THE BEGINNINGS OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC
At the moment of the assassination of William the Silent it might well
have seemed to an impartial observer that the restoration of the
authority of the Spanish king over the whole of the Netherlands was only
a question of time. The military skill and the statecraft of Alexander
Farnese were making slow but sure progress in the reconquest of Flanders
and Brabant. Despite the miserable inadequacy of the financial support
he received from Spain, the governor-general, at the head of a
numerically small but thoroughly efficient and well-disciplined army,
was capturing town after town. In 1583 Dunkirk, Nieuport, Lindhoven,
Steenbergen, Zutphen and Sas-van-Gent fell; in the spring of 1584 Ypres
and Bruges were already in Spanish hands, and on the very day of
William's death the fort of Liefkenshoek on the Scheldt, one of the
outlying defences of Antwerp, was taken by assault. In August
Dendermonde, in September Ghent, surrendered. All West Flanders, except
the sea-ports of Ostend and Sluis, had in the early autumn of 1584 been
reduced to the obedience of the king. The campaign of the following year
was to be even more successful. Brussels, the seat of government, was
compelled by starvation to capitulate, March 10; Mechlin was taken, July
19; and finally Antwerp, after a memorable siege, in which Parma
displayed masterly skill and resource, passed once more into the
possession of the Spaniards. The fall of this great town was a very
heavy blow to the patriot cause, and it was likewise the ruin of Antwerp
itself. A very large part of its most enterprising inhabitants left
their homes rather than abjure their religious faith and took refuge in
Holland and Zeeland, or fled across the Rhine into Germany. Access to
the sea down the Scheldt was closed by the fleets of the Sea Beggars,
and the commerce and industry of the first commercial port of western
Europe passed to Amsterdam and Middelburg. Meanwhile there had been no
signs of weakness or of yielding on the part of the sturdy burghers of
Holland and Zeeland. On the fatal July 10, 1584, the Estates of
Holland were in session at Delft. They at once took energetic action
under the able leadership of Paul Buys, Advocate of Holland, and John
van Oldenbarneveldt, Pensionary of Rotterdam. They passed a resolution
"to uphold the good cause with God's help without sparing gold or
blood." Despatches were at once sent to the Estates of the other
provinces, to the town councils and to the military and naval
commanders, affirming their own determined attitude and exhorting all
those who had accepted the leadership of the murdered Prince of Orange
"to bear themselves manfully and piously without abatement of zeal on
account of the aforesaid misfortune." Their calm courage at such a
moment of crisis reassured men's minds. There was no panic. Steps were
at once taken for carrying on the government in Holland, Zeeland and
Utrecht. Stimulated by the example of Holland, the States-General
likewise took prompt action. On August 18 a Council of State was
appointed to exercise provisionally the executive powers of sovereignty,
consisting of eighteen members, four from Holland, three each from
Zeeland and Friesland, two from Utrecht and six from Brabant and
Flanders. Of this body Maurice of Nassau, William's seventeen year-old
son, was nominated first Councillor, and a pension of 30,000 guilders
per annum was granted him. At the same time Louise de Coligny was
invited to take up her residence in Holland and suitable provision was
made for her. William Lewis, son of Count John of Nassau, was elected
Stadholder of Friesland. Count Nieuwenaar was Stadholder of Gelderland
and shortly afterwards also of Utrecht and Overyssel. Owing to the youth
of Maurice the question as to whether he should become Count of Holland
and Zeeland or be elected Stadholder was left in abeyance until it
should be settled to which of two foreign rulers the sovereignty of the
provinces, now that Anjou was dead, should be offered.
In the revolted provinces the responsible leaders were at this time
practically unanimous in their opinion that any attempt on their part to
carry on the struggle against the power of Spain without foreign
assistance was hopeless; and it was held that such assistance could only
be obtained by following in the footsteps of William and offering to
confer the overlordship of the provinces on another sovereign in the
place of Philip II. There were but two possible candidates, Henry III of
France and Elizabeth of England.
There were objections to both, but the rapid successes of Parma made it
necessary to take action. The partisans of a French alliance were in the
majority, despite the efforts of a strong opposition headed by Paul
Buys; and an embassy (January, 1585) was despatched to Paris to offer
conditionally to the French king the Protectorship of Holland and
Zeeland and sovereignty over the other provinces. The negotiations went
on for a couple of months, but Henry III finally declined the offer.
Another embassy was sent, July, 1585, to England, but Elizabeth refused
absolutely to accept the sovereignty. She however was not averse to the
proposal that she should despatch a body of troops to the armed
assistance of the provinces, provided that adequate guarantees were
given for the outlay. She was afraid of Philip II and, though she had no
love for men who were rebels to their lawful sovereign, was quite
willing to use them for her own ends. Her motives therefore were mixed
and purely self-interested; nevertheless it is doubtful if the
negotiations would have led to any definite result, had not the news of
the fall of Antwerp made both parties feel that this was no time for
haggling or procrastination. Elizabeth therefore promised to send at
once 6000 troops under the command of a "gentleman of quality," who
should bear the title of governor-general. He was to co-operate with the
Council of State (on which two Englishmen were to sit) in restoring
order and in maintaining and defending the ancient rights and privileges
of the provinces. The governor-general and all other officials were to
take an oath of fealty both to the States-General and to the queen. The
towns of Flushing and Brill with the fort of Rammekens were to be handed
over in pledge to Elizabeth for the repayment of expenses and received
English garrisons. They were known as "the cautionary towns."
At the end of October the States were informed that the choice of the
queen had fallen upon her favourite, Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester,
and that he would shortly set out for the Netherlands. Holland and
Zeeland, ever jealous of foreign interference with their rights and
privileges, resolved now to forestall the arrival of the English
governor-general by appointing Maurice of Nassau, with the title of
"Excellency," to the offices of Stadholder and Admiral and
Captain-General of both provinces; and the Count of Hohenlo was
nominated (Maurice being still little more than a boy) to the actual
command of the State's forces. Leicester set sail from Harwich
accompanied by a fleet of fifty vessels and landed at Flushing on
December 19. He met everywhere with an enthusiastic reception. The
States-General were eager to confer large powers upon him. Practically
he was invested with the same authority as the former regent, Mary of
Hungary, with the reservation that the States-General and the Provincial
Estates should meet at their own instance, that the present stadholders
should continue in office, and that appointments to vacant offices
should be made from two or three persons nominated by the Provincial
Estates. A new Council of State was created which, as previously agreed,
included two Englishmen. On February 4, 1586, Leicester's government was
solemnly inaugurated in the presence of Maurice of Nassau and the
States-General, and he accepted the title of "Excellency." Elizabeth on
hearing this was very angry and even threatened to recall Leicester, and
she sent Lord Heneage to express both to the States-General and the
governor-general her grave displeasure at what had taken place. She bade
Leicester restrict himself to the functions that she had assigned to
him, and it was not until July that she was sufficiently appeased to
allow him to be addressed as "Excellency."
