THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION WAR. WILLIAM IV, 1740-1751
The death of the Emperor Charles VI in October, 1740, was the signal for
the outbreak of another European war. All Charles' efforts on behalf of
the Pragmatic Sanction proved to have been labour spent in vain. Great
Britain, the United Provinces, Spain, Saxony, Poland, Russia, Sardinia,
Prussia, most of the smaller German States, and finally France, had
agreed to support (1738) the Pragmatic Sanction. The assent of Spain had
been bought by the cession of the two Sicilies; of France by that of
Lorraine, whose Duke Francis Stephen had married Maria Theresa and was
compensated by the Grand Duchy of Tuscany for the loss of his ancestral
domain. The only important dissentient was Charles Albert, Elector of
Bavaria, who had married the younger daughter of Joseph I and who
claimed the succession not only through his wife, but as the nearest
male descendant of Ferdinand I. On the death of Charles VI, then, it
might have been supposed that Maria Theresa would have succeeded to her
inheritance without opposition. This was far from being the case. The
Elector of Bavaria put forward his claims and he found unexpected
support in Frederick II of Prussia. Frederick had just succeeded his
father Frederick William I, and being at once ambitious and without
scruples he determined to seize the opportunity for the purpose of
territorial aggression. While lulling the suspicions of Vienna by
friendly professions, he suddenly, in December, 1740, invaded Silesia.
Maria Theresa appealed to the guarantors of the Pragmatic Sanction. She
met no active response, but on the part of Spain, Sardinia and France
veiled hostility. Great Britain, at war with Spain since 1739, and
fearing the intervention of France, confined her efforts to diplomacy;
and the only anxiety of the United Provinces was to avoid being drawn
into war. An addition was made to the army of 11,000 men and afterwards
in 1741, through dread of an attack on the Austrian Netherlands, a
further increase of 20,000 was voted. The garrisons and
fortifications of the barrier towns were strengthened and some addition
was made to the navy. But the policy of the States continued to be
vacillating and pusillanimous. The Republican party, who held the reins
of power, desiring peace at any price, were above all anxious to be on
good terms with France. The Orangist opposition were in favour of
joining with England in support of Maria Theresa; but the prince would
not take any steps to assert himself, and his partisans, deprived of
leadership, could exert little influence. Nor did they obtain much
encouragement from England, where Walpole was still intent upon a
pacific policy.
The events of 1741, however, were such as to compel a change of
attitude. The Prussians were in possession of Silesia; and spoliation,
having begun so successfully, became infectious. The aged Fleury was no
longer able to restrain the war party in France. In May at Nymphenburg a
league was formed by France, Spain, Sardinia, Saxony and Poland, in
conjunction with Prussia and Bavaria, to effect the overthrow of Maria
Theresa and share her inheritance between them. Resistance seemed
hopeless. A Franco-Bavarian army penetrated within a few miles of
Vienna, and then overran Bohemia. Charles Albert was crowned King of
Bohemia at Prague and then (January, 1742) was elected Emperor under the
title of Charles VII.
Before this election took place, however, English mediation had
succeeded by the convention of Klein-Schnellendorf in securing a
suspension of hostilities (October 9) between Austria and Prussia. This
left Frederick in possession of Silesia, but enabled the Queen of
Hungary, supported by English and Dutch subsidies, not only to clear
Bohemia from its invaders, but to conquer Bavaria. At the very time when
Charles Albert was elected Emperor, his own capital was occupied by his
enemies. In February, 1742, the long ministry of Walpole came to an end;
and the party in favour of a more active participation in the war
succeeded to office. George II was now thoroughly alarmed for the safety
of his Hanoverian dominions; and Lord Stair was sent to the Hague on a
special mission to urge the States to range themselves definitely on the
side of Maria Theresa. But fears of a French onslaught on the southern
Netherlands still caused timorous counsels to prevail. The French
ambassador, De Fénélon, on his part was lavish in vague promises not
unmingled with veiled threats, so that the feeble directors of Dutch
policy, torn between their duty to treaty obligations urged upon them by
England, and their dread of the military power of France, helplessly
resolved to cling to neutrality as long as possible. But events proved
too strong for them. Without asking their permission, an English force
of 16,000 men landed at Ostend and was sent to strengthen the garrison
of the barrier fortresses (May, 1742). The warlike operations of this
year were on the whole favourable to Maria Theresa, who through English
mediation, much against her will, secured peace with Prussia by the
cession of Silesia. The treaty between the two powers was signed at
Berlin on July 28. Hostilities with France continued; but, though both
the Maritime Powers helped Austria with subsidies, neither Great Britain
nor the States were at the close of the year officially at war with the
French king.
