COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH FRANCE
Although in the course of 1881 Sir Charles had refused to defend in the
House of Commons a special grant for defraying the Prince of Wales's
expenses on a Garter Mission to St. Petersburg, and Lord Frederick
Cavendish, Financial Secretary to the Treasury, had to undertake this
task, which more properly belonged to the Foreign Office, the Prince's
relations with him were cordial. The Prince was increasingly inclined to
interest himself in foreign politics, but received very little
encouragement from the Court. In June, 1880 (when the rumours as to
Challemel-Lacour were being set afloat [Footnote: For an account of these
rumours see Chapter XXII., p. 353.]), Sir Charles noted that, as far as he
could ascertain, the Prince of Wales,
'being not at this time admitted by the Queen to "official knowledge,"
got the whole of his modern history from the _Figaro_....
'On the evening of February 19th, 1881, I dined with Lord and Lady
Spencer to meet the Prince and Princess of Wales. The Prince spoke to
me about his anxiety to be kept informed of foreign affairs, and the
Princess spoke to me in the same sense, telling me how fond she was of
her brother the "King of Greece," and how anxious therefore about his
business. The Prince asked me whether he could, while in Paris, do
anything to help on the negotiation of a new treaty of commerce, and I
wrote to him next morning to suggest the language that he should hold.
Ferry, the Prime Minister, I pointed out, was a Protectionist, and I
suggested that the Prince should say to Ferry how important for the
good understanding of the two countries it would be to conclude a fair
treaty at once....
'On the 18th I had written to Gambetta to tell him that I should be in
Paris on April 9th and on April 24th, and that I was to see him, but
that no one was to know; and on March 20th I received his answer
accepting my conditions. The Prince of Wales had carried out the
suggestion which I had made, having taken my letter with him, and read
it over immediately before seeing Jules Ferry, upon whom he seemed to
have made some impression.'
This Sir Charles learnt from a letter of Gambetta's of March 30th, which
ended: "Je vous attends le 9 avril au matin, incognito strict
impénétrable, ou le 24 au retour Á votre choix." At this meeting Sir
Charles received from Gambetta the assurance that delegates would be sent
to London to attempt the negotiation of a treaty.
Sir Charles did not believe that a treaty would be concluded. In his
judgment England would not consent to accept a treaty unless it were an
improvement on the existing position, and such a treaty France was not
likely to give. But he believed that by negotiating better terms could be
obtained, not indeed by treaty, but under the tariff which the French
legislature would introduce by Bill. [Footnote: Gambetta kept in touch
with Sir Charles throughout on this matter, writing April 16th: "Nous
causerons de toutes ces sottes affaires, que je ne peux m'imaginer aussi
mal conduites, mais il y a encore de l'espoir, croyez-moi."]
A joint Commission was nominated to sit in London, with Challemel-
Lacour and Dilke for its respective heads. The other English Commissioners
were Sir C. Rivers Wilson, who was a Treasury official before he became
Finance Minister in Egypt; Mr. C. M. Kennedy, head of the Commercial
Department of the Foreign Office; and Mr. W. E. Baxter, the member for
Dundee. Sir Charles says of the preliminary meetings, which were concerned
with a wrangle between him and Challemel-Lacour as to the extent to which
M. Léon Say had committed his Government:
'We got no further, but we were both very much pleased with ourselves
for the manner in which we argued. Challemel, being an orator and
having the use of his own tongue, was at an advantage, but I managed
to hold my own, I think, pretty well.'
'At the second meeting, May 30th, I began a course of speeches on pig
iron and such matters which was destined to continue for many months.
I used to get up my technical terms in the morning (the "jargon," as
the French call it), and to forget them immediately after. I believe
that on this day I forgot the French for "steel blooms" within five
minutes after being most learned in regard to them.'
The sittings went on throughout June, 1881, with results in some respects
favourable. But the matter had now a political as well as a commercial
aspect. It was probable that Gambetta was about to form a Government,
though it was unlikely to come into being before the late autumn, after
the French general election. On both sides there was a desire to have
friendly relations, but public feeling was extremely sensitive in both
countries. The occupation of Tunis had produced a certain tension with the
Foreign Office; and in France the growing Protectionist movement made it
certain that if England, which from 1860 onward had enjoyed special terms
in her commerce with France, was again to have a special treaty, it would
not be so favourable.
