THE LAST YEARS OF DE WITT'S ADMINISTRATION, 1665-1672. THE SECOND
ENGLISH WAR. THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE. THE FRENCH INVASION
THE declaration of war in March, 1665, found the Dutch navy, thanks to
the prescience and personal care of the council-pensionary, far better
prepared for a struggle with the superior resources of its English rival
than was the case in 1654. John de Witt, aided by his brother Cornelis,
had supplied the lack of an admiral-general by urging the various
Admiralty Boards to push on the building of vessels in size,
construction and armaments able to contend on equal terms with the
English men-of-war. He had, moreover, with his usual industry taken
great pains to study the details of admiralty-administration and naval
science; and now, in company with the Commissioners of the
States-General, he visited all the ports and dockyards and saw that
every available ship was got ready for immediate service, provided with
seasoned crews, and with ample stores and equipment. The English on
their side were equally ready for the encounter. After the death of
Cromwell the fleet had been neglected, but during the five years that
had passed since the Restoration steps had been taken to bring it to an
even greater strength and efficiency than before. Whatever may have
been the faults of the Stewart kings, neglect of the navy could not be
laid to their charge. One of the first steps of Charles II was to
appoint his brother James, Duke of York, to the post of
Lord-High-Admiral; and James was unremitting in his attention to his
duties, and a most capable naval administrator and leader, while Charles
himself never ceased during his reign to take a keen interest in naval
matters. In his case, as previously in the case of his father, it was
lack of the necessary financial means that alone prevented him from
creating an English fleet that would be capable of asserting that
"sovereignty in the narrow seas," which was the traditional claim of the
English monarchy.
The English were ready before the Dutch, who were hampered in their
preparations by having five distinct Boards of Admiralty. The Duke of
York put to sea with a fleet of 100 ships at the end of April and,
cruising off the coast of Holland, cut off the main Dutch fleet in the
Texel from the Zeeland contingent. It was unfortunate for Holland that
Michael Adriansz de Ruyter, one of the greatest of seamen, was at this
time still in the Mediterranean Obdam, to whom the chief command was
given, waited until a storm drove the enemy to their harbours. He then
united all the Dutch squadrons and crossing to Southwold Bay found the
English fleet ready for battle. After some manoeuvring the action was
joined on June 13, and after a bloody fight ended most disastrously for
the Dutch. The flag-ships in the course of the struggle became closely
engaged, with the result that Obdam's vessel suddenly blew up, while
that of the English admiral was seriously damaged and he himself
wounded. The Dutch line had already been broken, and the fate of their
commander decided the issue. The Dutch in great confusion sought the
shelter of their shoals, but their habit of firing at the masts and
rigging had so crippled their opponents that a vigorous pursuit was
impossible. Nevertheless the English had gained at the first encounter a
decided victory. Sixteen Dutch ships were sunk or destroyed, nine
captured, and at least 2000 men were killed, including three admirals,
and as many more taken prisoners. The English had but one vessel sunk,
and their casualties did not amount to more than a third of the Dutch
losses. The consternation and anger in Holland was great. Jan Evertsen,
the second-in-command, and a number of the captains were tried by
court-martial; and the reorganisation of the fleet was entrusted to
Cornells Tromp, who, encouraged and aided by the council-pensionary,
set himself with great energy to the task.
The English meanwhile were masters of the sea, though administrative
shortcomings, defects of victualling and shortage of men prevented them
from taking full advantage of their success. Early in August, however, a
fleet under the Earl of Sandwich attempted to capture a number of Dutch
East Indiamen, who had sailed round the north of Scotland. The East
Indiamen took refuge in the neutral port of Bergen. Here Sandwich
ventured to attack them but was driven off by the forts. While he was
thus engaged in the north the Channel was left free; and De Ruyter with
his squadron seized the opportunity to return to home-waters without
opposition. His arrival was of the greatest value to the Dutch, and he
was with universal approval appointed to succeed Obdam as
lieutenant-admiral of Holland, and was given the supreme command on the
sea. Tromp, angry at being superseded, was with difficulty induced to
serve under the new chief, but he had to yield to the force of public
opinion. De Ruyter at once gave proof of his skill by bringing back
safely the East Indiamen from Bergen, though a severe storm caused some
losses, both to the fleet and the convoy. The damage was however by the
energy of De Witt and the admiral quickly repaired; and De Ruyter again
sailed out at the beginning of October to seek the English fleet. He
cruised in the Channel and off the mouth of the Thames, but no enemy
vessels were to be seen; and at the end of the month fresh storms
brought the naval campaign of 1665 to a close, on the whole to the
advantage of the English.
