DIFFICULTIES OF THE LIBERAL GOVERNMENT
I.
The close of 1881 virtually terminated the protracted negotiations with
France which had occupied most of Sir Charles Dilke's time, and had kept
him for long periods absent from London. In the new year he was more
closely concerned with the general business of the Government, and
especially with its attempts at legislation.
Two important subjects mentioned in the Queen's Speech of 1882 were the
reform of local government in the counties, [Footnote: This was
foreshadowed in a note of November 11th, 1881: 'Local Government (Boards
in all the three kingdoms on a tax-paying basis) will be the chief
measure.'] and the proposed recasting of London's system of government,
which appealed to Sir Charles both as a municipal reformer and as a
metropolitan member. In the previous summer Mr. Gladstone had shown
himself to Dilke as 'very keen' on this latter measure, and proposals to
undertake it were actually put before the Cabinet on Lord Mayor's Day,
1881. The choice of a date seemed
'dramatic and courageous.... We all dined with the Lord Mayor, and as
the men came in I felt that, knowing what I did as to Harcourt's
resolution, we were there under false pretences.'
This project began to take shape when Ministers reassembled after
Christmas.
'On the morning of January 3rd, 1882, I saw Harcourt about his London
Government scheme, of which he had sent me a rough sketch asking for
my criticisms. I found that he had adopted all the ideas of Beal and
Firth and of myself. [Footnote: Mr. Firth was Sir Charles Dilke's
fellow-member for Chelsea. Mr. James Beal, a Chelsea man and a veteran
reformer, was Honorary Secretary of the Metropolitan Municipal
Association, which existed to advocate the creation of a general
municipality for London.] We formed a committee, consisting of the
four, which met daily at Harcourt's house for some time.
'On the 6th regular Cabinets began, and Chamberlain came to stay with
me, although he offered to go to the hotel, "as there is no crisis on
hand just now." Hartington, who had a shooting party at Hardwick, ...
scandalized his colleagues by declaring that he was too lazy to come
up for the first Cabinet, although it had been fixed for between a
fortnight and three weeks....
'On January 7th a Committee of the Cabinet on the London Government
scheme was appointed, but it met only once, for the informal committee
of Harcourt, Beal, Firth, and myself did the whole work....
'On January 11th the single meeting of the London Government Committee
took place, Harcourt, Spencer, Childers, Chamberlain, and myself being
present. But instead of discussing London Government, we discussed the
Borneo Charter, to which all present were opposed.'
Over and above this work of preparation on another Minister's Bill, Sir
Charles had a variety of occupations outside his own official duties.
Thus, he notes on February 12th that he 'had a quarrel with Dodson' (then
President of the Local Government Board) 'as to a rating question'; and a
few weeks later, on April 28th:
'I was very busy at this moment because I had the Corrupt Practices
Bill and the Ballot Bill on hand in the House, as well as Foreign
Affairs debates.' [Footnote: In these measures he was helping Sir
Henry James, Attorney-General.]
The main difficulties immediately in hand were those caused by
Parliamentary procedure, and Mr. Bradlaugh, who had been re-elected during
the Recess, and now proposed to take the oath; but the House was unwilling
to let him do so, thus bringing itself into sharp conflict with the
constituency.
'It was reported by the Prime Minister to the Cabinet of January eth
that the Queen refused to open Parliament on the ground of health....
The Queen and Prince Leopold (who was about to marry) had urged that
an additional allowance to the Prince should be voted before the
discussions on the forms of the House began; but Mr. Gladstone
insisted, and the Cabinet decided, that it was to come only after the
Address, after the Bradlaugh business (upon which the Cabinet felt
certain that we should be beaten), and after the reform of the
procedure of the House--that is to say, at Easter at the earliest.'
When Mr. Bradlaugh presented himself to be sworn, Sir Stafford Northcote
moved to prohibit his taking the oath. To this motion the Government
opposed a motion for the 'previous question,' and were beaten. Feeling ran
high, and the House of Commons as a whole would have endorsed a saying of
Lord Winchilsea's. Having been asked to subscribe to the Northampton
Horticultural Show, he replied:
'"A town which enjoys the flowers of Mr. Labouchere's oratory and the
fruits of Mr. Bradlaugh's philosophy can need no further horticultural
exhibition."...
