THE EAST AND WEST INDIA COMPANIES. COMMERCIAL AND ECONOMIC EXPANSION
An account of the foundation, constitution and early efforts of the
Dutch East India Company has been already given. The date of its charter
(March 20, 1602) was later than that of its English rival (Dec. 31,
1600), but in reality the Dutch were the first in the field, as there
were several small companies in existence and competing with one another
in the decade previous to the granting of the charter, which without
extinguishing these companies incorporated them by the name of chambers
under a common management, the Council of Seventeen. The four chambers
however--Amsterdam, Zeeland, the Maas (Rotterdam and Delft) and the
North Quarter (Enkhuizen and Hoorn)--though separately administered and
with different spheres, became gradually more and more unified by the
growing power of control exercised by the Seventeen. This was partly due
to the dominating position of the single Chamber of Amsterdam, which
held half the shares and appointed eight members of the council. The
erection of such a company, with its monopoly of trade and its great
privileges including the right of maintaining fleets and armed forces,
of concluding treaties and of erecting forts, was nothing less than the
creation of an _imperium in imperio_; and it may be said to have
furnished the model on which all the great chartered companies of later
times have been formed. The English East India Company was, by the side
of its Dutch contemporary, almost insignificant; with its invested
capital of £30,000 it was in no position to struggle successfully
against a competitor which started with subscribed funds amounting to
£540,000.
The conquest of Portugal by Spain had spelt ruin to that unhappy country
and to its widespread colonial empire and extensive commerce. Before
1581 Lisbon had been a great centre of the Dutch carrying-trade; and
many Netherlanders had taken service in Portuguese vessels and were
familiar with the routes both to the East Indies and to Brazil. It was
the closing of the port of Lisbon to Dutch vessels that led the
enterprising merchants of Amsterdam and Middelburg to look further
afield. In the early years of the seventeenth century a large number of
expeditions left the Dutch harbours for the Indian Ocean and made great
profits; and very large dividends were paid to the shareholders of the
company. How far these represented the actual gain it is difficult to
discover, for the accounts were kept in different sets of ledgers; and
it is strongly suspected that the size of the dividends may, at times
when enhanced credit was necessary for the raising of loans, have been
to some extent fictitious. For the enterprise, which began as a trading
concern, speedily developed into the creation of an empire overseas, and
this meant an immense expenditure.
The Malay Archipelago was the chief scene of early activity, and more
especially the Moluccas. Treaties were made with the native chiefs; and
factories defended by forts were established at Tidor, Ternate,
Amboina, Banda and other places. The victories of Cornelis Matelief
established that supremacy of the Dutch arms in these eastern waters
which they were to maintain for many years. With the conclusion of the
truce the necessity of placing the general control of so many scattered
forts and trading posts in the hands of one supreme official led, in
1609, to the appointment of a governor-general by the Seventeen with the
assent of the States-General. The governor-general held office for five
years, and he was assisted by a council, the first member of which,
under the title of director-general, was in reality minister of
commerce. Under him were at first seven (afterwards eight) local
governors. These functionaries, though exercising considerable powers in
their respective districts, were in all matters of high policy entirely
subordinate to the governor-general. The first holders of the office
were all men who had risen to that position by proving themselves to
possess energy and enterprise, and being compelled by the distance from
home to act promptly on their own initiative, were practically endowed
with autocratic authority. In consequence of this the Dutch empire in
the East became in their hands rapidly extended and consolidated, to the
exclusion of all competitors. This meant not only that the Portuguese
and Spaniards were ousted from their formerly dominant position in the
Orient, but that a collision with the English was inevitable.
The first governor-general, Pieter Both, had made Java the centre of
administration and had established factories and posts at Bantam,
Jacatra and Djapara, not without arousing considerable hostility among
the local rulers, jealous of the presence of the intruders. This
hostility was fostered and encouraged by the English, whose vessels had
also visited Java and had erected a trading-post close to that of the
Dutch at Jacatra. Already the spice islands had been the scene of
hostile encounters between the representatives of the two nations, and
had led to many altercations. This was the state of things when Jan
Pieterzoon Koen became governor-general in 1615. This determined man,
whose experience in the East Indies was of long date, and who had
already served as director-general, came into his new office with an
intense prejudice against the English, and with a firm resolve to put an
end to what he described as their treachery and intrigues. "Were they
masters," he wrote home, "the Dutch would quickly be out of the Indies,
but praise be to the Lord, who has provided otherwise. They are an
unendurable nation." With this object he strongly fortified the factory
near Jacatra, thereby arousing the hostility of the _Pangeran_, as the
native ruler was styled. The English in their neighbouring post also
began to erect defences and to encourage the _Pangeran_ in his hostile
attitude. Koen thereupon fell upon the English and destroyed and burnt
their factory, and finding that there was a strong English fleet under
Sir Thomas Dale in the neighbourhood, he sailed to the Moluccas in
search of reinforcements, leaving Pieter van der Broeck in command at
the factory. The _Pangeran_ now feigned friendship, and having enticed
Broeck to a conference, made him prisoner and attacked the Dutch
stronghold. The garrison however held out until the governor-general
returned with a strong force. With this he stormed and destroyed the
town of Jacatra and on its site erected a new town, as the seat of the
company's government, to which the name Batavia was given. From this
time the Dutch had no rivalry to fear in Java. The conquest of the whole
island was only a question of time, and the "pearl of the Malay
Archipelago" has from 1620 to the present been the richest and most
valuable of all the Dutch colonial possessions. Koen was planning to
follow up his success by driving the English likewise from the Moluccas,
when he heard that the home government had concluded a treaty which tied
his hands.
The position in the Moluccas had for some years been one of continual
bickering and strife; the chief scene being in the little group known as
the Banda islands. The lucrative spice-trade tempted both companies to
establish themselves by building forts; and the names of Amboina and
Pulo Rum were for many years to embitter the relations of the two
peoples. Meanwhile the whole subject of those relations had been in 1619
discussed at London by a special embassy sent nominally to thank King
James for the part he had taken in bringing the Synod of Dort to a
successful termination of its labours, but in reality to settle several
threatening trade disputes. Almost the only result of the prolonged
conferences was an agreement (June 2, 1619) by which the East India
Companies were for twenty years to be virtually amalgamated. The English
were to have half the pepper crop in Java and one-third of the spices in
the Moluccas, Amboina and the Banda islands. Forts and posts were to
remain in their present hands, but there was to be a joint council for
defence, four members from each company, the president to be appointed
alternately month by month. Such a scheme was a paper scheme, devised
by those who had no personal acquaintance with the actual situation.
There was no similarity between a great military and naval organisation
like the Dutch Company and a body of traders like the English, whose
capital was small, and who were entirely dependent on the political
vagaries of an impecunious sovereign, whose dearest wish at the time was
to cultivate close relations with the very power in defiance of whose
prohibition the East India Company's trade was carried on. The agreement
received indeed a fresh sanction at another conference held in London
(1622-23), but it never was a working arrangement. The bitter
ill-feeling that had arisen between the Dutch and English traders was
not to be allayed by the diplomatic subterfuge of crying peace when
there was no peace. Events were speedily to prove that this was so.