Nor were the misfortunes of the Dutch confined to maritime warfare.
Between England and Holland indeed the war was entirely a sea affair,
neither of them possessing an army strong enough to land on the enemy's
coast with any hope of success; but the United Provinces were
particularly vulnerable on their eastern frontier, and Charles II
concluded an alliance with the Bishop of Münster, who had a grievance
against the States on account of a disputed border-territory, the
lordship of Borkelo. Subsidised by England, the bishop accordingly at
the head of 18,000 men (September, 1665) overran a considerable part of
Drente and Overyssel and laid it waste. There was at first no organised
force to oppose him. It had been the policy of Holland to cut down the
army, and the other provinces were not unwilling to follow her example.
No field-marshal had been appointed to succeed Brederode; there was no
army of the Union under a captain-general, but seven small provincial
armies without a military head. Some thousands of fresh troops were now
raised and munitions of war collected, but to whom should the chief
command be given? William Frederick was dead (October 31, 1664) and had
been succeeded by his youthful son, Henry Casimir, in the Stadholderate
of Friesland. Joan Maurice of Nassau had withdrawn from the Netherlands
and was Governor of Cleves in the service of Brandenburg. He was however
persuaded to place himself at the head of the army, though complaining
bitterly of the inadequacy of the forces placed at his disposal. De
Witt, however, had not been idle. He secured the assistance of
Brunswick-Lüneburg, and an army of 12,000 Brunswickers under the command
of George Frederick von Waldeck attacked Münster; while a force of 6000
French likewise, under the terms of the treaty of 1662, advanced to the
help of the Dutch. Threatened also by Brandenburg, the bishop was
compelled to withdraw his troops for home defence and in April, 1666,
was glad to conclude peace with the States.
French naval co-operation against England was also promised; and war was
actually declared by Louis XIV in the early spring of 1666. The real
cause of this strong action was due to other motives than enmity to
England. The death of Philip IV of Spain in September, 1665, had brought
nearer the prospect of there being no heir-male to the vast Spanish
monarchy. The French Queen, Maria Theresa, was the eldest child of
Philip; and, though on her marriage she had renounced her claim to the
Spanish throne, it was well known that Louis intended to insist upon her
rights, particularly in regard to the Spanish Netherlands. He was afraid
that the States, always suspicious of his ambitious projects, might be
tempted to come to terms with England on the basis of a defensive
alliance against French aggression in Flanders and Brabant, for both
powers were averse to seeing Antwerp in French hands. To avert this
danger Louis determined to take part in the war on the side of the
Dutch. The move however was diplomatic rather than serious, for the
French admiral, de Beaufort, never sailed into the North Sea or effected
a junction with the Dutch fleet. Nevertheless, as will be seen, his
presence in the Atlantic exercised an important effect upon the naval
campaign of 1666.
