THE REVOLT OF THE NETHERLANDS
The complete failure of the expeditions of Hoogstraeten and of Lewis of
Nassau was a great discouragement to the Prince of Orange. Nevertheless
after receiving the news of Jemmingen he wrote to his brother, "With
God's help I am determined to go on." By great exertions he succeeded in
gathering together a heterogeneous force of German and Walloon
mercenaries numbering about 18,000 men, and with these in the beginning
of October he crossed the frontier. But to maintain such a force in the
field required far larger financial resources than William had at his
disposal. Alva was aware of this, and, as the prince made his way into
Brabant, he followed his steps with a small body of veteran troops,
cutting off supplies and stragglers, but declining battle. The
mercenaries, debarred from plunder and in arrears of pay, could not be
kept together more than a few weeks. In November Orange withdrew into
France and disbanded the remnants of his army. In disguise he managed to
escape with some difficulty through France to Dillenburg. His brothers,
Lewis and Henry, joined the Huguenot army under Coligny and took part in
the battles of Moncontour and Jarnac.
Alva was now apparently supreme in the Netherlands; and crowds of
refugees fled the country to escape the wholesale persecutions of the
Council of Blood. Alva however, like his predecessor and indeed like all
Spanish governors engaged in carrying out the policy of Philip II, was
always hampered by lack of funds. The Spanish treasury was empty. The
governor-general's troops no less than those of Orange clamoured for
their regular pay, and it was necessary to find means to satisfy them.
The taxes voted for nine years in 1559 had come to an end. New taxes
could only be imposed with the assent of the States-General. Alva,
however, after his victory at Jemmingen and the dispersion of the army
of Orange, felt himself strong enough to summon the States-General and
demand their assent to the scheme of taxation which he proposed. The
governor-general asked for (1) a tax of five per cent., the "twentieth
penny," on all transfers of real estate, (2) a tax of ten per cent., the
"tenth penny," on all sales of commodities. These taxes, which were an
attempt to introduce into the Netherlands the system known in Castile as
_alcabala_, were to be granted in perpetuity, thus, as the duke hoped,
obviating the necessity of having again to summon the States-General. In
addition to these annual taxes he proposed a payment once for all of one
per cent., "the hundredth penny," on all property, real or personal.
Such a demand was contrary to all precedent in the Netherlands and an
infringement of time-honoured charters and privileges; and even the
terror, which Alva's iron-handed tyranny had inspired, did not prevent
his meeting with strong opposition. The proposals had to be referred to
the provincial estates, and everywhere difficulties were raised. All
classes were united in resistance. Petitions came pouring in protesting
against impositions which threatened to ruin the trade and industries of
the country. Alva found it impossible to proceed.
The "hundredth penny" was voted, but instead of the other taxes, which
were to provide a steady annual income, he had to content himself with a
fixed payment of 2,000,000 guilders for two years only. The imposition
of these taxes on the model of the _alcabala_ had been part of a scheme
for sweeping away all the provincial jurisdictions and rights and
forming the whole of the Netherlands into a unified state, as
subservient to despotic rule as was Castile itself. A greater
centralisation of government had been the constant policy of the
Burgundian and Habsburg rulers since the time of Philip the Good, a
policy to be commended if carried out in a statesmanlike and moderate
spirit without any sudden or violent infringement of traditional
liberties. The aim of Philip of Spain as it was interpreted by his
chosen instrument, the Duke of Alva, was far more drastic. With Alva and
his master all restrictions upon the absolute authority of the sovereign
were obstacles to be swept remorselessly out of the way; civil and
religious liberty in their eyes deserved no better fate than to be
suppressed by force. Alva's experience was that of many would-be tyrants
before and since his day, that the successful application of force is
limited by the power of the purse. His exchequer was empty. Philip was
himself in financial difficulties and could spare him no money from
Spain. The refusal of the provincial estates of the Netherlands to
sanction his scheme of taxation deprived him of the means for imposing
his will upon them. His reign of terror had produced throughout the land
a superficial appearance of peace. There were at the beginning of 1570
no open disturbances or insurrectionary movements to be crushed, but the
people were seething with discontent, and the feeling of hatred aroused
by the presence of the Spanish Inquisition and the foreign soldiery and
by the proceedings of the Council of Blood was, day by day, becoming
deeper and more embittered.
This condition of affairs was duly reported to the king at Madrid; and
there was no lack of councillors at his side who were unfriendly to Alva
and eager to make the most of the complaints against him. Among these
enemies was Ruy Gomez, the king's private secretary, who recommended a
policy of leniency, as did Granvelle, who was now at Naples. Philip
never had any scruples about throwing over his agents, and he announced
his intention of proclaiming an amnesty on the occasion when Anne of
Austria, his intended bride and fourth wife, set sail from Antwerp for
Spain. The proclamation was actually made at Antwerp by the
governor-general in person, July 16, 1570. It was a limited declaration
of clemency, for six classes of offenders were excepted, and it only
extended to those who within two months made their peace with the
Catholic Church and abjured the Reformed doctrines.
During the years 1570-71 there were however few outward signs of the
gradual undermining of Alva's authority. There was sullen resentment and
discontent throughout the land, but no attempt at overt resistance. The
iron hand of the governor-general did not relax its firm grasp of the
reins of power, and the fear of his implacable vengeance filled men's
hearts. He ruled by force, not by love; and those who refused to submit
had either to fly the country or to perish by the hands of the
executioner. Nevertheless during these sad years the Prince of Orange
and Lewis of Nassau, in spite of the apparent hopelessness of the
situation, were unremitting in their efforts to raise fresh forces.