The trade in spices had proved the most lucrative of all, and measures
had been taken to prevent any undue lowering of the price by a glut in
the market. The quantity of spices grown was carefully regulated,
suitable spots being selected, and the trees elsewhere destroyed. Thus
cloves were specially cultivated at Amboina; nutmegs in the Banda
islands. Into this strictly guarded monopoly, from which the English had
been expelled by the energy of Koen, they were now by the new treaty to
be admitted to a share.
It was only with difficulty that the Dutch were induced to acquiesce
sullenly in the presence of the intruders. A fatal collision took place
almost immediately after the convention between the Companies, about the
trade in the spice islands, had been renewed in London, 1622-3.
In 1623 Koen was succeeded, as governor-general, by Pieter Carpentier,
whose name is still perpetuated by the Gulf of Carpentaria on the north
of Australia. At this time of transition the Governor of Amboina, Van
Speult, professed to have discovered a conspiracy of the English
settlers, headed by Gabriel Towerson, to make themselves masters of the
Dutch fort. Eighteen Englishmen were seized, and though there was no
evidence against them, except what was extorted by torture and
afterwards solemnly denied, twelve, including Towerson, were executed.
Carpentier admitted that the proceedings were irregular, and they were
in any case unnecessary, for a despatch recalling Towerson was on its
way to Amboina. It was a barbarous and cruel act; and when the news of
the "massacre of Amboina," as it was called, reached England, there was
loud indignation and demands for redress. But the quarrel with Spain
over the marriage of the Prince of Wales had driven James I at the very
end of his life, and Charles I on his accession, to seek the support of
the United Provinces. By the treaty of Southampton, September 17, 1625,
an offensive and defensive alliance was concluded with the
States-General; and Charles contented himself with a demand that the
States should within eighteen months bring to justice those who were
responsible "for the bloody butchery on our subjects." However, Carleton
again pressed for the punishment of the perpetrators of "the foule and
bloody act" of Amboina. The Dutch replied with evasive promises, which
they never attempted to carry out; and Charles' disastrous war with
France and his breach with his parliament effectually prevented him from
taking steps to exact reparation. But Amboina was not forgotten; the
sore rankled and was one of the causes that moved Cromwell to war in
1654.
The activity of the Dutch in eastern waters was, however, by no means
confined to Java, their seat of government, or to the Moluccas and Banda
islands with their precious spices. Many trading posts were erected on
the large islands of Sumatra and Borneo. Trading relations were opened
with Siam from 1613 onwards. In 1623 a force under Willem Bontekoe was
sent by Koen to Formosa. The island was conquered and a governor
appointed with his residence at Fort Zelandia. Already under the first
governor-general, Pieter Both, permission was obtained from the Shogun
for the Dutch, under close restrictions, to trade with Japan, a
permission which was still continued, after the expulsion of the
Portuguese and the bloody persecution of the Christian converts
(1637-42), though under somewhat humiliating conditions. But, with the
Dutch, trade was trade, and under the able conduct of Francis Caron it
became of thriving proportions. During the next century no other
Europeans had any access to the Japanese market except the agents of the
Dutch East India Company.
Among the governors-general of this early period the name of Antony van
Diemen (1636-45) deserves special recognition. If Koen laid the firm
foundations of Dutch rule in the East, Van Diemen built wisely and ably
on the work of Koen. Carpentier's rule had been noteworthy for several
voyages of discovery along the coasts of New Guinea and of the adjoining
shore of Australia, but the spirit of exploration reached its height in
the days of Van Diemen. The north and north-west of Australia being to
some extent already known, Abel Tasman was despatched by Van Diemen to
find out, if possible, how far southward the land extended. Sailing in
October, 1642, from Mauritius, he skirted portions of the coast of what
is now Victoria and New South Wales and discovered the island which he
named after his patron Van Diemen's land, but which is now very
appropriately known as Tasmania. Pressing on he reached New Zealand,
which still bears the name that he gave to it, and sailed through the
strait between the northern and southern islands, now Cook's strait. In
the course of this great voyage he next discovered the Friendly or Tonga
islands and the Fiji archipelago. He reached Batavia in June, 1643, and
in the following year he visited again the north of Australia and
voyaged right round the Gulf of Carpentaria. Even in a modern map of
Australia Dutch names will be found scattered round certain portions of
the coast of the island-continent, recording still, historically, the
names of the early Dutch explorers, their patrons, ships and homes.
Along the shores of the Gulf of Carpentaria may be seen Van Diemen
river, gulf and cape; Abel Tasman, Van Alphen, Nassau and Staten rivers;
capes Arnhem, Caron and Maria (after Francis Caron and Maria van
Diemen) and Groote Eylandt. In Tasmania, with many other names, may be
found Frederick Henry bay and cape, Tasman's peninsula and Tasman's head
and Maria island; while the wife of the governor-general is again
commemorated, the northernmost point of New Zealand bearing the name of
Maria van Diemen cape.
To Van Diemen belongs the credit of giving to the Dutch their first
footing (1638) in the rich island of Ceylon, by concluding a treaty with
the native prince of Kandy. The Portuguese still possessed forts at
Colombo, Galle, Negumbo and other places, but Galle and Negumbo were now
taken by the Dutch, and gradually the whole island passed into their
hands and became for a century and a half their richest possession in
the East, next to Java. On the Coromandel coast posts were also early
established, and trade relations opened up with the Persians and Arabs.
At the time when the Treaty of Münster gave to the United Provinces the
legal title to that independence for which they had so long fought, and
conceded to them the freedom to trade in the Indies, that trade was
already theirs, safe-guarded by the fleets, the forts and the armed
forces of the chartered company. The governor-general at Batavia had
become a powerful potentate in the Eastern seas; and a succession of
bold and able men, by a policy at once prudent and aggressive, had in
the course of a few decades organised a colonial empire. It was a
remarkable achievement for so small a country as the United Provinces,
and it was destined to have a prolonged life. The voyage round by the
cape was long and hazardous, so Van Diemen in 1638 caused the island of
Mauritius to be occupied as a refitting station; and in 1652 one of his
successors (Reinierz) sent a body of colonists under Jan van Riebeck to
form a settlement, which should be a harbour of refuge beneath the Table
mountain at the Cape itself. This was the beginning of the Cape colony.
Quite as interesting, and even more exciting, was the history of Dutch
enterprise in other seas during this eventful period. The granting of
the East India Company's charter led a certain Willem Usselincx to come
forward as an earnest and persistent advocate for the formation of a
West India Company on the same lines. But Oldenbarneveldt, anxious to
negotiate a peace or truce with Spain and to maintain good relations
with that power, refused to lend any countenance to his proposals,
either before or after the truce was concluded. He could not, however,
restrain the spirit of enterprise that with increasing prosperity was
abroad in Holland. The formation of the Northern or Greenland Company in
1613, specially created in order to contest the claims of the English
Muscovy Company to exclusive rights in the whale fishery off
Spitsbergen, led to those violent disputes between the fishermen of the
two countries, of which an account has been given. The granting of a
charter to the Company of New Netherland (1614) was a fresh departure.