All this was galling to Leicester's pride and ambition, and did not tend
to improve his relations with the States. An English governor would in
any case have had a difficult task, and Leicester had neither tact nor
capacity as a statesman, and no pretensions as a military leader. He
possessed no knowledge of the institutions of the country or the
character of the people, and was ignorant of the Dutch language. The
measures he took and the arbitrary way in which he tried to enforce
them, soon brought him face to face with the stubborn resistance of the
Estates of Holland under the leadership of Oldenbarneveldt. In April,
1586, he issued a very stringent placard forbidding all traffic with the
enemy's lands and more especially the supplying of the enemy with grain.
He meant it well, for he had been informed that the cutting-off of this
commerce, which he regarded as illicit, would deprive the Spaniards of
the necessaries of life, and Parma's position would become desperate.
This carrying trade had, however, for long been a source of much profit
to the merchants and shipowners of Holland and Zeeland; indeed it
supplied no small part of the resources by which those two provinces
had equipped the fleets and troops by which they had defended themselves
against the efforts of the Spanish king. Two years before this the
States-General had tried to place an embargo on the traffic in grain,
but the powerful town-council of Amsterdam had refused obedience and the
Estates of Holland supported them in their action. The deputies of the
inland provinces, which had suffered most from the Spanish armies, were
jealous of the prosperity of the maritime States, and regarded this
trade with the Spaniard as being carried on to their injury. But Holland
and Zeeland supplied the funds without which resistance would long since
have been impossible, and they claimed moreover, as sovereign provinces,
the right to regulate their trade affairs. The edict remained a
dead-letter, for there was no power to enforce it.
The governor made a still greater mistake when, in his annoyance at the
opposition of the Hollanders, he courted the democratic anti-Holland
party in Utrecht, which had as its leader the ultra-Calvinist
stadholder, Nieuwenaar, and caused one of his confidants, a Brabanter,
Gerard Prounick, surnamed Deventer, to be elected burgomaster of
Utrecht, although as a foreigner he was disqualified from holding that
office. An even more arbitrary act was his creation of a Chamber of
Finance armed with inquisitorial powers, thus invading the rights of the
Provincial Estates and depriving the Council of State of one of its most
important functions. To make matters worse, he appointed Nieuwenaar to
preside over the new Chamber, with a Brabanter, Jacques Reingoud, as
treasurer-general, and a Fleming, Daniel de Burchgrave, as auditor. The
Estates of Holland, under the guidance of Oldenbarneveldt, prepared
themselves to resist stubbornly this attempt to thrust upon them a new
tyranny.
As a military leader Leicester was quite unfitted to oppose successfully
such a general as Parma. Both commanders were in truth much hampered by
the preparations that were being made by Philip for the invasion of
England. The king could spare Parma but little money for the pay of his
troops, and his orders were that the Spanish forces in the Netherlands
should be held in reserve and readiness for embarkation, as soon as the
Great Armada should hold command of the Channel. England was the first
objective. When its conquest was accomplished that of the rebel
provinces would speedily follow. On the other hand Elizabeth, always
niggardly, was little disposed in face of the threatened danger to
dissipate her resources by any needless expenditure. Leicester
therefore found himself at the head of far too small a force to deal any
effective blows at the enemy. He succeeded in capturing Doesburg, but
failed to take Zutphen. It was in a gallant effort to prevent a Spanish
convoy from entering that town that Sir Philip Sidney met his death at
the combat of Warnsfeld (Sept. 22, 1586). An important fort facing
Zutphen was however stormed, and here Leicester left Sir Robert Yorke
with a strong garrison, and at the same time sent Sir William Stanley
with 1200 men to be governor of Deventer. These appointments gave rise
to much criticism that proved later to be fully justified, for both
these officers were Catholics and had formerly been in the Spanish
service. Leicester had also taken other steps that were ill-judged. West
Friesland had for many years been united to Holland and was known as the
North-Quarter. The governor-general, however, appointed Sonoy Stadholder
of West Friesland, and was thus infringing the rights and jurisdiction
of Maurice of Nassau. Maurice also held the post of Admiral-General of
Holland and Zeeland, but Leicester took it upon himself to create three
distinct Admiralty Colleges, those of Holland, Zeeland, and the
North-Quarter, thus further dividing authority in a land where greater
unity was the chief thing to be aimed at. Leicester was equally unwise
in the part he took in regard to religious matters. Oldenbarneveldt,
Paul Buys and the great majority of burgher-regents in Holland belonged
to the moderate or, as it was called, the "libertine" party, to which
William the Silent had adhered and whose principles of toleration he had
strongly upheld. Leicester, largely influenced by spite against
Oldenbarneveldt and the Hollanders for their opposition to his edict
about trade with the enemy and to his appointment of Sonoy, threw
himself into the arms of the extreme Calvinists, who were at heart as
fanatical persecutors as the Spanish inquisitors themselves. These
"precisian" zealots held, by the governor-general's permission and under
his protection, a synod at Dort, June, 1586, and endeavoured to organise
the Reformed Church in accordance with their strict principles of
exclusiveness.
By this series of maladroit acts Leicester had made himself so unpopular
and distrusted in Holland that the Estates of that predominant province
lost no opportunity of inflicting rebuffs upon him. Stung by the
opposition he met and weary of a thankless task, the governor determined
at the end of November to pay a visit to England. The Council of State
was left in charge of the administration during his absence.
His departure had the very important effect of bringing the question of
State-rights acutely to the front. The dislike and distrust felt by the
Hollanders towards the English governor-general was greatly increased by
the treachery of Yorke and Stanley, who delivered the fort at Zutphen
and the town of Deventer, with the defence of which they had been
charged, into the hands of the Spaniards. The town of Gelder and the
fort at Wouw were likewise betrayed, and there can be small doubt that,
had Parma at this time been able to take advantage of the dissensions in
the ranks of his adversaries, he would have met with little effectual
resistance to his arms. His whole attention was, however, centred in
preparations for the proposed invasion of England. Leicester had no
sooner left the country than the Estates of Holland, under the strong
leadership of Oldenbarneveldt, took measures to assert their right to
regulate their own affairs, independently of the Council of State. A
levy of troops was made (in the pay of the province of Holland), who
were required to take an oath to the Provincial Estates and the
stadholder. To Maurice the title of "Prince" was given; and Sonoy in the
North-Quarter and all the commanders of fortified places were compelled
to place themselves under his orders. The States-General, in which the
influence of Holland and its chief representative, Oldenbarneveldt, was
overpoweringly great, upheld the Provincial Estates in the measures they
were taking. As a result of their action the trade restrictions were
practically repealed, the Council of State was reconstituted, and a
strong indictment of Leicester's conduct and administration was drawn up
in the name of the States-General and forwarded to the absent governor
in England.
Elizabeth was indignant at the language of this document, but at this
particular time the dangers which were threatening her throne and people
were too serious for her to take any steps to alienate the States. It
was her obvious policy to support them in their resistance, and to keep,
if possible, Parma's forces occupied in the Netherlands. Accordingly
Leicester returned to his post, July 1587, but in an altogether wrong
spirit. He knew that he had a strong body of partisans in Utrecht,
Friesland and elsewhere, for he had posed as the friend of the people's
rights against the nobles and those burgher-aristocracies in the cities
in whose hands all real power rested, and by his attitude in religious
matters he had won for himself the support of the Calvinist preachers.
