THE RISE OF JOHN DE WITT.
THE FIRST ENGLISH WAR
Before the sittings of the Great Assembly had come to an end, a young
statesman, destined to play the leading part in the government of the
Dutch republic during two decades, had already made his mark. After the
death of William II Jacob de Witt was not only reinstated in his former
position at Dordrecht but on December 21, 1650, John, his younger son,
at the age of 25 years was appointed pensionary of that town. In this
capacity he was _ex officio_ spokesman of the deputation sent to
represent Dordrecht in the Great Assembly. His knowledge, his readiness
and persuasiveness of speech, his industry and his gifts at once of
swift insight and orderly thoroughness, quickly secured for him a
foremost place both in the deliberations of the Assembly and in the
conduct of the negotiations with the English Parliament, which at this
time required very delicate handling.
The many disputes, which had arisen between England and the United
Provinces during the period between the accession of James I and the
battle of the Downs in 1639, had never been settled. The minds of
Englishmen were occupied with other and more pressing matters while the
Civil War lasted. But the old sores remained open. Moreover the refusal
of the States-General to receive the Parliamentary envoys, the murder of
Doreslaer, and the protection afforded to royalist refugees, had been
additional causes of resentment; but the English Council had not felt
strong enough to take action. The death of the Prince of Orange,
following so quickly upon the complete overthrow of Charles II at
Worcester, appeared at first to open out a prospect of friendlier
relations between the two neighbouring republics. In January, 1651, the
Great Assembly formally recognised the Commonwealth and determined to
send back to his old post in London the veteran ambassador, Joachimi,
who had been recalled. The English government on their part anticipated
his return by despatching, in March, Oliver St John and Walter
Strickland on a special embassy to the Hague. They reached that city
on March 27, 1651, and presented their credentials to the Great Assembly
two days later. Their reception in the streets was anything but
favourable. The feeling among the populace was predominantly Orangist
and Stewart; and St John and Strickland, greeted with loud cries of
"regicides" and many abusive epithets, remembering the fate of
Doreslaer, were in fear of their lives.
On April 4 a conference was opened between the envoys and six
commissioners appointed by the States to consider the proposals of the
English Government for "a more strict and intimate alliance and union"
between the two states. The Dutch quickly perceived that what the
English really wanted was nothing less than such a binding alliance or
rather coalition as would practically merge the lesser state in the
greater. But the very idea of such a loss of the independence that they
had only just won was to the Netherlanders unthinkable. The negotiations
came to a deadlock. Meanwhile St John and Strickland continued to have
insults hurled at them by Orangists and royalist refugees, foremost
amongst them Prince Edward, son of the Queen of Bohemia. The Parliament
threatened to recall the envoys, but consented that they should remain,
on the undertaking of the Estates of Holland to protect them from
further attacks, and to punish the offenders. New proposals were
accordingly made for an offensive and defensive alliance (without any
suggestion of a union), coupled with the condition that both States
should bind themselves not to allow the presence within their boundaries
of avowed enemies of the other--in other words the expulsion of the
members and adherents of the house of Stewart, including the princess
royal and the Queen of Bohemia with their children. In the face of the
strong popular affection for the infant Prince of Orange and his mother,
even the Estates of Holland dared not consider such terms, and the
States-General would have angrily rejected them. After some further
parleying therefore about fisheries and trade restrictions, it was felt
that no agreement could be reached; and St John and Strickland returned
to England on July 31, 1651.
Their failure created a very bad impression upon the Parliament. All the
old complaints against the Dutch were revived; and, as they had refused
the offer of friendship that had been made to them, it was resolved that
strong measures should be taken to obtain redress for past grievances
and for the protection of English trade interests.
At the instance of St John, the famous Navigation Act was passed by the
Parliament, October 9, 1651. This Act struck a mortal blow at the Dutch
carrying trade by forbidding the importation of foreign goods into
English ports except in English bottoms, or in those of the countries
which had produced the goods. Scarcely less injurious was the
prohibition to aliens to fish in British waters, and the withdrawal of
the rights based on the _Magnus Intercursus_, for the maintenance of
which Dutch statesmen had so long and strenuously fought. There was
consternation in Holland, and the States-General determined to send a
special embassy to London. At the same time the Estates of Holland
replaced Jacob Cats by appointing the aged Adrian Pauw, a man in whose
ripe judgment they had confidence, to the office of council-pensionary.