The voyage of Henry Hudson in the Dutch service when, in 1610, he
explored the coast of North America and sailed up the river called by
his name, led certain Amsterdam and Hoorn merchants to plan a settlement
near this river; and they secured a charter giving them exclusive rights
from Chesapeake bay to Newfoundland. The result was the founding of the
colony of New Netherland, with New Amsterdam on Manhattan island as its
capital. This settlement was at first small and insignificant, but,
being placed midway between the English colonies on that same coast, it
added one more to the many questions of dispute between the two
sea-powers.
Willem Usselincx had all this time continued his agitation for the
erection of a West India Company; and at last, with the renewal of the
war with Spain in 1621, his efforts were rewarded. The charter granted
by the States-General (June 3, 1621) gave to the company for twenty-four
years the monopoly of navigation and trade to the coast-lands of America
and the West Indies from the south-end of Newfoundland to the Straits of
Magellan and to the coasts and lands of Africa from the tropic of Cancer
to the Cape of Good Hope. The governing body consisted of nineteen
representatives, the Nineteen. The States-General contributed to the
capital 1,000,000 fl., on half of which only they were to receive
dividends. They also undertook in time of war to furnish sixteen ships
and four yachts, the company being bound to supply a like number. The
West India Company from the first was intended to be an instrument of
war. Its aims were buccaneering rather than commerce. There was no
secret about its object; it was openly proclaimed. Its historian De Laet
(himself a director) wrote, "There is no surer means of bringing our
Enemy at last to reason, than to infest him with attacks everywhere in
America and to stop the fountain-head of his best finances." After some
tentative efforts, it was resolved to send out an expedition in great
force; but the question arose, where best to strike? By the advice of
Usselincx and others acquainted with the condition of the defences of
the towns upon the American coast, Bahia, the capital of the Portuguese
colony of Brazil, was selected, as specially vulnerable. Thus in the
West, as in the East, Portugal was to suffer for her unwilling
subjection to the crown of Castile.
The consent of the States-General and of the stadholder being obtained,
some months were spent in making preparations on an adequate scale. The
fleet, which consisted of twenty-three ships of war with four yachts,
armed with 500 pieces of ordnance, and carrying in addition to the crews
a force of 1700 troops, sailed in two contingents, December, 1623, and
January, 1624. Jacob Willekens was the admiral-in-chief, with Piet Hein
as his vice-admiral. Colonel Jan van Dorth, lord of Horst, was to
conduct the land operations and to be the governor of the town, when its
conquest was achieved. On May 9 the fleet sailed into the Bay of All
Saints (_Bahia de todos os Santos_) and proceeded to disembark the
troops on a sandy beach a little to the east of the city of San
Salvador, commonly known as Bahia. It was strongly situated on heights
rising sheer from the water; and, as news of the Dutch preparations had
reached Lisbon and Madrid, its fortifications had been repaired and its
garrison strengthened. In front of the lower town below the cliffs was a
rocky island, and on this and on the shore were forts well provided with
batteries, and under their lee were fifteen ships of war. On May 10 Piet
Hein was sent with five vessels to contain the enemy's fleet and cover
the landing of the military forces. But Hein, far from being content
with a passive role, attacked the Portuguese, burnt or captured all
their ships and then, embarking his men in launches, stormed the
defences of the island and spiked the guns. Meanwhile the troops had,
without opposition, occupied a Benedictine convent on the heights
opposite the town. But the daring of Piet Hein had caused a panic to
seize the garrison. Despite the efforts of the governor, Diogo de
Mendoça Furdado, there was a general exodus in the night, both of the
soldiery and the inhabitants. When morning came the Dutch marched into
the undefended town, the governor and his son, who had refused to desert
their posts, being taken prisoners. They, with much booty, were at once
sent to Holland as a proof of the completeness of the victory. Events,
however, were to prove that it is easier for an expeditionary force to
capture a town at such a distance from the home-base of supplies, than
to retain it.
Governor Van Dorth had scarcely entered upon his duties when he fell
into an ambush of native levies near San Salvador and was killed. His
successor, Willem Schouten, was incompetent and dissolute; and, when the
fleet set sail on its homeward voyage at the end of July, the garrison
soon found itself practically besieged by bodies of Portuguese troops
with Indian auxiliaries, who occupied the neighbouring woods and stopped
supplies. Meanwhile the news of the capture of San Salvador reached
Madrid and Lisbon; and Spaniards and Portuguese vied with one another in
their eagerness to equip a great expedition to expel the invaders. It
was truly a mighty armada which set sail, under the supreme command of
Don Fadrique de Toledo, from the Iberian ports at the beginning of 1625,
for it consisted of fifty ships with five caravels and four pinnaces,
carrying 12,566 men and 1185 guns. On Easter Eve (March 29) the fleet
entered All Saints' Bay in the form of a vast crescent measuring six
leagues from tip to tip. The Dutch garrison of 2300 men, being strongly
fortified, resisted for a month but, shut in by sea and by land and
badly led, they capitulated on April 28, on condition that they were
sent back to Holland.
That the brilliant success of 1624 was thus so soon turned into disaster
was in no way due to the supineness of the home authorities. The
Nineteen were in no way surprised to hear of great preparations being
made by the King of Spain to retake the town, and they on their part
were determined to maintain their conquest by meeting force with force.
Straining all their resources, three squadrons were equipped; the first
two, numbering thirty-two ships and nine yachts, were destined for
Brazil; the third, a small flying squadron of seven vessels, was
despatched early to watch the Spanish ports. The general-in-chief of the
Brazilian expedition was Boudewyn Hendrikszoon. Driven back by a
succession of storms, it was not until April 17, 1625, that the fleet
was able to leave the Channel and put out to sea. The voyage was a rapid
one and on May 23, Hendrikszoon sailed into the bay in battle order,
only to see the Spanish flag waving over San Salvador and the mighty
fleet of Admiral Toledo drawn up under the protection of its batteries.
Hendrikszoon sailed slowly past the Spaniards, who did not stir, and
perceiving that it would be madness to attack a superior force in such
a position he reluctantly gave orders to withdraw. On the homeward
journey by the West Indies a number of rich prizes were made, but
sickness made great ravages among the crews, and counted Hendrikszoon
himself among its victims.
The events of the following year seem to show that with audacity he
might have at least inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. For in 1626 the
directors, ignorant of his failure, sent out a reinforcement of nine
ships and five yachts under the command of the redoubtable Piet Hein.