His agents, Deventer in Utrecht, Aysma in Friesland and Sonoy in the
North-Quarter, were able men, who could count on the help of the
democracy, whom they flattered. So Leicester came back with the
determination to override the opposition of the Estates of Holland and
compel their submission to his will. But he found that he only succeeded
in making that opposition more resolute. His attempts to overthrow the
supremacy of the "regents" in Amsterdam, Leyden, Enkhuizen and other
towns were complete failures. Oldenbarneveldt and Maurice were supreme
in Holland and Zeeland; and the power of the purse gave to Holland a
controlling voice in the States-General. The position of Leicester was
shaken also by his inability to relieve Sluis, which important seaport
fell after a long siege into Parma's hands, August 5. Its capture was
attributed by rumour, which in this case had no foundation, to the
treachery of the English governor and garrison. Moreover it was
discovered that for some months secret peace negotiations had been
passing between the English government and Parma; and this aroused
violent suspicions that the Netherlands were merely being used as pawns
in English policy, and alienated from the governor-general the sympathy
of the preachers, who had been his strongest supporters. Humiliated and
broken in spirit, Leicester, after many bickerings and recriminations,
finally left the Netherlands (December 10), though his formal
resignation of his post did not reach the States-General until the
following April. Lord Willoughby was placed in command of the English
troops.
The year 1588 was the beginning of a decade full of fate for the Dutch
Republic. The departure of Leicester left the seven provinces of the
Union of Utrecht weak, divided, torn by factions, without allies, the
country to the east of the Yssel and to the south of the Scheldt and the
Waal already in the hands of the enemy. Moreover the armed forces of
that enemy were far stronger than their own and under the command of a
consummate general. But this was the year of the Spanish Armada, and
Parma's offensive operations were, by the strictest orders from Madrid,
otherwise directed. And Elizabeth on her side, though highly offended
at the treatment which her favourite, Leicester, had received from the
Hollanders, was too astute to quarrel at such a moment with a people
whose ships kept a strict blockade in the Scheldt and before the Flemish
harbours. Thus a respite was obtained for the States at this critical
time, which was turned to good account and was of vital import for their
constitutional development. The Leicestrian period, despite its record
of incompetence and failure, had however the distinction of being the
period which for good or for evil gave birth to the republic of the
United Netherlands, as we know it in history. The curious, amorphous,
hydra-headed system of government, which was to subsist for some two
centuries, was in its origin the direct result of the confused welter of
conflicting forces, which was the legacy of Leicester's rule. As a
preliminary to a right understanding of the political system, which was
now, more by accidental force of circumstances than by design,
developing into a permanent constitution, it will be necessary to trace
the events of the years which immediately followed the departure of
Leicester, and which under the influence and by the co-operation of
three striking personalities were to mould the future of the Dutch
republic.
Those three personalities were John van Oldenbarneveldt, Maurice of
Nassau and his cousin William Lewis of Nassau, the Stadholder of
Friesland. Born in 1547, Oldenbarneveldt, after studying Jurisprudence
at Louvain, Bourges and Heidelberg, became a devoted adherent of William
the Silent and took part in the defence of Haarlem and of Leyden. His
abilities, however, fitted him to take a prominent part as a politician
and administrator rather than as a soldier; and his career may be said
to have begun by his appointment to the post of Pensionary of Rotterdam
in 1576. In this capacity his industry and his talent speedily won for
him a commanding position in the Estates of Holland, and he became one
of the Prince of Orange's confidential friends and advisers. In 1586 he
was appointed Advocate of Holland in succession to Paul Buys. This
office included the duties of legal adviser, secretary and likewise in a
sense that of "Speaker" to the Provincial Estates. In addition to all
this he was the mouthpiece in the States-General of the deputation
representing the Provincial Estates, and exercised in that assembly all
the authority attaching to the man who spoke in the name of Holland. At
this time of transition, by his predominance alike in his own province
of Holland and in the States-General, he was able to secure for the
general policy of the Union, especially in the conduct of foreign
affairs, a continuity of aim and purpose that enabled the
loosely-cemented and mutually jealous confederacy of petty sovereign
states to tide-over successfully the critical years which followed the
departure of Leicester, and to acquire a sense of national unity.
The brain and the diplomatic skill of the great statesman would,
however, have been of little avail without the aid of the military
abilities of Maurice of Nassau. Maurice was twenty years of age when
Leicester left Holland. He was a man very different from his father in
opinions and in the character of his talents. Maurice had nothing of his
father's tolerance in religious matters or his subtle skill in
diplomacy. He was a born soldier, but no politician, and had no wish to
interfere in affairs of State. He had the highest respect for
Oldenbarneveldt and complete confidence in his capacity as a statesman,
and he was at all times ready to use the executive powers, which he
exercised by virtue of the numerous posts he was speedily called upon to
fill, for the carrying out of Oldenbarneveldt's policy; while the
Advocate on his side found in the strong arm of the successful general
the instrument that he needed for the maintenance of his supremacy in
the conduct of the civil government. Already in 1587 Maurice was
Stadholder of Holland and Zeeland. In 1588 he became Captain-General and
Admiral-General of the Union with the control and supervision of all the
armed forces of the Provinces by sea and by land. The death of
Nieuwenaar in the following year created a vacancy in the stadholderates
of Utrecht, Gelderland and Overyssel. Maurice was in each province
elected as Nieuwenaar's successor. The Advocate therefore and the
Prince, through the close accord which was for many years to subsist
between them, gathered thus into their hands (except in Friesland)
practically the entire administrative, executive and military powers of
the United Provinces and by their harmonious co-operation with William
Lewis, the wise and capable Stadholder of Friesland, were able to give
something of real unity to a group of states, each claiming to be a
sovereign entity, and to give them the outward semblance of a federal
republic. There was no "eminent head," but the sovereignty in reality,
if not in name, was vested during the period with which we have now to
deal in this triumvirate.
Circumstances provided a favourable field for the display of the
youthful Maurice's military abilities. In 1589 the assassination of
Henry III placed Henry of Navarre on the throne of France. The accession
of the brilliant Huguenot leader led to civil war; and the Catholic
opposition was encouraged and supported by Philip II, who regarded Henry
IV as a menace and danger to the Spanish power. Parma, therefore, whose
active prosecution of the war against the rebel provinces had been so
long hindered by having to hold his army in readiness for the projected
invasion of England, found himself, after the failure and destruction of
the Armada, in no better position for a campaign in the northern
Netherlands. Disappointment and false charges against him brought on a
serious illness, and on his recovery he received orders to conduct an
expedition into France. William Lewis of Nassau had for sometime been
urging upon the States-General that the time for remaining upon the
strict defensive was past, and that, when the enemy's efforts were
weakened and distracted, the best defence was a vigorous offensive. At
first he spoke to deaf ears, but he found now a powerful supporter in
Maurice, and the two stadholders prevailed. They had now by careful and
assiduous training created a strong and well-disciplined army for the
service of the States. This army was made up by contingents of various
nationalities, English, Scottish, French and German as well as
Netherlanders. But the material was on the whole excellent, and the
entire force was welded together by confidence in their leaders.
