COERCION--CLOSURE--MAJUBA
In November, 1880, Mr. Forster's "resignation" had only been staved off by
the Cabinet's promise to him of coercive powers in the new year, and it
was certain that such a Coercion Bill, when introduced, would be met by
the Irish members with obstruction outdoing all previous experience. The
Land Bill, which was to accompany coercion, went far enough in limitation
of the rights of property to be a grievous trial to the Whigs, and yet to
Radicals such as Dilke and Chamberlain seemed complicated, inconclusive,
and unsatisfactory.
Bad as was the Irish trouble, South Africa was worse. Finding no attempt
made by Liberal statesmen to fulfil the expectations of free institutions
which had been held out even by the Tory Government, the Boers rose for
independence in December, 1880. War followed--a half-hearted war
accompanied by negotiations. All was in train for the day of Majuba.
Sir Charles's Memoir shows this ferment working. By January 6th, 1881, he
was back in London from his Christmas at Toulon.
'The Radicals were angry with the weakness of the Land Bill, which,
however, was Mr. Gladstone's own. Oddly enough, both Hartington and
Forster would have gone further, and Hartington certainly even for the
"three F's," though he would have preferred to have had no Bill at
all; but then Hartington did not care about stepping in, and Gladstone
did, and feared the Lords. Chamberlain thought that the Land Bill was
sure to be vastly strengthened in passing through the House....
'I noted on January 7th that I was very restive under Mr. Gladstone's
Irish policy, but I found that if I were to go I should have to go
alone, for Chamberlain at this moment was not in a resigning humour.'
A second element of discord lay in the preparations for the struggle on
the Coercion Bill.
'On January 8th Chamberlain gave me a minute by Hartington, which I
still have (dated the 3rd), proposing a summary method of dealing with
Irish obstruction. Hartington thought that the Speaker, "by a stretch
of the rule against wilful obstruction, might, if assured of the
support of the great majority of the House, take upon himself the
responsibility of declaring that he would consider any member rising
to prolong the debate as guilty of wilful obstruction, and thus liable
to be silenced." If the Speaker exceeded his power, he would
(Hartington thought) only render himself liable to censure by the
House, and if previously assured of its support there was hardly any
limit to the authority which he might not assume. Chamberlain wrote
strongly to Hartington against this proposal. He was convinced that
with a stretch of authority the number of opponents would be
increased. He added: "I believe the time has passed when Ireland can
be ruled by force. If justice also fails, the position is hopeless,
but this is a remedy which has never yet been tried fairly."
Hartington wrote in reply, on January 10th: "If we cannot pass the
Coercion Bill without locking up fifty or sixty members, they must be
locked up." Hartington's view was accepted by the Speaker, and led to
the wholesale expulsion from the body of the House of the Irish
members....
'On January 12th I somewhat unwillingly made up my mind that I must
remain in the Government, as Chamberlain insisted on remaining. I
feared that if I came out by myself I should be represented as
encouraging disorder, and to some extent should encourage it, and
should be driven to act with mere fanatics. In coming out with
Chamberlain I always felt safe that we could carry a large section of
the party with us. Coming out by myself, I feared that that was not
so. Chamberlain's position at this moment was that he personally did
not believe in coercion, but that the feeling in the country was such
that any Government would be forced to propose it, and he was not
sufficiently clear that it was certain to fail to be bound as an
honest man to necessarily oppose it. I received on this day a letter
from a constituent upon the point, and answered that, agreeing
generally as regarded pending Irish questions with Bright and
Chamberlain, I should follow them if they remained united. [Footnote:
The phrase 'pending Irish questions' is important. It excluded Home
Rule.] Should they at any point differ from Mr. Gladstone, or the one
with the other, as to the course to be adopted, I should have to
reconsider my position.
'On January 14th I had a full talk with Bright, trying to get him to
go with me. Bright told me that the outrages had got much worse in
Ireland since the middle of December, as for example that of firing
into houses. He had come round a great deal in the coercion direction.
