, and his decrees were therefore a dead letter; nor on

the other hand could he trample upon the convictions of the vast

majority of his Belgian subjects by making admission to the priesthood

impossible. He had to give way and to send a special envoy--De

Celles--to the Pope in 1827 to endeavour to negotiate a Concordat. It

was accomplished. By Article III of the Concordat, there were to be

eight bishops in the Netherlands instead of five. They were to be chosen

by the Pope, but the king was to have the right of objection, and they

were required to take the oath of allegiance. The course at the

_Collegium Philosophicum_ was made optional. William thus yielded on

practically all the points at issue, but prided himself on having

obtained the right of rejecting a papal nominee. The Pope, however, in

an allocution made no mention of this right, and declared that the

decree about the _Collegium_ was annulled, and that in matters of

education the bishops would act in accordance with instructions from

Rome. The government immediately issued a confidential notice to the

governors of provinces, that the carrying-out of the Concordat was

indefinitely postponed. Thus the effort at conciliation ended in the

humiliation of the king, and the triumph of the astute diplomacy of the

Vatican.

The financial situation, as we have seen, was from the outset full of

difficulty. The king was personally parsimonious, but his many projects

for the general welfare of the land involved large outlay, and the

consequence was an annual average deficit of seven million florins. At

first the revenue was raised by the increase of customs and excise,

including colonial imports. This caused much dissatisfaction in Holland,

especially when duties were placed on coffee and sugar. The complaint

was that thus an undue share of taxation fell on the maritime north. In

order to lighten these duties on colonial wares, other taxes had to be

imposed. In 1821 accordingly it was proposed to meet the deficit by two

most unwise and obnoxious taxes, known as _mouture_ and _abbatage_. The

first was on ground corn, the second on the carcases of beasts, exacted

at the mill or the slaughter-house--in other words on bread and on

butcher's meat. Both were intensely unpopular, and the _mouture_ in

particular fell with especial severity on the Belgian working classes

and peasantry, who consumed much more bread per head than the Dutch.

Nevertheless by ministerial pressure the bill was passed (July 21, 1821)

by a narrow majority of four--55 to 51. All the minority were Belgians,

only two Belgians voted with the majority. It is inconceivable how the

government could have been so impolitic as to impose these taxes in face

of such a display of national animosity. The _mouture_ only produced a

revenue of 5,500,000 fl.; the _abbatage_ 2,500,000 fl.

This amount, though its exaction pressed heavily on the very poor,

afforded little relief; and to meet recurring deficits the only resource

was borrowing. To extricate the national finances from ever-increasing

difficulties the _Amortisatie-Syndikaat_ was created in December, 1822.

Considerable sources of income from various public domains and from

tolls passed into the hands of the seven members of the Syndicate, all

of whom were bound to secrecy, both as to its public and private

transactions. Its effect was to diminish still further the control of

the Representative Chamber over the national finances. The Syndicate

did indeed assist the State, for between 1823 and 1829 it advanced no

less than 58,885,443 fl. to meet the deficits in the budget, but the

means by which it achieved this result were not revealed.

Yet another device to help the government in its undertakings was the

_million de l'industrie_, which was voted every year, as an

extraordinary charge, but of which no account was ever given. That this

sum was beneficially used for the assistance of manufacturing and

industrial enterprise, as at Seraing and elsewhere, and that it

contributed to the growing prosperity of the southern provinces, is

certain. But the needless mystery which surrounded its expenditure led

to the suspicion that it was used as a fund for secret service and

political jobbery.

The autocratic temper of the king showed itself not merely in keeping

the control of finance largely in his own hands, but also in carrying

out a series of measures arousing popular discontent by simple _arrêtés_

or decrees of the Council of State without consultation with the

representative Chamber. Such were the decree of November 6,1814,

abolishing trial by jury and making certain other changes in judicial

proceedings; that of April 15, 1815, imposing great restrictions on the

liberty of the press; that of September 15, 1819, making Dutch the

official language of the country; that of June 25,1825, establishing the

_Collegium Philosophicum_; and finally that of June 21, 1830, making the

Hague the seat of the supreme court of justice. All these produced

profound discontent and had a cumulative effect.

The language decree of 1819 was tentative, declaring a knowledge of

Dutch obligatory for admission to all public offices, but it was

followed by a much more stringent decree in 1822 by which, in the two

Flanders, South Brabant and Limburg, Dutch was to be used in the

law-courts and in all public acts and notices. Although the operation of

this decree was confined to the Flemish-speaking districts, it must be

remembered that, from the time of the Burgundian dukes right through the

Spanish and Austrian periods, French had always been the official

language of the country, the upper classes only spoke French, and with

few exceptions the advocates could only plead in that language. This was

a great hardship upon the Belgian bar, which would have been greatly

increased had the royal decree (June 21,1830), placing the court of

appeal for the whole kingdom at the Hague, been carried into effect.