In 1590 the capture of Breda by a ruse (seventy men hidden beneath a
covering of peat making their entrance into the town and opening the
gates to their comrades outside) was a good omen for the campaign that
was planned for 1591. For the first time Maurice had an opportunity for
showing his genius for war and especially for siege warfare. By rapid
movements he took first Zutphen, then Deventer and Delfzijl, and
relieved the fort of Knodsenburg (near Nijmwegen). Thus successful on
the eastern frontier, the stadholder hurried to Zeeland and captured
Hulst, the key to the land of Waas. He then turned his steps again to
the east and appearing suddenly before Nijmwegen made himself master of
this important city. Such a succession of brilliant triumphs established
Maurice's fame, and to a lesser degree that of William Lewis, whose
co-operation and advice were of the greatest service to the younger man.
This was markedly the case in the following year (1592) when the two
stadholders set to work to expel the Spaniards from the two strongly
fortified towns of Steenwijk and Coevorden, whose possession enabled a
strong force under the veteran Verdugo to retain their hold upon
Friesland. The States army was not at its full strength, for the English
contingent under Sir Francis Vere had been sent to France; and Verdugo
was confident that any attempt to capture these well-garrisoned
fortresses was doomed to failure. He had to learn how great was the
scientific skill and resource of Maurice in the art of beleaguering.
Steenwijk after an obstinate defence capitulated on June 5. Coevorden
was then invested and in its turn had to surrender, on September 12.
During this time Parma had been campaigning with no great success in
northern France. In the autumn he returned to the Netherlands suffering
from the effects of a wound and broken in spirit. Never did any man fill
a difficult and trying post with more success and zeal than Alexander
Farnese during the sixteen years of his governor-generalship.
Nevertheless Philip was afraid of his nephew's talents and ambition, and
he despatched the Count of Fuentes with a letter of recall. It was never
delivered. Parma set out to meet him, but fell ill and died at Spa,
December 2, 1592. He appointed the Count of Mansfeld to take his place,
until the Archduke Ernest of Austria, who had been appointed to succeed
him, arrived in the Netherlands.
The campaign of 1593 was marked by the taking of Geertruidenberg, a
fortress which barred the free access of the Hollanders and Zeelanders
to the inland waters. The science which Maurice displayed in the siege
of this town greatly increased his renown. In the following year the
stadholders turned their attention to the north-east corner of the land,
which was still in the possession of the Spaniards. After a siege of two
months Groningen surrendered; and the city with the surrounding district
was by the terms of the capitulation--known as "The Treaty of
Reduction"--admitted as a province into the Union under the name of
_Stad en Landen._ William Lewis was appointed stadholder, and Drente was
placed under his jurisdiction. The northern Netherlands were now cleared
of the enemy, and Maurice at the conclusion of the campaign made a
triumphal entry into the Hague amidst general rejoicing. William Lewis
lost no time in taking steps to establish Calvinism as the only
recognised form of faith in his new government. His strong principles
did not allow him to be tolerant, and to Catholicism he was a
convinced foe. Everywhere throughout the United Provinces the reformed
religion was now dominant, and its adherents alone could legally take
part in public worship.
In January, 1595, Henry IV declared war against Spain and was anxious
for an alliance with the States against the common enemy. The Archduke
Ernest, on whose coming into the Netherlands great hopes had been
placed, found himself now in a difficult position with hostile armies
threatening from both sides and no hope of efficient financial or other
support from Spain. He was instructed therefore to enter into
negotiations at the Hague with a view to the conclusion of a peace,
based upon the terms of the Pacification of Ghent. But there was never
any prospect of an agreement being reached; and the sudden death of the
archduke (February 20,1595) brought the negotiations to an end. Archduke
Ernest was succeeded by the Count of Fuentes as governor _ad interim._
Fuentes proved himself to be a strong and capable commander; and the
summer was marked by a series of successes against the hostile forces
both of the French and the Netherlanders. There was no decisive
encounter, but the Spanish forces foiled the efforts of their
adversaries to effect an invasion or capture any towns.
The Cardinal Archduke Albert arrived at Brussels to replace Fuentes in
January, 1596. Albert was the favourite nephew of King Philip, and had
been brought up at Madrid. Although an ecclesiastic, he proved himself
to be a statesman and soldier of more than ordinary capacity. It was
intended that he should, as soon as the Pope's consent could be
obtained, divest himself of his orders and marry his cousin the Infanta
Isabel. The bankrupt condition of Spain prevented Philip from furnishing
the archduke with adequate financial help on entering upon his
governorship, but Albert was provided with some money, and he found in
the Netherlands the well-disciplined and war-tried force of which
Fuentes had made such good use in the previous campaign. He was anxious
to emulate that general's success, and as the veteran leaders, Mondragon
and Verdugo, had both died, he gave the command to the Seigneur de
Rosne, a French refugee. This man was a commander of skill and
enterprise, and special circumstances enabled him by two brilliant
offensive strokes to capture first Calais and afterwards Hulst. Hulst
was only taken after a severe struggle, in which De Rosne himself
fell.
The special circumstances which favoured these operations were brought
about by the conclusion of a treaty of alliance between France, England
and the States. This treaty was the result of prolonged negotiations; it
was of short duration and its conditions were far from favourable to the
United Provinces, but it was of great importance from the fact that for
the first time the new-fledged republic was recognised by the
neighbouring sovereigns of France and England as an independent state
and was admitted into alliance on terms of equality. It was, however,
only with difficulty and through the insistence of Henry IV that
Elizabeth was induced to acknowledge the independent status of the rebel
provinces. In return the republic was required to keep up a force of
8000 men for service in the Netherlands, and to despatch 4000 men to act
with the French army in northern France--this auxiliary force to include
the five English regiments in the States' service. Thus Maurice was
deprived of a considerable part of his army and obliged to act on the
defensive. Elizabeth also insisted upon the carrying out of Leicester's
placard forbidding trade with the enemy. This clause of the treaty was
very unpalatable to Amsterdam and the Hollanders generally, and only a
sullen acquiescence was given to it. From the first it was
systematically evaded. The English government on their part undertook to
support the French king with a force equal in strength to that furnished
by the Provinces, _i.e._ 4000 men, but at the same time a secret treaty
was drawn up by which Henry agreed to a reduction of the English troops
by one-half. This piece of underhand work was in due time discovered by
the States, who saw that their allies were not to be trusted and that
they must be on the watch lest their interests should be sacrificed to
the selfish policy of France. The issue showed that Henry IV was in fact
ready to make terms with Spain, as soon as it was to his advantage to do
so. Meanwhile in 1597 the French king, by advancing in force into
Picardy, drew upon this frontier the chief attention of the Spaniards;
and Maurice seized the opportunity that was offered to him to conduct an
offensive campaign with signal success.