The chosen envoys were Jacob Cats and Gerard Schaep from Holland, Paulus
van der Perre from Zeeland, all three representative of the two maritime
and trading provinces. They arrived in England on December 27, 1651.
Their instructions were to secure the withdrawal of the Navigation Act
and to try to negotiate a new treaty of commerce on the basis of the
_Magnus Intercursus_. They were also to protest strongly against the
action of English privateers, who, having been given letters of marque
to prey upon French commerce, had been stopping and searching Dutch
merchantmen on the ground that they might be carrying French goods. The
English government, however, met the Dutch complaints by raking up the
long list of grievances that had stirred up a bitter feeling of popular
hatred against the United Provinces in England, and by demanding
reparation. They further demanded that Dutch commanders should
acknowledge England's sovereignty by striking flag and sail and by
firing a salute, whenever any of their squadrons met English ships "in
the narrow seas."
It was these last two questions, the right of search and the striking of
the flag, that were to be the real causes of the outbreak of a war that
was desired by neither of the two governments. But popular feeling and
the course of events was too strong for them. The news of the seizure of
their vessels, not merely by privateers, but by an English squadron
under Ayscue in the West Indies, had caused intense indignation and
alarm in Holland, and especially in Amsterdam. Pressure was brought to
bear on the States-General and the Admiralties, who in pursuance of
economy had reduced the fleet to seventy-five ships. It was resolved
therefore, on February 22, to fit out an additional 150 vessels. The
Council of State, on hearing of this, began also to make ready for
eventualities. Negotiations were still proceeding between the two
countries, when Martin Tromp, the victor of the battle of the Downs, now
lieutenant-admiral of Holland, was sent to sea with fifty ships and
instructions to protect Dutch merchantmen from interference, and to see
that the States suffered no affront. Nothing was actually said about the
striking of the flag.
The situation was such that an armed collision was almost certain to
happen with such an admiral as Tromp in command. It came suddenly
through a misunderstanding. The Dutch admiral while cruising past Dover
met, on May 29, fifteen English ships under Blake. The latter fired a
warning shot across the bows of Tromp's ship to signify that the flag
should be struck. Tromp declared that he had given orders to strike the
flag, but that Blake again fired before there was time to carry them
out. Be this as it may, the two fleets were soon engaged in a regular
fight, and, the English being reinforced, Tromp withdrew at nightfall to
the French coast, having lost two ships. Great was the anger aroused in
England, where the Dutch were universally regarded as the aggressors. In
the Netherlands, where the peace party was strong, many were disposed to
blame Tromp despite his protests. Adrian Pauw himself left hastily for
London, John de Witt being appointed to act as his deputy during his
absence. Pauw's strenuous efforts however to maintain peace were all in
vain, despite the strong leanings of Cromwell towards a peaceful
solution. But popular feeling on both sides was now aroused. The
States-General, fearing that the Orangists would stir up a revolt, if
humiliating terms were submitted to, stiffened their attitude. The
result was that the envoys left London on June 30, 1652; and war was
declared.
The Dutch statesmen who sought to avoid hostilities were right. All the
advantages were on the side of their enemies. The Dutch merchant-fleets
covered the seas, and the welfare of the land depended on commerce. The
English had little to lose commercially. Their war-fleet too, though
inferior in the number of ships, was superior in almost all other
respects. The Stuarts had devoted great attention to the fleet and would
have done more but for lack of means. Charles' much abused ship-money
was employed by him for the creation of the first English professional
navy. It had been largely increased by the Parliament after 1648; and
its "generals," Blake, Penn and Ayscue, had already acquired much
valuable experience in their encounters with the royalist squadron under
Prince Rupert, and in long cruises to the West Indies for the purpose of
forcing the English colonies to acknowledge parliamentary rule. The
crews therefore were well trained, and the ships were larger, stronger
and better armed than those of the Dutch. The position of England, lying
as it did athwart the routes by which the Dutch merchant-fleets must
sail, was a great advantage. Even more important was the advantage of
having a central control, whereas in the Netherlands there were five
distinct Boards of Admiralty, to some extent jealous of each other, and
now lacking the supreme direction of an admiral-general.
The war began by a series of English successes and of Dutch misfortunes.