Such a state of precarious make-believe could not last much longer. The
Austrians were anxious that the English force in the Netherlands, which
had been reinforced and was known as the _Pragmatic Army_, should
advance into Bavaria to co-operate with the Imperial forces.
Accordingly the army, commanded by George II in person, advanced across
the Main to Dettingen. Here the king, shut in by French forces and cut
off from his supplies, was rescued from a very difficult position by the
valour of his troops, who on June 27, 1743 attacked and completely
routed their opponents. The States-General had already, on June 22,
recognised their responsibilities; and by a majority vote it was
determined that a force of 20,000 men under the command of Count Maurice
of Nassau-Ouwerkerk should join the _Pragmatic Army_.
The fiction that the Maritime Powers were not at war with France was
kept up until the spring of 1744, when the French king in alliance with
Spain declared war on England. One of the projects of the war party at
Versailles was the despatch of a powerful expedition to invade England
and restore the Stewarts. As soon as news of the preparations reached
England, a demand was at once made, in accordance with treaty, for naval
aid from the States. Twenty ships were asked for, but only eight were in
a condition to sail; and the admiral in command, Grave, was 73 years of
age and had been for fifteen years in retirement. What an object lesson
of the utter decay of the Dutch naval power! Fortunately a storm
dispersed the French fleet, and the services of the auxiliary squadron
were not required.
The news that Marshal Maurice de Saxe was about to invade the Austrian
Netherlands with a French army of 80,000 men came like a shock upon the
peace party in the States. The memory of 1672 filled them with terror.
The pretence of neutrality could no longer be maintained. The choice lay
between peace at any price or war with all its risks; and it was
doubtful which of the two alternatives was the worse. Was there indeed
any choice? It did not seem so, when De Fénélon, who had represented
France at the Hague for nineteen years, came to take leave of the
States-General on his appointment to a command in the invading army
(April 26). But a last effort was made. An envoy-extraordinary, the
Count of Wassenaer-Twickel, was sent to Paris, but found that the king
was already with his army encamped between Lille and Tournay. Wassenaer
was amused with negotiations for awhile, but there was no pause in the
rapid advance of Marshal Saxe. The barrier fortresses, whose defences
had been neglected, fell rapidly one after another. All west Flanders
was overrun. The allied forces, gathered at Oudenarde, were at first too
weak to offer resistance, and were divided in counsels. Gradually
reinforcements came in, but still the Pragmatic army remained inactive
and was only saved from inevitable defeat by the invasion of Alsace by
the Imperialists. Marshal Saxe was compelled to despatch a considerable
part of the invading army to meet this attack on the eastern frontier,
and to act on the defensive in Flanders. Menin, Courtrai, Ypres, Knocke
and other places remained, however, in French hands.
All this time the Dutch had maintained the fiction that the States were
not at war with France; but in January, 1745, the pressure of
circumstances was too strong even for the weak-kneed Van der Heim and
his fellow-statesmen, and a quadruple alliance was formed between
England, Austria, Saxony and the United Provinces to maintain the
Pragmatic Sanction. This was followed in March by the declaration of war
between France and the States. Meanwhile the position of Austria had
improved. The Emperor Charles VII died on January 20; and his youthful
successor Maximilian Joseph, in return for the restoration of his
electorate, made peace with Maria Theresa and withdrew all Bavarian
claims to the Austrian succession. Affairs in Flanders however did not
prosper. The command-in-chief of the allied army had been given to the
Duke of Cumberland, who was no match for such an opponent as Maurice de
Saxe. The Prince of Waldeck was in command of the Dutch contingent.