He began the year brilliantly by surprising in January, while still in
its winter quarters, a Spanish force of 4500 near Turnhout. More than
half the force was destroyed. On the side of the Netherlands eight men
only fell. With the spring began a series of sieges; and, one after the
other, Rheinberg, Meurs, Groenloo, Breedevoort, Enschede, Ootmarsum,
Oldenzaal and Lingen were captured. Gelderland, Overyssel and Drente
were entirely freed from the presence of the enemy. With the opening of
1598 Henry IV and Philip II entered upon negotiations for a peace. The
French king felt the necessity of a respite from war in order to
reorganise the resources of his country, exhausted by a long continuance
of civil strife; and Philip was ill and already feeling his end
approaching. The States strove hard to prevent what they regarded as
desertion, and two embassies were despatched to France and to England to
urge the maintenance of the alliance. Oldenbarneveldt himself headed the
French mission, but he failed to turn Henry from his purpose. A treaty
of peace between France and Spain was signed at Vervins, May 2, 1598.
Oldenbarneveldt went from Paris to England and was more successful.
Elizabeth bargained however for the repayment of her loan by annual
installments, and for armed assistance both by land and sea should an
attack be made by the Spaniards on England. The queen, however, made two
concessions. Henceforth only one English representative was to have a
seat in the Council of State; and all the English troops in the
Netherlands, including the garrisons of the cautionary towns, were to
take an oath of allegiance to the States.
This year saw the accomplishment of a project on which the Spanish king
had for some time set his heart--the marriage of the Cardinal Archduke
Albert to his cousin the Infanta Isabel Clara Eugenia, and the erection
of the Netherlands into an independent sovereignty under their joint
rule. Philip hoped in this way to provide suitably for a well-beloved
daughter and at the same time, by the grant of apparent independence to
the Netherland provinces, to secure their allegiance to the new
sovereigns. The use of the word "apparent" is justified, for provision
was made in the deed of cession that the Netherlands should revert to
the Spanish crown in case the union should prove childless; and there
was a secret agreement that the chief fortresses should still be
garrisoned by Spanish troops and that the archdukes, as they were
officially styled, should recognise the suzerainty of the King of Spain.
Philip did not actually live to carry his plan into execution. His
death took place on September 13, 1598. But all the necessary
arrangements for the marriage and the transfer of sovereignty had
already been made. Albert, having first divested himself of his
ecclesiastical dignities, was married by proxy to Isabel at Ferrara in
November. It was not until the end of the following year that the new
rulers made their _joyeuse entrée_ into Brussels, but their marriage
marks the beginning of a fresh stage in the history of the Netherlands.
Albert and Isabel were wise and capable, and they succeeded in gaining
the affection and willing allegiance of the southern provinces. The
States-General of the revolted provinces of the north had, however,
already enjoyed for some years a real independence won by suffering and
struggle and they showed no disposition to meet the overtures of the
archdukes. They were resolved to have no further connection with Spain
or with Spanish rulers, and from this time forward the cleavage in
character, sentiment, and above all in religion, between north and south
was to become, as time went on, more and more accentuated. The Dutch
republic and the Spanish Netherlands were henceforth destined to pursue
their separate course along widely divergent paths.
The ten years which had elapsed between the departure of Leicester and
the advent of Albert and Isabel had witnessed a truly marvellous
transformation in the condition of the rebel provinces, and especially
of Holland and Zeeland. Gradually they had been freed from the presence
of the Spaniard, while at the same time the Spanish yoke had been firmly
riveted upon Flanders and Brabant. These provinces were now devastated
and ruined. The quays of Antwerp were deserted, the industries of Ghent
and Bruges destroyed. The most enterprising and skilful of their
merchants and artisans had fled over the frontier into Holland or across
the sea into England. Holland and Zeeland were thronged with refugees,
Flemings and Brabanters, French Huguenots and numerous Spanish and
Portuguese Jews, driven out by the pitiless persecution of Philip II.
The Hollanders and Zeelanders had long been a seafaring people, who had
derived the chief part of their wealth from their fisheries and their
carrying trade; and this influx of new and vigorous blood, merchants,
traders, and textile workers, bringing with them their knowledge, skill
and energy, aroused such a phenomenal outburst of maritime and
commercial activity and adventure as the world had never seen before.
The fleets of the Hollanders and Zeelanders had during the whole of the
war of independence been the main defence of those provinces against
Spanish invasion; but, great as had been the services they had
rendered, it was the carrying-trade which had furnished the rebel states
with the sinews of war, and of this a large part had been derived from
that very trading with the enemy which Leicester had striven in vain to
prevent. The Spaniards and Portuguese were dependent upon the Dutch
traders for the supply of many necessaries of life; and thus Spanish
gold was made to pay for the support of the war which was waged against
the Spanish king. The dues in connection with this trade, known as
licences and convoys, alone furnished large sums to replenish the
war-chest; and it is said that from 25,000 to 30,000 seamen found
employment by it.
Amsterdam during this decade had been rapidly growing in importance and
it was soon to be the first seaport in the world. It had become the
_emporium_ of the Baltic trade. In 1601 it is stated that between 800
and 900 ships left its quays in three days, carrying commodities to the
Baltic ports. They came back laden with corn and other "east-sea" goods,
which they then distributed in French, Portuguese and Spanish havens,
and even as far as Italy and the Levant. Ship-building went on apace at
Enkhuizen, Hoorn and other towns on the Zuyder Zee; and Zaandam was soon
to become a centre of the timber trade. In Zeeland, Middelburg, through
the enterprise of an Antwerp refugee of French extraction, by name
Balthazar de Moucheron, was second only to Amsterdam as a sea-port,
while Dordrecht and Rotterdam were also busy with shipping.
The energies of the Dutch at this springtide of their national life were
far from being confined to European, waters. Dutch sailors already knew
the way to the East-Indies round the Cape of Good Hope through
employment on Portuguese vessels; and the trade-routes by which the
Spaniards brought the treasures of the New World across the Atlantic
were likewise familiar to them and for a similar reason. The East-Indies
had for the merchants of Holland and Zeeland, ever keenly on the
look-out for fresh markets, a peculiar attraction. At first the Cape
route was thought to be too dangerous, and several attempts were made to
discover a north-west passage along the coast of Siberia. Balthazar de
Moucheron was the pioneer in these northern latitudes. He established a
regular traffic with the Russians by way of the White Sea, and had a
factory (built in 1584) at Archangel. Through his instances, aided by
those of the famous geographer Petrus Plancius (likewise a refugee from
Antwerp), an expedition was fitted out and despatched in 1594 to try
to sail round northern Asia, but it was driven back after passing
through the Waigat by ice and storms. A like fate befell a second
expedition in the following year. Discouraged, but still not despairing,
a third fleet set out in 1596 under the command of Jacob van Heemskerk
with William Barendtsz as pilot. Forced to winter in Spitsbergen, after
terrible sufferings, Heemskerk returned home in the autumn of 1597 with
the remnant of his crews. Barendtsz was one of those who perished. This
was the last effort in this direction, for already a body of Amsterdam
merchants had formed a company for trafficking to India by the Cape; and
four ships had sailed, April 2, 1596, under the command of Cornelis
Houtman, a native of Gouda. A certain Jan Huyghen van Linschoten, who
had been in the Portuguese service, had published in 1595 a book
containing a description from personal knowledge of the route to the
East and the character of the Portuguese commerce. It was the
information contained in this work that led the Amsterdam merchants to
venture their money upon Houtman's expedition, which Linschoten himself
accompanied as guide. They reached Madagascar, Java and the Moluccas,
and, after much suffering and many losses by sickness, what was left of
the little fleet reached home in July, 1597. The rich cargo they brought
back, though not enough to defray expenses, proved an incentive to
further efforts. Three companies were formed at Amsterdam, two at
Rotterdam, one at Delft and two in Zeeland, for trading in the
East-Indies, all vying with one another in their eagerness to make large
profits from these regions of fabled wealth, hitherto monopolised by the
Portuguese. One expedition sent out by two Amsterdam companies under the
command of Jacob van Neck and Wybrand van Waerwyck was very successful
and came back in fifteen months richly laden with East-Indian products.