Hein sailed on May 21 for the West Indies, where he learnt that
Hendrikszoon was dead and that the remnant of his expedition had
returned after a fruitless voyage of misadventure. Hein however was not
the man to turn back. He determined to try what he could effect at Bahia
by a surprise attack. He reached the entrance to the bay on March 1,
1627, but was unluckily becalmed; and the Portuguese were warned of his
presence. On arriving before San Salvador he found thirty ships drawn up
close to the land; sixteen of these were large and armed, and four were
galleons with a considerable number of troops on board. The Dutch
admiral with great daring determined to attack them by sailing between
them and the shore, making it difficult for the guns on shore to fire on
him without injury to their own ships. It was a hazardous stroke, for
the passage was narrow, but entirely successful. One of the four
galleons, carrying the admiral's flag, was sunk, the other three struck.
Taking to their launches, the Dutchmen now fiercely assailed the other
vessels, and in a very short time were masters of twenty-two prizes. It
was a difficult task to carry them off at the ebb-tide, and it was not
achieved without loss. Hein's own ship, the _Amsterdam,_ grounded and
had to be burnt, and another ship by some mischance blew up. The total
loss, except through the explosion, was exceedingly small. The captured
vessels contained 2700 chests of sugar, besides a quantity of cotton,
hides and tobacco. The booty was stored in the four largest ships and
sent to Holland; the rest were burnt.
Hein now made a raid down the coast as far as Rio de Janeiro and then
returned. The "Sea Terror of Delft" for some weeks after this remained
in unchallenged mastery of the bay, picking up prizes when the
opportunity offered. Then he sailed by the West Indies homewards and
reached Dutch waters on October 31, 1627, having during this expedition
captured no less than fifty-five enemy vessels. The value of the booty
was sufficient to repay the company for their great outlay, and it was
wisely used in the equipment of fresh fleets for the following year.
This next year, 1628, was indeed an _annus mirabilis_ in the records of
the Dutch West India Company. On January 24 two fleets put to sea, one
under Dirk Simonsz Uitgeest for the coast of Brazil; another under
Pieter Adriansz Ita for the West Indies. Both were successful and came
back laden with spoil. It was reserved, however, for the expedition
under Piet Hein to make all other successes seem small. This fleet,
consisting of thirty-one ships of war, left Holland at the end of May
for the West Indies with instructions to lie in wait for the Spanish
Treasure Fleet. Many attempts had been made in previous years to
intercept the galleons, which year by year carried the riches of Mexico
and Peru to Spain, but they had always failed. After some weeks of
weary cruising, Piet Hein, when off the coast of Cuba, was rewarded
(September 8) by the sight of the Spanish fleet approaching, and at once
bore down upon them. After a sharp conflict, the Spaniards took refuge
in the bay of Matanzas and, running the galleons into shoal-water, tried
to convey the rich cargoes on shore. It was in vain. The Dutch sailors,
taking to their boats, boarded the galleons and compelled them to
surrender. The spoil was of enormous value, comprising 177,537 lbs. of
silver, 135 lbs. of gold, 37,375 hides, 2270 chests of indigo, besides
cochineal, logwood, sugar, spices and precious stones. It brought
11,509,524 fl. into the coffers of the company, and a dividend of 50 per
cent, was paid to the shareholders. It was a wrong policy thus to deal
with the results of a stroke of good fortune not likely to be repeated.
This year was, however, to be a lucky year unto the end. A fourth
expedition under Adrian Jansz Pater which left on August 15 for the
Caribbean sea, sailed up the Orinoco and destroyed the town of San Thomé
de Guiana, the chief Spanish settlement in those parts. All this, it may
be said, partook of the character of buccaneering, nevertheless these
were shrewd blows struck at the very source from whence the Spanish
power obtained means for carrying on the war. The West India Company was
fulfilling triumphantly one of the chief purposes for which it was
created, and was threatening Philip IV with financial ruin.
The successes of 1628 had the effect of encouraging the directors to try
to retrieve the failure at Bahia by conquest elsewhere.
Olinda, on the coast of Pernambuco, was selected as the new objective.
An expeditionary force of exceptional strength was got ready; and, as
Piet Hein, at the very height of his fame, unfortunately lost his life
in the spring of 1629 in an encounter with the Dunkirk pirates, Hendrik
Cornelisz Lonck, who had served as vice-admiral under Hein at Matanzas
bay, was made admiral-in-chief, with Jonckheer Diederik van Waerdenburgh
in command of the military forces. A considerable delay was caused by
the critical position of the United Provinces when invaded by the
Spanish-Imperialist armies at the time of the siege of Hertogenbosch,
but the capture of that fortress enabled the last contingents to sail
towards the end of the year; and Lonck was able to collect his whole
force at St Vincent, one of the Canary islands, on Christmas Day to
start on their voyage across the Atlantic. That force consisted of
fifty-two ships and yachts and thirteen sloops, carrying 3780 sailors
and 3500 soldiers, and mounting 1170 guns. Adverse weather prevented the
arrival of the fleet in the offing of Olinda until February 13. Along
the coast of Pernambuco runs a continuous reef of rock with narrow
openings at irregular intervals, forming a barrier against attack from
the sea. Olinda, the capital of the provinces, was built on a hill a
short distance inland, having as its port a village known as Povo or the
Reciff, lying on a spit of sand between the mouths of the rivers
Biberibi and Capibaribi. There was a passage through the rocky reef
northwards about two leagues above Olinda and three others southwards
(only one of which, the _Barra_, was navigable for large ships) giving
access to a sheet of water of some 18 ft. in depth between the reef and
the spit of sand, and forming a commodious harbour, the Pozo.
The problem before the Dutch commander was a difficult one, for news of
the expedition had reached Madrid; and Matthias de Albuquerque, brother
of "the proprietor" of Pernambuco, Duarte de Albuquerque, a man of great
energy and powers of leadership, had arrived in October to put Olinda
and the Reciff into a state of defence. Two forts strongly garrisoned
and armed, San Francisco and San Jorge, defended the entrances through
the reef and the neck of the spit of sand; sixteen ships chained
together and filled with combustibles barred access to the harbour; and
the village of the Reciff was surrounded by entrenchments. Within the
fortifications of Olinda, Albuquerque held himself in readiness to
oppose any body of the enemy that should effect a landing above the
town. Lonck, after consultation with Waerdenburgh, determined to make
with the main body of the fleet under his own command an attempt to
force the entrances to the Pozo, while Waerdenburgh, with the bulk of
the military contingent on sixteen ships, sailed northwards to find some
spot suitable for disembarkation.
The naval attack was made on February 15, but was unavailing. All the
efforts of the Dutch to make their way through any of the entrances to
the Pozo, though renewed again and again with the utmost bravery, were
beaten off. In the evening Lonck withdrew his ships. He had learnt by an
experience, to which history scarcely offers an exception, that a naval
attack unsupported by military co-operation against land defences
cannot succeed. But Waerdenburgh had used the opportunity, while the
enemy's attention was directed to the repelling of the assault on the
Reciff, to land his army without opposition. At dawn the Dutch general
advanced and, after forcing the crossing of the river Doce in the teeth
of the resistance of a body of irregular troops led by Albuquerque in
person, marched straight on Olinda. There was no serious resistance. The
fortifications were carried by storm and the town fell into the hands of
Waerdenburgh. The garrison and almost all the inhabitants fled into the
neighbouring forest.
