FOREIGN AND COLONIAL AFFAIRS
OCTOBER, 1882, TO DECEMBER, 1883
Sir Charles Dilke's transference to the Local Government Board scarcely
lessened his contact with the more important branches of the Foreign
Office work, while his entry into the Cabinet greatly increased the range
of his consultative authority.
The Triple Alliance was a fact, but only guessed as yet. It is not till
the middle of 1883 that Sir Charles writes:
'On June 4th, 1883, I heard the particulars of the alliance of the
Central Powers, signed at Vienna between Germany and Austria in
October, 1879, and ratified at Berlin on October 18th of that year, to
which Italy had afterwards adhered.' [Footnote: Sir Charles knew that
Prince Bismarck had tried first for an English alliance, and wrote on
August 17th, 1882, to Sir M. Grant Duff: "N. Rothschild told me that
the late Government had twice declined an offensive and defensive
alliance offered by Germany." See also _Life of Lord Granville_, vol.
ii., p. 211.]
An extension was contemplated which would have put France between two
fires. Later, in the autumn of 1883,
'a private letter from Morier to Lord Granville showed that Bismarck
had sent the Crown Prince of Germany to Spain to induce Spain to join
the "peace league"' (Triple Alliance), 'and had failed.'
On November 22nd, 1883,
'At the Cabinet I saw a telegram from Lord Dufferin, No. 86, received
late on the previous night, in which the Sultan asked our advice as to
offers of alliance in the event of immediate general war, which had
probably been made him by both sides. We replied to it after the
Cabinet (No. 68): "We cannot enter into hypothetical engagements or
make arrangements in contemplation of war between friendly Powers now
at peace. The Sultan must be aware that Germany is the most powerful
military nation on the Continent, and that she has no ambitious views
against Turkey. Strongly advise the Sultan not to enter into
entangling engagements." This whole story of the Sultan's was probably
a lie, to get us to say whether we would defend his Armenian frontier,
but, curiously enough, Dufferin seemed to believe it.'
'On May 24th, 1883, I informed the Ministers assembled of two
interesting matters of foreign affairs. The one was Bismarck's
denunciation to us of a league among the small Christian States of the
Balkan Peninsula for provoking popular votes in Turkey in favour of
annexation of various provinces to one or other of the partners. The
other was an offer by the Grand Sherif of Mecca to turn the Turks out
of Arabia, and place it under British protection.'
The gravest danger to the world's peace lay in the fact that to the
ordinary Englishman Russia was still the natural enemy, and that France,
smarting under the rebuff she had experienced in Egypt, was assuming a
more unfriendly attitude towards Great Britain.
In South Africa the state of things established after Majuba was revealing
itself as one of constant friction, and border wars between the Boers and
African tribes claiming British protection led to ceaseless controversy.
'On the 10th (March, '83) there was another Cabinet. A Transvaal
debate was coming on on Thursday the 15th, and in view of this
Chamberlain asked for support of his opinion that an expedition should
be sent out to save Montsioa. He was supported only by Hartington and
myself, but he afterwards managed to commit us to it, and to force his
view upon Mr. Gladstone. He passed a paper to me when he found we
could not win at the Cabinet: "How far would the difficulty be met by
supplying arms to Mankowane and (query) to Montsioa, and permitting
volunteers to go to their assistance?" I replied, "I don't think it
would stand House of Commons discussion." To this he answered,
"Perhaps not. But the first is what Mankowane himself asks for, and if
we gave him what he wants that course ought to be defensible." I
wrote, "Yes, I was thinking more of Montsioa."' [Footnote: Mankowane
and Montsioa were independent native chiefs of Bechuanaland, for whose
protection the Aborigines' Protection Society was appealing to the
British Government.]
'March 16th, 1883, Mr. Gladstone asked me to speak in the event of the
Transvaal debate coming on again, and I refused, as I did not agree in
the policy pursued. Chamberlain said he would speak in my place, and
did so.
'May 26th or 27th. We decided at the Cabinet to keep Basutoland.