He now distinctly favoured suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act--that
is to say, did not unwillingly yield to it, like Chamberlain, but
supported it almost willingly, and he evidently had been converted by
Forster to the view that things had grown to be very bad, and that by
locking up a small number of the chiefs the rule of law might be
restored. I did not agree, but his opinion showed me how completely I
was isolated. I seemed trying to put people a point beyond themselves
before they were naturally ready to go, and risked only being followed
by those who are always ready to run on any fresh scent and whose
support is but a hindrance. I felt myself face to face with the
necessity for self-sacrifice of the hardest kind, the sacrifice of my
own judgment as to the right course in the attempt to work with
others. It was clear that few men thought at this time that coercion
was so inexpedient that a single member of the Government would be
justified in venturing on a course which would weaken the hands of
Government itself, increase Mr. Gladstone's difficulties, and retard
or hamper the remedial legislation which I myself thought most
desirable. Moreover, we had weakened the Irish executive in past years
by continually teaching them to rely on unconstitutional expedients,
and it seemed very difficult to choose a moment of great outrage to
refuse them the support which we had long accustomed them to look for
in every similar stress of circumstances.
'The Cabinet of January 22nd dealt with the allied questions of
closure, coercion, and remedial legislation for Ireland. It was
decided to produce a scheme of closure as soon as it was certain that
Northcote was in favour of the principle, and it was left to Mr.
Gladstone to make sure of this, and I noted in my diary, "He had
better make _very_ sure." I was right in my doubt, and this question
of Parliamentary procedure led to such a breach between Mr. Gladstone
and his former private secretary that the Prime Minister told me he
should never in future believe a word that Northcote might say. The
apparent tortuousness of Northcote's conduct was caused by the
weakness of his position as leader of the Opposition in the House of
Commons. He was in favour of moderate courses, and always began by
agreeing with us in private, after which Randolph Churchill would send
a man to him with the message: "Go and tell the old goat that I won't
have it." And then the unfortunate Northcote, to avoid being denounced
in public, had to turn round and say that he could not answer for his
party.'
Chronicling another talk with Gladstone, in which the latter spoke of
Northcote's "shiftiness," Sir Charles says:
'I had a high opinion of Sir Stafford, but in face of Churchill he was
not a free agent....
'The Cabinet rejected Chamberlain's proposal to accompany coercion by
a provision against ejectments in the sense of the Compensation Bill
of 1880. In my diary I add: "By a majority they decided that there
should be no declaration of the nature of the Land Bill as yet; but,
as Gladstone was in the minority on this point, we shall probably not
wait long for the declaration. The Land Bill was finally settled. It
really gives the 'three F's,' applied by a Court, but so wrapped up
that nobody will find them."'
Mr. Forster's Coercion Bill was introduced as the first business of the
Session, and was met by obstruction which more than realized the forecast.
From Monday, January 31st, through the whole of Tuesday, February 1st, the
debate was prolonged in a House possessing no recognized authority to
check it; and at nine on the Wednesday morning Speaker Brand adopted the
course which had been advocated by Lord Hartington. Acting in the exercise
of his own discretion, he ordered the question to be put. The Irish
members, having refused to submit, were removed one by one, technically by
force. In face of these circumstances the Cabinet met on the Wednesday
afternoon.
'The Cabinet decided not to have general closure in the form in which
Chamberlain had asked for it in my name as well as in his. Gladstone
wanted to have a special closure for Irish coercion, but Chamberlain
presented our ultimatum against that, and won. When Chamberlain and I
talked over the whole situation, I told him that I thought we had been
too popular up to now for it to last. We were now unpopular with our
own people in the constituencies on account of coercion, but, holding
their opinions, were not really trusted by the moderates. I thought
this position inevitable. The holding of strongly patriotic and
national opinions in foreign affairs combined with extreme Radical
opinions upon internal matters made it difficult to act with anybody
for long without being attacked by some section with which it was
necessary to act at other times, and made it difficult to form a solid
party.'