William at Dillenburg exerted himself to the uttermost to obtain
assistance from the Protestant princes of the Rhineland. With the
Calvinists he was, however, as yet strongly suspect. He himself was held
to be a lukewarm convert from Catholicism to the doctrines of Augsburg;
and his wife was the daughter and heiress of Maurice of Saxony, the
champion of Lutheranism. William's repudiation of Anne of Saxony for her
repeated infidelities (March, 1571) severed this Lutheran alliance.
The unfortunate Anne, after six years' imprisonment, died insane in
1577. At the same time the closest relations of confidence and
friendship sprang up between Orange and the well-known Calvinist writer
and leader, Philip de Marnix, lord of Sainte Aldegonde. This connection
with Sainte Aldegonde ensured for William the support of the Calvinists;
and secret agents of the prince were soon busily at work in the
different parts of the provinces promising armed assistance and
collecting levies for the raising of an invading force. Foremost among
these active helpers were Jacob van Wesenbeke, Diedrich Sonoy and Paul
Buys; and the chief scene of their operations were the provinces of
Holland and Zeeland, already distinguished for their zeal in the cause
of freedom. The amount of cash that was raised was, however, for some
time very small. There was goodwill in plenty, but the utter failure of
the prince's earlier efforts had made people despair.
These earlier efforts had indeed, on land, been disastrous, but they
had not been confined entirely to land operations. Orange, in his
capacity as a sovereign prince, had given _letters of marque_ to a
number of vessels under the command of the lord of Dolhain. These
vessels were simply corsairs and they were manned by fierce fanatical
sectaries, desperadoes inflamed at once by bitter hatred of the papists
and by the hope of plunder. These "Beggars of the Sea" (_Gueux de mer_),
as they were called, rapidly increased in number and soon made
themselves a terror in the narrow seas by their deeds of reckless daring
and cruelty. William tried in vain to restrain excesses which brought
him little profit and no small discredit. It was to no purpose that he
associated the lord of Lumbres in the chief command with Dolhain. Their
subordinates, William de Blois, lord of Treslong, and William de la
Marck, lord of Lumey, were bold, unscrupulous adventurers who found it
to their interest to allow their unruly crews to burn and pillage, as
they lusted, not only their enemies' ships in the open sea, but churches
and monasteries along the coast and up the estuaries that they infested.
The difficulty was to find harbours in which they could take refuge and
dispose of their booty. For some time they were permitted to use the
English ports freely, and the Huguenot stronghold at La Rochelle was
also open to them as a market. Queen Elizabeth, as was her wont, had no
scruple in conniving at acts of piracy to the injury of the Spaniard;
but at last, at the beginning of 1572, in consequence of strong
representations from Madrid, she judged it politic to issue an order
forbidding the Sea-Beggars to enter any English harbours. The pirates,
thus deprived of the shelter which had made their depredations possible,
would have been speedily in very bad case, but for an unexpected and
surprising stroke of good fortune. It chanced that a large number of
vessels under Lumbres and Treslong were driven by stress of weather into
the estuary of the Maas; and finding that the Spanish garrison of Brill
had left the town upon a punitive expedition, the rovers landed and
effected an entry by burning one of the gates. The place was seized and
pillaged, and the marauders were on the point of returning with their
spoil to their ships, when at the suggestion of Treslong it was
determined to place a garrison in the town and hold it as a harbour of
refuge in the name of the Prince of Orange, as Stadholder of Holland. On
April 1, 1572, the prince's flag was hoisted over Brill, and the
foundation stone was laid of the future Dutch republic.
William himself at first did not realise the importance of this capture,
and did not take any steps to express his active approval; but it was
otherwise with his brother Lewis, who was at the time using his utmost
endeavours to secure if not the actual help, at least the connivance, of
Charles IX to his conducting an expedition from France into the
Netherlands. Lewis saw at once the great advantage to the cause of the
possession of a port like Brill, and he urged the Beggars to try and
gain possession of Flushing also, before Alva's orders for the
strengthening of the garrison and the defences had been carried out.
Flushing by its position commanded the approach by water to Antwerp.
When the ships of Lumbres and Treslong appeared before the town, the
inhabitants rose in revolt, over-powered the garrison, and opened the
gates. This striking success, following upon the taking of Brill,
aroused great enthusiasm. The rebels had now a firm foothold both in
Holland and Zeeland, and their numbers grew rapidly from day to day.
Soon the whole of the island of Walcheren, on which Flushing stands, was
in their hands with the exception of the capital Middelburg; and in
Holland several important towns hoisted the flag of revolt and
acknowledged the Prince of Orange as their lawful Stadholder. From
Holland the rebellion spread into Friesland. Finally on June 19 an
assembly of the Estates of Holland was, at the instance of Dordrecht,
convened to meet in that town. There was but one representative of the
nobility present at this meeting, whose legality was more than doubtful,
but it included deputies of no less than twelve out of the fourteen
towns which were members of the Estates. The prince sent Ste Aldegonde
as his plenipotentiary. The step taken was practically an act of
insurrection against the king. William had resigned his stadholdership
in 1568 and had afterwards been declared an outlaw. Bossu had been by
royal authority appointed to the vacant office. The Estates now formally
recognised the prince as Stadholder of the king in Holland, Zeeland,
West Friesland and Utrecht; and he was further invested with the supreme
command of the forces both by land and sea and was charged with the duty
of protecting the country against foreign oppression or invasion by
foreign troops. Ste Aldegonde in the name of the prince announced his
acceptance of the posts that had been conferred on him and declared that
he desired, as a condition of such acceptance, that the principle of
religious freedom and liberty of worship should be conceded to
Catholics and Protestants alike. To this the Estates assented. Orange
took an oath to maintain the towns in the rights and privileges of which
they had been deprived by Alva and not to enter into any negotiations or
conclude any treaty with Spain without their consent. The Court of
Holland for the administration of justice was reconstituted and a
Chamber of Finance erected. The question of finance was indeed crucial,
for the new stadholder asked for a subsidy of 100,000 crowns a month for
the support of the army he had raised for the invasion of Brabant; and
the Estates agreed to take measures for appropriating certain taxes for
the purpose, an undertaking which had, however, in this time of present
distress small likelihood of effectual result.