'June 13th. As to South Africa, the Colonial Office told us that they
hoped to induce the Cape to take Bechuanaland. A little later on the
whole of their efforts were directed in the opposite direction--
namely, to induce the Cape to let us keep Bechuanaland separate from
the Cape. It was announced that Reay had accepted the Transvaal
Mission.
'June 23rd. We decided that Reay was not to go out, because the
Transvaal people preferred to come to us.
'November 30th. We talked of the Transvaal, which looked bad.'
The Transvaal deputation is mentioned immediately after this as having
arrived.
There are also allusions to South African affairs having been raised at
other Cabinets in this year, but no details given.
Late in 1883, Sir Charles says, 'I was pressing for the restoration of
Cetewayo, and Lord Derby insisted that he had brought all his troubles on
himself.'
At this time Russia had subdued the Turcomans and made herself paramount
in the territories north of Persia and Afghanistan. It was only a matter
of months before Russian troops would be on the ill-defined frontiers of
Afghanistan. Great Britain was bound to the Amir of Afghanistan by an
engagement to assist him against external attack, provided that he
complied with British advice as to his foreign relations. Not only was a
collision predicted between Russia and the Amir, whose territory Great
Britain had thus guaranteed, but it was known where the struggle would be.
'It was also about this time' (February, 1883) 'that the Russian
Government took up my suggestion as to the delimitation of the
boundary of Afghanistan. But, as Currie wrote, "the object of the
Russian Foreign Office may only be to keep the British Government
quiet, while they are settling the boundary question with Persia and
annexing ... Merv, with a view to a fresh departure in the direction
of Herat as soon as that process is accomplished."'
'We already foresaw that the struggle would be over Penjdeh. A
memorandum of 1882, by Major Napier, [Footnote: Lieutenant-Colonel the
Hon. G. C. Napier, C.I.E., son of the first Lord Napier of Magdala,
and twin brother of the second Lord Napier.] had told us that "below
Penjdeh the Afghans would not appear to have ever extended their
authority." Mr. Currie, [Footnote: Afterwards Lord Currie, Assistant
Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office.] as he then was, prophesied
that the line proposed by the Russians would strike the Murghab near
Penjdeh.'
This was a situation well fitted to arouse Sir Charles, who wrote to Lord
Edmond Fitzmaurice: "I'm as great a jingo in Central Asia as I am a
scuttler in South Africa." His policy was not that of the India Office. He
advocated delimitation of the Afghan frontiers, and in October, 1882, the
Amir had asked for this. [Footnote: 'On October 17th, 1882, the Amir had
proposed to Lord Ripon that delimitation of his frontiers which I was
pressing at the time, but which had been refused by Lord Ripon. Lord
Granville and Fitzmaurice had come round to my view. Northbrook strongly
resisted, and wanted his famous treaty.'] 'The Government of India
insisted at this time upon the proposal to Russia of a treaty with regard
to Afghanistan.' Sir Charles thought that British interests in India would
be better served by strengthening Afghanistan, by ascertaining exactly
what the Amir's rights were, and by making him feel that he would be
protected in them. To-day, when Afghanistan is one of the self-equipping
Asiatic military powers, and admittedly an awkward enemy to tackle, the
situation seems plain enough; but in those days Abdurrahman, new on the
throne, was still a 'King with opposition.'
'On April 20th, 1883, there was a meeting at the Foreign Office as to
Central Asia between Lord Granville, Hartington, Kimberley,
Northbrook, Edmond Fitzmaurice, and myself. The Amir was in a friendly
humour, and I felt that the evacuation of Kandahar had been better
than a dozen victories.'
The evacuation of Kandahar had been Lord Ripon's work, but Lord Ripon was
now inclining to compromise the unity of the Native State which he had
then laboured to establish. He was disposed to keep the Amir at arm's
length, and wished to decline a visit of ceremony which Abdurrahman
proposed. All the Committee at the Foreign Office were against this,
except Lord Northbrook, who 'did not believe in Abdurrahman's strength,
and believed that he would soon be turned out of Herat by his own
Governor.'