When Dilke and Chamberlain, neither of whom was averse from the idea of
closure in itself, resisted a proposal which meant treating the Irish
members in a category apart from the rest of the House of Commons, they
took a course which now seems simple and inevitable. But there is some
difficulty in realizing to-day how Irishmen, and more especially Irish
members, were viewed in England through the early eighties. Something of
the public feeling towards them may be gathered from a string of extracts
dealing with another source of dissension in this Cabinet. Sir William
Harcourt, as Home Secretary, had adopted determined views of what may be
conceded to the exigencies or the demands of detectives. Sir Charles
writes on February 5th:
'It was at this moment that I first had to do with dynamite. Lord
Granville had instructed me to deal with such matters at once myself
without their passing through the Office; and receiving despatches
from Washington (containing despatches from our Consul at Philadelphia
offering information as to plots), and having missed Harcourt, I took
them to Mr. Gladstone. I said that I had no doubt a sharp Yankee was
trying to get a couple of hundred pounds out of us.'
But Sir William Harcourt wished for the information, and Sir Charles adds:
'The result of this policy undoubtedly was the fabrication of plots,
as exposed by Michael Davitt in the _Labour World_ in 1890.'
Later Harcourt modified his view, but 'this was like shutting the stable
door when the steed was stolen.'
'On February 16th I noted in my diary my dissatisfaction with regard
to the Secret Service money. In 1880 I had walked out instead of
voting for it, and I proposed this year to follow the same course. I
knew of nothing on which was spent the £15,000, except one sum of £40
for a service not secret at all in its nature, "and £200 spent in
America on a ... panic of Harcourt's." I believe that as a fact most
of the money was spent in the United States, but as I was not trusted
with the information, I again walked out.'
On February 12th 'there was a great row between Fawcett and Harcourt.'
'Harcourt and Fawcett had been opening the letters of the Irish
members, and when the Irishmen found it out Fawcett wanted to admit
it, and Harcourt insisted on a blank refusal of information. My
brother came to me with this question from the Radicals: "What is the
use of having a blind Postmaster-General if he reads our letters?"'
The matter came up in the Cabinet along with a discussion on the Arms Act,
which prohibited the possession of firearms in Ireland without licence
from a Magistrate, and authorized the police to search. This Act had been
in force before, but had been dropped by the Government on coming into
office, and was now proposed as a supplement to Mr. Forster's "Protection
of Property" measure.
'On February 12th Mr. Gladstone, with Bright and Chamberlain, fought
hard against the Arms Bill. Harcourt, however, said that "coercion was
like caviare: unpleasant at first to the palate, it becomes agreeable
with use"; and, led by Harcourt, the majority insisted on having more
coercion, and it was settled that the second Bill should go on. At
dinner at Lord and Lady Cork's in the evening I was astonished to see
in what excellent spirits Mr. Gladstone was, although he had been
entirely overruled in his own Cabinet in the afternoon.'
Meanwhile the Home Secretary's activity was making trouble for the Foreign
Office.
'It having been stated in the House of Commons by Parnell that he had
been watched and followed in Paris by persons connected with the
Embassy, Lord Lyons telegraphed to me to ask me to contradict the
statement. On February 19th he telegraphed again: "No one known to or
in communication with the Embassy followed Parnell or watched him in
any way in Paris, and nobody reported to the Embassy about him." I
wrote to Harcourt and told him that Lord Lyons wished a contradiction
made, and that Lord Granville wished me to make the contradiction "if
Harcourt sees no objection." I afterwards wrote to Harcourt, "From
what you said, I imagine that you do see objection; but if we can, it
is better to keep the Embassies out of police matters." Harcourt,
however, would not allow a contradiction to be given; and the fact was
that Parnell had been watched, but watched by the Home Office, through
the police, without the knowledge of the Embassy. Through this
watching of the Irish leaders, Parnell's relations with Mrs. O'Shea
were known to some of those who afterwards professed to be amazed by
the discovery.'
Another subject produced open symptoms of a "split." On January 21st,
1881, during the debate on the Address, Mr. Rylands proposed a resolution
condemning the annexation of the Transvaal as impolitic and unjustifiable,
which was tantamount to declaring that the Boers had been justified in
their revolt.
'After my dinner party on the 21st, I went down to the House of
Commons and deliberately walked out on the Transvaal division, as did
three other members of the Government--Bright, Chamberlain, and
Courtney. We had all along been opposed to the annexation.'