No one quite knew how to deal with the situation which was now created by
Mr. Bradlaugh's hurried advance up the floor of the House, when he
administered the oath to himself.
'On February 22nd there was a Cabinet at one o'clock, at which there
was a tremendous disturbance about Bradlaugh, Chamberlain and Mr.
Gladstone standing alone against all their colleagues, most of whom,
under Hartington's lead, had proposed expulsion, and wanted Mr.
Gladstone himself to move it. While Mr. Gladstone was addressing the
Cabinet, Harcourt wrote a paper, and got Hartington, Childers, and
Dodson to sign it. Forster was in Ireland, and Bright was away with a
cold. Harcourt did not ask Chamberlain to sign his paper, which,
Chamberlain thought, probably suggested that Mr. Gladstone should
himself propose some middle course, but Mr. Gladstone turned round
angrily and hissed through his teeth at Harcourt "I cannot!" When the
time came, even Northcote did not dare to move expulsion, which showed
how foolish our people must be to long to go further in an anti-
popular sense than the Tories themselves.'
There was also the other question of reform of Parliamentary procedure.
'On January 7th the Cabinet discussed the Closure, which was warmly
supported (in the strongest form) by Harcourt and Chamberlain.
Hartington walked in in the middle of the afternoon.
'On February 1st I had a chat with Manning, who says the Church
applied the Closure at the Vatican Council to put down the minority
against the Promulgation of the Doctrine of Infallibility, and that it
must therefore be a good thing.
'On February 9th I was consulted by Harcourt and Chamberlain as to
what I thought about sticking to Closure in the face of the great
probability of defeat. I advised making it a question of life and
death, but advised that if beaten we should immediately prepare for
dissolution by bringing in the County Franchise Bill, and if the Lords
threw it out, stop in to carry it. On a vote of confidence the Tories
could not turn us out, so that we could play the game with them as
long as necessary to carry County Franchise.
'On March 26th we learnt our majority on the power to close debate was
far from certain, and that on Sir John Lubbock's amendment we very
probably should be beaten. Mr. Gladstone began to wish to bow before
the storm, but Chamberlain and others were for holding to our
proposals at all risks.
'On March 31st there was a Cabinet, at which Mr. Gladstone, thinking
with the Whips that we should be beaten on the Closure, again wished
to give way. It was decided to make no fresh declaration of standing
or falling by our rule.'
The question of Procedure remained till the Autumn Session, a constant
embarrassment to the Government. But a difficulty, personal to Sir
Charles, and affecting the Government only through him, arose on the Civil
List.
'On this day (March 31st) the Queen wrote to Lord Granville to
complain of my having walked out on the division on the annuity to
Prince Leopold, Duke of Albany, and Sir Henry Ponsonby also wrote. I
refused to give any further explanation, and on April 1st Lord
Granville wrote:
'"HOLMBURY, DORKING.
'"MY DEAR DILKE,--I thought Chamberlain had voted in the majority. The
Queen appears to me to have a _prima facie_ right to complain of any
of her servants refusing to support a Government measure which she and
the administration think necessary for her comfort and position. But
if you stated to the Prime Minister on taking office that you did not
intend to vote for these grants, your responsibility ceases.
Resignation is not in question either with the Queen, yourself, or
Gladstone. The thing to consider is how to put the matter best in
answer to Ponsonby's letter. I do not mind the bother in the least.
'"Yours sincerely,
'"Granville."'
A reply from Sir Charles explained to Lord Granville why Mr. Chamberlain's
name had come in. Although he had voted for the grant
"neither he nor I would ever be likely to let the other resign alone. Our
relations are so close that I should resign with him if he were to resign
because he thought Forster did not have his hair cut sufficiently often."
This explanation was promptly endorsed by Mr. Chamberlain.