Aware of the fact that the occupation of Olinda was useless without a
harbour as a base of supplies, it was resolved at once with the aid of
the fleet to lay siege to the forts of San Francisco and San Jorge.
Despite obstinate resistance, first San Jorge, then San Francisco
surrendered; and on March 3 the fleet sailed through the Barra, and the
Reciff with the island of Antonio Vaz behind it was occupied by the
Dutch. No sooner was the conquest made than steps were taken for its
administration. A welcome reinforcement arrived from Holland on March
11, having on board three representatives sent by the Nineteen, who were
to form with Waerdenburgh, appointed governor, an administrative
council, or Court of Policy. The Reciff, rather than Olinda, was
selected as the seat of government, and forts were erected for its
defence. The position, however, was perilous in the extreme.
Albuquerque, who was well acquainted with the country and skilled in
guerrilla warfare, formed an entrenched camp to which he gave the name
of the _Arreyal de Bom Jesus_, a position defended by marshes and thick
woods. From this centre, by the aid of large numbers of friendly
Indians, he was able to cut off all supplies of fresh water, meat or
vegetables from reaching the Dutch garrison. They had to depend for the
necessaries of life upon stores sent to them in relief fleets from
Holland. It was a strange and grim struggle of endurance, in which both
Dutch and Portuguese suffered terribly, the one on the barren sea-shore,
the other in the pathless woods under the glare of a tropical sun, both
alike looking eagerly for succour from the Motherland. The Dutch
succours were the first to arrive. The first detachment under Marten
Thijssen reached the Reciff on December 18, 1630; the main fleet under
Adrian Jansz Pater on April 14, 1631. The whole fleet consisted of
sixteen ships and yachts manned by 1270 sailors and 860 soldiers. Their
arrival was the signal for offensive operations. An expedition under
Thijssen's command sailed on April 22 for the large island of Itamaraca
about fifteen miles to the north of the Reciff. It was successful.
Itamaraca was occupied and garrisoned, and thus a second and
advantageous post established on the Brazilian coast.
Meanwhile the Spanish government had not been idle. After many delays a
powerful fleet set sail from Lisbon on May 5 for Pernambuco, consisting
of fifteen Spanish and five Portuguese ships and carrying a large
military force, partly destined for Bahia, but principally as a
reinforcement for Matthias de Albuquerque. The expedition was commanded
by Admiral Antonio de Oquendo, and was accompanied by Duarte de
Albuquerque, the proprietor of Pernambuco. After landing troops and
munitions at Bahia, the Spaniards wasted several weeks before starting
again to accomplish the main object of blockading the Dutch in the
Reciff and compelling their surrender by famine. But Pater had learnt by
his scouts of the presence of Oquendo at Bahia, and though his force was
far inferior he determined to meet the hostile armada at sea. The
Spanish fleet was sighted at early dawn on September 12, and Pater at
once gave orders to attack. His fleet consisted of sixteen ships and
yachts, that of the enemy of twenty galleons and sixteen caravels. The
Dutch admiral had formed his fleet in two lines, himself in the _Prins
Willem_ and Vice-Admiral Thijssen in the _Vereenigte Provintien_ being
the leaders. On this occasion the sight of the great numbers and size of
the Spanish galleons caused a great part of the Dutch captains to lose
heart and hang back. Pater and Thijssen, followed by only two ships,
bore down however on the Spaniards. _The Prins Willem_ with the
_Walcheren_ in attendance laid herself alongside the _St Jago_, flying
the flag of Admiral Oquendo; the _Vereenigte Provintien_ with the
_Provintie van Utrecht_ in its wake drew up to the _St Antonio de
Padua_, the ship of Vice-Admiral Francisco de Vallecilla. For six hours
the duel between the _Prins Willem_ and the _St Jago_ went on with
fierce desperation, the captain of the _Walcheren_ gallantly holding at
bay the galleons who attempted to come to the rescue of Oquendo.
At 4 p.m. the _St Jago_ was a floating wreck with only a remnant of
her crew surviving, when suddenly a fire broke out in the _Prins
Willem_, which nothing could check. With difficulty the _St Jago_ drew
off and, finding that his vessel was lost, Pater, refusing to
surrender, wrapped the flag round his body and threw himself into the
sea. Meanwhile success had attended Thijssen. The lagging Dutch ships
coming up gradually threatened the convoy of Spanish transports and
drew off many of the galleons for their protection. The _Provintie van
Utrecht_ indeed, like the _Prins Willem_, caught fire and was burnt to
the water's edge; but the vice-admiral himself sank the _St Antonio de
Padua_ and another galleon that came to Vallecilla's help, and
captured a third. It was a bloody and apparently indecisive fight, but
the Dutch enjoyed the fruits of victory. Oquendo made no attempt to
capture the Reciff and Olinda, but, after landing the troops he
convoyed at a favourable spot, sailed northwards, followed by
Thijssen.
But though relieved the position was still very serious. Albuquerque,
now considerably reinforced from his impregnable post at the _Arreyal de
Bom Jesus_, cut off all intercourse inland. The Dutch even abandoned
Olinda and concentrated themselves at the Reciff, where they remained as
a besieged force entirely dependent upon supplies sent from Holland.
Several expeditions were despatched with the hope of seizing other
positions on the coast, but all of them proved failures; and, when
Waerdenburgh returned home in 1633, having reached the end of his three
years' service as governor, all that could be said was that the Dutch
had retained their foothold on the coast of Pernambuco, but at vast cost
to the company in men, vessels and treasure, and without any apparent
prospect for the future. But pertinacity was to be rewarded. For the
period of success that followed special histories must be consulted. In
the year following the return of Waerdenburgh the efforts of the Dutch
authorities to extend their possessions along the coast at the various
river mouths were steadily successful; and with the advent of Joan
Maurice of Nassau to the governorship, in 1637, the dream of a Dutch
empire in Brazil seemed to be on the point of realisation. This cousin
of the Prince of Orange was endowed with brilliant qualities, and during
the seven years of his governorship he extended the Dutch dominion from
the Rio Grande in the south to the island of Maranhão on the north and
to a considerable distance inland, indeed over the larger part of seven
out of the fourteen captaincies into which Portuguese Brazil was
divided. On his arrival, by a wise policy of statesmanlike conciliation,
he contrived to secure the goodwill of the Portuguese planters, who,
though not loving the Dutch heretics, hated them less than their Spanish
oppressors, and also of the Jews, who were numerous in the conquered
territory. Under his rule the Reciff as the seat of the Dutch government
was beautified and enlarged; many fine buildings and gardens adorned it,
and the harbour made commodious for commerce with rows of warehouses and
ample docks. To the new capital he gave the name of Mauritsstad.