The year 1598 was one of great commercial activity. Two-and-twenty large
vessels voyaged to the East-Indies; others made their way to the coasts
of Guinea, Guiana and Brazil; and one daring captain, Olivier van Noort,
sailing through the Straits of Magellan, crossed the Pacific. It was in
this year that Philip II prohibited by decree all trading in Spain with
the Dutch, and all the Dutch ships in the harbours of the Peninsula were
confiscated. But the Spanish trade was no longer of consequence to the
Hollanders and Zeelanders. They had sought and found compensation
elsewhere.
The small companies formed to carry out these ventures in the
far-Eastern seas continued to grow in number, and by the very keenness
of their competition threatened each other's enterprises with ruin. In
these circumstances the States-General and the Estates of Holland
determined, under the leadership of Oldenbarneveldt, to take a step
which was to be fraught with very important consequences. The rival
companies were urged to form themselves into a single corporation to
which exclusive rights would be given for trading in the East-Indies.
Such a proposal was in direct contradiction to that principle of free
trade which had hitherto been dear to the Netherlanders, and there was
much opposition, and many obstacles had to be overcome owing to the
jealousies of the various provinces, towns and bodies of merchants who
were interested. But at length the patience and statesmanship of
Oldenbarneveldt overcame all difficulties, and on March 20,1601, a
charter was issued creating the United East-India Company and giving it
a monopoly of the East-India trade (for 21 years) with all lands east of
the Cape of Good Hope and west of the Straits of Magellan. The executive
control was vested in a College known as the Seventeen. Extensive
sovereign privileges were conferred upon the company and exercised by
the Seventeen in the name of the States-General. They might make
treaties with native rulers and potentates, erect forts for the
protection of their factories, appoint governors and officials with
administrative and judicial functions, and enlist troops, but these
officials and troops were required to take an oath of allegiance to the
States-General. The States-General themselves became "participants" by
investing the 25,000 pounds, which the company had paid them for the
grant of the charter. The capital speedily reached the amount of six and
a half million guilders.
The warlike operations of the year 1599 were uneventful and in the main
defensive, except on the eastern frontier where the Spanish forces under
the command of the Admiral of Aragon, Mendoza, captured Wesel and
Rheinberg. The new rulers of the Netherlands, Albert and Isabel, did
not make their entry into Brussels until the end of 1599; and almost
before they had had time to organise the new government and gain firm
possession of the reins of power in the Belgic provinces, they found
themselves confronted with a serious danger. The seaport of Dunkirk had
for many years been a nest of pirates, who preyed upon Dutch commerce
in the narrow seas. The States-General, urged on by Oldenbarneveldt,
resolved in the spring of 1606 to despatch an expedition to besiege and
capture Dunkirk. Both Maurice and William Lewis were opposed to the
project, which they regarded as rash and risky. The States-General,
however, hearing reports of the archduke's soldiery being mutinous for
lack of pay, persisted in their purpose, and Maurice, against his better
judgment, acquiesced. A body of picked troops, 12,000 foot and 3000
horse, was assembled on the island of Walcheren. A succession of
contrary winds delaying the sailing of the force, it was determined to
march straight through West Flanders to Nieuport and then along the
shore to Dunkirk. A deputation of the States-General, of which
Oldenbarneveldt was the leading member, went to Ostend to supervise,
much to Maurice's annoyance, the military operations. The stadholder,
however, reached Nieuport without serious opposition and proceeded to
invest it. Meanwhile the Archduke Albert had been acting with great
energy. By persuasive words and large promises he succeeded in winning
back the mutineers, and at the head of a veteran force of 10,000
infantry and 1500 cavalry he followed Maurice and, advancing along the
dunes, came on July 1 upon a body of 2000 men under the command of
Ernest Casimir of Nassau, sent by the stadholder to defend the bridge of
Leffingen. At the sight of the redoubtable Spanish infantry a panic
seized these troops and they were routed with heavy loss. The fight,
however, gave Maurice time to unite his forces and draw them up in
battle order in front of Nieuport. Battle was joined the following
afternoon, and slowly, foot by foot, after a desperate conflict the
archduke's Spanish and Italian veterans drove back along the dunes the
troops of the States. Every hillock and sandy hollow was fiercely
contested, the brunt of the conflict falling on the English and Frisians
under the command of Sir Francis Vere. Vere himself was severely
wounded, and the battle appeared to be lost. At this critical moment the
Spaniards began to show signs of exhaustion through their tremendous
exertions in two successive fights under a hot sun in the yielding
sand-hills; and the prince, at the critical moment, throwing himself
into the midst of his retreating troops, succeeded in rallying them. At
the same time he ordered some squadrons of cavalry which he had kept in
reserve to charge on the flank of the advancing foe. The effect was
instantaneous. The Spaniards were thrown into confusion, broke and
fled. The victory was complete. The archduke only just escaped capture,
and of his army 5000 perished and a large number were taken prisoners,
among these the Admiral of Aragon. Almost by a miracle was the States'
army thus rescued from a desperate position. Maurice's hard-won triumph
greatly enhanced his fame, for the battle of Nieuport destroyed the
legend of the invincibility of the Spanish infantry in the open field.
The victorious general, however, was not disposed to run any further
risks. He accordingly retreated to Ostend and there embarked his troops
for the ports from which they had started. The expedition had been very
costly and had been practically fruitless. Oldenbarneveldt and those who
had acted with him were deeply disappointed at the failure of their
plans for the capture of Dunkirk and were far from satisfied with
Maurice's obstinate refusal to carry out any further offensive
operations. From this time there arose a feeling of soreness between the
advocate and the stadholder, which further differences of opinion were
to accentuate in the coming years.
The vigour and powers of leadership displayed by their new sovereigns in
meeting the invasion of Flanders by the States' army, though a defeat in
the field had been suffered at Nieuport, had inspired their subjects in
the southern Netherlands with confidence and loyalty. Albert had proved
himself a brave commander, and his efforts had at least been successful
in compelling the enemy to withdraw within his own borders.