Early in July, 1652, Blake at the head of sixty ships set sail for the
north to intercept the Dutch Baltic commerce, and to destroy their
fishing fleet off the north of Scotland. He left Ayscue with a small
squadron to guard the mouth of the Thames. Tromp meanwhile had put to
sea at the head of nearly a hundred ships. Ayscue succeeded in
intercepting a fleet of Dutch merchantmen near Calais, all of them being
captured or burnt, while Blake with the main force off the north coast
of Scotland destroyed the Dutch fishing fleet and their convoy. After
these first blows against the enemy's commerce good fortune continued to
attend the English. Tromp was prevented from following Blake by strong
northerly winds. He then turned upon Ayscue, whose small force he must
have overwhelmed, but for a sudden change to a southerly gale. The Dutch
admiral now sailed northwards and (July 25) found the English fleet off
the Shetlands. A violent storm arose, from the force of which Blake was
protected, while the Dutch vessels were scattered far and wide. On the
following day, out of ninety-nine ships Tromp could only collect
thirty-five, and had no alternative but to return home to refit.
Before Tromp's return another Dutch fleet under Michael de Ruyter had
put to sea to escort a number of outward-bound merchantmen through the
Channel, and to meet and convoy back the home-coming ships. He had
twenty-three warships and three fireships under his command. Ayscue had
previously sailed up Channel with forty men-of-war and five fireships
for a similar purpose. The two fleets met on August 16, and despite his
inferiority of force De Ruyter forced Ayscue to withdraw into Plymouth,
and was able to bring his convoy home to safety.
The ill-success of Tromp, though he was in no way to blame for it,
caused considerable alarm and discontent in Holland. His enemies of the
States party in that province took advantage of it to suspend the
gallant old seaman from his command. He was an Orangist; and, as the
Orange partisans were everywhere clamorously active, the admiral was
suspect. In his place Cornelisz Witte de With was appointed, a capable
sailor, but disliked in the fleet as much as Tromp was beloved. De With
effected a junction with De Ruyter and with joint forces they attacked
Blake on October 8, near the shoal known as the Kentish Knock. The
English fleet was considerably more powerful than the Dutch, and the
desertion of De With by some twenty ships decided the issue. The Dutch
had to return home with some loss. The English were elated with their
victory and thought that they would be safe from further attack until
the spring. Blake accordingly was ordered to send a squadron of twenty
sail to the Mediterranean, where the Dutch admiral Jan van Galen held
the command of the sea. But they were deceived in thinking that the
struggle in the Channel was over for the winter. The deserters at the
Kentish Knock were punished, but the unpopularity of De With left the
authorities with no alternative but to offer the command-in-chief once
more to Martin Tromp. Full of resentment though he was at the bad
treatment he had received, Tromp was too good a patriot to refuse. At
the end of November the old admiral at the head of 100 warships put to
sea for the purpose of convoying some 450 merchantmen through the
Straits. Stormy weather compelled him to send the convoy with an escort
into shelter, but he himself with sixty ships set out to seek the
English fleet, which lay in the Downs. After some manoeuvring the two
fleets met on December 10, off Dungeness. A stubborn fight took place,
but this time it was some of the English ships that were defaulters.
The result was the complete victory of the Dutch; and Blake's fleet,
severely damaged, retreated under cover of the night into Dover roads.
Tromp was now for a time master of the Channel and commerce to and from
the ports of Holland and Zeeland went on unimpeded, while many English
prizes were captured.
This state of things was however not to last long. Towards the end of
February, 1653, Blake put to sea with nearly eighty ships, and on the
25th off Portland met Tromp at the head of a force nearly equal to his
own in number. But the Dutch admiral was convoying more than 150
merchantmen and he had moreover been at sea without replenishment of
stores ever since the fight at Dungeness, while the English had come
straight from port. The fight, which on the part of the Dutch consisted
of strong rear-guard actions, had lasted for two whole days, when Tromp
found that his powder had run out and that on the third day more than
half his fleet were unable to continue the struggle. But, inspiring his
subordinates De Ruyter, Evertsen and Floriszoon with his own indomitable
courage, Tromp succeeded by expert seamanship in holding off the enemy
and conducting his convoy with small loss into safety. Four Dutch
men-of-war were taken and five sunk; the English only lost two ships.