The English fleet was not ready until the beginning of June. The ravages
of the plague and financial difficulties had caused delay; and the fleet
only numbered about eighty sail, including a squadron which had been
recalled from the Mediterranean. The "Generals-at-Sea," as they were
called, were Monk and Rupert. They began by committing the great blunder
of dividing their force. Rupert was detached with twenty ships to keep
watch over de Beaufort, a diversion which had serious consequences for
the English. The Dutch fleet, consisting of seventy-two men-of-war with
twelve frigates, was the most powerful that the Admiralties had ever
sent to sea, not in numbers but in the quality of the ships. De Witt
himself had supervised the preparations and had seen that the equipment
was complete in every respect. De Ruyter was in supreme command and led
the van, Cornelis Evertsen the centre, Cornelis Tromp the rear. On June
11 the English fleet under Monk was sighted between the North Foreland
and Dunkirk, and the famous Four Days' Battle was begun. The English had
only fifty-four ships, but having the weather gauge Monk attacked
Tromp's squadron with his whole force; nor was it till later in the day
that De Ruyter and Evertsen were able to come to the relief of their
colleague. Night put an end to an indecisive contest, in which both
sides lost heavily. The next day Monk renewed the attack, at first with
some success; but, De Ruyter having received a reinforcement of sixteen
ships, the weight of numbers told and Monk was forced to retreat. On the
third morning De Ruyter pursued his advantage, but the English admiral
conducted his retirement in a most masterly manner, his rear squadron
covering the main body and fighting stubbornly. Several ships, however,
including the flag-ship of Vice-Admiral Ayscue, had to be abandoned and
were either destroyed or captured by the Dutch. At the end of the day
Monk had only twenty-eight ships left fit for service. Very opportunely
he was now rejoined by Rupert's squadron and other reinforcements; and
on the fourth morning the two fleets confronted one another in almost
equal numbers, each having some sixty vessels. Once more therefore the
desperate struggle was resumed and with initial advantage to the
English. Rupert forced his way through the Dutch fleet, which was for
awhile divided. But the English habit of firing at the hulls, though it
did most damage, was not so effective as the Dutch system of aiming at
the masts and rigging in crippling the freedom of tacking and
manoeuvring; and Monk and Rupert were unable to prevent De Ruyter from
re-uniting his whole force, and bearing down with it upon the enemy. The
English were forced to retreat again, leaving several of their "lamed"
vessels behind. They lost in all ten ships besides fireships, something
like 3000 killed and wounded and 2500 prisoners. Vice-Admiral Berkeley
was killed, Vice-Admiral Ayscue taken prisoner. Nor were the Dutch much
better off. Four or five of their ships were sunk, a number severely
damaged, and their casualty list was probably as large as that of their
foes. Nevertheless the victory was undoubtedly theirs; and the fleet on
its return was greeted with public rejoicings in Holland and Zeeland.
The triumph was of short duration.
By vigorous efforts on both sides the damaged fleets were rapidly
repaired. De Ruyter was the first to put to sea (July 9) with some
ninety ships; three weeks later Monk and Rupert left the Thames with an
equal force. The encounter took place on August 4. It ended in a
decisive English victory after some fierce and obstinate fighting. The
Dutch van, after losing its two admirals, Evertsen and De Vries, gave
way. Monk and Rupert then attacked with a superior force the centre
under De Ruyter himself, who to save his fleet from destruction was
compelled to take refuge behind the Dutch shoals. Meanwhile the squadron
under Tromp, driving before it the rear squadron of the English, had
become separated and unable to come to De Ruyter's assistance. For this
abandonment he was bitterly reproached by De Ruyter and accused of
desertion. The quarrel necessitated Tromp's being deprived of his
command, as the States-General could not afford to lose the services of
the admiral-in-chief.
For a time the English were now masters of the narrow seas, and,
cruising along the Dutch coast, destroyed a great number of Dutch
merchantmen, made some rich prizes and even landed on the island of
Terschelling, which was pillaged. Lack of supplies at length compelled
them to withdraw for the purpose of revictualling. On this De Ruyter,
accompanied by Cornelis de Witt as special commissioner, sailed out in
the hopes of effecting a junction with De Beaufort. Rupert also put to
sea again, but storms prevented a meeting between the fleets and
sickness also seriously interfered with their efficiency. De Ruyter
himself fell ill; and, though John de Witt was himself with the fleet,
no further operations were attempted. Both sides had become weary and
exhausted and anxious for peace.
To De Witt the war had been from the outset distasteful; and he had been
much disturbed by the constant intrigues of the Orangist party to
undermine his position. He was aware that in this hour of the country's
need the eyes of a considerable part of the people, even in Holland,
were more and more directed to the young prince. There was a magic in
his name, which invested the untried boy with the reflected glory of his
ancestor's great deeds. The council-pensionary, a past-master in the
arts of expediency, was driven to avert the danger which threatened
the supremacy of the States party, by proposing to the Princess Amalia
that the province of Holland should not only charge themselves with
William's education, but should adopt him as "a Child of State." It was
a short-sighted device for, as the princess shrewdly saw, this
exceptional position assigned to her grandson must ensure, when he grew
to man's estate, the reversion of his ancestral dignities. She willingly
assented; and in April, 1666, the Estates of Holland appointed a
Commission, of which John de Witt was himself the head, which was
entrusted with the religious and political instruction of the prince. A
few months later De Witt was to discover that Orangist intrigues were
being still clandestinely carried on. An officer of French extraction,
the lord of Buat, though an Orange partisan, had been employed by the
pensionary to make tentative proposals of peace to the English court
through Lord Arlington. In August a packet of intercepted letters showed
that Buat had played him false and was seeking to compass his overthrow.