The position in July was that a treaty giving certain advantages to
England could be secured at once from M. Ferry's Ministry, and that a
total failure of the negotiations was in itself to be deprecated. Lord
Lyons was for concluding the treaty which might be made at once, fearing
lest England should be put under the general tariff. Here Sir Charles's
familiarity with Parliament made him invaluable. He perceived that any
treaty which could be made at this moment would leave certain leading
British industries--notably cottons and woollens--worse off than they had
been under the expiring arrangement, and therefore would probably be upset
by a vote in the House of Commons. This would be disastrous. It seemed to
him better to wait till Gambetta came in, and to do the best he could with
the new Government. This decision prevailed, Sir Charles persuading Mr.
Chamberlain to support his view in the Cabinet.
It was decided, however, to insist on prolongation of the existing treaty
as a condition of continuing the negotiations, and Sir Charles now
proposed to strengthen his hand by a threat of retaliation. He was invited
by the Prime Minister to attend a meeting of the Cabinet in regard to
commercial treaties on August 6th.
'The result was a despatch from myself to Mr. Adams [Footnote:
Afterwards Sir Francis Adams. He was then Chargé d'Affaires in Paris,
and later Minister in Switzerland. He was at this moment in charge of
the Embassy during Lord Lyons's absence.] which was not included in
the Blue-Book afterwards laid before Parliament. It ended by relating
a conversation with the French Ambassador on the previous day, in
which I threatened (and this was the reason for not placing the
despatch before Parliament) that if we did not come to a satisfactory
understanding with France, we should make treaties with Spain,
Portugal, and Italy, in which we should reduce the rate of duty on the
dear wines produced by those countries, and raise the rate of duty on
the less strong wines produced by France. I have always been a
reciprocitarian to this extent, and was always backed in using such
arguments by Chamberlain, who held the same view in a still stronger
form. Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville always prevented any public
reference to such matters, but they allowed me to put them in
despatches, although not to lay them before Parliament.'
On August 17th Gambetta again suggested a private interview, and it was
decided that Dilke should cross, ostensibly on a visit to La Bourboule,
and hold the interview on his way. [Footnote: Gambetta wrote: "Nons serons
strictement seuls. Si! les choses électorales ont fort bien tourné, non
sans peine, mais pas de guerre sans blessures." (22 août, 1881).] On
August 22nd Mr. Adams reported that--
'Gambetta was determined that Tirard' (Minister of Commerce in M.
Ferry's Cabinet) 'should fail, in order that his Government should
have the glory of succeeding in our negotiations....
'On Thursday, August 25th, I breakfasted with Gambetta, and then went
on to La Bourboule. He told me that he was prepared to take office
without portfolio, "in order to be able to watch all the others."'
"Tuesday, August 30th, '81.--As to the treaty, Gambetta said that M.
Tirard would not be got rid of in time; some mode must be found of
turning the difficulty which he had created. He would see him, and
Tirard would probably propose some plan to me when I called on
Tuesday" (this might be Thursday). "_I suggested... a treaty with some
small country, and the most-favoured-nation clause with us--we giving
nothing...._ This was the excellent ultimate outcome." [Footnote: This
paragraph is from a note made at the time.]
On September 5th, on his way back from La Bourboule, 'I was officially in
Paris, and saw the Ministers, Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, Jules Ferry, and
Tirard; and on the next day, Tuesday the 6th, saw Gambetta privately
without their knowledge.'
At this moment prolongation of the existing treaty had not been accorded,
and negotiations were in suspense. Sir Charles frankly "told the Ministers
that I did not expect we should be able to agree," and suggested a plan
which, without a special commercial treaty, should secure what had up till
then been settled in negotiation. France was obliged to renew her treaties
with Switzerland and Belgium, and might concede to these countries in
detail 'those things which up to this point we had obtained in
negotiation.'
Prolongation of the existing treaty was, however, at last accorded, and
conferences were resumed on September 19th in Paris-a change of scene
greatly to the Commission's advantage.