The provinces of Friesland, Groningen, Overyssel and Gelderland had
repeatedly urged that this post should be bestowed upon the Prince of
Orange; and the States-General had in 1742 offered to give William the
rank of lieutenant-general in the army, but Holland and Zeeland steadily
refused. The campaign of 1745 was disastrous. The battle of Fontenoy
(May 11) resulted in a victory for Marshal Saxe over the allied forces,
a victory snatched out of the fire through the pusillanimous withdrawal
from the fight of the Dutch troops on the left wing. The British
infantry with magnificent valour on the right centre had pierced through
the French lines, only to find themselves deserted and overwhelmed by
superior forces. This victory was vigorously followed up. The Jacobite
rising under Charles Edward, the young Pretender, had necessitated the
recalling not only of the greater part of the English expeditionary
force, but also, under the terms of the treaties between Great Britain
and the United Provinces, of a body of 6000 Dutch. Before the year 1745
had ended, Tournay, Ghent, Bruges, Oudenarde, Dendermonde, Ostend,
Nieuport, Ath fell in succession into the hands of Marshal Saxe, and
after a brave defence Brussels itself was forced to capitulate on
February 19, 1746.
Van der Heim and the Republican conclave in whose hands was the
direction of foreign affairs, dreading the approach of the French armies
to the Dutch frontier, sent the Count de Larrey on a private mission to
Paris in November, 1745, to endeavour to negotiate terms of peace. He
was unsuccessful; and in February, 1746 another fruitless effort was
made, Wassenaer and Jacob Gilles being the envoys. The French minister,
D'Argenson, was not unwilling to discuss matters with them; and
negotiations went on for some time in a more or less desultory way, but
without in any way checking the alarming progress of hostilities. An
army 120,000 strong under Marshal Saxe found for some months no force
strong enough to resist it. Antwerp, Louvain, Mechlin, Mons, Charleroi,
Huy and finally Namur (September 21) surrendered to the French. At last
(October 11) a powerful allied army under the command of Charles of
Lorraine made a stand at Roucoux. A hardly-fought battle, in which both
sides lost heavily, ended in the victory of the French. Liège was taken,
and the French were now masters of Belgium.
These successes made the Dutch statesmen at the Hague the more anxious
to conclude peace. D'Argenson had always been averse to an actual
invasion of Dutch territory; and it was arranged between him and the
Dutch envoys, Wassenaer and Gilles, at Paris, and between the
council-pensionary Van der Heim and the Abbé de la Ville at the Hague,
that a congress should meet at Breda in August, in which England
consented to take part. Before it met, however, Van der Heim had died
(August 15). He was succeeded by Jacob Gilles. The congress was destined
to make little progress, for several of the provinces resented the way
in which a small handful of men had secretly been committing the
Republic to the acceptance of disadvantageous and humiliating terms of
peace, without obtaining the consent of the States-General to their
proposals. The congress did not actually assemble till October, and
never got further than the discussion of preliminaries, for the war
party won possession of power at Paris, and Louis XV dismissed
D'Argenson. Moderate counsels were thrown to the winds; and it was
determined in the coming campaign to carry the war into Dutch territory.
Alarm at the threatening attitude of the French roused the allies to
collect an army of 90,000 men, of whom more than half were Austrian;
but, instead of Charles of Lorraine, the Duke of Cumberland was placed
in command. Marshal Saxe, at the head of the main French force, held
Cumberland in check, while he despatched Count Löwenthal with 20,000 to
enter Dutch Flanders. His advance was a triumphal progress. Sluis,
Cadsand and Axel surrendered almost without opposition. Only the timely
arrival of an English squadron in the Scheldt saved Zeeland from
invasion.
The news of these events caused an immense sensation. For some time
popular resentment against the feebleness and jobbery of the
stadholderless government had been deep and strong. Indignation knew no
bounds; and the revolutionary movement to which it gave rise was as
sudden and complete in 1747 as in 1672. All eyes were speedily turned to
the Prince of Orange as the saviour of the country. The movement began
on April 25 at Veere and Middelburg in the island of Walcheren. Three
days later the Estates of the Province proclaimed the prince stadholder
and captain-and admiral-general of Zeeland. The province of Holland,
where the stadholderless form of government was so deeply rooted and had
its most stubborn and determined supporters, followed the example of
Zeeland on May 3, Utrecht on May 5, and Overyssel on May 10. The
States-General appointed him captain-and admiral-general of the Union.