This was only the beginning. In South Africa difficulties accumulated for
the British Government. General Colley was repulsed at Laing's Nek on
January 28th, and on February 8th at the Ingogo River. But in this war
there was a real anxiety on both sides to negotiate, and President Kruger
despatched an offer to submit the whole dispute to an English Royal
Commission if troops were withdrawn from the Transvaal. On Wednesday,
February 16th, Sir Charles learnt from Mr. Chamberlain that there had been
a special Cabinet that afternoon 'to consider proposals from President
Kruger of the Transvaal, which Mr. Gladstone was most anxious to accept.'
On the 18th 'the Transvaal question came up again on a Dutch petition
brought over by delegates, as to which Lord Granville wrote to me: "I
suppose it would not be right for you or me to see them. We shall probably
bear with fortitude the sacrifice."' But the Government were trying to
meet Kruger's advances in a reasonable spirit, and they instructed Colley
by telegram to suspend hostilities if the Boers abandoned armed
opposition. Colley telegraphed back for more precise instructions. The
Boers hold Laing's Nek, which was in Natal territory. Was he to insist on
their evacuating it--and thus opening the pass into the Transvaal--before
he suspended hostilities? The answer sent back on February 19th was that
he should forward to the Boers the British proposal, and fix a reasonable
time within which they must reply. During that time he was not to attempt
to occupy Laing's Nek. Sir Charles's Memoir makes it plain that the
decision to negotiate with the Boers was due to Mr. Gladstone and Mr.
Chamberlain:
'At the Cabinet of Saturday, February 19th, Mr. Gladstone and
Chamberlain, for a wonder, were in the majority, and it was decided to
drop the Arms Bill and to negotiate with the Boers; but at a further
Cabinet on the 26th, Mr. Gladstone being in bed... the decision of the
previous week was reversed, and it was decided to go forward with the
Arms Bill.'
No reply came from the Boers within the time appointed, and on the night
of February 26th Colley seized the height of Majuba, which commanded
Laing's Nek. By noon on the 27th he was a dead man, and his force
defeated. The stated time had expired, and Colley did his duty as a
soldier. [Footnote: See an article in the _Nineteenth Century_ (March,
1904) by Lady Pomeroy Colley (Lady Allendale) in reply to some points in
the account of these events in the _Life of Gladstone_, iii., pp. 36-38.]
But it is none the less true that the Boers, even after the action, still
believed themselves to be in negotiation. On the 28th Kruger, ignorant of
what had befallen, was writing a grateful acknowledgment of the proposal
to suspend hostilities, and was suggesting a meeting of representatives
from both sides.
It was urged, of course, that a disgrace to the British Army must be wiped
out before there could be any further talk of parleying. Yet in Mr.
Gladstone's Government there had been from the first an element which
plainly thought the war unjustified, and with that element Mr. Gladstone
had some sympathy. The Radicals now asserted themselves.
'On Wednesday, March 2nd, after a long interview between me and
Chamberlain on the state of affairs, Chamberlain had an hour and a
half with Bright, and got him to write a strong letter to Gladstone
about the Transvaal, which we put forward as the ground for a proposed
resignation, although of course the strength of the Coercion measures,
the weakness of the Land measures, and the predominance of the Whigs
in the Cabinet were the reasons which weighed chiefly with Chamberlain
and myself. In the Transvaal matter, however, we should not be two,
but four, for Bright and Courtney must go out with us, and Lefevre
might do so. On the other hand, we had reason to think that if the
Whigs yielded to us on the Transvaal, Kimberley would go. On the next
day, Thursday the 3rd, Bright was sent for by Mr. Gladstone on his
letter. Bright found him in entire harmony with our views. Kimberley
at once gave in, and telegraphed what he was told; so the difficulty
was over before the Cabinet was able to meet, and we as far from
resignation as ever.
'On March 5th, I noted in my diary that the Land Bill was
unsatisfactory. Chamberlain told me of a scene between Bright and
Dodson which amused me much. Says Bright to Dodson: "You were put into
the Cabinet to vote with Gladstone. Surely you ought not to oppose
him." Says Dodson indignantly, "A man may have an opinion." "But why
express it?" said the old Quaker.'