'We now continued to sit day by day in state at the French Foreign
Office, which contrasted with the simplicity of Downing Street under
the rule of a parsimonious Treasury. The French certainly know how to
spend their money, and I fancy that the United Kingdom must suffer in
negotiations both from the superior style in which foreign Governments
treat negotiators and from our abstention from the practice pursued by
foreign Governments of showering decorations upon negotiators. At the
French Foreign Office, outside the magnificent room in which the
conferences are held, was a great buffet covered with the most costly
luxuries, behind which stood tall footmen dressed in the national
livery of red and blue, and I think that our manufacturers who came in
to give evidence were in some cases not altogether insensible to the
attractions offered them. Some of our witnesses, however, were really
first-class men, and it was a pleasure to hear Mr. Joseph Lee of
Manchester, who was afterwards knighted on my suggestion, hammering
the French.... When I called the name of Wedgwood as that of my
witness upon pottery I noticed the sensation that ran round the French
Commission, who were under the impression that "Wedgwood" was a
contemporary of Michael Angelo; but, of course, my Wedgwood was not
the original, though he was a descendant....
'During my first long visit to Paris the French Government gave me
every night the official box at either the Opera or one of the great
theatres, and I used to go, not that I cared about the theatre, but
because I was able to give hospitality in this way to our leading
manufacturers, who were over as our witnesses. We used, indeed, to do
a good deal of our business at the theatre. The official boxes having
drawing-rooms at the back, we retired into these, and discussed what
we were going to say at the Conference the next morning.'
But after many sittings negotiations did not seem likely to lead to any
settlement, and Sir Charles was anxious to break them off. The French
opposed this, urging that prolongation of the treaty would then have been
gained for nothing; and they made a good many small concessions on the
numerous articles subject to their tariff.
During the sittings Sir Charles Dilke kept Lord Granville posted in a mass
of detail: Ivory and pearl buttons reduced to half; vulcanite goods, an
improvement on the _status quo_; great and wholly unexpected reduction on
biscuits; but starch very bad (this was on "an excellent day for the small
things"). Other reports dealt with steel scrap, phosphorus, faience, and
so forth, and by tabulated figures set off the total of losses and gains.
Lord Granville, thanking him for these constant reports, remarked with
serene detachment that they were "as interesting as lists of the betting
in the newspapers just before the Derby. I hope you will win the race." He
added that in his opinion "Tirard and the Temps were only playing a game
of brag."
'At my conference on October 24th I had found Tirard very cross, he
apparently having made up his mind that Gambetta intended to turn him
out, and having therefore resolved to make the conclusion of a treaty
impossible in order to attack his successor and to destroy the treaty
if one were made. He suddenly asked for a vast reduction in the
English wine duties, and on my refusing to discuss the matter, he
replied that after the "enormous concessions" which had been made to
us, any French Minister who did not obtain similar concessions from us
would be worthy of impeachment. He was very rude to me, and evidently
wanted to provoke an immediate rupture.'
On this Sir Charles wrote to Mr. Gladstone:
"The Commissioners are in the singular position of trying to arrange
the terms of a treaty with a Minister who, if the treaty is made, is
likely to become the private member to move its rejection."
'I was not much hampered from London at this time. Mr. Gladstone
wrote: "I have nothing to do but commend and concur."'
'On October 28th I determined not to break off negotiations, but
simply to finish--that is to say, to go clean through the tariff, and
stop when we had no more to say. We then could leave matters open, and
begin again in the following month with the new Government which
Gambetta was about to form.'
Already Sir Charles was being introduced to the future members of what
came to be called the "Grand Ministère," and was not favourably impressed:
'On November 2nd, Gambetta having informed me that Rouvier would be
his Minister of Commerce, and having asked me to meet him, we dined
together at the Café Anglais, but I was greatly disappointed in him.'
On November 5th Sir Charles left Paris for London, nominally for purposes
of consultation; but this was only a pretext to suspend operations till
Gambetta came into office, which he did on November 10th. Sir Charles,
being then in London, found the British Government of his own opinion,
that they could hope for no more than most-favoured-nation treatment; but
opinions differed as to how this should be obtained. Mr. Gladstone wanted
to give a pledge that the low duty on the lighter wines--which favoured
France, since no other country could produce them-should not be raised.
Sir Charles, on the other hand, wanted to threaten the French with a
change in the duties, which would favour Italy by letting in the slightly
stronger Italian wines at the same rate as "Gladstone" clarets.