Meanwhile both nations had been getting sick of the war. The Dutch were
suffering terribly from the serious interference with their commerce and
carrying trade and from the destruction of the important fisheries
industry, while the English on their side were shut out from the Baltic,
where the King of Denmark, as the ally of the United Provinces, had
closed the Sound, and from the Mediterranean, where Admiral van Galen,
who lost his life in the fight, destroyed a British squadron off Leghorn
(March 23). In both countries there was a peace party. Cromwell had
always wished for a closer union with the United Provinces and was
averse to war. In the Dutch republic the States party, especially in
Holland the chief sufferer by the war, was anxious for a cessation of
hostilities; and it found its leader in the youthful John de Witt, who
on the death of Adrian Pauw on February 21, 1653, had been appointed
council-pensionary. Cromwell took pains to let the Estates of Holland
know his favourable feelings towards them by sending over, in February,
a private emissary, Colonel Dolman, a soldier who had served in the
Netherland wars. On his part John de Witt succeeded in persuading the
Estates of Holland to send secretly, without the knowledge of the
States-General, letters to the English Council of State and the
Parliament expressing their desire to open negotiations. Thus early did
the new council-pensionary initiate a form of diplomacy in which he was
to prove himself an adept. This first effort was not a success. The
Parliament published the letter with the title "Humble Supplication of
the States of Holland." The indignation of the Orange partisans was
great, and they threatened internal disturbances throughout the country.
Such however was the skill of De Witt that, on Parliament showing a
willingness to resume the negotiations that had been broken off in the
previous summer, he induced the States-General by a bare majority (four
provinces to three) to send a conciliatory letter, the date of which
(April 30, 1653) coincided with Cromwell's forcible dissolution of the
Rump Parliament and the assumption by him, with the support of the army,
of dictatorial powers. The English Council of State, however, was well
informed of the serious economical pressure of the war upon Holland; and
their insistence now on the full satisfaction of all the English demands
made a continuation of hostilities inevitable.
Tromp, after successfully bringing in two large convoys of merchantmen,
encountered (June 12), near the Gabbard, the English fleet under Monk
and Deane. Each fleet numbered about 100 sail, but the Dutch ships were
inferior in size, solidity and weight of metal. For two days the fight
was obstinately and fiercely contested, but on Blake coming up with a
reinforcement of thirteen fresh ships, Tromp was obliged to retreat,
having lost twenty ships. He complained bitterly, as did his
vice-admirals De Ruyter and De With, to the Board of Admiralty of the
inferiority of the vessels of his fleet, as compared with those of the
adversary.
The English now instituted a blockade of the Dutch coast, which had the
effect of reducing to desperate straits a land whose welfare and
prosperity depended wholly on commerce. Amsterdam was ruined. In these
circumstances direct negotiation was perforce attempted. Four envoys
were sent representing the three maritime provinces. At first it seemed
impossible that any common ground of agreement could be found. Cromwell
was obsessed with the idea of a politico-religious union between the two
republics, which would have meant the extinction of Dutch independence.
The Council of State met the Dutch envoys with the proposal _una gens,
una respublica,_ which nothing but sheer conquest and dire necessity
would ever induce the Dutch people to accept. Accordingly the war went
on, though the envoys did not leave London, hoping still that some
better terms might be offered. But in order to gain breathing space for
the efforts of the negotiators, one thing was essential--the breaking
of the blockade. The Admiralties made a supreme effort to refit and
reinforce their fleet, but it lay in two portions; eighty-five sail
under Tromp in the Maas, thirty-one under De With in the Texel. Monk
with about 100 ships lay between them to prevent their junction. On
August 4 Tromp sailed out and, after a rearguard action off Katwijk,
out-manoeuvred the English commander and joined De With. He now turned
and with superior numbers attacked Monk off Scheveningen. The old hero
fell mortally wounded at the very beginning of what proved to be an
unequal fight. After a desperate struggle the Dutch retired with very
heavy loss. Monk's fleet also was so crippled that he returned home to
refit. The action in which Tromp fell thus achieved the main object for
which it was fought, for it freed the Dutch coast from blockade. It was,
moreover, the last important battle in the war. The States, though much
perplexed to find a successor to Martin Tromp, were so far from being
discouraged that great energy was shown in reorganising the fleet. Jacob
van Wassenaer, lord of Obdam, was appointed lieutenant-admiral of
Holland, with De Ruyter and Evertsen under him as vice-admirals. De With
retained his old command of a detached squadron, with which he safely
convoyed a large fleet of East Indiamen round the north of Scotland into
harbour. After this there were only desultory operations on both sides
and no naval engagement.