Ostend had long been a thorn in the side of the government at Brussels
and energetic steps were soon taken to besiege it. But the possession of
Ostend was important also to Elizabeth, and she promised active
assistance. The larger part of the garrison was, indeed, formed of
English troops, and Sir Francis Vere was governor of the town. The siege
which ensued was one of the memorable sieges of history, it lasted for
more than three years (July 15,1601, to September 20,1604) and was
productive of great feats of valour, skill and endurance on the part
alike of besiegers and besieged. The States' army under Maurice, though
it did not march to the relief of Ostend, endeavoured to divert the
attention of Albert from his objective by attacks directed elsewhere. In
1601 the fortresses of Rheinberg and Meurs on the Rhine were captured,
and an attack made upon Hertogenbosch. In 1602 the important town of
Grave on the Meuse was taken and a raid made into Brabant and
Luxemburg.
Meanwhile the defenders of Ostend had been making a desperate
resistance, and little progress was made by the besiegers, with the
result that a great drain was made upon the finances of the archdukes
and there were threatenings of mutiny among the troops. But the
situation was saved by the intervention of a wealthy Genoese banker,
Ambrosio de Spinola, who offered his services and his money to the
archdukes and promised that if he, though inexperienced in warfare, were
given the command, he would take Ostend. He fulfilled his promise.
Without regard to loss of life he pressed on the siege, and though as
fast as one line of defences was taken another arose behind it to bar
his progress, little by little he advanced and bit by bit the area held
by the garrison grew less. At last in the spring of 1604, under the
pressure of the States-General, Maurice led an army of 11,000 men into
Flanders in April, 1604, and laid siege to Sluis on May 19. Both Maurice
and William Lewis were still unwilling to run the risk of an attack on
Spinola's army in its lines, and so the two sieges went on side by side,
as it were independently. Sluis fell at the end of August, and Ostend
was then at its last gasp. Urged now by the deputies of the States to
make a direct effort to relieve the heroic garrison, Maurice and his
cousin, after wasting some precious time in protesting against the step,
began to march southward. It was too late. What was left of Ostend
surrendered on September 20, and Spinola became the master of a heap of
ruins. It is said that this three years' siege cost the Spaniards 80,000
lives, to say nothing of the outlay of vast expenditure. Whether Maurice
and William Lewis were right or wrong in their reluctance to assail
Spinola's entrenched camp, it is certain that they were better judges of
the military situation than the civilian deputies of the States. In any
case the capture of Sluis was an offset to the loss of Ostend; and its
importance was marked by the appointment of Frederick Henry, the young
brother of the stadholder, as governor of the seaport and the
surrounding district, which received the name of States-Flanders. The
tremendous exertions put forward for the defence of Ostend had been a
very serious drain upon the resources of the United Provinces,
especially upon those of Holland. Taxation was already So high that
Oldenbarneveldt and many other leading members of the States-General and
Provincial Estates began to feel despondent and to doubt whether it were
possible to continue the war. No longer could the States rely upon the
assistance of England. James I had concluded peace with Spain; and,
though he made professions of friendship and goodwill to the Dutch, wary
statesmen, like the Advocate, did not trust him, and were afraid lest he
should be tempted to deliver up the cautionary towns into the hands of
the enemy. Reverting to the policy of William the Silent,
Oldenbarneveldt even went so far as to make tentative approaches to
Henry IV of France touching the conditions on which he would accept the
sovereignty of the Provinces. Indeed it is said that such was the
despair felt by this great statesman, who knew better than any man the
economic difficulties of the situation, that he even contemplated the
possibility of submission to the archdukes. Had he suggested submission,
there would have been no question, however, that he could not have
retained office, for Maurice, William Lewis and the military leaders on
the one hand, and on the other the merchants and the adventurous seamen,
whom they employed in the profitable Indian traffic, would not have
listened for a moment to any thought of giving up a struggle which had
been so resolutely and successfully maintained for so many years. For
financially the archdukes were in even worse plight than the
Netherlanders, even though for a short time, with the help of Spinola,
appearances seemed to favour the Belgic attacks on the Dutch frontier
districts. In 1605 the Genoese general, at the head of a mixed but
well-disciplined force in his own pay, made a rapid advance towards
Friesland, and, after capturing Oldenzaal and Lingen and ravaging the
eastern provinces, concluded the campaign with a brilliant success
against a body of the States cavalry commanded by Frederick Henry, who
nearly lost his life. Maurice with inferior forces kept strictly on the
defensive, skilfully covering the heart of the land from attack, but
steadily refusing a pitched battle. In the following year Spinola with
two armies attempted to force the lines of the Waal and the Yssel, but,
though thwarted in this aim by the wariness of the stadholder and by a
very wet season, he succeeded in taking the important fortresses of
Groll and Rheinberg. Maurice made no serious effort to relieve them, and
his inactivity caused much discontent and adverse comment. His military
reputation suffered, while that of his opponent was enhanced. But
subsequent events showed that Maurice, though perhaps erring on the side
of caution, had acted rightly. The armies which had threatened the
safety of the Provinces had been raised at the charges of a private
individual, but the financial resources, even of a Spinola, were not
capable of a prolonged effort; there was no money in the State treasury;
and the soldiery, as soon as their pay was in arrears, began once more
to be mutinous. The bolt had been shot without effect, and the year 1607
found both sides, through sheer lack of funds, unable to enter upon a
fresh campaign on land with any hope of definite success. But though the
military campaigns had been so inconclusive, it had been far different
with the fortunes of maritime warfare in these opening years of the
seventeenth century. The sea-power of the Dutch republic was already a
formidable factor which had to be reckoned with and which was destined
to be decisive.
The East-India Company was no sooner founded than active steps were
taken to make full use of the privileges granted by the Charter. A fleet
of 17 vessels was despatched in 1602 under Wybrand van Waerwyck.
Waerwyck visited Ceylon and most of the islands of the Malay
Archipelago, established a factory at Bantam with a staff of officials
for developing trade relations with the natives, and even made his way
to Siam and China. He sent back from time to time some of his vessels
richly laden, and finally returned himself with the residue of his fleet
after an absence of five years in June, 1607. Another expedition of
thirteen ships sailed in 1604 under Steven van der Hagen, whose
operations were as widespread and as successful as those of Waerwyck.
Van der Hagen took possession of Molucca and built factories at Amboina,
Tidor and other places in the spice-bearing islands. On his way back in
1606 with his cargo of cloves, spices and other products of the far
Orient, he encountered at Mauritius another westward-bound fleet of
eleven ships under Cornelis Matelief. Matelief's first objective was the
town of Malacca, held by the Portuguese and commanding the straits to
which it gave its name. Alphonso de Castro, the Viceroy of India,
hastened however with a naval force far more powerful than the Dutch
squadron to the relief of this important fortress; and after a
hardly-fought but indecisive action Matelief raised the siege on August
17. Returning, however, about a month later, the Dutch admiral found
that De Castro had sailed away, leaving only a detachment of ten vessels
before Malacca. Matelief at once attacked this force, whose strength was
about equal to his own, and with such success that he sank or burnt
every single ship of the enemy with scarcely any loss, September 21,
1606.