Buat was brought to trial, condemned to death, and executed on October
11.
This strong action by the council-pensionary did not prevent, however,
the preliminaries of a peaceful settlement being discussed both at the
Hague and in London during the winter months, with the result that a
conference of delegates representing Great Britain, the United Provinces
and France, met at Breda in May, 1667, to discuss the terms of peace.
But the negotiations did not progress. The English envoys raised afresh
all the old questions, while the Dutch were not ready to concede
anything unless the Navigation Act was largely modified. In these
circumstances De Witt determined by bold action to try to expedite the
negotiations in a sense favourable to Holland. He knew that the English
were unprepared. Charles II, in opposition to the advice of Rupert, Monk
and the Duke of York, had refused to spend money in preparation for a
campaign at sea, which he felt confident would never take place. The
ravages of the plague and of the Great Fire of London had made the year
1666 one of the darkest in English history and had caused the heavy
financial drain and losses of the war to be more severely felt. There
was widespread discontent in the country; and the king in sore financial
distress was immovable in his resolve that no steps should be taken for
refitting the fleet. The ships remained laid up in port, although the
Dutch despatched in April a squadron to the Firth of Forth and dominated
the Channel.
In deep secrecy De Witt now made preparations for the despatch of a
great fleet with orders to sail up the estuary of the Thames and attack
the English ships in harbour. De Ruyter, accompanied by Cornelis de
Witt, left the Texel on June 14, at the head of a fleet numbering more
than eighty vessels. A squadron under Admiral Van Ghent sailed up the
Thames on June 19, followed by the main body. Sheerness was captured,
and on the 22nd De Ruyter determined to force his way up the Medway. The
river had been blocked by drawing up a line of ships behind a heavy
chain. The Dutch fire-ships broke through the chain and burnt the
vessels, and then proceeding upwards burnt, scuttled or captured some
sixteen vessels, among the latter the flag-ship, _Royal Charles_. The
sound of the Dutch guns was heard in London and for a time panic
reigned. But the narrowness of the river and the prompt measures that
were taken to call out the militia and man the forts prevented any
further success. The Dutch fleet withdrew to the Nore and, beyond
blocking the mouth of the river, were able to effect no further damage.
The blow to English prestige was however irreparable, and the people
felt deeply humiliated that short-sightedness and lack of preparation on
the part of the government should have exposed them to an insult galling
to the national pride. One of its consequences, as had been anticipated
by De Witt, was a more conciliatory attitude on the part of the English
envoys at Breda. Peace was concluded on July 26, on terms more
favourable than the Dutch could have expected. The Navigation Act was
modified, various commercial advantages were conceded and Poeloe-Rum
was retained. On the other hand, the custom of the striking of the flag
remained unchanged. It was agreed that the English colony of Surinam,
which had been captured in March, 1667, by a Zeeland squadron should be
kept in exchange for New York, an exchange advantageous to both parties.
By the treaty of Breda the Dutch republic attained the summit of its
greatness, and the supremacy of De Witt appeared to be not only secure
but unassailable. Yet events were preparing which were destined to
undermine the prosperity of Holland and the position of the statesman to
whom in so large a measure that prosperity was due. France under the
absolute rule of Louis XIV had become by far the most powerful State
in Europe, and the king was bent upon ambitious and aggressive projects.
It has already been explained that after the death of Philip IV of Spain
he claimed for his queen, Maria Theresa, the succession, by the
so-called "law of devolution," to a large part of the southern
Netherlands. He now determined that the hour had come for enforcing his
claim. In May, 1667, before the treaty of Breda had been signed, a
French army of 50,000 men crossed the Belgic frontier. Castel-Rodrigo,
the Spanish governor, had no force at his disposal for resisting so
formidable an invasion; fortress after fortress fell into French hands;
and Flanders, Brabant and Hainault were speedily overrun. This rapid
advance towards their borders caused no small consternation in Holland,
and De Witt's efforts to reach an understanding with King Louis proved
unavailing. The States were not in a position to attempt an armed
intervention, and the once formidable Spanish power was now feeble and
decrepit. The only hope lay in the formation of a coalition. De Witt
therefore turned to England and Sweden for help.