Meanwhile negotiations had been slowly dragging on. The accession of
Cromwell to supreme power in December, 1653, with the title of Lord
Protector seemed to make the prospects of the negotiations brighter, for
the new ruler of England had always professed himself an opponent of the
war, which had shattered his fantastic dream of a union between the two
republics. Many conferences took place, but the Protector's attitude and
intentions were ambiguous and difficult to divine. The fear of an Orange
restoration appears to have had a strange hold on his imagination and to
have warped at this time the broad outlook of the statesman. At last
Cromwell formulated his proposals in twenty-seven articles. The demands
were those of the victor, and were severe. All the old disputes were to
be settled in favour of England. An annual sum was to be paid for the
right of fishing; compensation to be made for "the massacre of Amboina"
and the officials responsible for it punished; the number of warships in
English waters was to be limited; the flag had to be struck when
English ships were met and the right of search to be permitted. These
demands, unpalatable as they were, might at least have furnished a basis
of settlement, but there was one demand besides these which was
impossible. Article 12 stipulated that the Prince of Orange should not
at any time hold any of the offices or dignities which had been held by
his ancestors, or be appointed to any military command. De Witt, in
whose hands were all the threads of the negotiations, was perfectly
aware that it would be useless to present such proposals to the
States-General. Not only would they indignantly reject them, but he had
not the slightest hope of getting any single province, even Holland, to
allow a foreign power to interfere with their internal affairs and to
bid them to treat with harsh ingratitude the infant-heir of a family to
which the Dutch people owed so deep a debt. There was nothing for it but
to prepare for a vigorous resumption of the war. Strong efforts were
therefore made at De Witt's instigation to increase the fleet and secure
the active co-operation of Denmark and France, both friendly to the
States. But Cromwell really wanted peace and showed himself ready to
yield on certain minor points, but he continued to insist on the
exclusion of the Prince of Orange. Not till the Dutch envoys had
demanded their passports did the Protector give way so far as to say he
would be content to have the exclusion guaranteed by a secret article.
What followed forms one of the strangest chapters in the history of
diplomacy. De Witt had all this time been keeping up, in complete
secrecy, a private correspondence with the leading envoy, his confidant
Van Beverningh. Through Van Beverningh he was able to reach the private
ear of Cromwell, and to enter into clandestine negotiations with him.
The council-pensionary knew well the hopelessness of any attempt to get
the assent of the States-General to the proposed exclusion, even in a
secret article. Van Beverningh was instructed to inform Cromwell of the
state of public feeling on this point, with the result that the
Protector gave the envoy to understand that he would be satisfied if the
Estates of Holland alone would affirm a declaration that the Prince
should never be appointed stadholder or captain-general. Whether this
concession was offered by Cromwell _proprio motu_ or whether it was in
the first instance suggested to him by De Witt through Van Beverningh is
unknown. In any case the council-pensionary, being convinced of the
necessity of peace, resolved to secure it by playing a very deep and
dangerous game. Not only must the whole affair be kept absolutely from
the cognisance of the States-General, but also De Witt was fully aware
that the assent of the Estates of Holland to the proposed exclusion
article could only be obtained with the greatest difficulty. He was to
prove himself a very past master in the art of diplomatic chicanery and
intrigue.
The council-pensionary first set to work to have the treaty, from which
the exclusion article had been cut out, ratified rapidly by the
States-General, before bringing the secret article to the knowledge of
the Estates of Holland. The Estates adjourned for a recess on April 21,
1654. On the following day he presented the treaty to the
States-General, and such was his persuasive skill that he accomplished
the unprecedented feat of getting this dilatory body to accept the
conditions of peace almost without discussion. On April 23 the treaty
ratified and signed was sent back to London. Only one article aroused
opposition (Art. 32), the so-called "temperament clause"; but Cromwell
had insisted upon it. By this article the States-General and the
Provincial Estates separately undertook that every stadholder,
captain-general or commander of military or naval forces should be
required to take an oath to observe the treaty. Meanwhile De Witt had
received a letter from Van Beverningh and his colleague Nieuwpoort
addressed to the Estates of Holland (not at the moment in session)
stating that Cromwell refused on his part to ratify the treaty until he
received the Act of Exclusion[8] from the Estates, who were until now
wholly ignorant that any such proposal would be made to them.