'Chamberlain wrote on April 2nd two letters, one for me and one for me
to show to Lord Granville.... In the latter he said:
'"I am very sorry to hear that any notice has been taken of the
absentees in the vote for Prince Leopold's grant. Considering the
strong views held on this subject by the Radical party in the country,
I think their representatives in the Government made great sacrifices
in order to maintain unity of action as far as possible. You and
Fawcett and Trevelyan have on previous occasions, both by speech and
vote, and on strictly constitutional grounds, opposed these grants,
and you could not have supported the present one without loss of self-
respect and of public reputation. For myself, I agree in your
opposition, but having never taken any public part in reference to the
question, and having never voted against the grant itself, I felt
myself free to yield my opinion to that of the majority, and to vote
with the rest of my colleagues in the Cabinet. In your case such a
course was impossible, having regard to the prominence which, through
no fault or desire of your own, has been given to your past action in
the matter, and which has made you in some sort the chief
Parliamentary representative of objections which are widely felt to
the present mode of providing for members of the Royal Family. When
the Government was formed I mentioned this point to Mr. Gladstone, and
told him you could not vote for any grant of the kind. He asked me if
I was equally pledged, and I replied that this was not the case. Mr.
Gladstone then said that, of course, a divergence of opinion in a
member of the Cabinet would be more serious than in a Minister outside
the Cabinet, and I took it for granted that under the circumstances
you, at least, would not be expected to vote at all. I assume that
although the subject has now been referred to, there is not the
slightest intention or suggestion from any quarter that you should
resign on such a matter. If there were, I have not the least
hesitation in saying that I should make common cause with you; and I
cannot conceive that any Radical would consent to hold office in a
Government which had expelled one of its most popular members, and one
of the few representatives of the most numerous section of the Liberal
party, for such a cause. But I cannot believe in the possibility of
any such intention. If I did I might end with Lord Hartington's
celebrated postscript, and 'Thank God we should soon be out of this
d--d Government.'
'"Yours ever,
'"J. Chamberlain."
'I received further letters about the matter from Lord Granville, who
ultimately replied on April 4th that "Gladstone does not admit your
contention." But he said, "The case is not likely to arise again for
some time.... In the meantime he approves my writing to the Queen off
my own bat," and this was done accordingly, the letter not being shown
to me, so that I do not know what was in it. But the whole matter came
up again in the autumn, when it was proposed to put me in the
Cabinet.'
Sir Charles wished on public grounds to get rid of questions as to these
grants, the recurrence of which must always lead to trouble, and to do
this by settling them on a principle. But also he was desirous to forward
the wishes of the Prince of Wales, and in the month of May he devised a
method for meeting the difficulty, which might be proposed by the Prince
himself.
'On Friday Mr. Gladstone talked for an hour to me about the Royal
Grants question, and the conversation was satisfactory on both sides,
for he told the Cabinet yesterday that it had been satisfactory to
him. In the course of it he said that many years ago a memorandum on
the provision for the younger branches of the Royal Family had been
agreed upon by the Cabinet, and shown to the chiefs of the Opposition.
He added that this was a course perhaps not so wise as would have been
the appointment of a Select Committee of the House of Commons. I at
once told him that the consideration of the subject, which had not
been discussed by the Civil List Committee at the beginning of the
reign, by a later Select Committee, would in my opinion have prevented
all but most unreasonable opposition to the various grants. There are
many years to spare, and I only write because the matter is fresh in
my mind.... My suggestion is that when provision is proposed for the
establishment of the eldest son of H.R.H. the Prince of Wales, for
whom a liberal provision would be made without reasonable opposition,
as he is in the direct line of succession, it should (at the same
time) be stated by the Government of the day that the question of the
extent of the provision for the younger children of the Prince and
Princess of Wales should be, on the motion of the Government,
considered by a Select Committee. On that Committee all shades of
opinion ought in prudence to be represented, and to it as much
information be given as is given to the Civil List Committee at the
beginning of the reign. Its decisions would be respected by all who
value Parliamentary methods, and much unseemly wrangling would be
prevented for many years. The fate of this plan, however prudent it
may be, would be certain if it came from anyone except His Royal
Highness himself or the Prime Minister of the day.'
Sir Charles embodied this suggestion in a letter to Mr. Knollys of May
9th. The proposal was agreed to in principle by Mr. Gladstone's Government
in 1885, and it was adopted later on.
'On May 3rd I had heard from Knollys that the Prince, who had
frequently been restive about not getting Foreign Office information,
which Lord Granville would not allow him to have for fear he should
let it out, had made Knollys write to Sir Henry Ponsonby to ask him to
beg the Queen to direct Lord Granville to send the Prince the
confidential telegrams.... On the 7th Knollys sent me Sir Henry
Ponsonby's "not very satisfactory reply," and a copy of his answer.'