The anti-French party in Sweden was then predominant; and Dohna, the
Swedish ambassador at the Hague, was ordered to go to London, there to
further the efforts of the newly appointed Dutch envoy, John Meerman,
for the formation of a coalition to check French aggrandisement. They
had difficulties to overcome. The English were sore at the results of
the peace of Breda. Charles disliked the Dutch and was personally
indebted to Louis XIV for many favours. But the feeling in England was
strongly averse to French aggression towards Antwerp. The fall of
Clarendon from power at this time and the accession of Arlington, who
was son-in-law to Beverweert, turned the scale in favour of the
proposals of De Witt; and Charles found himself obliged to yield. Sir
William Temple, whose residence as English minister at Brussels had
convinced him of the gravity of the French menace, was ordered to go to
the Hague to confer personally with the council-pensionary and then to
proceed to London. His mission was most promptly and skilfully carried
out. His persuasiveness overcame all obstacles. After a brief stay in
London he returned to the Hague, January 17, 1668. Even the proverbial
slowness of the complicated machinery of the Dutch government did not
hinder him from carrying out his mission with almost miraculous
rapidity. Having first secured the full support of De Witt to his
proposals, he next, with the aid of the council-pensionary, pressed
the urgency of the case upon the States-General with such convincing
arguments that the treaty between England and the United Provinces was
signed on January 23. Three days afterwards Dohna was able to announce
the adhesion of the Swedish government; and on January 26, the Triple
Alliance was an accomplished fact. It was essentially a defensive
alliance, and its main object was to offer mediation between France and
Spain in order to moderate the French claims and to back up their
mediation, if necessity should arise, by joint action. As a preliminary
precaution, a strong force was promptly placed under the command of Joan
Maurice of Nassau, and a fleet of forty-eight ships was fitted out.
These steps had their effect. Louis, suddenly confronted by this
formidable coalition, preferred to accept mediation, though it involved
his waiving a portion of his pretensions. Knowing well that the alliance
was a very unstable one, for the consent of Charles was given under
duress and the aims of Sweden were mercenary, he foresaw that by biding
his time, he could have ample revenge later upon the republic of traders
who had ventured to thwart him. At a meeting at St Germain-en-Laye
between the French Foreign Minister, Lionne, and the Dutch and English
ambassadors, Van Beuningen and Trevor, preliminaries were settled on
April 15. These were confirmed by a conference of representatives of all
the interested States at Aix-la-Chapelle (May 2), in which Temple took
an active part. Louis gave up Franche-Comté, which he had conquered, but
retained Mons, Courtrai, Tournai, Lille, Charleroi and other frontier
towns. This treaty, following on that of Breda, was the crowning
triumph of De Witt's administration, for it had given to the Dutch
Republic a decisive voice in the Councils of the Great Powers of Europe.
But, though he had proved himself so successful in the fields of
diplomacy and statesmanship, the position of the council-pensionary had,
during the course of the English war, become distinctly weaker. De
Witt's authoritative ways, his practical monopoly of power, and his
bestowal of so many posts upon his relatives and friends, aroused
considerable jealousy and irritation. Cabals began to be formed against
him and old supporters to fall away. He lost the help of Van Beverningh,
who resigned the office of Treasurer-General, and he managed to estrange
Van Beuningen, who had much influence in Amsterdam. The Bickers and De
Graeffs were no longer supreme in that city, where a new party under the
leadership of Gillis Valckenier had acceded to power. This party, with
which Van Beuningen now associated himself, was at present rather
anti-De Witt than pro-Orange. Valckenier and Beuningen became in
succession burgomasters; and De Witt's friend, Pieter de Groot, had to
resign the office of pensionary. In the Estates of Holland, therefore,
De Witt had to face opposition, one of the leaders being the able
Pensionary of Haarlem, Caspar Fagel. And all this time he had ever
before his eyes the fact that the Prince of Orange could not much longer
remain "the Child of State"; and that, when he passed out of the
tutelage of the Estates of Holland, his future position would have to be
settled. De Witt had himself devoted much personal care to William's
instruction; and the prince had submitted patiently and apparently with
contentment to the restrictions with which he was surrounded. Physically
weakly, his health was at all times delicate, but his intelligence was
remarkable and his will-power extraordinary. Cold and impenetrable in
manner and expression, unbending in his haughty aloofness, he knew how
with perfect courtesy to keep his own counsel and to refrain from giving
utterance to an unguarded word. But behind this chilling and sphinx-like
exterior was a mind of singular precocity, already filled with deep-laid
schemes and plans for the future, confident that his opportunity would
come, and preparing when the hour struck to seize it. One can well
imagine how anxiously in their many personal interviews the
council-pensionary must have tried to read what was passing in his
pupil's inmost thoughts, only to be baffled.