These successful incursions into a region that the Spaniards and
Portuguese had jealously regarded as peculiarly their own aroused both
anger and alarm. All available forces in the East (the Portuguese from
the Mozambique and Goa, the Spaniards from the Philippines) were
equipped and sent to sea with the object of expelling the hated and
despised Netherlanders from East-Indian waters. Paulus van Caerden,
Matelief's successor in command, was defeated and himself taken
prisoner. Nor were the Spaniards content with attacking the Dutch fleets
in the far East. As the weather-worn and heavily-laden Company's vessels
returned along the west coast of Africa, they had to pass within
striking distance of the Spanish and Portuguese harbours and were in
constant danger of being suddenly assailed by a superior force and
captured. In 1607 rumours reached Holland of the gathering of a large
Spanish fleet at Gibraltar, whose destination was the East-Indies. The
directors of the Company were much alarmed, an alarm which was shared by
the States-General, many of whose deputies were cargo-shareholders.
Accordingly, in April, 1607, a fleet of twenty-six vessels set sail for
the purpose of seeking out and attacking the Spaniards whether in
harbour or on the open sea. The command was given to one of the most
daring and experienced of Dutch seamen, Jacob van Heemskerk. He found
twenty-one ships still at anchor in Gibraltar Bay, ten of them large
galleons, far superior in size and armament to his own largest vessels.
Heemskerk at once cleared for action. Both Heemskerk and the Spanish
commander, d'Avila, were killed early in the fight, the result of which
however was not long doubtful. The Spanish fleet was practically
destroyed. On the Dutch side no vessel was lost and the casualties were
small. Such a disaster was most humiliating to Castilian pride, and its
effect in hastening forward the peace negotiations, which were already
in progress, was considerable.
The initial steps had been taken by the archdukes. Through the secret
agency of Albert's Franciscan Confessor, Father John Neyen, both
Oldenbarneveldt and Maurice were approached in May, 1606, but without
any result. Early in 1607 however the efforts were renewed, and
negotiations were actively set on foot for the purpose of concluding a
peace or a truce for a term of twelve, fifteen or twenty years. There
were, however, almost insuperable difficulties in the way. In the first
place the stadholders, the military and naval leaders, the Calvinist
clergy, and the great majority of the traders honestly believed that a
peace would be detrimental to all the best interests of the States, and
were thoroughly distrustful of the motives which had prompted the
archdukes and the Spanish government to make these advances.
Oldenbarneveldt on the other hand thought that peace was necessary for
the land to recuperate after the exhausting struggle, which had already
lasted for forty years; and he found strong support among the
burgher-regents and that large part of the people who were over-burdened
and impoverished by the weight of taxation, and sick and weary of
perpetual warfare. There were, however, certain preliminary conditions,
which all were agreed must be assented to, and without which it would be
useless to continue the negotiations. The independence of the United
Provinces must be recognised, freedom of trade in the Indies conceded,
and the public exercise of Catholic worship prohibited. After some
parleying the archdukes agreed to treat with the United Provinces "in
the quality and as considering them free provinces and states," and an
armistice was concluded in April, 1607, for eight months, in order that
the matters in dispute might be referred to the King of Spain and his
views upon them ascertained. Not till October did the king's reply
arrive at Brussels. He consented to negotiate with the States "as free
and independent" parties, but he required that liberty of Catholic
worship should be permitted during the truce, and no mention was made of
the Indian trade. This was by no means satisfactory; nevertheless the
influence of Oldenbarneveldt prevailed and the negotiations were not
broken off. On February 1, 1608, the archdukes' envoys, the two leading
members being Ambrosio de Spinola and the president of the Privy
Council, Ricardot, arrived in Holland. They were met at Ryswyck by
Maurice and William Lewis in person, and with much ceremony and
splendour a solemn entry was made into the Hague, the procession with
the brilliant retinues forming a memorable spectacle, as it made its way
through the crowds which lined the roads. The negotiations were
conducted in the Binnenhof. The Special Commissioners to represent the
States-General were William Lewis of Nassau, Walraven, lord of
Brederode, and a deputy from each of the provinces under the leadership
of Oldenbarneveldt. Envoys from France, England, Denmark, the
Palatinate and Brandenburg were present, took part in the discussions,
and acted as friendly mediators.
The question of treating the United Provinces "as free States" was soon
settled. The archdukes, who were aiming at the conclusion of a truce in
which to recuperate and not of a definitive peace, showed an unexpected
complaisance in granting a concession which they regarded as only
temporary. Then came the really serious questions as to freedom of trade
in the Indies and the liberty of Catholic worship. Of these the first
was of most immediate interest, and showed irreconcilable differences
between the two parties. The Spaniards would never consent to any
trespassing in the closed area, which they regarded as their own
peculiar preserve. The Dutch traders and sailors were fired with the
spirit of adventure and of profit, and their successful expeditions had
aroused an enthusiasm for further effort in the distant seas, which had
hardened into a fixed resolve not to agree to any peace or truce
shutting them out from the Indian trade. For months the subject was
discussed and re-discussed without result. Some of the foreign delegates
left. The armistice was prolonged, in order that Father Neyen might go
to Madrid for further instructions. It was found, however, that the King
of Spain would yield nothing. The negotiations came to a standstill, and
both sides began to make preparations for a renewal of the war.
President Jeannin on behalf of the French king, by his skilful
mediation, in which he was supported by his English colleague, saved the
situation. He proposed as a compromise a twelve years' truce, pointing
out that whatever terms were arranged would only be binding for that
short period. He managed to bring about a personal interview between
Oldenbarneveldt and Maurice, who had respectively headed the peace and
war parties in the provinces; and henceforth both consented to work
together for this proposal of a limited truce, during which the trade to
the Indies should be open and the religious question be untouched. The
assent of the States-General and of the several Provincial Estates was
obtained. The two most interested, Holland and Zeeland, were won over,
Holland by the arguments and persuasions of the Advocate, Zeeland, which
was the last to agree, by the influence of Maurice. Jeannin was aware
that the finances of Spain were at their last gasp, and that both the
archdukes and Philip III were most anxious for a respite from the
ever-consuming expense of the war. At last the long and wearisome
negotiations came to an end, and the treaty concluding a truce for
twelve years was signed at the Hague on April 9,1609. The territorial
_status quo_ was recognised. The United Provinces were treated "as free
States over which the archdukes made no pretensions." Nothing was said
about the religious difficulty nor about trade in the Indies, but in a
secret treaty the King of Spain undertook not to interfere with Dutch
trade, wherever carried on. Thus access to the Indies was conceded,
though to save appearances the word was not mentioned. This result was
due solely to the diplomatic tact and resource of Jeannin, who was able
to announce to Henry IV that he had accomplished his task "to the
satisfaction of everyone, and even of Prince Maurice."
* * * * *