'On June 7th it was settled that the Amir should have twelve lakhs of
rupees a year.' But Sir Charles had not yet carried his point as to
preventing a treaty with Russia, and
'Philip Currie and Fitzmaurice both wrote to me in favour of the India
Office view, while Condie Stephen [Footnote: Sir Alexander Condie
Stephen, K.C.M.G., was in 1882-83 despatched from the Legation at
Teheran on a mission to Khorassan, the north-east province of Persia]
returned from Central Asia with the same view in favour of a
treaty.... But Currie put a postscript to his long letter, in which he
departed altogether from the treaty position, and took up my own view
as to delimitation: "In view of our engagement to defend Afghanistan
from foreign aggression, we ought surely to know the limits of the
territory we have guaranteed."
'I finally said that I had no objection to a treaty which would merely
recapitulate facts and set out the Afghan frontier. This was my last
word, and, Lord Granville agreeing with me, we went on with
delimitation as against treaty.... It was not until June 8th, 1888,
that the Emperor of Russia recognized the arrangement and the frontier
marked by the boundary pillars.'
For Sir Charles's policy it was necessary to propitiate the ruler of
Afghanistan, and in July, 1883, it was reported that the Amir had applied
to the British Government for a new set of teeth. The application had
really been for a European dentist. When Lord Ripon persisted in refusing
Abdurrahman's proffered visit, Sir Charles tried to get civil expressions
of regret from the Government, and, failing in this, wrote in despair to
Lord Kimberley: "I hope to goodness he has got his teeth."
It was not, however, till 1885 that the tension with Russia became really
acute.
In France, Gambetta's death had been followed by a Ministerial crisis, and
in the disturbances which resulted M. Duclerc fell in February, 1883, and
after a time of confusion M. Ferry became, for a second time, Prime
Minister, having M. Challemel-Lacour, no lover of England, for his Foreign
Secretary.
"In order to distract the country's attention from internal dissensions
and the Eastern frontier," [Footnote: _Life of Lord Granville_, vol. ii.,
p. 313.] M. Ferry developed that "Colonial policy" of which Sir Charles
said, in 1887, that
"it greatly weakens the military position of France in Europe, and
disorganizes her finances, while it compromises the efficiency of the
only thing which really counts in modern European war, the rapidity of
mobilization of the reserves." [Footnote: _Present Position of
European Politics_, p. 101.]
Germany also was embarking on a "Colonial policy" disapproved of by
Bismarck, but to which later he had to bow. One instance of the
difficulties thus created was that of the Congo. A sketch of our proposed
treaty with Portugal has already been given; [Footnote: See Chapter XXVI.,
p. 418.] but while the negotiations were proceeding,
'de Brazza, employed by the French, had been making treaties in the
Congo district, which had been approved by the French Government and
Parliament. The King of the Belgians pulled the strings of the
Manchester Chamber of Commerce, and succeeded in arousing a good deal
of feeling against our negotiations with the Portuguese, and
ultimately the French and Germans joined the King of the Belgians in
stopping our carrying through our treaty.'
Mr. Jacob Bright became the spokesman of those who opposed the Portuguese
negotiations, and in 1883 Sir Charles, though offering to express his own
clear belief that the treaty was right, foretold to Lord Granville that
the House of Commons would not accept the arrangement, and Mr. Gladstone
avoided an adverse vote only by promising that the treaty should not be
made without the express consent of Parliament. Sir Charles's reference to
this lays down an opinion upon the relation of Parliament to the Foreign
Office which is interesting as coming from so strong a democrat:
'In the Congo debate, which took place on Tuesday, April 3rd, 1883,
Mr. Gladstone went perilously near giving up the valuable treaty-
making power of the Crown. What he said, however, applied in terms
only to this one case. To Grant Duff I wrote: "In all other countries
having parliamentary government, the Parliaments have to be consulted.
We stood alone, and it was hard to keep the special position, but it
was good for the country, I feel sure."'
In 1883 a Committee of the Cabinet was appointed to deal with affairs on
the West Coast of Africa, and this Committee 'by its delays and
hesitations lost us the Cameroons,' where two native Kings had asked to be
taken under British protection. [Footnote: See Chapter XXVII., p. 431.] On
the East Coast there was a more serious result of procrastination in
regard to Zanzibar.