So early as August, 1667, steps had been taken by the Estates of Holland
to forestall the danger that threatened. On the proposal of Van
Beuningen and Valckenier, who had not yet detached themselves from the
States party, an edict was passed to which, somewhat infelicitously, the
name of the "Eternal Edict" was given. It abolished in Holland the
office of stadholder for ever and affirmed the right of the
town-corporations (_vroedschappen_) to elect their own magistrates. It
was further resolved to invite the other provinces to declare that no
stadholder could hold either the captain-or admiral-generalship of the
Union. This resolution was styled the "Concept of Harmony." Deputations
were sent to urge the acceptation of the Concept; and De Witt himself
used his utmost power of persuasion to bring about a general
agreement. He was successful in Utrecht, Gelderland and Overyssel. But
Zeeland, Friesland and Groningen, where the Orangists were strong,
refused to give their assent; and the approval of the States-General was
only carried by a bare majority. De Witt himself doubtless knew that the
erection of this paper barrier against the inherited influence of one
bearing the honoured title of Prince of Orange was of little real value.
It is reported that Vivien, the Pensionary of Dordrecht, De Witt's
cousin, stuck his pen-knife into a copy of the Eternal Edict as it lay
on the table before him, and in reply to a remonstrance said: "I was
only trying what steel can do against parchment."
The second period of five years during which De Witt had held the post
of council-pensionary was now drawing to an end. For a decade he had
wielded a power which had given to him almost supreme authority in the
republic, especially in the control of foreign affairs. But all the time
he had lived the life of a simple burgher, plainly dressed, occupying
the same modest dwelling-house, keeping only a single manservant. He was
devotedly attached to his wife and children, and loved to spend the
hours he could spare from public affairs in the domestic circle. The
death of Wendela on July 1, 1668, was a great blow to him and damped the
satisfaction which must have filled him at the manner in which he was
reelected at the end of that month to enter upon his third period of
office. In recognition of his great services his salary of 6000 guilders
was doubled, and a gratuity of 45,000 guilders was voted to him, to
which the nobles added a further sum of 15,000 guilders. De Witt again
obtained an Act of Indemnity from the Estates of Holland and likewise
the promise of a judicial post on his retirement.
The Prince of Orange had received the announcement of the passing of the
Eternal Edict without showing the slightest emotion, or making any
protest. He now, two months after the re-election of the
council-pensionary, took the first step towards self-assertion. Under
cover of a visit to his ancestral town of Breda, William made his way to
Middelburg, where the Estates of Zeeland were assembled. Being now
eighteen years of age he claimed his inherited right to take his seat as
"first noble," and after being duly installed he appointed his relative,
Seigneur van Odijk, to act as his deputy. This done, he quietly
returned to the Hague, having given a clear indication of the course he
meant to pursue.
The peace of Aix-la-Chapelle had left a deep feeling of humiliation and
rancour in the heart of Louis XIV; and he was resolved to leave no stone
unturned to wreak his vengeance on Holland and its council-pensionary.
The Triple Alliance was plainly an ill-assorted combination. Charles II
cared nothing about the fate of the Spanish Netherlands, and there was a
strong party in England which hated the Dutch and wished to wipe out
the memory of Chatham and to upset the treaty of Breda. Grievances about
the settlement of questions concerning the East Indies and Surinam were
raked up. Both Van Beuningen in London and Pieter de Groot in Paris sent
warnings that the States should be prepared for war and at an early
date, but the council-pensionary pinned his faith on Temple and the
Alliance, and kept his eyes shut to the imminent danger. Meanwhile Louis
had been bribing freely both in England and Sweden, and he had no
difficulty in detaching the latter power from the Alliance. To England
he sent over the beautiful Henrietta, Duchess of Orleans, Charles'
favourite sister, on a secret mission to the king, and she was speedily
successful. The offer of an annual payment of 3,000,000 francs and the
possession of Walcheren, which commanded the entrance to the Scheldt,
effected their purpose. A secret treaty was signed at Dover on December
31, 1670, between Louis and Charles, by which the latter agreed, on
being called upon to do so, to declare war upon Holland in conjunction
with the French.