In the middle of March
'Things looked bad again at this moment, for on the 14th I wrote a
draft address to the electors of Chelsea, prepared in view of my
resignation along with Bright and Chamberlain. I alluded in it to "the
non-reversal in the Transvaal of an act of high-handed aggression,
which at the time of its inception I had condemned by vote and
speech," and also condemned the resort to coercive measures for
Ireland.'
So far as the Transvaal was concerned, the sympathies of Chamberlain and
Dilke with the Boers prevailed; negotiations proceeded, and a Commission
was named, which finally recommended a reversal of the annexation. The
selection of Chamberlain--whose department had no connection with South
Africa--to justify this step in debate indicated how strong was his
opinion in favour of the Boers. But the Duke of Argyll, who was leaving
the Government from disapproval of their Irish Land Bill, nevertheless on
this matter defended the action of his former colleagues.
The situation was summed up by an observation of the Queen's to Lord
Spencer, which, says Sir Charles, amused the Cabinet on March 26th. The
Queen's Speech on January 7th had contained this curt phrase: "A rising in
the Transvaal has imposed upon me the duty of taking military measures
with a view to the prompt vindication of my authority." To this the Queen
replied: "I cannot see how my 'authority' has been 'vindicated' in the
Transvaal." "There was nothing else to be done, Ma'am," says Spencer. "I
quite understand that," says Her Majesty, "but still I do not see how my
'authority' has been 'vindicated.'"
Mr. Gladstone was meanwhile doing the right thing in Ireland with his Land
Bill, but Mr. Forster, Sir Charles thought, was destroying the effect by
the free use of his new measure, which, having become law by the end of
February, enabled the Irish Government to put any man into gaol on a mere
suspicion and without form of trial. Members of Parliament were not at
first attacked, but the officials of the Land League were seized. Mr.
Davitt had been general manager; his ticket-of-leave, as an ex-Fenian
prisoner, was recalled by Sir William Harcourt, and he was re-arrested.
Mr. Dillon took Davitt's place. Sir Charles writes on Saturday, April
30th, 1881:
'At the Cabinet, which I think was on the previous night, but of which
I heard the details on this day, it was decided to arrest Dillon.
Spencer and Granville, who were both of them away, for it was not, I
think, a regular Cabinet, were both against it rather than for it;
Harcourt was really neutral, though Gladstone counted him for it;
Kimberley, Hartington, and the Chancellor alone supported Gladstone
and Forster. Bright, Chamberlain, Childers, and, wonderful to relate,
Carlingford (who was present, though the newspapers said he was
absent), Northbrook, and Dodson opposed the arrest. Gladstone declared
that it was six to six, and gave himself a casting vote. A few days
later Lord Granville spoke to me warmly against the decision of the
Cabinet. He said he never knew numbers counted in the Cabinet before,
and that it was absurd to count heads in assemblies in which there was
such a difference in the contents of the heads. This criticism,
however, goes too far, and strikes at the root of the decisions of
Parliament itself.'
Meanwhile the Land Bill had reached its second reading. But the Irish
executive was constantly appealed to for constabulary to assist in
carrying out sentences of eviction, while, on the other hand, tenants were
fighting landlords by a general strike against rents.
'At the Cabinet on May 4th the chief topic discussed was the
possibility of checking evictions in Ireland without preventing the
payment of rent by tenants perfectly able to pay.'
In addition to the Irish trouble in Ireland, there was the Irish trouble
in the House of Commons, in no way settled by the Speaker's one arbitrary
imposition of closure at his own discretion. That Mr. Gladstone's mind was
working towards another solution is evident from the following note:
'On June 8th I went to The Durdans to lunch with the Roseberys, and
walked with Mr. Gladstone. We marched round the Derby course, and Mr.
Gladstone said that the first business after the Irish Land Bill must
be procedure, and that this must be the business of next year. He
said, "there must no doubt be some repression by the closure, but
there must also be still more delegation."'