More serious in its results was the infringement of Art. CCXXVII of the

Fundamental Law guaranteeing liberty of the press. The return of

Napoleon from Elba, and the imminent danger to which the, as yet,

unorganised kingdom of the Netherlands was exposed, led to the issue of

an _arrêté_ of the severest character. By it all persons publishing news

of any kind, or giving information injurious to the State, or writing or

distributing political pamphlets, were to be brought before a special

tribunal of nine judges holding office at the king's pleasure; and, if

condemned, were liable to be sentenced to exposure in the pillory,

deprivation of civic rights, branding, imprisonment, and fines varying

from 100 to 10,000 francs. This harsh measure was possibly justifiable

in an extreme emergency upon the plea that it was necessary for the

safety of the State. When the danger was over, and the Fundamental Law

was passed, there was no excuse for its further maintenance on the

Statute-book. Yet before this court Abbé de Foere was summoned for

having defended in the _Spectateur Beige_ the _jugement doctrinal_ of

Bishop de Broglie, and he was sentenced to two years' imprisonment. In

the following year, 1818, the government obtained the approval of the

States-General (with slight modification) for the continuance of this

war-time censorship of the press. The penalties remained, but the court

consisted of a judge and four assessors, all government nominees. Under

this law a Brussels advocate, Van der Straeten, was fined 3000 fl. for a

brochure attacking the ministers; and several other advocates were

disbarred for protesting that this sentence was in conflict with the

Fundamental Law. Prosecutions henceforth followed prosecutions, and the

press was gagged.

As a result of these press persecutions, the two Belgian political

parties, the clericals and the liberals, poles apart as they were in

their principles, drew closer together. All differences of religious and

political creed were fused in a common sense of national grievances

under what was regarded as a foreign tyranny. This brought about in 1828

the formation of the _Union_, an association for the co-operation of

Belgians of all parties in defence of liberty of worship, liberty of

instruction and liberty of the press. The ultra-clericals, who looked to

the Vatican for their guidance, and the advanced liberals who professed

the principles of the French Revolution were thus by the force of

events led on step by step to convert an informal into a formal

alliance. The Abbe de Foere in the _Spectateur_ and MM. D'Ellougue and

Donker in the _Observateur_ had been for some years advocating united

action; and it was their success in winning over to their side the

support and powerful pen of Louis de Potter, a young advocate and

journalist of Franco-radical sympathies, that the _Union_, as a party,

was actually effected. From this time the onslaughts in the press became

more and more violent and embittered, and stirred up a spirit of unrest

throughout the country. Petitions began to pour in against the _mouture_

and _abbatage_ taxes and other unpopular measures, especially from the

Walloon provinces. These were followed by a National Petition, signed by

representatives of every class of the community asking for redress of

grievances, but it met with no response from the unyielding king. He had

in the early summer of this year, 1828, made a tour in Belgium and had

in several towns, especially in Antwerp and Ghent, met with a warm

reception, which led him to underestimate the extent and seriousness of

the existing discontent. At Liège, a centre of Walloon liberalism, he

was annoyed by a number of petitions being presented to him; and, in a

moment of irritation, he described the conduct of those who there

protested against "pretended grievances" as infamous, "une conduite

in-fâme." The words gave deep offence; and the incident called forth a

parody of the League of the Beggars in 1566, an Order of Infamy being

started with a medal bearing the motto _fidèles jusqu' à l'infamie._ The

movement spread rapidly, but it remains a curious fact that the

animosity of the Belgians, as yet, was directed against the Dutch

ministers (especially Van Maanen the Minister of Justice) and the Dutch

people, whose overbearing attitude was bitterly resented, rather than

against the king or the House of Orange. William's good deeds for the

benefit of the country were appreciated; his arbitrary measures in

contravention to the Fundamental Law were attributed chiefly to his bad

advisers.

The month of December, 1829, was however to bring the king and his

Belgian subjects into violent collision. A motion was brought forward in

the Second Chamber (December 8) by M. Charles de Broukère, an eminent

Belgian liberal supported by the Catholics under the leadership of M. de

Gerlache, for the abolition of the hated Press Law of 1815. The motion

was defeated by the solid Dutch vote, supplemented by the support of

seven Belgians. The decennial budget was due, and opposition to it was

threatened unless grievances were remedied--the cry was "point de

redressements de griefs, point d'argent." On December 11 came a royal

message to the States-General which, while promising certain concessions

regarding the taxes, the _Collegium Philosophicum_ and the language

decree, stated in unequivocal terms the principle of royal absolutism.