'As late as November 16th, 1882, I wrote to Lord Northbrook, "Are you
going to let Zanzibar die without a kick?" a note which applied to an
offer which had been made to us by the Sultan, that we should become
his heirs--an offer which Mr. Gladstone had wished us to decline, and
which I was in favour of accepting.'
'The Foreign Office, in a memorandum upon this subject, assigned as
the chief reason for not accepting this trust "the fear lest it should
infringe the agreement entered into with France in 1862." ... It may
be open to argument whether our acceptance of a voluntary offer by the
Sultan of the above nature would have been a breach of the agreement.
In the autumn of 1884 the Government, waking up too late, telegraphed
to our agent at Zanzibar as to the importance of our not being
forestalled by any European nation in the exercise of at least
paramount influence over the mountain districts situated near the
coast and to the north of the equator. The Foreign Office at my
suggestion pointed out at this time that "to the north of the
Portuguese dominions we are at present, but who can say for how long?
without a European rival; where the political future of the country is
of real importance to Indian and Imperial interests, where the climate
is superior, where commerce is capable of vast extension, and where
our influence could be exercised unchecked by the rivalry of Europe in
the extension of civilization and the consequent extinction of the
slave trade." The Government, however, delayed too long, and we
afterwards lost our position at Zanzibar, and had ultimately to buy
half of it back again by the cession of a British colony.'
(Heligoland).
Sir Charles was especially concerned at the heedlessness which disregarded
the interests of the great self-governing colonies, who had no authority
to deal with foreign affairs. He gives the history of the New Hebrides.
Here native chiefs had asked to be taken under British protection; New
South Wales had urged action; the French had three times declared
intention to annex, but Great Britain had done nothing. Australian anxiety
as to the French occupation extended to New Guinea, and in March, 1883,
officials of the Government of Queensland declared an annexation of half
New Guinea. They were disavowed, but their action had created a feeling
that something must be done.
'On June 12th, 1883, there was hatched a scheme for the partial
annexation of New Guinea, which had been prepared by the Chancellor,
Mr. Gladstone, and Sir Arthur Gordon, [Footnote: Sir Arthur Gordon was
one of the philanthropists who believed in making the coloured peoples
work by a labour tax. Sir Charles had met him in 1879, and described
him as one 'who invented, in the name of civilization and progress, a
new kind of slavery in Fiji.'] of Fiji and New Zealand fame. On the
13th a Cabinet decided to go slowly in this matter, and they went so
slowly that we lost half of our half of New Guinea to Germany, and
almost lost the whole of it.'
'As early as June, 1883, we had told Italy that any attempt to occupy
any portion of New Guinea without a previous agreement with the
British Government would undoubtedly "excite a violent outbreak of
public feeling in the Australian colonies." Lord Derby was a party to
this communication to the Italians, and it was absurd for the Cabinet
and Lord Derby afterwards to argue, when the Germans landed in New
Guinea, that steps ought not to have been taken in advance to have
prevented such action. The difference was that we were willing to
bully Italy, and not willing to stand up to Germany.'
The Colonial Secretary's general attitude upon these matters may be
illustrated from a correspondence which passed between him and Sir Charles
in the autumn of this year. Replying to criticisms concerning the
Australian Colonies, Lord Derby
'somewhat sneeringly observed that in order to keep out foreign
convicts "it is not necessary that they should annex every island
within a thousand miles of their coast. They cannot have at once the
protection of British connection and the pleasures of a wholly
independent foreign policy."'
On this Sir Charles comments:
'Lord Derby had lost all credit with the Conservative party about the
time of his resignation of the Secretaryship of State for Foreign
Affairs in the Conservative Administration. But he had retained
considerable weight with Liberals. During his tenure of the
Secretaryship of State for the Colonies in Mr. Gladstone's
Administration, he lost his credit with the Liberals as well, and his
influence reached a position of decline which makes it difficult even
to remember the enormous weight he had possessed in the earliest part
of his political career. For many years Lord Derby was the ideal
spokesman of the middle man not fiercely attached to either party.