The course of events indeed in the months which followed this historic
gathering at Dordrecht was not encouraging to those who had thus dared
somewhat prematurely to brave the wrath of Philip and the vengeance of
Alva. Lewis of Nassau had for some time been engaged in raising a
Huguenot force for the invasion of the southern Netherlands. The news of
the capture of Brill and Flushing stirred him to sudden action. He had
collected only a small body of men, but, with characteristic impetuosity
he now led these across the frontier, and, before Alva was aware of his
presence in Hainault, had captured by surprise Valenciennes and Mons
(May 24). It was a rash move, for no sooner did the news reach the
governor-general than he sent his son, Don Frederick of Toledo, at the
head of a powerful force to expel the invader. Don Frederick quickly
made himself master of Valenciennes and then proceeded (June 3) to lay
siege to Mons, where Lewis, in hopes that relief would reach him,
prepared for an obstinate defence. These hopes were not without
foundation, for he knew that, beyond the Rhine, Orange with a
considerable army was on the point of entering the Netherlands from the
east, and that the Huguenot leader, Genlis, was leading another force
from France to his succour. William at the head of 20,000 German and
3000 Walloon mercenaries actually entered Gelderland (July 7), captured
Roeremonde and then marched into Brabant. Here (July 19) the news
reached him of the complete defeat and annihilation of the raw levies of
Genlis by Toledo's veteran troops. Hampered by lack of funds William
now, as throughout his life, showed himself to be lacking in the higher
qualities of military leadership. With an ill-paid mercenary force time
was a factor of primary importance, nevertheless the prince made no
effort to move from his encampment near Roeremonde for some five weeks.
Meanwhile his troops got out of hand and committed many excesses, and
when, on August 27, he set out once more to march westwards, he found to
his disappointment that there was no popular rising in his favour.
Louvain and Brussels shut their gates, and though Mechlin, Termonde and
a few other places surrendered, the prince saw only too plainly that his
advance into Flanders would not bring about the relief of Mons. All his
plans had gone awry. Alva could not be induced to withdraw any portion
of the army that was closely blockading Mons, but contented himself in
following Orange with a force under his own command while avoiding a
general action. And then like a thunderclap, September 5, the news of
the massacre of St Bartholomew was brought to the prince, and he knew
that the promise of Coligny to conduct 12,000 arquebusiers to the
succour of Lewis could not be redeemed. In this emergency William saw
that he must himself endeavour to raise the siege. He accordingly
marched from Flanders and, September 11, encamped at the village of
Harmignies, a short distance from Mons. In the night six hundred
Spaniards, each of whom to prevent mistakes wore a white shirt over his
armour, surprised the camp. The prince himself was awakened by a little
dog that slept in his tent and only narrowly escaped with his life,
several hundred of his troops being slain by the _Camisaders_. He was
now thoroughly discouraged and on the following day retreated first to
Mechlin, then to Roeremonde, where on September 30 the ill-fated
expedition was disbanded. The retirement from Harmignies decided the
fate of Mons. Favourable conditions were granted and Lewis of Nassau,
who was ill with fever, met with chivalrous treatment and was allowed to
return to Dillenburg.
William now found himself faced with something like financial ruin.
Mercenary armies are very costly, and by bitter experience he had learnt
the futility of opposing a half-hearted and badly disciplined force to
the veteran troops of Alva. He resolved therefore to go in person to
Holland to organise and direct the strong movement of revolt, which had
found expression in the meeting of the Estates at Dordrecht. His agents
had long been busy going about from town to town collecting funds in the
name of the prince and encouraging the people in their resistance to the
Inquisition and to foreign tyranny. William's declaration that
henceforth he intended to live and die in their midst and to devote
himself with all his powers to the defence of the rights and liberties
of the land met with willing and vigorous support throughout the greater
part of Holland, West Friesland and Zeeland; and contributions for the
supply of the necessary ways and means began to flow in. It was,
however, a desperate struggle to which he had pledged himself, and to
which he was to consecrate without flinching the rest of his life. If,
however, the prince's resolve was firm, no less so was that of Alva.
Alva had his enemies at the Spanish court, always ready to excite
distrust against the duke in the mind of the suspicious king. In July,
1572, the Duke of Medina-Coeli had been sent from Spain to enquire into
the state of affairs in the Netherlands; probably it was intended that
he should take over the administration and supersede the
governor-general. On his arrival, however, Medina-Coeli quickly saw that
the difficulties of the situation required a stronger hand than his, and
he did not attempt to interfere with Alva's continued exercise of
supreme authority. The governor-general, on his side, knew well what was
the meaning of this mission of Medina-Coeli, and no sooner was the army
of Orange dispersed than he determined, while the reins of power were
still in his hands, to visit the rebellious towns of the north with
condign vengeance.
At the head of a powerful force, Frederick of Toledo marched northwards.