In the reply Mr. Knollys pointed out that the Prince was under the
impression that the Queen would have wished him to know as much of what
was going on as possible. The question whether telegrams were to be shown
to the Prince depended entirely on Her Majesty, as Lord Granville would
not be likely to raise difficulties in the matter if the Prince put his
wishes before him. The fact that the private secretaries of Cabinet
Ministers had Cabinet keys, and therefore had access to all confidential
documents, was quoted as showing the curious position of the Prince.
The Queen persisted in her objection, and Sir Charles supplied the lack of
official access to the papers by keeping the Prince privately informed
from day to day in critical moments. He spent the first Sunday in February
of this year at Sandringham,
'where the company was chiefly sporting, even the clergyman who
performed the service being the famous "Jack" Russell, eighty-seven
years of age, known in Devonshire as "the hunting parson"....
'On March 21st the Prince of Wales invited me to go with him to see
the Channel Tunnel works, and to bring the map of Central Asia, and to
explain to him the matters that we were discussing with the Russians.
But I was unable or unwilling to go--probably unwilling because of
overwork, and dislike to commit myself to the Channel Tunnel project.
I was one of those who thought that the Channel Tunnel was far less
important in a commercial sense than was generally believed, and, on
the other hand, I feared that the creation of it might lead to
panic....'
Later: 'I converted the Prince of Wales to oppose the Channel Tunnel.'
The one matter which, Sir Charles notes, still caused serious friction
between himself and his Chief came up in this Session. On February 12th
'I was still fighting about Borneo and about a Garter Mission to the
King of Saxony, which I thought a waste of public money, and I was in
a difficulty with the Cabinet as to Errington's mission--of the
details of which I was not kept informed.
'Wolff, who evidently had been told something by Errington himself,
gave notice of a question to ask Hartington whether communications had
taken place with the Papal See as to prelates in India, and Lord
Granville directed me to answer that no such communications had been
made by Her Majesty's Government. As, however, I thought that
communications had been made by Errington, I felt that this would be a
virtual lie, and wrote to Hartington to ask him. Hartington then took
the answer upon himself, and in his reply to me he said that there had
been some discussions on a closely connected matter, but not exactly
on that mentioned in the question, and that nothing had been done by
him in the matter. Who, then, instructed Errington?... The Errington
mission led for a moment to strained relations between Lord Granville
and myself, and one of my letters he said was evidently intended to be
"wholesome in Lent." "The tone of it is hardly that of two members of
the same Government, more particularly when they are excellent
friends."'
Sir Charles apologized frankly and cordially for the tone of his certainly
peremptory letter, but
'I had to stick to my text....
'It was evidently monstrous that I should be made to answer questions
about negotiations of which I knew nothing, thus leading the House of
Commons to believe that I was in some sense responsible to them for
what passed, when as a matter of fact I was not informed, except
privately, and in strict confidence, by Errington himself. One result
of the concealment as to the whole Errington business was that Mr.
Gladstone on one occasion gave an answer in the House of Commons which
was untrue, although he did not know that it was untrue, and that on
another occasion the same thing happened to Courtney, who as Under-
Secretary of State for the Colonies denied that a Roman Catholic
question affecting the Colonies' (the proposal for a cathedral at
Gibraltar) 'had been discussed, when Errington himself told me that it
had. The Colonial Office did not know.'
Later:
'There never was a more discreditable piece of business than the whole
of this Errington matter. Errington himself is an excellent fellow. I
have not a word to say against him. It is the Government and not
Errington that must be blamed.
'At this time I received a pamphlet from Auberon Herbert on the title-
page of which he had drawn a picture of Gladstone in the fiery pit
beckoning me, and I, winged and crowned as an archangel, falling from
heaven to him, with the inscription: "Lapsus e coelo; or how C.D.
accepted an invitation."'
II.
Notwithstanding his attention to domestic politics, Sir Charles was first
and foremost the representative of the Foreign Office, and during the
spring of 1882 he was ceaselessly concerned in the negotiations which were
in progress between the Russian Government and the British India Office,
over which Lord Hartington then presided.