The discussion of the Land Bill was long almost beyond precedent, but by
August it left the Commons, and Lord Salisbury, though furious in his
invective, declined to advise its total rejection. The Irish landlords had
their will of it in Committee, and sent it back unrecognizable. The Lords'
amendments were then reviewed by Mr. Gladstone, and, broadly speaking,
rejected. There was the usual threat of a collision between the Houses.
Sir Charles's first note, in his diary of August 12th, indicates how
completely Mr. Gladstone controlled this situation:
'"Harcourt is very violent against the Lords, more so than either
Bright or Chamberlain, but the decision, whatever it may be, of the
Cabinet, will on this occasion be Mr. Gladstone's."
'On the 14th I noted, "The claim of Lord Salisbury to force us to
'consult the country' is a claim for annual Parliaments when we are in
office, and septennial Parliaments when they are in office." I did
not, however, believe in this particular crisis. On the 14th Lord
Houghton wrote complaining that we did not meet so often as we used to
do. "This is a penalty one pays for having one's friends in power. I
fear there is no hope of their ceasing to be so by the instrumentality
of the House of Lords." On the 15th Lady Lytton's sister told me that
Lytton had "enjoyed the fighting attitude of the Lords. It seemed more
worthy than talking so much and doing so little." But she added:
"After it was all over they were in a most horrid fright."'
Lord Ripon wrote from India of the proceedings in the House of Lords that
he thought Lord Salisbury "would succeed in blowing the institution to
pieces before long."
With a Cabinet so divided, rumour of changes was certain to be rife.
'On August 17th there occurred the Ministerial fish dinner at
Greenwich, which was then a yearly institution. Rosebery was in the
chair--for on these occasions the Chairman is arbitrarily chosen,
generally from among the very youngest members of the Government, and
is a sort of lord of misrule. [Footnote: Lord Rosebery was Under-
Secretary at the Home Office.]
'Harcourt told Chamberlain at the dinner that Mr. Gladstone had made
up his mind to put Lord Frederick Cavendish into the Cabinet, as
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Chamberlain arguing that he ought not to
be put in over my head.
'On the way home Harcourt told me that there were other changes to be
made besides putting in Cavendish, and that one of them was that he
should become Lord Chancellor.... I did not myself believe any of
these reports, but confined myself to urging that Chamberlain should
be Chancellor of the Exchequer.'
This assumed continuance in office, but a little later Mr. Chamberlain,
writing to Sir Charles, entered the domain of prophecy, with some hint of
the 'unauthorized programme.' He thought that the Liberals would be beaten
at the next election, and that their business was to try to get the
farmers over to their side.
"What is the good of bothering about Bankruptcy or Local Government
when our real business is to outbid Chaplin and Co. with the farmers?
But, then, what will our Whig friends say to Radical proposals as to
tenant right, improvements, rating, etc.?"
While Sir Charles was in Paris Mr. Chamberlain wrote on October 4th:
"I am very uneasy about the Irish business. It does not look as if the
Land Bill would do much, and meanwhile 'outrages,' exaggerated
probably by the Press, are forming a large part of the information
supplied by the papers for the autumn season. It is the history of
last October over again, and I expect every day to hear of some
proposal for further coercion. I am clear that we were right in
resisting coercion last year, and I even wish we had gone further and
gone out upon it. But what is to be done now? Can we go on drifting
without a policy? We cannot go back. It is too late to release the
'suspects,' and, if we were to do so, the experience of the past few
weeks shows that this would not make things smoother with Parnell and
Co., while it would bring down a storm of denunciation from the other
side. Then, can we go further in the direction of coercion? I doubt if
the House of Commons would stand it. To put down the Land League would
involve so many questions affecting public agitation in this country
that the Radicals would surely be up in arms. It is possible the
Tories might do it if they were in office, which I wish to God they
were. But can the Liberals do it, and, above all, can you and I be
parties to any more of such work? I should not have a moment's
hesitation in saying 'No,' if I could find any alternative, but it is
evident that Parnell has now got beyond us. He asks for 'No Rent,' and
Separation, and I am not prepared to say that the refusal of such
terms as these constitutes an Irish grievance. I should like to stand
aside and let the Coercionists and Parnell fight it out together, but
I fear this is not now possible. Altogether it is a horrible
imbroglio, and for the moment I do not see my way out of the fog. I
wish I could talk it all over with you."