Mechlin, which had received Orange, was given over for three days to
pillage and outrage. Then Zutphen was taken and sacked. Naarden, which
had, though without regular defences, dared to resist the Spaniards, was
utterly destroyed and the entire population massacred. Amsterdam, one of
the few towns of Holland which had remained loyal to the king, served as
a basis for further operations. Although it was already December and the
season was unfavourable, Toledo now determined to lay siege to the
important town of Haarlem. Haarlem was difficult of approach. It was
protected on two sides by broad sheets of shallow water, the Haarlem
lake and the estuary of the Y, divided from one another by a narrow neck
of land. On another side was a thick wood. It was garrisoned by 4000
men, stern Calvinists, under the resolute leadership of Ripperda and
Lancelot Brederode. An attempt to storm the place (December 21) was
beaten off with heavy loss to the assailants; so Toledo, despite the
inclemency of the weather, had to invest the city. Another desperate
assault, January 31, disastrously failed, and the siege was turned into
a blockade. The position, however, of the besiegers was in some respects
worse than that of the besieged; and Toledo would have abandoned his
task in despair had not his father ordered him at all costs to proceed.
William meanwhile made several efforts to relieve the town. Bodies of
skaters in the winter, and when the ice disappeared, numbers of boats
crossed over the Haarlem lake from Leyden and managed to carry supplies
of food into the town, and resistance might have been indefinitely
prolonged had not Bossu put a stop to all intercourse between Haarlem
and the outside world by convoying a flotilla of armed vessels from the
Y into the lake. Surrender was now only a question of time. On July
11,1573, after a relieving force of 4000 men, sent by Orange, had been
utterly defeated, and the inhabitants were perishing by famine, Toledo
gained possession of Haarlem. The survivors of the heroic garrison were
all butchered, and Ripperda and Brederode, their gallant leaders,
executed. A number of the leading citizens were likewise put to death,
but the town was spared from pillage on condition of paying a heavy
fine. The siege had lasted seven months, and the army of Toledo, which
had suffered terribly during the winter, is said to have lost twelve
thousand men.
Alva in his letters to the king laid great stress on the clemency with
which he had treated Haarlem. It had been spared the wholesale
destruction of Zutphen and Naarden, and the duke hoped that by this
exhibition of comparative leniency he might induce the other rebel towns
to open their gates without opposition. He was deceived. On July 18
Alkmaar was summoned to surrender, but refused. Alva's indignation knew
no bounds, and he vowed that every man, woman and child in the
contumacious town should be put to the sword. The threat, however, could
not at once be executed. Toledo's army, debarred from the sack of
Haarlem, became mutinous through lack of pay. Until they received the
arrears due to them, they refused to stir. Not till August 21 was Don
Frederick able to invest Alkmaar with a force of 16,000 men. The
garrison consisted of some 1300 burghers with 800 troops thrown into the
town by Sonoy, Orange's lieutenant in North Holland. Two desperate
assaults were repulsed with heavy loss, and then the Spaniards proceeded
to blockade the town. Sonoy now, by the orders of the prince, gained the
consent of the cultivators of the surrounding district to the cutting of
the dykes. The camps and trenches of the besiegers were flooded out; and
(October 8) the siege was raised and the army of Don Frederick retired,
leaving Alkmaar untaken. Within a week another disaster befell the
Spanish arms. Between Hoorn and Enkhuizen the fleet of Bossu on the
Zuyder Zee was attacked by the Sea-Beggars and was completely defeated.
Bossu himself was taken prisoner and was held as a hostage for the
safety of Ste Aldegonde, who fell into the hands of the Spaniards about
month later.
This naval victory, following upon the retreat from Alkmaar,
strengthened greatly the efforts of Orange and gave fresh life to the
patriot cause. It likewise marked the end of the six years of Alva's
blood-stained rule in the Netherlands. Weary and disappointed, always
hampered by lack of funds, angry at the loss of the king's confidence
and chafing at the evidence of it in the presence of Medina-Coeli at his
side, the governor-general begged that he might be relieved of his
functions. His request was granted, October 29. The chosen successor was
the Grand Commander, Don Luis de Requesens, governor of Milan. It was
only with much reluctance that Requesens, finding the king's command
insistent and peremptory, accepted the charge.
The Grand Commander was indeed far from being a suitable man for dealing
with the difficult situation in the Netherlands, for he was a Spanish
grandee pure and simple and did not even speak French. Even the
loyalists received him coolly. He knew nothing of the country, and
whatever his ability or disposition it was felt that he would not be
allowed a free hand in his policy or adequate means for carrying it out.
That his temper was conciliatory was quickly shown. An amnesty was
proclaimed for political offenders except three hundred persons (among
these Orange and his principal adherents), and pardon to all heretics
who abjured their errors. He went even further than this by entering
into a secret exchange of views with William himself through Ste
Aldegonde as an intermediary, in the hope of finding some common
meeting-ground for an understanding. But the prince was immovable.
Unless freedom of worship, the upholding of all ancient charters and
liberties and the removal of Spaniards and all foreigners from any share
in the government or administration of the land were granted, resistance
would be continued to the last. These were conditions Requesens had no
power even to consider.
Orange during this time was on his side using all his diplomatic ability
to gain help for the oppressed Netherlanders from France and England.
But Charles IX had his own difficulties and was in too feeble health (he
died May, 1574) to take any decided step, and Queen Elizabeth, though
she connived at assistance being given to the rebel cause on strictly
commercial terms, was not willing either to show open hostility to
Philip or to support subjects in revolt against their sovereign.