'I had received from the India Office on January 6th a private
communication suggesting arrangement with Russia as to the
delimitation of the new Russo-Persian frontier. The India Office were
inclined to hand over Merv nominally to Persia, regardless of the fact
that the Russians would not consent to any proposal of the kind. I
wrote to Lord Granville on the 9th, "I must say I don't like it at
all," and he answered: "It appears to me that some of the permanent
Jingoes in the I.0. want to establish that they are always pressing
the F.O. to do spirited things, and constantly thwarted. I rather
agree with you that it is better to do nothing than to do that which
is not really effective, but Hartington is very anxious not to be
altogether quiet.--G."
'On January 17th I had the first of a series of important interviews
with Brett, Hartington's secretary, with regard to Central Asian
affairs. He gave up Merv, and in return I agreed with him that the
Foreign Office should propose to the India Office to ask Russia to
define the Persian frontier by an English-Russian-Persian Commission,
and the Afghan frontier by an English-Russian-Afghan Commission. Lord
Granville was unfavourable, Lord Hartington favourable to this view,
which after a great number of meetings at the Foreign Office
prevailed, the Russians ultimately accepting the Afghan delimitation,
a matter to which I shall have to return. The policy to which I have
always adhered was on this occasion stated in a paper which we drew
up--a secret "Memorandum on the question of the undefined frontiers
between Persia, Afghanistan, and Russia"--in words which, referring to
the probability that without an agreement Russia would establish
herself at Herat, went on:
'"Peace might be maintained for a time, but it would always be a
precarious peace, for the direct influence of Russia, backed by her
show of military force, would in time overawe the Afghans, and give
her a preponderance of which we should feel the effects, either in the
necessity for costly defensive preparations and a large increase of
the garrison of India, or in the danger to the tranquillity and
permanence of our rule.... Secure on a strong line, flanked at one end
by Balkh and at the other by Herat, covered towards Kabul by a zone of
friendly Hazara tribes ... and connected by rail and steam with her
bases in the Caucasus and on the Volga, she could afford to laugh at
threats from India, and might deal at leisure with Afghan tribes and
leaders."'
Two later jottings on the manuscript follow:
'"This is still true in 1906."
'"In 1908 I approved the main lines of an agreement with Russia."
'On February 20th (1882) a conference took place between Lord
Granville, Lord Hartington, Tenterden, and myself as to Central Asia.
Hartington wanted to pay Persia to hold the Turcoman oasis--a most
monstrous proposition.
'On the next day, the 21st, a telegram was written to go to India,
which was so drawn by Hartington as to make the Foreign Office approve
his absurd Merv scheme. I got it altered, and Merv left out, and
guarding words put in.
'On February 22nd the Russian Ambassador promised Lord Granville that
we should be allowed to carry out my idea of a joint commission for
the Afghan frontier.
'On March 10th there was a meeting between Lord Hartington and Lord
Granville and myself as to Central Asia.'
Lord Ripon wrote from Simla on May 15th to condemn Lord Hartington's
policy of
'"trying to interpose Persia as a buffer between Russia and the
Afghans.... I do not believe either in the strength or in the good
faith of Persia," said Lord Ripon. "...I am afraid that the India
Office have by no means got rid of the notions which were afloat in
Salisbury's time." On the other hand, Lord Ripon was in favour of a
treaty with the Afghans, to which I was opposed except in the form of
a mere frontier delimitation.'
The India Office, however, never caused Dilke so many heart-burnings as
sprang from his concern with those African and Australasian matters on
which the Foreign Office was obliged to secure co-operation from the
Colonial Office.
'On January 13th, in addition to further trouble about Borneo, a new
controversy sprang up between me and the Colonial Office. It was, I
think, on January 6th, 1882, that I received from Mr. Gladstone the
letter which began: "Cameroon River, West Africa. Mr. Gladstone. Dear
Sir, We both your servants have meet this afternoon to write to you
these few lines of writing, trusting it may find you in a good state
of life, as it leaves us at present. As we heard here that you are the
chief man in the House of Commons, so we write to you to tell you that
we want to be under Her Majesty's control." It ended: "Please to send
us an answer as quick as you can. With kind regards, we are, dear sir,
your obedient servants, King Bell and King Akua."