A little later, however, he wrote:
"'The resources of civilization'--see Mr. G.'s speech--will mean
immediate and greatly extended use of the Protection Act. There will
be a miraculous draught of fishes directly. In for a penny, in for a
pound. I hope it will be a clean sweep. The electors will better stand
a crushing blow than coercion by driblets. There is no other
alternative except new legislation--and from that may Heaven defend
us."
On October 12th, 1881, Mr. Parnell was arrested and put into gaol. On
October 17th, Sir Charles, then in the South of France, wrote to Sir M.
Grant Duff--who had become Governor of Madras--that "Bright and
Chamberlain supported the proposed general _razzia_ on the Land League
leaders in order to avoid fresh coercive legislation." Fresh legislation
would have meant trouble in the House of Commons. But the arrest of Mr.
Parnell, which "folly" Sir Charles had tried to prevent, led to greater
trouble.
The British Government now endeavoured to back up the policy of force by
dividing the opposition. Ever since the trouble generated by the rejection
of the Compensation for Disturbance Bill, Dublin Castle had been (not for
the first time) seeking to enlist on its side the spiritual power of Rome.
There were two lines of approach, of which the first is indicated in a
note under November 22nd, 1880:
'Lord Granville was engaged at this moment in trying, through Cardinal
Newman, to induce the Pope to bully the Irish Bishops; but the Irish
Bishops told the Pope, in reply to his remonstrances, that if he
adopted a policy of compromise in Italy which was unpopular with the
Church, he must leave them alone with Irish affairs.'
The "policy of compromise" was not likely to be adopted. Cardinal Manning,
talking to Sir Charles on July 15th, 1880, on his return from Rome,
expressed his belief that the Vatican was badly advised in its hostile
attitude towards the Italian Monarchy, which he personally would be
prepared to support against the Revolutionary Party, since its fall would
probably bring about an anti-clerical republic.
Far more continuous were the negotiations, with a view to influencing the
Irish Church, carried on through Mr. George Errington, a gentleman of old
Roman Catholic family, who had sat since 1874 as a moderate Home Rule
member for County Longford. [Footnote: The historic difficulties in the
way of an Embassy to the Vatican, fully given by Lord Fitzmaurice in the
_Life of Lord Granville_, vol. ii., chap, viii., pp. 281-282, had been
surmounted "by the practice of allowing a Secretary of Legation, nominally
appointed to the Grand Ducal court of Tuscany, to reside at Rome, where he
was regarded as _de facto_ Minister to the Vatican." Lord Derby had,
however, withdrawn Mr. Jervoise, the last representative, and no other
appointment had been made.]
The following notes show the points at which Sir Charles came into touch
with the development of Mr. Errington's 'Mission' to the Vatican. On
December 1st, 1880, Mr. Errington wrote--in pursuance of a conversation of
the previous day--to solicit Sir Charles's offices with the French
Government towards mitigating the severity with which expropriation of the
unauthorized congregations might be carried out under M. Ferry's Article
7. The letter dealt also with the matter on which his 'Mission' was
afterwards based:
"I am constantly receiving news from Ireland of the evil effects
already produced by the temporary success at Rome of Archbishop
Croke"--who represented advanced Nationalism--"and his party. This
would have been quite impossible had any diplomatic relations existed.
Cardinal Jacobini will take care, I am sure, that such a thing does
not occur again. Whether he can undo or counteract the mischief
already done is, I am afraid, doubtful....
"I suppose it would be desirable in the interests of government and
order in Ireland that the Vatican should do all in its power to keep
the clergy from going with or countenancing the Land League."
On December 6th, 1880:
'Errington came to me in Paris, nominally on behalf of the Vatican,
with a view of having negotiations entered upon, and I believe this
was the time at which he obtained, at Lord Spencer's request, some
sort of private commission from Lord Granville. The commission was
afterwards made more definite.'