The cleverness and skill now shown by the council-pensionary were truly
extraordinary. A summons was sent out to the Estates to meet on April 28
without any reason being assigned. The members on assembly were sworn to
secrecy, and then the official letter from London was read to them. The
news that Cromwell refused to sign the treaty until he received the
assent of the Province of Holland to the Act of Exclusion came upon the
Estates like a thunder-bolt. The sudden demand caused something like
consternation, and the members asked to be allowed to consider the
matter with their principals before taking so momentous a decision.
Three days were granted but, as it was essential to prevent publicity,
it was settled that only the burgomasters should be consulted, again
under oath of secrecy. At the meeting on May 1 another despatch from Van
Beverningh was read in which the envoy stated that the demand of
Cromwell--that the Act should be placed in his hands within two days
after the ratification of the treaty--was peremptory and threatening.
Unless he received the Act he would consider the treaty as not binding
upon him. Using all his powers of advocacy, De Witt succeeded after an
angry debate in securing a majority for the Act. Five towns however
obstinately refused their assent, and claimed that it could not be
passed without it. But De Witt had made up his mind to risk illegality,
and overruled their protest. The Act was declared to have been passed
and was on May 5 sent to Van Beverningh and Nieuwpoort with instructions
not to deliver it until circumstances compelled them to do so. The
proclamation of peace followed amidst general rejoicing both in England
and the Netherlands; but for some five weeks the existence of the Act
was unknown to the States-General, and during that period, as a fact, it
remained in Van Beverningh's possession still undelivered.
Early in June a bribe induced one of De Witt's clerks to betray the
secret to Count William Frederick. The news soon spread, and loud was
the outcry of the Orange partisans and of the two princesses, who at
once addressed a remonstrance to the States-General. All the other
provinces strongly protested against the action of the Estates of
Holland and of the council-pensionary. De Witt attempted to defend
himself and the Estates, by vague statements, avoiding the main issue,
but insisting that nothing illegal had been done. His efforts were in
vain. On June 6 the States-General passed a resolution that the envoys
in England should be ordered to send back at once all the secret
instructions they had received from Holland, and the Act of Exclusion.
Meanwhile the Estates of Holland themselves, frightened at the clamour
which had been aroused, began to show signs of defection. They went so
far as to pass a vote of thanks to the envoys for not having delivered
the Act to Cromwell. De Witt's position appeared hopeless. He extricated
himself and outwitted his opponents by the sheer audacity and cleverness
of the steps that he took. His efforts to prevent the resolution of the
States-General from taking immediate effect proving unavailing, he put
forward the suggestion that on account of its importance the despatch
should be sent to the envoys in cipher. This was agreed to, and on June
7 the document was duly forwarded to London by the council-pensionary;
but he enclosed a letter from himself to Van Beverningh and Nieuwpoort
informing them that the Estates of Holland assented to the request made
by the States-General, and that they were to send back the secret
correspondence and also the Act, _if it were still undelivered_. The
result answered to his expectations. While the clerk was laboriously
deciphering the despatch, the envoys read between the lines of De Witt's
letter, and without a moment's delay went to Whitehall and placed the
Act in Cromwell's hands. The States-General had thus no alternative
between acceptance of the _fait accompli_ and the risk of a renewal of
the war. No further action was taken, and the Protector professed
himself satisfied with a guarantee of such doubtful validity.
It is impossible to withhold admiration from De Witt's marvellous
diplomatic dexterity, and from the skill and courage with which he
achieved his end in the face of obstacles and difficulties that seemed
insurmountable; but for the course of double-dealing and chicanery by
which he triumphed, the only defence that can be offered is that the
council-pensionary really believed that peace was an absolute necessity
for his country, and that peace could only be maintained at the cost of
the Act of Exclusion. Whether or no Cromwell would have renewed the war,
had the Act been withdrawn, it is impossible to say. There is, however,
every reason to believe that De Witt was prompted to take the risks he
did by purely patriotic motives, and not through spite against the house
of Orange. Be this as it may, the part that he now played was bitterly
resented, not merely by the Orange partisans, but by popular opinion
generally in the United Provinces, and it was never forgiven.
* * * * *