Thus without bloodshed or disturbance of any kind or any personal effort
on the part of the prince, he found himself by general consent invested
with all the posts of dignity and authority which had been held by
Frederick Henry and William III. It was amidst scenes of general popular
rejoicing that William visited Amsterdam, the Hague and Middelburg, and
prepared to set about the difficult task to which he had been called.
One of the first results of the change of government was the closing of
the Congress of Breda. There was no improvement, however, in the
military position. The allied army advancing under Cumberland and
Waldeck, to prevent Marshal Saxe from laying siege to Maestricht, was
attacked by him at Lauffeldt on July 2. The fight was desperately
contested, and the issue was on the whole in favour of the allies, when
at a critical moment the Dutch gave way; and the French were able to
claim, though at very heavy cost, a doubtful victory. It enabled Saxe
nevertheless to despatch a force under Löwenthal to besiege the
important fortress of Bergen-op-Zoom. It was carried by assault on
September 16, and with it the whole of Dutch Brabant fell into the
enemy's hands.
Indignation against the rule of the burgher-regents, which had been
instrumental in bringing so many disasters upon the Republic, was very
general; and there was a loudly expressed desire that the prince should
be invested with greater powers, as the "eminent head" of the State.
With this object in view, on the proposal of the nobles of Holland, the
Estates of that province made the dignity of stadholder and of
captain-and admiral-general hereditary in both the male and female
lines. All the other provinces passed resolutions to the same effect;
and the States-General made the offices of captain-and admiral-general
of the Union also hereditary. In the case of a minority, the
Princess-Mother was to be regent; in that of a female succession the
heiress could only marry with the consent of the States, it being
provided that the husband must be of the Reformed religion, and not a
king or an elector.
Strong measures were taken to prevent the selling of offices and to do
away with the system of farming out the taxes. The post-masterships in
Holland, which produced a large revenue, were offered to the prince;
but, while undertaking the charge, he desired that the profits should
be applied to the use of the State. Indeed they were sorely needed, for
though William would not hear of peace and sent Count Bentinck to
England to urge a vigorous prosecution of the war in conjunction with
Austria and Russia in 1748, promising a States contingent of 70,000 men,
it was found that, when the time for translating promises into action
came, funds were wanting. Holland was burdened with a heavy debt; and
the contributions of most of the provinces to the Generality were
hopelessly in arrears. In Holland a "voluntary loan" was raised, which
afterwards extended to the other provinces and also to the Indies, at
the rate of 1 per cent. on properties between 1000 fl. and 2000 fl.; of
2 per cent. on those above 2000 fl. The loan (_mildegift_) produced a
considerable sum, about 50,000,000 fl.; but this was not enough, and the
prince had the humiliation of writing and placing before the English
government the hopeless financial state of the Republic, and their need
of a very large loan, if they were to take any further part in the war.
This pitiful revelation of the condition of their ally decided Great
Britain to respond to the overtures for peace on the part of France. The
representatives of the powers met at Aix-la-Chapelle; and, as the
English and French were both thoroughly tired of the war, they soon came
to terms. The preliminaries of peace between them were signed on April
30, 1748, on the principle of a restoration of conquests. In this treaty
of Aix-la-Chapelle the United Provinces were included, but no better
proof could be afforded of the low estate to which the Dutch Republic
had now fallen than the fact that its representatives at
Aix-la-Chapelle, Bentinck and Van Haren, were scarcely consulted and
exercised practically no influence upon the decisions. The French
evacuated the southern Netherlands in return for the restoration to them
of the colony of Cape Breton, which had fallen into the hands of the
English; and the barrier towns were again allowed to receive Dutch
garrisons. It was a useless concession, for their fortifications had
been destroyed, and the States could no longer spare the money to make
them capable of serious defence.