Going over this diary in 1900, it is a curious reflection that the
immense weight gained by Sir Edward Grey in the period between 1890
and 1900 was similar to that which Lord Derby had enjoyed at the
earlier period. Each of them in his time appeared to express, though
far from old, the lifelong judgment of a Nestor. Each of them extorted
from the hearer or reader the feeling: "What this man says is
unanswerable. It is the dispassionate utterance of one who knows
everything, and has thought it out in the simplest but the most
convincing form." Lord Derby could sum up a discussion better,
probably, than anyone has ever done, unless it is Sir Edward Grey. Sir
Edward Grey's summing up of a discussion on a difficult problem, such
as that presented by the Chinese question, 1897-1900, was better than
was to be expected from anyone else, unless it had been the Lord
Stanley of, say, thirty-five years before.'
On May 27th
'I dined at Marlborough House at a dinner to meet a little tin soldier
cousin in white epaulettes, who was over from Germany ... and (the
German Ambassador) Count Münster told me that the French had hoisted
their flag on a reef, as he said, within cannon-shot of Jersey, as to
the British or neutral nature of which there had long been a dispute
between the two Governments.' [Footnote: The Memoir has a note upon
this episode of the Ecréhous Books, which led to the publication of
Parliamentary papers in June of that year:
'The rocks were not within three miles of the coast of Jersey at low-
water mark, and this was the limit of the reservation of the Jersey
oyster fishery, and it was upon this fact that the French went. It
afterwards appeared that the French flag never had been hoisted on the
rocks, but only on a boat which came thither for the purpose of
fishing, so that the whole matter was somewhat of a storm in a teacup.
It raised, however, another question. The Convention of 1839, which
defined the limits of the oyster fishery between Jersey and France,
also defined the limits of the exclusive French rights of fishery on
all other parts of the coast of the British islands; and some day an
Irish Parliament may find interest in Sir Edward Hertslet's
"Memorandum as to the French right of fishery upon the coast of
Ireland, printed for the Foreign Office on the 5th June, 1883."']
'On May 28th there was a Levee, at which d'Aunay, of the French
Embassy, told me that the act of the fishermen at Ecréhous was
disavowed by France. "But," he added, "there is perhaps some Challemel
in it," an admission which rather weakened the other statement, and it
again struck me that it was a pity we had been so rude to Challemel
when he was Ambassador.'
Relations with France were going from bad to worse. Not only were they
strained by the breach of 1882 over Egypt, but French colonizing
aspirations had created trouble in Madagascar. The understanding between
the two Great Powers that an "identic attitude" in regard to the Hova
people was to be maintained was broken down by France, which under various
pretexts intervened by force in Madagascar, claiming a protectorate over
certain narrow strips of territory on the north-west coast. This claim was
denounced by Lord Granville. Yet 'on October 27th, 1882, there was a
dinner at Lord Granville's, at which I met Hartington, Kimberley, and
Northbrook.' This meeting of the heads of the military and foreign
services discussed the affairs of the Congo, and also Madagascar; 'it was
decided against my strong opposition to put no difficulties in the way of
the French. 'At this time the growing tension was disagreeably felt, and
Sir Charles learnt a month later that the Cabinet of November 28th, 1882,
'had been much frightened at the prospect of trouble with France.'
At this time an Embassy from Madagascar was in Paris to protest against
the oppressive policy pursued. An ultimatum was presented which left the
envoys no option but to depart, and they came with their bitter complaint
to London, where Sir Charles Dilke very warmly espoused their cause:
'At this moment, December 1st, 1882, I was having difficulties with
Lord Granville about Madagascar, as I was seeing much of the Malagasy
envoys, and was very friendly to them; whereas Lord Granville was
frightened of the French. A deputation came to us, got up by Chesson,
Secretary of the Aborigines' Protection Society, and introduced by
Forster; it suggested American arbitration, and Lord Granville threw
much cold water upon the scheme.'
A few days later he adds:
'I was still at this moment fighting for my Malagasy friends. Not only
did Lord Granville snub me, but Courtney wrote from the Treasury: "I
hope you will get rid of these people as soon as possible. Even the
Baby Jenkins sees the absurdity of the anti-French feeling." But
whatever "Ginx's Baby" might do, I could not see the absurdity of the
anti-French feeling with regard to Madagascar, for the French were
wantonly interfering with an interesting civilized black people in
whose country they had not even trade, for All the trade was in
American, British, or German hands.