William's position appeared well-nigh desperate, for at the opening of
the year 1574 his authority was only recognised in a few of the towns of
Holland and in some of the Zeeland islands, and the Spaniards had sent a
large force to invest Leyden. He had, however, made up his mind to cast
in his lot with the brave Hollanders and Zeelanders in their gallant
struggle against overwhelming odds. To identify himself more completely
with his followers, the prince, October, 1573, openly announced his
adhesion to Calvinism. There are no grounds for doubting his sincerity
in taking this step; it was not an act of pure opportunism. His early
Catholicism had probably been little more than an outward profession,
and as soon as he began to think seriously about religious questions,
his natural bent had led him first to the Lutheran faith of his family,
and then to the sterner doctrines, which had gained so firm a foothold
in the towns of Holland and Zeeland. Nevertheless William, though
henceforth a consistent Calvinist, was remarkable among his
contemporaries for the principles of religious toleration he both
inculcated and practised. He was constitutionally averse to religious
persecution in any form, and by the zealots of his party he was
denounced as lukewarm; but throughout his life he upheld the right of
the individual, who was peaceful and law-abiding, to liberty of opinion
and freedom of worship.
The year 1574 opened favourably. By a remarkable feat of arms the
veteran Spanish commander Mondragon had, October, 1572, reconquered
several of the Zeeland islands. His men on one occasion at ebb-tide
marched across the channel which lies between South Beveland and the
mainland, the water reaching up to their necks. The patriot forces had
since then recovered much of the lost ground, but Middelburg was
strongly held, and so long as the Spaniards had command of the sea, was
the key to the possession of Zeeland. On January 29, 1574, the
Sea-Beggars under Boisot attacked the Spanish fleet near Roemerswaal and
after a bloody encounter gained a complete victory. The siege of
Middelburg was now pressed and Mondragon surrendered, February 18. The
prince at once set to work to create a patriot government in the
province. Four towns had representatives, Middelburg, Zierikzee, Veere
and Flushing. William himself acquired by purchase the marquisate of
Flushing and thus was able to exercise a preponderating influence in the
Provincial Estates, all of whose members were required to be Calvinists
and supporters of the rebel cause.
The investment of Leyden by the Spaniards threatened however, now
that Haarlem had fallen, to isolate South Holland and Zeeland; and
William did not feel himself strong enough to make any serious attempt
to raise the siege. Lewis of Nassau therefore, with the help of French
money, set himself to work with his usual enthusiastic energy to
collect a force in the Rhineland with which to invade the Netherlands
from the east and effect a diversion. At the head of 7000 foot and
3000 horse--half-disciplined troops, partly Huguenot volunteers,
partly German mercenaries--he tried to cross the Meuse above Maestricht
with the intention of effecting a junction with the Prince of Orange.
He was accompanied by John and Henry of Nassau, his brothers, and
Christopher, son of the Elector Palatine. He found his course blocked
by a Spanish force under the command of Sancho d'Avila and Mondragon.
The encounter took place on the heath of Mook (April 14) and ended in
the crushing defeat of the invaders. Lewis and his young brother,
Henry, and Duke Christopher perished, and their army was completely
scattered. The death of his brothers was a great grief to William.
Lewis had for years been his chief support, and the loss of this
dauntless champion was indeed a heavy blow to the cause for which he
had sacrificed his life. He was only thirty-six years of age, while
Henry, the youngest of the Nassaus, to whom the Prince was deeply
attached, was but a youth of twenty-four.
The invasion of Lewis had nevertheless the result of raising the siege
of Leyden; but only for a time. After the victory at Mook the Spanish
troops were free to continue the task of reconquering rebel Holland for
the king. On May 26 a strong force under Valdez advanced to Leyden and
completely isolated the town by surrounding it with a girdle of forts.
The attack came suddenly, and unfortunately the place had not been
adequately provisioned. So strong was the position of the Spaniards that
the stadholder did not feel that any relieving force that he could send
would have any chance of breaking through the investing lines and
revictualling the garrison. In these circumstances he summoned, June 1,
a meeting of the Estates of Holland at Rotterdam and proposed, as a
desperate resource, that the dykes should be cut and the land submerged,
and that the light vessels of the Sea-Beggars under Boisot should sail
over the waters, attack the Spanish forts and force an entrance into the
town. After considerable opposition the proposal was agreed to and the
waters were allowed to flow out upon the low-lying fields, villages and
farms, which lie between the sea, the Rhine, the Waal and the Maas.
Unfortunately the season was not favourable, and though the water
reached nearly to the higher land round Leyden on which the Spanish
redoubts were erected, and by alarming Valdez caused him to press the
blockade more closely, it was not deep enough even for the light-draught
vessels, which Boisot had gathered together, to make their way to the
town. So the month of August passed and September began. Meanwhile the
prince, who was the soul of the enterprise, was confined to his sick-bed
by a violent attack of fever, and the pangs of famine began to be
cruelly felt within the beleaguered town. A portion of the citizens were
half-hearted in the struggle, and began to agitate for surrender and
even sent out emissaries to try to make terms with the Spanish
commander. But there were within Leyden leaders of iron resolution, the
heroic Burgomaster Pieter Adriaanzoon van der Werf; the commandant of
the garrison, Jan van der Does; Dirk van Bronkhorst, Jan van Hout and
many others who remained staunch and true in face of the appalling agony
of a starving population; men who knew the fate in store for them if
they fell into the enemy's hands and were determined to resist as long
as they had strength to fight. At last in mid-September faint hopes
began to dawn. William recovered, and a fierce equinoctial gale driving
the flood-tide up the rivers gradually deepened the waters up to the
very dyke on which the entrenchments of the besiegers stood. Urged on by
Orange, Boisot now made a great effort. Anxiously from the towers was
the approach of the relieving fleet watched. The town was at the very
last extremity. The people were dying of hunger on every side. Some
fierce combats took place as soon as the Sea-Beggars, experts at this
amphibious warfare, arrived at the outlying Spanish forts, but not for
long. Alarmed at the rising of the waters and fearing that the fleet of
Boisot might cut off their escape, the Spaniards retreated in the night;
and on the morning of October 3 the vessels of the relieving force,
laden with provisions, entered the town. The long-drawn-out agony was
over and Leyden saved from the fate of Haarlem, just at the moment when
further resistance had become impossible. Had Leyden fallen the
probability is that the whole of South Holland would have been
conquered, and the revolt might have collapsed. In such a narrow escape
well might the people of the town see an intervention of Providence on
their behalf. The prince himself hastened to Leyden on the following
day, reorganised the government of the town and in commemoration of this
great deliverance founded the University, which was to become in the
17th century one of the most famous seats of learning in Europe.