'Lord Kimberley had absolutely refused; but I, holding that this spot was
after all the best on the West Coast of Africa, and the only one where a
health station could be established, urged acceptance, without being able
to get my own way. Lord Granville wrote concerning Lord Kimberley' (not
without a retrospective glance at his own Under-Secretary): '"Perhaps he
fears Cameroon cold water too much in consequence of the scalding water
from Borneo." Being entirely unable to get my way, I proposed that the
letter of the Kings should be "made official," and sent to Lord Granville;
that he should officially invite the opinion of the Colonial Office on it,
and that if the Colonial Office wrote a despatch against it we should
refuse, but not refuse without the Colonial Office opinion being on
official record. The offer of the cession of the Cameroons having been
renewed later, and I having again most strongly urged acceptance, a consul
was sent to the country to investigate the matter, when the Germans
suddenly interfered; snapped it up, and made it a new colony. Kimberley
was entirely responsible, as I had persuaded Lord Granville to agree with
me.'
III.
Among the passages which carry on the Parliamentary narrative come sundry
jottings and observations. Those for the first session of 1882 concern
themselves mainly with two names--Bismarck and Gambetta.
'On January 14th I heard from Germany that the Crown Prince had
suddenly broken away from Bismarck on the issue of the last rescript,
and that he had sent his secretary to the Liberal leaders to tell them
that he had first heard of the rescript when he read it in the paper.
Writing to Grant Duff, I added that the Crown Prince "swears that
nothing will induce him to employ Bismarck when he ascends the
throne." This was but a passing feeling caused by Bismarck's attacks
on the Princess.'
"Herbert Bismarck is coming to see me in Paris at his father's
wish....
"_18th_.--He is confined to his bed in London; I am to see him there
instead of here."
'On January 20th Herbert Bismarck dined with me--a man to whom I took
a liking. I had not seen much of him before this date, but from this
time forward we had continual meetings--a man of far stronger ability
than that for which the public gives him credit. He had a special
aversion to being called "Herbert," and insisted on being called the
Count of Bismarck-Schoenhausen.
'On Sunday, January 22nd, I dined with the German Councillor of
Embassy... and met again Count Bismarck. I wrote in my diary on this
day: "Bismarck is a chip of the old block: not a bad sort of brute,
with a great deal of humour of a rough kind. He saw through ----, an
Austrian, who is a toad-eater, in a moment, and stopped a pompous
story of his about ----. As soon as we were told by the narrator, with
a proper British shake of the head, that he 'drank,' Bismarck shouted
at the top of his voice: 'Well, that is _one_ point in his favour.'
----, disconcerted, went on and said: 'He fell from the landing and
was killed.' 'Ah,' cried Bismarck, 'what a wretched constitution he
must have had!'" In an aside to me Bismarck violently attacked
Papists, and broke out against the Confessional in the tone of
Newdegate, or of Whalley, or of General Grant. To the whole table he
stoutly maintained that it was right that no Jew should be admitted
into the Prussian Guards or into clubs. One man at table said: "But
you had a Jew in the Guards"; to which Bismarck replied: "We precious
soon hunted him out." The man hunted out was the son of Prince
Bismarck's banker, the Rothschilds' agent, British Consul at Berlin,
and Bismarck's confidential adviser at the time of the treaty of
Versailles. I added in my diary of young Bismarck: "He is only 'sham'
mad."
'On March 29th I received a letter from Crowe [Footnote: Of Sir Joseph
Crowe, British Commercial Attaché, Sir Charles says:
"Joseph Archer Crowe had been known to me as _Daily News_
correspondent in Paris when I was six years old in 1849, and when my
grandfather was managing the _Daily News_. Many years afterwards I got
to know of a Crowe, a great authority on Italian Painters, but I had
not the least idea that this Crowe was the same person as the other
Crowe. When I entered the Foreign Office I became aware of the
diplomatic and consular work that had been done by J. A. Crowe, but I
was not aware of his identity with either of the others till we sat
together on the Royal Commission. After ceasing to be a young painter
in Paris, Crowe became _Illustrated London News_ correspondent in the
Crimea, and then accepted an art appointment in India. He was at
Bombay during the Mutiny. Subsequently he went through the Franco-
Italian campaign of 1859 as the war-correspondent of the _Times_,
being present at the battle of Solferino. He was appointed in 1860
Consul-General for Saxony. Few men wrote four languages so well, and
while I never heard him speak German I'm told that it was as good as
his English, and his French was as good as either."] from Berlin,
saying that the Chancellor was weak in health and prophesying ultimate
war. In sending it to Lord Granville, I wrote: "I obstinately refuse
to believe that the Russian Emperor will go to his destruction at the
behest of his revolutionists." And Lord Granville wrote back: "I
agree. Herbert Bismarck confirms the account of his father's weakness.