During the earlier part of his governor-generalship Joan Maurice was
called upon to face a really great danger. The year 1639 was to witness
what was to be the last great effort (before the Portuguese revolt) of
the still undivided Spanish monarchy for supremacy at sea. Already it
has been told how a great fleet sent under Antonio de Oquendo to drive
the Dutch from the narrow seas was crushed by Admiral Tromp at the
battle of the Downs. In the same year the most formidable armada ever
sent from the Peninsula across the ocean set sail for Brazil. It
consisted of no less than eighty-six vessels manned by 12,000 sailors
and soldiers under the command of the Count de Torre. Unpropitious
weather conditions, as so often in the case of Spanish naval
undertakings, ruined the enterprise. Making for Bahia they were detained
for two months in the Bay of All Saints by strong northerly winds.
Meanwhile Joan Maurice, whose naval force at first was deplorably weak,
had managed by energetic efforts to gather together a respectable fleet
of forty vessels under Admiral Loos, which resembled the English fleet
of 1588 under Effingham and Drake, in that it made up for lack of
numbers and of size by superior seamanship and skill in manoeuvring. At
length, the wind having shifted, the Count de Torre put to sea; and on
January 12, 1640, the Dutch squadrons sighted the Spaniards, who were
being driven along by a southerly gale which had sprung up. Clinging to
their rear and keeping the weather-gauge, the Dutch kept up a running
fight, inflicting continual losses on their enemies, and, giving them no
opportunity to make for land and seek the shelter of a port, drove them
northwards in disorder never to return. By this signal deliverance the
hold of the Netherlanders upon their Brazilian conquests appeared to be
assured; and, as has been already stated, Joan Maurice took full
advantage of the opportunity that was offered to him to consolidate and
extend them. A sudden change of political circumstances was, however,
to bring to a rapid downfall a dominion which had never rested on a
sound basis.
The revolt of Portugal in 1641 was at first hailed in the United
Provinces as the entry of a new ally into the field against their
ancient enemy the Spaniard. But it was soon perceived that there could
be no friendship with independent Portugal, unless both the East and
West India Companies withdrew from the territories they had occupied
overseas entirely at the expense of the Portuguese. King João IV and his
advisers at Lisbon, face to face as they were with the menacing Spanish
power, showed willingness to make great concessions, but they could not
control the spirit which animated the settlers in the colonies
themselves. Everywhere the Spanish yoke was repudiated, and the Dutch
garrisons in Brazil suddenly found themselves confronted in 1645 with a
loyalist rising, with which they were not in a position to deal
successfully. The West India Company had not proved a commercial
success. The fitting out of great fleets and the maintenance of numerous
garrisons of mercenaries at an immense distance from the home country
had exhausted their resources and involved the company in debt. The
building of Mauritsstad and the carrying out of Joan Maurice's ambitious
schemes for the administration and organisation of a great Brazilian
dominion were grandiose, but very costly. The governor, moreover, who
could brook neither incompetence nor interference on the part of his
subordinates, had aroused the enmity of some of them, notably of a
certain Colonel Architofsky, who through spite plotted and intrigued
against him with the authorities at home. The result was that, the
directors having declined to sanction certain proposals made to them by
Joan Maurice, he sent in his resignation, which was accepted (1644).
It must be remembered that their position was a difficult one. The
charter of the company had been granted for a term of twenty-four years,
and it was doubtful whether the States-General, already beginning to
discuss secretly the question of a separate peace with Spain, would
consent to renew it. The relations with Portugal were very delicate; and
a formidable rebellion of the entire body of Portuguese settlers, aided
by the natives, was on the point of breaking out. Indeed the successors
of Joan Maurice, deprived of any adequate succour from home, were unable
to maintain themselves against the skill and courage of the insurgent
Portuguese leaders. The Dutch were defeated in the field, and one by
one their fortresses were taken. The Reciff itself held out for some
time, but it was surrendered at last in 1654; and with its fall the
Dutch were finally expelled from the territory for the acquisition of
which they had sacrificed so much blood and treasure.
The West India Company at the peace of Münster possessed, besides the
remnant of its Brazilian dominion, the colony of New Netherland in North
America, and two struggling settlements on the rivers Essequibo and
Berbice in Guiana. New Netherland comprised the country between the
English colonies of New England and Virginia; and the Dutch settlers had
at this time established farms near the coast and friendly relations
with the natives of the interior, with whom they trafficked for furs.
The appointment of Peter Stuyvesant as governor, in 1646, was a time of
real development in New Netherland. This colony was an appanage of the
Chamber of Amsterdam, after which New Amsterdam, the seat of government
on the island of Manhattan, was named. The official trading posts on the
Essequibo and the Berbice, though never abandoned, had for some years a
mere lingering existence, but are deserving of mention in that they were
destined to survive the vicissitudes of fortune and to become in the
18th century a valuable possession. Their importance also is to be
measured not by the meagre official reports and profit and loss accounts
that have survived in the West India Company's records, but by the much
fuller information to be derived from Spanish and Portuguese sources, as
to the remarkable daring and energy of Dutch trading agents in all that
portion of the South American continent lying between the rivers Amazon
and Orinoco. Expelled from the Amazon itself in 1627 by the Portuguese
from Para, the Dutch traders established themselves at different times
at the mouths of almost all the rivers along what was known as the Wild
Coast of Guiana, and penetrating inland through a good understanding
with the natives, especially with the ubiquitous Carib tribes, carried
on a barter traffic beyond the mountains into the northern watershed of
the Amazon, even as far as the Rio Negro itself. This trade with the
interior finds no place in the company's official minutes, for it was
strictly speaking an infringement of the charter, and therefore
illegitimate. But it was characteristically Dutch, and it was winked at,
for the chief offenders were themselves among the principal
shareholders of the company.
No account of Dutch commerce during the period of Frederick Henry would
be complete, however, which did not refer to the relations between
Holland and Sweden, and the part played by an Amsterdam merchant in
enabling the Swedish armies to secure the ultimate triumph of the
Protestant cause in the Thirty Years' War. Louis de Geer sprang from an
ancient noble family of Liège. His father fled to Dordrecht in 1595 to
escape from the Inquisition and became prosperous in business. Liège was
then, as now, a great centre of the iron industry; and after his
father's death Louis de Geer in 1615 removed to Amsterdam, where he
became a merchant in all kinds of iron and copper goods, more especially
of ordnance and fire-arms. In close alliance with him, though not in
partnership, was his brother-in-law, Elias Trip, the head of a firm
reputed to have the most extensive business in iron-ware and weapons in
the Netherlands. The commanding abilities of de Geer soon gave to the
two firms, which continued to work harmoniously together as a family
concern, a complete supremacy in the class of wares in which they dealt.