The successful relief of Leyden was followed by a mutiny of the army of
Valdez. They were owed long arrears of pay, had endured great hardships,
and now that they saw themselves deprived of the hope of the pillage
of the town, they put their commander and his officers under arrest and
marched under a leader elected by themselves into Utrecht. Other
mutinies occurred in various parts of the southern provinces, for
Requesens had no funds, and it was useless to appeal to Philip, for the
Spanish treasury was empty. This state of things led to a practical
cessation of active hostilities for many months; and Requesens seized
the opportunity to open negotiations with Orange. These were, however,
doomed to be fruitless, for the king would not hear of any real
concessions being made to the Protestants. The position of William was
equally beset with difficulties, politically and financially. In the
month following the relief of Leyden he even threatened to withdraw from
the country unless his authority were more fully recognised and adequate
supplies were furnished for the conduct of the war. The Estates
accordingly, November 12, asked him to assume the title of Regent or
Governor, with "absolute might, authority and sovereign control" of the
affairs of the country. They also voted him an allowance of 49,000
guilders a month; but, while thus conferring on the man who still
claimed to be the "Stadholder of the king" practically supreme power,
the burgher-corporations of the towns were very jealous of surrendering
in the smallest degree that control over taxation which was one of their
most valued rights. The exercise of authority, however, by the prince
from this time forward was very great, for he had complete control in
military and naval matters, and in the general conduct of affairs he
held all the administrative threads in his own hands. He had become
indispensable, and in everything but name a sovereign in Holland and
Zeeland.
The first part of 1575 was marked by a lull in warlike operations, and
conferences were held at Breda between envoys of Orange and Requesens,
only to find that there was no common ground of agreement. The marriage
of the prince (June 24) with Charlotte de Bourbon, daughter of the Duke
of Montpensier, was a daring step which aroused much prejudice against
him. The bride, who was of the blood-royal of France, had been Abbess of
Jouarre, but had abjured her vows, run away and become a Calvinist. This
was bad enough, but the legality of the union was rendered the more
questionable by the fact that Anne of Saxony was still alive. On all
sides came protests--from Charlotte's father, from John of Nassau, and
from Anne's relations in Saxony and Hesse. But William's character was
such that opposition only made him more determined to carry out his
purpose. The wedding was celebrated at Brill with Calvinist rites. The
union, whether legitimate or not, was undoubtedly one of great
happiness.
Meanwhile the governor-general, unable to obtain any financial help from
Spain, had managed to persuade the provinces, always in dread of the
excesses of the mutinous soldiery, to raise a loan of 1,200,000 guilders
to meet their demands for arrears of pay. Requesens was thus enabled to
put in the late summer a considerable army into the field and among
other successes to gain possession of the Zeeland islands, Duiveland and
Schouwen. On September 27 a force under the command of the veteran
Mondragon waded across the shallow channels dividing the islands, which
fell into their hands. Zierikzee, the chief town of Schouwen, made a
stout resistance, but had at length to surrender (July, 1576). This
conquest separated South Holland from the rest of Zeeland; and, as
Haarlem and Amsterdam were in the hands of the Spaniards, the only
territory over which the authority of Orange extended was the low-lying
corner of land between the Rhine and the Maas, of which Delft was the
centre.
The situation again appeared well-nigh desperate, and the stadholder
began to look anxiously round in the hope of obtaining foreign
assistance. It was to the interest of both France and England to assist
a movement which distracted the attention and weakened the power of
Spain. But Henry III of France was too much occupied with civil and
religious disturbances in his own country, and Elizabeth of England,
while receiving with courtesy the envoys both of Orange and Requesens,
gave evasive replies to both. She was jealous of France, and pleased to
see the growing embarrassment of her enemy Philip, but the Tudor queen
had no love either for rebels or for Calvinists. While refusing
therefore openly to take the side of the Hollanders and Zeelanders, she
agreed to give them secret help; and no obstacle was placed in the way
of the English volunteers, who had already since 1572 been enlisting in
the Dutch service. It was at this time that those English and Scottish
Brigades were first formed which remained for nearly two centuries in
that service, and were always to be found in the very forefront of the
fighting throughout the great war of Liberation.
On March 4, 1576, Requesens died; and in the considerable interval
that elapsed before the arrival of his successor, the outlook for the
patriot cause became distinctly brighter. The Estates of Holland and
Zeeland met at Delft (April 25, 1576); and the assembly was noteworthy
for the passing of an Act of Federation. This Act, which was the work of
Orange, bound the two provinces together for common action in defence of
their rights and liberties and was the first step towards that larger
union, which three years later laid the foundations of the Dutch
Republic. By this Act sovereign powers were conferred upon William; he
was in the name of the king to exercise all the prerogatives of a ruler.
It required all his influence to secure the insertion of articles (1)
extending a certain measure of toleration to all forms of religious
worship that were not contrary to the Gospel, (2) giving authority to
the prince in case of need to offer the Protectorate of the federated
provinces to a foreign prince. Orange knew only too well that Holland
and Zeeland were not strong enough alone to resist the power of Spain.