October 28th, 1881:
'I saw Errington, who was in Paris on his way to Rome with letters
from Lord Granville, based on the request of Spencer and Forster that
he, Errington, should represent the Irish Government at Rome during
its great struggle with Parnell, matters in Ireland being too serious
to make roundabout dealing through Lord Emly [Footnote: An Irish Roman
Catholic M.P. who, after being Postmaster-general, was raised to the
Peerage.] and Cardinal Howard safe; and Errington was to be tried from
October until Easter....
'In the evening of November 10th, at dinner at the Harcourts', Mr.
Gladstone, taking me aside about Errington's mission, told me that he
was bitterly opposed to the notion of reopening relations with the
Papal Court; and there can be no doubt that he assented most
unwillingly to the views of Spencer, Forster, and Harcourt in favour
of the Errington "Mission." He deceived the House of Commons about it,
because he always closed his own eyes to the facts. [Footnote: The
line taken by the Government in the House of Commons was that Mr.
Errington had no formal appointment, and that his communications were
not officially dealt with by the Foreign Office. These diplomatic
explanations only increased the suspicion of the followers of Parnell
and of the Ultra-Protestants led by Sir H. Drummond Wolff.]
'On December 24th, 1881, Lord O'Hagan passed through Paris, despatched
on a secret mission to Rome about Ireland by Forster, who was not
satisfied with the results up to then of the Errington Mission.'
'On December 31st I received a letter from Forster, in which he said
that Lord O'Hagan had returned, and that no notice had been taken by
the papers of his visit to Rome, which was a good thing.'
To the principle of such intermediation Sir Charles had no objection. What
he disliked was that the thing should be done and denied. He himself in
the previous year had written by the Government's request to Cardinal
Manning at Rome for assurance that the future Bishop of a new See in
Canada would be a British subject. Manning also had written to him
concerning the establishment of a new See for Catholics of the Levant,
with its seat in Cyprus, guaranteeing that "the influence of our Bishop
and all about him would be ... strictly in support of the Government," and
asking therefore that, "when the seat of Government for Cyprus had been
fixed, Rome might be informed, as it would be desirable for the Bishop to
be in the same place."
Manning was quite content with the influence that he could wield, and, as
a letter from him in 1885 shows, was strongly against diplomatic relations
between England and the Vatican. Sir Charles, however, did not take that
view:
'Such perpetual applications have to be made to the Court of Rome, not
only (as the public thinks) with regard to Irish affairs, but with
regard to Roman Catholic interests in all parts of the world, that I
have always been favourable to taking the public into our confidence
in the matter and appointing a representative at the Court of Rome. At
one time we used to carry on our affairs with the Papal Court through
Cardinal Howard, an English Cardinal; but the Pope is so anxious to
obtain official representation that he throws difficulties in the way
of ecclesiastics acting as informal representatives. Then Lord O'Hagan
used to go to Rome, at the expense of Irish Secret Service money, as a
private traveller, and he used to carry on negotiations with the
Vatican.'
Sir Charles resented 'the complications that are caused by our having to
do that in fact which we refuse to do in form.' The Errington "Mission,
which was no mission," was an instance.
Though the year drew to its close there was still no decision as to the
means of dealing with obstruction. But approach was being made to a
settled policy.
'On my return to London I found that a Cabinet had been called for
Thursday, November 10th, to deal with the forms of the House, as the
Speaker and Erskine May had been concocting a new code, which, I
added, "is certain to be perfectly useless, as the Speaker is
generally, and May invariably, wrong.... Direct closure is the only
thing of any use. That would be one fight and no more; but the
Speaker-May code would probably take a whole Session to get, and be
useless when we have got it.'
'When Chamberlain came to dinner on November 11th, he left with me till
the next day the "secret" paper printed for the Cabinet as to the forms of
the House, which was written by May and annotated by the Speaker, and I
was glad to find that it included closure.'
In a Parliamentary Session marked by so much that was inconclusive, Sir
Charles had the satisfaction of recording in his diary one piece of
progressive legislation which was his own. By April, 1881, he had got
ready his Bill for putting an end to the Unreformed Municipal
Corporations, and so carrying out the policy which he had recommended
while in Opposition, and it became law.