'On December 15th, 1882, there was a fresh trouble, for Lord Granville
was furious at a speech by Lord Derby, and, indeed, I never knew him
so cross about anything at all. The difficulty was once more
Madagascar. Lord Granville _meant_ to do nothing about Madagascar, but
he did not like Lord Derby saying so in public. It spoiled his play,
by allowing his French adversary to look over his hand and see how bad
the cards were.'
The Malagasys were unique in that since 1869 they had become definitely a
Christian State, and a State Christianized by English missionaries, and
this fact was impressively brought home to Sir Charles by a scene which he
afterwards (in 1886) thus described in a public lecture:
"At Westminster Abbey there came in to the Morning Service the whole
of the members of the Madagascar Embassy, which had just come to
London from France. The two Malagasy Ambassadors were at the head of
the party. They sat very silently through the service, which the
senior Ambassador did not understand at all, and which the second
Ambassador only partly understood, until a hymn which had been given
out was sung, when, recognizing the familiar tune, the two Ambassadors
and the whole of their secretaries struck boldly in with the Malagasy
words. There could be no better instant proof, to anyone who saw the
scene, of their familiarity with the missionary teaching of England
and America, and of the extent to which, though separated from us by
language, they look upon themselves as members of the Christian
Church."
In 1882-83 Sir Charles failed to interest his colleagues in the matter,
till on August 22nd, 1883, just before Parliament was prorogued, the
Cabinet had to discuss 'what was known as the Tamatave incident, which
nearly brought England and France to war over matters growing out of the
French operations in Madagascar.'
The town of Tamatave had been bombarded and occupied by the French in
June. The matter was aggravated by the treatment of the British Consul and
of a British missionary, and difficulties were made as to adequate apology
and indemnity.
'In the course of September I had frequent interviews with Fitzmaurice
at the Foreign Office with regard to Madagascar.... Lord Granville
wrote to me, about the middle of October, that (the French Ambassador)
Waddington "professed to have a solution of the Tamatave" difficulty,
and on the 22nd a Cabinet was called with regard to the Tamatave
difficulty, Egypt, and South Africa. The French despatch from
Challemel to Waddington was most unsatisfactory.'
Another Cabinet having been summoned for October 25th, Harcourt wrote:
"I have heard nothing about its cause or object, but conjecture that
it is Granville's Cabinet for France.... It is ominous Northbrook
(First Lord of the Admiralty) being a principal assistant. I am myself
for being _stiff_ with France."
'The Cabinet was upon the two points of Tamatave and withdrawal from
Egypt, but, in the absurd way in which Cabinets behave when summoned
upon important questions, we spent most of our time in discussing a
scheme of Lefevre's for widening Parliament Street; Mr. Gladstone
wishing to widen King Street and to make a fork. A Committee was
appointed on the matter, to consist of Harcourt, Childers, Lefevre,
Northbrook, and myself. Hartington came late as usual, and on his
arrival our Tamatave despatch was discussed.'
The complete destruction of the native State and dynasty did not come at
this time, and French "protection" of Madagascar was only recognized by
Lord Salisbury's Government in 1890. But the encroachments of France led
in this year to further friction, arising from their conflict for the
possession of Tonquin. On November 17th the Cabinet discussed 'the
protection of British subjects in China in view of a French attack on the
Chinese Empire, and decided to concert measures with Germany and the
United States.' On the 19th they proposed to France mediation in the
Chinese difficulty, 'with the full expectation that it would be refused.'
'On December 7th there was a paragraph in the _Times_ in large type
intended to reassure the French, by stating that our interference in
China to protect our own subjects was not combined with Germany in
particular. The paragraph, although it may have been wanted, was
untrue. We _had_ combined our action with the Germans, and then found
it was resented by the French.'
So dissension grew at a pace which enabled Bismarck to turn his attention
from European politics, and, in one of his many meetings with Count
Herbert, Sir Charles reports that about the second week in November
'I had a conversation with H. Bismarck about his father. He said that
the Prince had turned as yellow as a guinea, and could not now work
more than an hour at a time, and that the only thing on which he
troubled himself was his workman's insurance scheme.'