His hopes of securing the support of the other provinces, in which
Catholics were in the majority, depended, he clearly saw, on the
numerous adherents to the ancient faith in Holland and Zeeland being
protected against the persecuting zeal of the dominant Calvinism of
those provinces. In any case--and this continued to be his settled
conviction to the end of his life--the actual independence of the whole
or any portion of the Netherlands did not seem to him to lie within the
bounds of practical politics. The object for which he strove was the
obtaining of substantial guarantees for the maintenance of the ancient
charters, which exempted the provinces from the presence of foreign
officials, foreign tribunals, foreign soldiery and arbitrary methods of
taxation. As Philip had deliberately infringed all those privileges
which he had sworn to maintain, it was the duty of all patriotic
Netherlanders to resist his authority, and, if resistance failed to
bring redress, to offer the sovereignty with the necessary restrictions
to some other prince willing to accept it on those conditions and
powerful enough to protect the provinces from Spanish attack. In order
to grasp the principles which guided William's policy during the next
few years it is essential to bear in mind (1) that he sought to bring
about a union of all the Netherland provinces on a basis of toleration,
(2) that he did not aim at the erection of the Netherlands into an
independent State.
On the death of Requesens the Council of State had assumed temporary
charge of the administration. There had for some time been growing
dissatisfaction even amongst the loyalist Catholics of the southern
provinces at the presence and over-bearing attitude of so many Spanish
officials and Spanish troops in the land and at the severity of the
religious persecution. Representations were made to the king by the
Council of State of the general discontent throughout the country, of
the deplorable results of the policy of force and repression, and urging
the withdrawal of the troops, the mitigation of the edicts, and the
appointment of a member of the royal house to the governorship. To these
representations and requests no answer was sent for months in accordance
with Philip's habitual dilatoriness in dealing with difficult affairs of
State. He did, however, actually nominate in April his bastard brother,
Don John of Austria, the famous victor of Lepanto, as Requesens'
successor. But Don John, who was then in Italy, had other ambitions, and
looked with suspicion upon Philip's motives in assigning him the
thankless task of dealing with the troubles in the Low Countries.
Instead of hurrying northwards, he first betook himself to Madrid where
he met with a cold reception. Delay, however, so far from troubling
Philip, was thoroughly in accordance with the whole bent of his
character and policy. For six months Don John remained in Spain, and it
was a half-year during which the situation in the Netherlands had been
to a very large extent transformed.
The position of Orange and his followers in Holland and Zeeland in the
spring of 1576 had again darkened. In June the surrender of Zierikzee to
Mondragon was a heavy blow to the patriot cause, for it gave the
Spaniards a firm footing in the very heart of the Zeeland archipelago
and drove a wedge between South Holland and the island of Walcheren.
This conquest was, however, destined to have important results of a very
different character from what might have been expected. The town had
surrendered on favourable terms and pillage was forbidden. Baulked of
their expected booty, the Spanish troops, to whom large arrears of pay
were due, mutinied. Under their own "eletto" they marched to Aalst,
where they were joined by other mutineers, and soon a large force was
collected together, who lived by plunder and were a terror to the
country. The Council declared them to be outlaws, but the revolted
soldiery defied its authority and scoffed at its threats. This was a
moment which, as Orange was quick to perceive, was extremely favourable
for a vigorous renewal of his efforts to draw together all the provinces
to take common action in their resistance to Spanish tyranny. His agents
and envoys in all parts of the Netherlands, but especially in Flanders
and Brabant, urged his views upon the more influential members of the
provincial estates and upon leading noblemen, like the Duke of Aerschot
and other hitherto loyal supporters of the government, who were now
suspected of wavering. His efforts met with a success which a few months
earlier would have been deemed impossible. The conduct of the Spanish
troops, and the lack of any central authority to protect the inhabitants
against their insolence and depredations, had effected a great change
in public opinion. In Brussels Baron de Héze (a god-child of the prince)
had been appointed to the command of the troops in the pay of the
Estates of Brabant. De Héze exerted himself to arouse popular opinion in
the capital in favour of Orange and against the Spaniards. To such an
extent was he successful that he ventured, Sept. 21, to arrest the whole
of the Council of State with the exception of the Spanish member Roda,
who fled to Antwerp. William now entered into direct negotiations with
Aerschot and other prominent nobles of Flanders and Brabant. He took a
further step by sending, at the request of the citizens of Ghent, a
strong armed force to protect the town against the Spanish garrison in
the citadel. In the absence of any lawful government, the States-General
were summoned to meet at Brussels on September 22. Deputies from
Brabant, Flanders and Hainault alone attended, but in the name of the
States-General they nominated Aerschot, Viglius and Sasbout as
Councillors of State, and appointed Aerschot to the command of the
forces, with the Count of Lalaing as his lieutenant. They then, Sept.
27, approached the prince with proposals for forming a union of all the
provinces. As a preliminary it was agreed that the conditions, which had
been put forward by William as indispensable--namely, exclusion of all
foreigners from administrative posts, dismissal of foreign troops, and
religious toleration--should be accepted. The proposals were gladly
received by William, and Ghent was chosen as the place where nine
delegates from Holland and Zeeland should confer with nine delegates
nominated by the States-General as representing the other provinces.
They met on October 19. Difficulties arose on two points--the
recognition to be accorded to Don John of Austria, and the principle of
non-interference with religious beliefs. Orange himself had always been
an advocate of toleration, but the representatives of Holland and
Zeeland showed an obstinate disinclination to allow liberty of Catholic
worship within their borders; and this attitude of theirs might, in
spite of the prince's efforts, have led to a breaking-off of the
negotiations, had not an event occurred which speedily led to a sinking
of differences on the only possible basis, that of mutual concession and
compromise.