On November 19th he was back in Paris, seeing Rouvier and Gambetta, both
of whom asked for time to prepare the way for a final meeting of the
Commission, and Sir Charles went to his house near Toulon. On December
28th the detail of the French proposals was known, and they were held to
be unsatisfactory. Gambetta still insisted that an agreement could and
must be reached, but Dilke was of another opinion, and at the thirty-
seventh sitting, held on the last day of the year, negotiations were
really broken off. The last sitting, held on January 2nd, 1882, was merely
formal, and that evening Sir Charles left for London. He had not expected
to succeed in concluding a treaty, and he had not concluded one, but he
had earned high credit from experts. Lord Granville wrote: "From all sides
I hear praises of your knowledge, tact, and judgment." His secretary, Mr.
Austin Lee, [Footnote: Now Sir Henry Austin Lee, K.C.M.G., C.B.,
Commercial attaché for France, Belgium, and Switzerland at the British
Embassy in Paris.] showed him a letter from one of the Under-Secretaries
of State in the Foreign Office, who
'said that it was a blessing to have had me at Paris, because any
other negotiator would have sent yards of cipher telegram to the
Office asking to be allowed to give the French all that they demanded
from us, and proving that we must take whatever we could get from
them.'
The British members of the Commission were unanimous in support of their
chairman, and when Gambetta fell and M. de Freycinet became Prime
Minister, they refused to hold any further sittings. Lord Lyons was
uneasy, and in February, 1882, wrote that the most-favoured-nation treaty
was a very forlorn hope." Mr. Gladstone thereupon wished to give his
pledge against any raising of the duties.
'I succeeded in stopping this, for I felt sure that we should get it
for nothing, as, in fact, we did.
'That we obtained most-favoured-nation treatment without giving way
upon our wine duties and sacrificing revenue was a triumph, as we got
all the reductions (which on yarns were very large) which we had
obtained in the course of the negotiations. These had, after being won
by us, been given to the Swiss and Belgians--who were "behind" us, and
signed treaties. The result was that there was an increase, not a
falling off, in our trade with France.' [Footnote: Full information
with regard to the negotiations of a new commercial treaty between
France and Great Britain, will be found in Commercial No. 37, 1881,
and Commercial No. 9, 1882.]
"The foresight shown by Sir Charles Dilke in proposing this arrangement is
brought out by the fact that it has been maintained, and given entire
satisfaction, during the thirty years and more which have elapsed from its
conclusion," says Sir Henry Austin Lee.
M. Hanotaux, in his _France Contemporaine_, observes that Dilke was often
a _précurseur_. He certainly was so in an important matter of Imperial
policy which connects itself with these negotiations. Leave was granted,
through Sir Charles at the Foreign Office, to the Canadian High
Commissioner, Sir A. Galt, 'to negotiate upon his own account, provided
that he concluded no stipulations unfavourable to the mother country. In
this, I made a precedent which has been followed,' and which was not made
without opposition. The Colonial Office, while unable to prevent Canada
from acting for herself, prevented Sir Charles at the Foreign Office from
acting conjointly with Canada. The matter developed in 'the following
spring':
'On March 1st (1882) Sir A. Galt asked me to let Kennedy' (Sir C. M.
Kennedy) 'of the Foreign Office go to Paris as Second Commissioner for
Canada to help make a Franco-Canadian treaty. On the 2nd I agreed, and
got Lord Granville's consent, and the Foreign Office officially asked
the Colonial Office, when Lord Kimberley refused. I pressed the matter
in angry, but as I think conclusive, minutest Lord Kimberley, however,
set his teeth, and refused point blank, and Lord Granville then backed
him up, saying that "on a Colonial matter it was impossible to fly in
the face of the Colonial Secretary of State." I wrote, 2nd March,
1882:
'"I think Lord Kimberley's decision a great misfortune to British
trade and to friendly relations with the Colonies, and wish this
minute and opinion to that effect placed on record with the despatch
which he wishes to withdraw. We could have stipulated that the mother
country should have been entitled to all reductions made to France, a
further advantage which, if Canada is angry at the refusal, may be
needed but not obtained."'
'April 20th, 1882: At this moment I called attention to the bearing of
our most-favoured-nation-clause treaties on the commercial condition
of the British Empire generally, and pointed out that the bearing of
the matter on the Colonies would become very important some day; and I
found even too much support from the head of the Trade Department, who
was a Protectionist, or at least a strong Reciprocitarian, and who at
once grasped my idea by arguing that there was a chance that some day
there would be formed a British Zollverein, raising discriminating
duties upon foreign produce as against that of the British Empire. I
had only pointed out the possibility. The representation of Canada by
Sir A. Galt at Paris also provoked minutes by me on this question
later in the year.'