At this time the chief supply of iron and copper ore came from Sweden;
and in 1616 de Geer was sent on a mission by the States-General to that
country to negotiate for a supply of these raw materials for the forging
of ordnance. This mission had important results, for it was the first
step towards bringing about those close relations between Sweden and the
United Provinces which were to subsist throughout the whole of the
Thirty Years' War. In the following year, 1617, Gustavus Adolphus, then
about to conduct an expedition into Livonia, sent an envoy to Holland
for the purpose of securing the good offices of the States-General for
the raising of a loan upon the security of the Swedish copper mines. The
principal contributor was Louis de Geer. He had, during his visit to
Sweden, learnt how great was the wealth of that country in iron ore, and
at the same time that the mines were lying idle and undeveloped through
lack of capital and skilled workmen. He used his opportunity therefore
to obtain from Gustavus the lease of the rich mining domain of Finspong.
The lease was signed on October 12, 1619, and de Geer at once began
operations on the largest scale. He introduced from Liège a body of
expert Walloon iron-workers, built forges and factories, and was in a
few years able to supply the Swedish government with all the ordnance
and munitions of war that they required, and to export through the port
of Norrköping large supplies of goods to his warehouses at Amsterdam.
His relations with Gustavus Adolphus soon became intimate. The king
relied upon de Geer for the supply of all the necessaries for his armies
in the field, and even commissioned him to raise troops for the Swedish
service. In 1626 the Dutch merchant was appointed by the king
acting-manager of the copper mines, which were royal property; and, in
order to regularise his position and give him greater facilities for the
conduct of his enterprises, the rights of Swedish citizenship were
conferred by royal patent upon him. It was a curious position, for
though de Geer paid many visits to Sweden, once for three consecutive
years, 1626-29, he continued to make Amsterdam his home and principal
residence. He thus had a dual nationality. Year after year saw an
increasing number of mines and properties passing into the great
financier's hands, and in return for these concessions he made large
advances to the king for his triumphant expedition into Germany;
advancing him in 1628 50,000 rixdalers, and somewhat later a further sum
of 32,000 rixdalers. So confidential were the relations between them
that Gustavus sent for de Geer to his camp at Kitzingen for a personal
consultation on business matters in the spring of 1632. It was their
last interview, for before that year closed the Swedish hero was to
perish at Lützen.
The death of Gustavus made no difference to the position of Louis de
Geer in Sweden, for he found Axel Oxenstierna a warm friend and powerful
supporter. Among other fresh enterprises was the formation of a
Swedo-Dutch Company for trading on the West Coast of Africa. In this
company Oxenstierna himself invested money. In reward for his many
services the Swedish Council of Regency conferred upon de Geer and his
heirs a patent of nobility (August 4,1641); and as part repayment of the
large loans advanced by him to the Swedish treasury he obtained as his
own the districts containing his mines and factories in different parts
of Sweden, making him one of the largest landed proprietors in the
country. He on his part in return for this was able to show in a
remarkable way that he was not ungrateful for the favours that he had
received.
With Christian IV of Denmark for many years the Swedes and the Dutch had
had constant disputes and much friction. This able and ambitious king,
throughout a long and vigorous reign, which began in 1593, had watched
with ever-increasing jealousy the passing of the Baltic trade into Dutch
hands, and with something more than jealousy the rapid advance to power
of the sister Scandinavian kingdom under Gustavus Adolphus. Of the 1074
merchant ships that passed through the Sound between June 19 and
November 16, 1645, all but 49 came from Dutch ports, by far the largest
number from Amsterdam; and from these Christian IV drew a large revenue
by the exaction of harsh and arbitrary toll-dues. Again and again the
States-General had complained and protested; and diplomatic pressure had
been brought to bear upon the high-handed king, but without avail.
Between Sweden and Denmark there had been, since Gustavus Adolphus came
to the throne in 1613, no overt act of hostility; but smouldering
beneath the surface of an armed truce were embers of latent rivalries
and ambitions ready at any moment to burst into flame. Christian IV was
a Protestant, but his jealousy of Sweden led him in 1639 openly to take
sides with the Catholic powers, Austria and Spain. Fearing that he might
attempt to close the passage of the Sound, the States-General and the
Swedish Regency in 1640 concluded a treaty "for securing the freedom and
protection of shipping and commerce in the Baltic and North Seas"; and
one of the secret articles gave permission to Sweden to buy or hire
ships in the Netherlands and in case of necessity to enlist crews for
the same. Outward peace was precariously maintained between the
Scandinavian powers, when the seizure of a number of Swedish ships in
the Sound in 1643 made Oxenstierna resolve upon a bold stroke. Without
any declaration of war the Swedish general, Torstensson, was ordered to
lead his victorious army from North Germany into Denmark and to force
King Christian to cease intriguing with the enemy. Holstein, Schleswig
and Jutland were speedily in Torstensson's hands, but the Danish fleet
was superior to the Swedish, and he could make no further progress. Both
sides turned to the United Provinces. Christian promised that the
grievances in regard to the Sound dues should be removed if the
States-General would remain neutral. Oxenstierna addressed himself to
Louis de Geer. The merchant on behalf of the Swedish government was
instructed to approach the stadholder and the States-General, and to
seek for naval assistance under the terms of the treaty of 1640; and, if
he failed in obtaining their assent, then he--de Geer--should himself
(in conformance with the secret article of that treaty) raise on his
own account and equip a fleet of thirty ships for the Swedish service.
De Geer soon discovered that Frederick Henry, being intent on peace
negotiations, was averse to the proposal. The stadholder, and the
States-General acting under his influence, did not wish to create fresh
entanglements by embroiling the United Provinces in a war with Denmark.
De Geer therefore at once began on his own responsibility to equip ships
in the various seaports of Holland and Zeeland which had been the chief
sufferers by the vexatious Sound dues, and he succeeded in enlisting the
connivance of the Estates of Holland to his undertaking. Before the end
of April, 1644, a fleet of thirty-two vessels was collected under the
command of Marten Thijssen. Its first efforts were unsuccessful. The
Danish fleet effectually prevented the junction of Thijssen with the
Swedes, and for a time he found himself blockaded in a narrow passage
called the Listerdiep. Taking advantage of a storm which dispersed the
Danes, the Dutch admiral at last was able to put to sea again, and early
in July somewhat ignominiously returned to Amsterdam to refit. For the
moment King Christian was everywhere triumphant. On July 11 he gained a
signal victory over the Swedish fleet at Colberg Heath, and he had the
satisfaction of seeing Torstensson compelled by the Imperialists to
retreat from Jutland. But the energy and pertinacity of the Amsterdam
merchant saved the situation. Though the retreat of Thijssen meant for
him a heavy financial loss, de Geer never for a moment faltered in his
purpose. Within three weeks Thijssen again put to sea with twenty-two
ships, and by skilful manoeuvring he succeeded in making his way
through the Skagerak and the Sound, and finally brought his fleet to
anchor in the Swedish harbour of Calmar. From this harbour the united
Swedo-Dutch squadrons sailed out and on October 23, between Femern and
Laaland, met the Danish fleet, and after a desperate conflict completely
defeated and destroyed it. Thus were the wealth and resources of a
private citizen of Amsterdam able to intervene decisively at a critical
moment in the struggle for supremacy in the Baltic between the two
Scandinavian powers. But it is not in the victory won by Marten Thijssen
that de Geer rendered his greatest service to Sweden. As the Swedish
historian Fryxell truly says, "all that was won by the statesmanship of
Oxenstierna, by the sword of Baner, Torstensson and Wrangel, in a
desolated Germany streaming with blood, has been already lost again; but
the benefits which Louis de Geer brought to Sweden, by the path of
peaceful industry and virtue, these still exist, and bear wholesome
fruit to a late posterity."