The position of William IV all this time was exceptionally responsible,
and therefore the more trying. Never before had any Prince of Orange
been invested with so much power. The glamour attaching to the name of
Orange was perhaps the chief asset of the new stadholder in facing the
serious difficulties into which years of misgovernment had plunged
the country. He had undoubtedly the people at his back, but
unfortunately they expected an almost magical change would take place in
the situation with his elevation to the stadholderate. Naturally they
were disappointed. The revolution of 1747 was not carried out in the
spirit of "thorough," which marked those of 1618, 1650 and 1672. William
IV was cast in a mould different from that of Maurice or William II,
still more from that of his immediate predecessor William III. He was a
man of wide knowledge, kindly, conciliatory, and deeply religious, but
only a mediocre statesman. He was too undecided in his opinions, too
irresolute in action, to be a real leader in a crisis.
The first business was to bring back peace to the country; and this was
achieved, not by any influence that the Netherlands government was able
to exercise upon the course of the negotiations at Aix-la-Chapelle, but
simply as a part of the understanding arrived at by Great Britain and
France. It was for the sake of their own security that the English
plenipotentiaries were willing to give up their conquests in North
America as compensation for the evacuation of those portions of Belgium
and of the Republic that the French forces occupied, and the restoration
of the barrier fortresses.
After peace was concluded, not only the Orange partisans but the great
mass of the people, who had so long been excluded from all share of
political power, desired a drastic reform of the government. They had
conferred sovereign authority upon William, and would have willingly
increased it, in the hope that he would in his person be a centre of
unity to the State, and would use his power for the sweeping away of
abuses. It was a vain hope. He never attempted to do away, root and
branch, with the corrupt municipal oligarchies, but only to make them
more tolerable by the infusion of a certain amount of new blood.
The birth of an heir on March 8,1748, caused great rejoicings, for it
promised permanence to the new order of things. Whatever the prince had
firmly taken in hand would have met with popular approval, but William
had little power of initiative or firmness of principle. He allowed his
course of action to be swayed now by one set of advisers, now by their
opponents. Even in the matter of the farmers of the revenue, the
best-hated men throughout the Republic and especially in Holland, it
required popular tumults and riots at Haarlem, Leyden, the Hague and
Amsterdam, in which the houses of the obnoxious officials were
attacked and sacked, to secure the abolition of a system by which the
proceeds of taxation were diverted from the service of the State to fill
the pockets of venal and corrupt officials. In Amsterdam the spirit of
revolt against the domination of the Town Council by a few patrician
families led to serious disorders and armed conflicts in which blood
was shed; and in September, 1748, the prince, at the request of the
Estates, visited the turbulent city. As the Town Council proved
obstinate in refusing to make concessions, the stadholder was compelled
to take strong action. The Council was dismissed from office, but here,
as elsewhere, the prince was averse from making a drastic purge; out of
the thirty-six members, more than half, nineteen, were restored. The new
men, who thus took their seats in the Town Council, obtained the
_sobriquet_ of "Forty-Eighters."
The state of both the army and navy was deplorable at the end of the
war in which the States had played so inglorious a part. William
had neither the training nor the knowledge to undertake their
reorganisation. He therefore sought the help of Lewis Ernest, Duke of
Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel (1718-86), who, as an Austrian field-marshal,
had distinguished himself in the war. Brunswick was with difficulty
persuaded, in October, 1749, to accept the post of Dutch field-marshal,
a salary of 60,000 fl. being guaranteed to him, the governorship of
Hertogenbosch, and the right to retain his rank in the Austrian army.
The duke did not actually arrive in Holland and take up his duties until
December, 1750.
The prince's efforts to bring about a reform of the Admiralties, to make
the Dutch navy an efficient force and to restore the commerce and
industries of the country were well meant, but were marred by the
feebleness of his health. All through the year 1750 he had recurring
attacks of illness and grew weaker. On October 22, 1751, he died. It is
unfair to condemn William IV because he did not rise to the height of
his opportunities. When in 1747 power was thrust upon him so suddenly,
no man could have been more earnest in his wish to serve his country.
But he was not gifted with the great abilities and high resolve of
William III; and there can be no doubt that the difficulties with which
he had to contend were manifold, complex and deep-rooted. A
valetudinarian like William IV was not fitted to be the physician of a
body-politic suffering from so many diseases as that of the United
Provinces in 1747.
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