Cannot walk eighty yards without sitting down."'
In France, the greatest of French statesmen had been turned out of office
on January 26th. [Footnote: The Gambetta Ministry fell by a vote on
Scrutin de Liste on January 26th. The Freycinet Ministry succeeded to
office on January 31st. On January 31st, 1882, Sir Charles wrote to Mr.
Frank Hill: "No member of the new French Government is taken from the
majority that overthrew Gambetta. All who are deputies voted in the
Minority. All who are senators would have so voted."] But already people
were saying that Gambetta must be President, and that by 1886, the date of
the next Presidential election, he would have recovered all his
popularity--or lost it for ever. 'The alternative of death,' says Dilke,
'had not occurred to them; yet it was death, coupled with popularity, that
came.'
The friends had not met since Gambetta's fall, but
'Gambetta found time to write and thank me for my speech, as well as
for what I had said to him about his fall. He again promised a visit
to London in one of these letters.'
"PARIS,
"_Le 31 Janvier_, 1882.
"MON CHER AMI,
"Je vous remercie de votre bonne et forte parole. Elle me plaît par-
dessus tout venant de vous, qui êtes bon juge en fait de dignité et
d'autorité politique.
"Je ne regrette en partant qu'une seule chose--de n'avoir pu terminer
le traité. Mais j'ai grand espoir d'avoir porté les choses assez loin
pour empêcher les successeurs de reculer.
"Quand vous reverrai-je? Je compte bien que ce sera ê Londres, qui
sera toujours en beau quand vous y serez.
"Bien cordialement,
"LÉON GAMBETTA."
'But the visit was destined never to take place,' though for years it had
been continually talked of between them. About August, 1876, when it was
almost settled, Sir Charles had noted:
'Gambetta never came to England in his life but once (about 1869), and
that was on a curious mission, considering what the future was to
bring forth; for he came under the Empire as the representative of the
Republicans to enter into consultation with the Orleans Princes for
the overthrow of Louis Napoleon. This interview would no doubt be
denied if mentioned by many of Gambetta's friends, but he told me of
it himself.'
On April 16th, 1882, Sir Charles, on his way back from spending the Easter
recess at Toulon, breakfasted with Gambetta, who told his friend 'that he
was "unique among fallen Ministers, for others, once fallen, are
forgiven," whereas he was "worse hated and more attacked than when in
power."'
He was none the less witty. There was talk of reforms in Russia--reforms
that had been suddenly obliterated by the murder of the reforming Tsar.
"What did Russia want with a 'Parlement'?" (Gambetta asked). "She has two
Generals who provide her with it. Skobelef, _Parle_; et Ignatief, _Ment._"
'On the 21st January, 1882, Alfred de Rothschild came to see me to
tell me that Bontoux had been to "Alphonse" [Footnote: The head of the
Paris house.] to ask him to help the Union Générale, which had been a
Catholic alliance against the Jews, and was now on its last legs. On
the next day Alphonse de Rothschild decided that he would not, as was
indeed to be expected, unless he had very strong, purely financial,
reasons the other way. He ultimately helped enough to save the
brokers, but not enough to save Bontoux or the rest. I found that,
ever since the Battle of Waterloo, the Rothschilds in London and in
Paris have been in the habit of writing to one another long letters
every day, and from time to time I saw these letters from Alphonse
when they bore upon political affairs.'
Sir Charles was not impressed by the political insight of those documents,
which seemed to him 'extraordinarily uninteresting,' expressing old-
fashioned Conservative ideas, though 'the Rothschilds all think they are
Liberals.'
The jottings end with a definition of diplomacy:
'On the 24th January, 1882, I dined at the French Embassy, where Baron
Solvyns, the Belgian Minister, amused me with the saying that diplomacy
meant "to pass one's life à expliquer les choses sans les comprendre."'
[Footnote: Adapted from Beaumarchais, who thus describes "la politique" in
'Le Mariage de Figaro,' Act III., Scene ii.]