To quote the words of a competent observer of these events:

The message declared in substance that the constitution was an act of

condescension on the part of the throne; that the king had restrained

rather than carried to excess the rights of his house; that the press

had been guilty of sowing discord and confusion throughout the State;

and that the opposition was but the fanatic working of a few misguided

men, who, forgetting the benefits they enjoyed, had risen up in an

alarming and scandalous manner against a paternal government[10].

The Minister of Justice, Van Maanen, on the next day issued a circular

calling upon all civil officials to signify their adherence to the

principles of the message within 24 hours. Several functionaries, who

had taken part in the petition-agitation, were summarily dismissed; and

prosecutions against the press were instituted with renewed energy. From

this time Van Maanen became the special object of Belgian hatred.

The threat of the Belgian deputies to oppose the decennial budget was

now carried out. At the end of December the ministerial proposals were

brought before the States-General. The expenditure was sanctioned, the

ways and means to meet it were rejected by 55 votes to 52. The Finance

Minister in this emergency was obliged to introduce fresh estimates for

one year only, from which the _mouture_ and _abbatage_ taxes were

omitted. This was passed without opposition, but in his vexation at this

rebuff the king acted unworthily of his position by issuing an _arrêté_

(January 8, 1830) depriving six deputies, who had voted in the majority,

of their official posts. Meanwhile the virulence of the attacks in the

press against the king and his ministers from the pens of a number of

able and unscrupulous journalists were too daring and offensive to be

overlooked by any government. Foremost in the bitterness of his

onslaught was Louis de Potter, whose _Lettre de Démophile au Roi_ was

throughout a direct challenge to the autocratic claims advanced by the

royal message. Nor was De Potter content only with words. An appeal

dated December 11, of which he and his friend Tielemans were

originators, appeared (January 31,1830) in seventeen news-papers, for

raising a national subscription to indemnify the deputies who had been

ejected from their posts and salaries for voting against the budget.

Proceedings were taken against De Potter and Tielemans, and also against

Barthels, editor of the _Catholique_, and the printer, De Nève, and all

were sentenced by the court to banishment--De Potter for eight years,

Tielemans and Barthels for seven years, DeNève for five years. These men

had all committed offences which the government were fully justified in

punishing, for their language had passed the limits not only of good

order but of decency, and was subversive of all authority. Nevertheless

they were regarded by their Belgian compatriots as political martyrs

suffering for the cause of their country's liberties. Their condemnation

was attributed to Van Maanen, already the object of general detestation.

The ministry had meanwhile taken the wise step of starting an organ, the

_National_, at Brussels to take their part in the field of controversy.

But in the circumstances it was an act of almost inconceivable folly to

select as the editor a certain Libri-Bagnano, a man of Italian

extraction, who, as it was soon discovered by his opponents, had twice

suffered heavy sentences in France as a forger. He was a brilliant and

caustic writer, well able to carry the polemical war into his

adversaries' camp. But his antecedents were against him, and he aroused

a hatred second only to the aversion felt for Van Maanen.

We have now arrived at the eve of the Belgian Revolt, which had its

actual origin in a riot. But the riot was not the cause of the revolt;

it was but the spark which brought about an explosion, the materials for

which had been for years preparing. The French secret agent, Julian,

reports a conversation which took place between the king and Count

Bylandt on July 20,1823[11]. The following extract proves that, so early

as this date, William had begun to perceive the impossibility of the

situation:

I say it and I repeat it often to Clancarty (the British Minister)

that I should love much better to have my Holland quite alone. I

should be then a hundred times happier.... When I am exerting

myself to make a whole of this country, a party, which in

collusion with the foreigner never ceases to gain ground, is

working to disunite it. Besides the allies have not given me this

kingdom to submit it to every kind of influence. This situation

cannot last.

Another extract from a despatch of the French Minister at the Hague,

Lamoussaye, dated December 26, 1828, depicts a state of things in the

relations between the two peoples, tending sooner or later to make a

political separation of some kind inevitable:

The Belgian hates the Hollander and he (the Hollander) despises

the Belgian, besides which he assumes an infinite _hauteur_, both

from his national character, by the creations of his industry and

by the memories of his history. Disdained by their neighbour of

the North, governed by a prince whose confidence they do not

possess, hindered in the exercise of their worship, and, as they

say, in the enjoyment of their liberties, overburdened with taxes,

having but a share in the National Representation disproportionate

to the population of the South, the Belgians ask themselves

whether they have a country, and are restless in a painful

situation, the outcome of which they seek vainly to discover[12].

From an intercepted letter from Louvain, dated July 30, 1829:

What does one see? Hesitation uncertainty, embarrassment and fear

in the march of the government; organisation, re-organisation and

finally disorganisation of all and every administration. Again a

rude shock and the machine crumbles.

A true forecast of coming events.

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History of Holland · 第 30 / 35 章