This expedition under Marten Thijssen, who after his victory was created
a Swedish noble and definitely entered the Swedish naval service, though
connived at by Frederick Henry and the States-General, did not express
any desire on their part to aggrandise Sweden unduly at the expense of
Denmark. If some great merchants such as Louis de Geer and Elias Trip
were exploiting the resources of Sweden, others, notably a certain
Gabriel Marcelis, had invested their capital in developing the Danish
grazing lands; and politically and commercially the question of the
Sound dues, pre-eminently a Danish question, overshadowed all others in
importance. The Dutch had no desire to give Sweden a share in the
control of the Sound; they preferred in the interests of their vast
Baltic trade to have to deal with Christian IV alone. The Swedish threat
was useful in bringing diplomatic pressure to bear on the Danish king,
but ultimately they felt confident that, if he refused to make
concessions in the matter of the dues, they could compel him to do so.
As one of their diplomatists proudly declared, "the wooden keys of the
Sound were not in the hands of King Christian, but in the wharves of
Amsterdam." In June, 1645, his words were put to a practical test.
Admiral Witte de With at the head of a fleet of fifty war-ships was
ordered to convoy 300 merchantmen through the Sound, peacefully if
possible, if not, by force. Quietly the entire fleet of 350 vessels
sailed through the narrow waters. The Danish fleet and Danish forts
made no attempt at resistance. All the summer De With cruised to and fro
and the Dutch traders suffered no molestation. Christian's obstinacy at
last gave way before this display of superior might, and on August 23,
by the treaty of Christianopel he agreed to lower the tolls for forty
years and to make many other concessions that were required from him. At
the same time by Dutch mediation peace was concluded between Denmark and
Sweden, distinctly to the advantage of the former, by the treaty of
Brömsebro.
To pass to other regions. In the Levant, during the long residence of
Cornelis Haga at Constantinople, trade had been greatly extended.
Considerable privileges were conceded to the Dutch by the so-called
"capitulation" concluded by his agency with the Porte in 1612; and Dutch
consuls were placed in the chief ports of Turkey, Asia Minor, Syria,
Egypt, Tunis, Greece and Italy. The trading however with the
Mediterranean and the Levant was left to private enterprise, the
States-General which had given charters to the different Companies--East
India, West India and Northern--not being willing to create any further
monopolies.
The lack of coal and of metals has always seriously hindered industrial
development in the United Provinces. Nevertheless the advent into
Holland of so many refugees who were skilled artisans, from the southern
Netherlands, led to the establishment of various textile industries at
Leyden, Haarlem and other towns. One of the chief of these was the
dressing and dyeing of English cloth for exportation.
Amsterdam, it should be mentioned, had already at this time become the
home of the diamond industry. The art of cutting and polishing diamonds
was a secret process brought to the city on the Y by Portuguese Jews,
who were expelled by Philip II; and in Amsterdam their descendants still
retain a peculiar skill and craftmanship that is unrivalled. Jewish
settlers were indeed to be found in many of the Dutch towns; and it was
through them that Holland became famous in 17th century Europe for the
perfection of her goldsmiths' and silversmiths' art and for jewelry of
every kind. Another industry, which had its centre at Delft, was that of
the celebrated pottery and tiles known as "delfware." It will be evident
from what has been said above that vast wealth flowed into Holland at
this period of her history, but, as so often happens, this sudden
growth of riches had a tendency to accumulate in the hands of a minority
of the people, with the inevitable consequence, on the one hand, of the
widening of the gulf which divided poverty from opulence; on the other,
with the creation among rich and poor alike of a consuming eagerness and
passion for gain, if not by legitimate means, then by wild speculation
or corrupt venality. Bubble companies came into existence, only to bring
disaster on those who rashly invested their money in them. The fever of
speculation rose to its height in the mania for the growing of bulbs and
more especially of tulips, which more and more absorbed the attention of
the public in Holland in the years 1633-6. Perfectly inordinate sums
were offered in advance for growing crops or for particular bulbs; most
of the transactions being purely paper speculations, a gambling in
futures. Millions of guilders were risked, and hundreds of thousands
lost or won. In 1637 the crash came, and many thousands of people, in
Amsterdam, Haarlem, Leyden, Alkmaar and other towns in Holland, were
brought to ruin. The Estates of Holland and the various municipal
corporations, numbers of whose members were among the sufferers, were
compelled to take official action to extend the time for the liquidation
of debts, and thus to some extent limit the number of bankruptcies. The
tulip mania reduced, however, so many to beggary that it came as a stern
warning. It was unfortunately only too typical of the spirit of the
time.
Even worse in some ways was the venality and corruption which began to
pervade the public life of the country. The getting of wealth, no matter
how, was an epidemic, which infected not merely the business community,
but the official classes of the republic. There was malversation in the
admiralties and in the military administration. The government was in
the hands of narrow oligarchies, who took good care to oppose jealously
any extension of the privileges which placed so much valuable patronage
at their disposal. Even envoys to foreign courts were reputed not to be
inaccessible to the receipt of presents, which were in reality bribes;
and in the law-courts the wealthy suitor or offender could generally
count on a charitable construction being placed upon all points in his
favour. The severe placards, for instance, against the public
celebration of any form of worship but that of the Reformed religion,
according to the decrees of the Synod of Dort, were notoriously not
enforced. Those who were able and willing to pay for a dispensation
found a ready and judicious toleration.
This toleration was not entirely due to the venality of the officials,
but rather to the spirit of materialistic indifference that was abroad
among the orthodox Calvinists, who were alone eligible for public
office. Large numbers of those who professed the established faith were
in reality either nominal conformists too much immersed in affairs to
trouble about religious questions, or actually free-thinkers in
disguise. It must never be forgotten that in the United Provinces taken
as a whole, the Calvinists, whether orthodox or arminian, formed a
minority of the population. Even in Holland itself more than half the
inhabitants were Catholics, including many of the old families and
almost all the peasantry. Likewise in Utrecht, Gelderland and Overyssel
the Catholics were in the majority. The Generality lands, North Brabant
and Dutch Flanders, were entirely of the Roman faith. In Holland,
Zeeland and especially in Friesland and Groningen the Mennonite Baptists
and other sects had numerous adherents. Liberty of thought and to a
large extent of worship was in fact at this time the characteristic of
the Netherlands, and existed in spite of the unrepealed placards which
enforced under pain of heavy penalties a strict adherence to the
principles of Dort.
* * * * *