The citadel of Antwerp was, during this month of October, garrisoned by
a body of mutinous Spanish troops under the command of Sancho d'Avila,
the victor of Mook. Champagney, the governor, had with him a body of
German mercenaries under a certain Count Oberstein; and at his request,
such was the threatening attitude of the Spaniards, the States-General
sent Havré with a reinforcement of Walloon troops. On Sunday, November
4, the garrison, which had been joined by other bands of mutineers,
turned the guns of the citadel upon the town and sallying forth attacked
the forces of Champagney. The Germans offered but a feeble resistance.
Oberstein perished; Champagney and Havré took refuge on vessels in the
river; and the Spaniards were masters of Antwerp. The scene of massacre,
lust and wholesale pillage, which followed, left a memory behind it
unique in its horror even among the excesses of this blood-stained time.
The "Spanish Fury," as it was called, spelt the ruin of what, but a
short time before, had been the wealthiest and most flourishing
commercial city in the world.
The news of this disaster reached the States-General, as they were in
the act of considering the draft proposals which had been submitted to
them by the Ghent conference. At the same time tidings came that Don
John, who had travelled through France in disguise, had arrived at
Luxemburg. They quickly therefore came to a decision to ratify the pact,
known as the _Pacification of Ghent,_ and on November 8 it was signed.
The _Pacification_ was really a treaty between the Prince of Orange and
the Estates of Holland and Zeeland on the one hand, and the
States-General representing the other provinces. It was agreed that the
Spanish troops should be compelled to leave the Netherlands and that the
States-General of the whole seventeen provinces, as they were convened
at the abdication of Charles V, should be called together to decide upon
the question of religious toleration and other matters of national
importance. Meanwhile the placards against heresy were suspended, and
all the illegal measures and sentences of Alva declared null and void.
His confiscated property was restored to Orange, and his position, as
stadholder in Holland and Zeeland, acknowledged. Don John was informed
that he would not be recognised as governor-general unless he would
consent to dismiss the Spanish troops, accept the Pacification of Ghent,
and swear to maintain the rights and privileges of the Provinces.
Negotiations ensued, but for a long time to little purpose; and Don
John, who was rather an impetuous knight-errant than a statesman and
diplomatist, remained during the winter months at Namur, angry at his
reception and chafing at the conditions imposed upon him, which he dared
not accept without permission from the king. In December the
States-General containing deputies from all the provinces met at
Brussels, and in January the Pacification of Ghent was confirmed, and a
new compact, to which the name of the Union of Brussels was given, was
drawn up by a number of influential Catholics. This document, to which
signatures were invited, was intended to give to the Pacification of
Ghent the sanction of popular support and to be at the same time a
guarantee for the maintenance of the royal authority and the Catholic
religion. The Union of Brussels was generally approved throughout the
southern provinces, and the signatories from every class were numbered
by thousands. Don John, who was at Huy, saw that it was necessary to
temporise. He was willing, he declared, to dismiss the foreign troops
and send them out of the country and to maintain the ancient charters
and liberties of the provinces, provided that nothing was done to
subvert the king's authority or the Catholic faith. Finally, on February
12, a treaty called "The Perpetual Edict," a most inappropriate name,
was signed, and the States-General acknowledged Don John as
governor-general. The agreement was principally the work of Aerschot and
the loyalist Catholic party, who followed his leadership, and was far
from being entirely acceptable to Orange. He had no trust in the good
faith of either Philip or his representative, and, though he recommended
Holland and Zeeland to acquiesce in the treaty and acknowledge Don John
as governor-general, it was with the secret resolve to keep a close
watch upon his every action, and not to brook any attempt to interfere
with religious liberty in the two provinces, in which he exercised
almost sovereign power and with whose struggles for freedom he had
identified himself.
The undertaking of Don John with regard to the Spanish troops was
punctually kept. Before the end of April they had all left the country;
and on May 1 the new governor-general made his state entry into
Brussels. It was to outward appearances very brilliant. But the hero of
Lepanto found himself at once distrusted by the Catholic nobles and
checkmated by the influence and diplomacy of the ever watchful William
of Orange. Chafing at his impotence, and ill-supported by the king, who
sent no reply to his appeals for financial help, Don John suddenly left
the capital and, placing himself at the head of a body of Walloon
troops, seized Namur. Feeling himself in this stronghold more secure, he
tried to bring pressure on the States-General to place in his hands
wider powers and to stand by him in his efforts to force Orange to
submit to the authority of the king. His efforts were in vain. William
had warned the States-General and the nobles of the anti-Spanish party
in Brabant and Flanders that Don John was not to be trusted, and he now
pointed to the present attitude of the governor-general, as a proof that
his suspicions were well-founded. Indeed the eyes of all true patriots
began to turn to the prince, who had been quietly strengthening his
position, not only in Holland and Zeeland, where he was supreme, but
also in Utrecht and Gelderland; and popular movements in Brussels and
elsewhere took place in his favour. So strongly marked was the Orange
feeling in the capital that the States-General acceded to the general
wish that the prince should be invited to come in person to Brussels.
Confidence was expressed by Catholics no less than by Protestants that
only under his leadership could the country be delivered from Spanish
tyranny. A deputation was sent, bearing the invitation; but for a while
William hesitated in giving an affirmative reply. On September 23,
however, he made his entry into Brussels amidst general demonstrations
of joy and was welcomed as "the Restorer and Defender of the
Father-land's liberty." Thus, ten years after he had been declared an
outlaw and banished, did the Prince of Orange return in triumph to the
town which had witnessed the execution of Egmont and Hoorn. It was the
proudest day of his life and the supreme point of his career.
* * * * *