Meanwhile De Witt was so absorbed in domestic politics and in the
maintenance of the burgher-aristocratic party in power, that he seemed
to have lost his usual statesmanlike acumen. He never ceased to work for
the general acceptance of the Concept of Harmony. At last the three
recalcitrant provinces (Friesland, Groningen and Zeeland), when William
had reached his twenty-first year, agreed to accept it on condition that
the prince were at once admitted to the Council of State. Even now De
Witt tried to prevent the prince from having more than an advisory vote,
but he was overruled through the opposition of Amsterdam to his views.
All this time Louis was preparing his great plan for the crushing of the
republic. He succeeded in gaining the promised assistance of England,
Münster and Cologne, and in detaching from the Dutch the Emperor and
the Swedes. The finances under Colbert were in a flourishing state, and
a splendid army had been equipped by the great war minister, Louvois. It
was in vain that Pieter de Groot sent warnings of coming peril. The
council-pensionary was deaf, and the States-General still deafer. Temple
had left (August, 1670) for a visit to London, and he never returned.
For some months there was no resident English ambassador at the Hague.
Finally, at the end of the year, Downing arrived, the very man who had
done his utmost to bring about the war of 1665. De Witt still placed
his hopes in the anti-French views of the English Parliament; but in
August, 1671, it was dissolved by the king and was not summoned to meet
again for a year and a half. Charles had therefore a free-hand, and the
secret treaty of Dover was the result. The reports of De Groot became
more and more alarming; and De Witt found it necessary to urge the
States to make preparations both by sea and land to resist attack. But
he met with a luke-warm response. The fleet indeed was considerably
strengthened, but the army was in a miserable state. At no time during
the English wars had a powerful army been required, and the lesson
taught by the invasion of the Bishop of Münster had had little effect.
The heavy charges of the naval war compelled the States and especially
Holland, on whom the chief burden fell, to economise by cutting down the
military expenses. Politically also the ruling burgher-regents in
Holland had from past experience a wholesome fear lest the power of the
sword wielded by another Maurice or William II should again overthrow
the civil power. The consequence was that when Charles II declared war
on March 28, 1672, and Louis on the following April 6, and a great
French army of 120,000 men under Condé, Turenne and Luxemburg marched
through Liège to invade the States, while another army of 30,000 men
from Münster and Cologne attacked farther north, all was confusion and
panic, for it was felt that there was no possibility of effective
resistance. The Bishop of Münster was eager to take vengeance for his
defeat in 1666, and the Elector-Archbishop of Cologne was a Bavarian
prince friendly to France. His help was the more valuable, as he was
likewise Bishop of Liège, and thus able to offer to the French armies a
free passage through his territory.
Not until the storm was actually bursting on them by sea and land at
once were the various authorities in the threatened land induced to
move in earnest. Confronted by the sudden crisis, De Witt however made
the most strenuous efforts to meet it. A fleet of 150 ships was got
ready and an army of some 50,000 men, mercenaries of many nationalities,
hastily gathered together. It was a force without cohesion, discipline
or competent officers. In the peril of the country all eyes were turned
towards the Prince of Orange. William was now twenty-one years of age,
but by the provisions of the Concept of Harmony his name was not to be
proposed as captain-general until he had reached the age of twenty-two.
But in the wave of feeling which swept over the country the paper
barrier was dashed aside. In the Estates of Holland, which De Witt had
so long controlled, and despite his strong opposition, the proposal to
confer the post on William for one year was carried. All that the
council-pensionary could effect was to surround the exercise of the
office with so many restrictions as to deprive the prince of any real
authority. These restrictions did not, however, meet the approval of the
other provinces, and William himself refused to accept them. De Witt had
to give way. William was appointed captain-general for one year
(February 25, 1672). It appeared to be an absolutely hopeless task that
this utterly inexperienced young man had to face. But the mere fact that
once more a Prince of Orange was in command gave new hope. It was a name
to conjure with; and the holder of it, young as he was and with no
previous military training, faced his task with the calm confidence
which comes from conscious power and an inherited aptitude for the
leadership of men.
* * * * *