strange performance. Hurried naval preparations were made for
vigorous action, if found necessary, and formal demands for
apology, inquiry and compensation were presented at St.
Petersburg. Nothing, however, was done rashly, and the two
governments concerned agreed sensibly and quickly to an
investigation of the affair by an International Commission,
which gave hearings in Paris soon afterwards. The Commission
found precedents in recent naval experience—even in the
manoeuvres of the British navy—of a similar mistaking of
fishing boats and other vessels for torpedo craft, and was
able to deal gently and pacifically with the facts brought
before it. It decided that the fishing fleet had committed no
hostile act, and that no torpedo boat was either among them or
near them, and that, consequently, the Russian Admiral was not
justified in opening fire. As for his not stopping to
ascertain the damage he had done, the conclusion was that
enough uncertainty on the subject of danger had been raised in
his mind to warrant that neglect; but a majority of the
commissioners expressed regret that he had not given notice of
what had happened when he passed through the Straits. Then, as
_The Naval Annual_ remarked, in reviewing the incident,
"diplomacy steps in and seeks to soothe military and national
susceptibilities by declaring that Admiral Rozhdestvensky’s
‘valeur militaire’ is unimpaired, and his ‘sentiments
d’humanité’ unimpeachable."
_Naval Annual, 1905,
chapter vi._
Between the English and Russian governments the affair was
settled amicably by an indemnity of £65,000 from the latter to
the fishermen who suffered.
The first halt in Rozhdestvensky’s voyage was off Tangier,
where he divided his fleet, sending one division, under
Admiral Folkersahm, by the Suez Canal route, and leading the
other in person down the Atlantic and round the Cape. They met
off Madagascar on the 3d of January, and got news there of the
fall of Port Arthur and, later, of the defeat of the Russian
army at Mukden. The stay of the reunited fleet at Nossi Bé
island, off the west coast of Madagascar, near its northern
extremity, was prolonged, awaiting orders, till the 17th of
March. Nothing was known of its next movements until it was
seen off Singapore, April 8. Thence it proceeded to Kam-ranh
Bay, in French Indo-China, where it stayed for some weeks,
waiting to be joined by another squadron from the Baltic,
which came under the command of Admiral Nebogatoff. This use
of the waters of a neutral Power was bitterly complained of in
Japan and sharply criticised elsewhere. The whole fleet
resumed its northward voyage on the 14th of May, and on the
27th, in the Korean Straits, off the island of Tsushima, it
was intercepted by Admiral Togo’s fleet. An account of the
circumstances of the interception, and of the wonderfully
decisive battle which ensued, derived by Mr. George Kennan
from both Russian and Japanese participants in the engagement,
was published in _The Outlook_ of July 29, 1905. Mr.
Kennan, who had been with the Japanese forces during the siege
of Port Arthur, and had described it for _The Outlook_,
obtained permission to visit some of the wounded and captured
officers of Rozhdestvensky’s fleet in hospital at one of the
naval stations in Japan. As he spoke their language they
talked with him freely, and information from both victors and
vanquished is thus combined in the account from which we quote
a few passages, as follows:
"When the Baltic fleet left the coast of Annam, on its way to
Vladivostok, Admiral Rojesvensky [so Mr. Kennan writes the
name] had no accurate information with regard to the
whereabouts of the Japanese squadrons. They might all be
concentrated in the Tsushima Strait, between Japan and Korea,
or they might be watching, in three separate detachments, the
three channels that give access to the Sea of Japan, viz,
Tsushima, Tsuguru, and La Perouse. Thinking that Togo would
not dare to leave wholly unguarded the two northern passages,
which are nearest to Vladivostok, Rojesvensky assumed that the
Japanese fleet had been divided into three sections, and that,
on any route which he might select, he would probably have to
deal with only one of them. …
"Admiral Togo, however, did not divide his fleet.
Anticipating, with acute prescience, the reasoning and the
decision of the Russian commander, he concentrated his whole
force in the Tsushima Strait, and concealed it so perfectly in
unfrequented harbors at the southern end of Korea that nobody
ever saw it or discovered its location. … It seems to have had
its main base near Masampho, Korea. The arrangements made for
discovering the approach and reporting the movements of the
Russian fleet were as comprehensive and perfect as possible.
{354}
All along the southwestern coast of Japan signal stations had
been established on prominent islands and on the tops of high
mountains, and every one of these ‘watch-towers,’ as they were
called, was connected by telephone, either with Sasebo or with
Maizuru. Fast scouting ships, equipped with wireless telegraph
instruments, patrolled the entrance to the strait, and on the
charts carried by them, as well as by all other vessels of the
Japanese fleet, the whole stretch of water between Japan and
Korea had been divided into small numbered squares, so that
the exact location of the enemy at any moment might be
designated by a number. There was no possibility of
Rojesvensky’s getting through the strait unobserved unless he
should be favored by dense fog.
"At five o’clock on the morning of Saturday, May 27, the
scouting ship Shinano-maru reported by wireless telegraphy
from the vicinity of Quelpart Island, ‘Enemy's fleet sighted
in square 203. He seems to be steering for the East Channel’
(the passage between Tsushima Island and the Japanese
mainland, which is called on English charts Krusenstern
Strait). The Japanese fleet, which was all ready for sea, left
its Korean base at once. Admiral Togo himself, with four
battle-ships and eight armoured cruisers, took a northerly
course in order to get ahead of the enemy and stop his
progress at or near Oki Island (Okinoshima), while Admirals
Kamimura, Uriu, Dewa, and Kataoka sailed in a southeasterly
direction for the purpose of enveloping his rear. The officers
last named came into touch with the Russian fleet between Iki
Island and Tsushima soon after ten o’clock; but as the
Japanese plan of action did not contemplate an attack at that
point, they merely kept the enemy in sight and reported to
Admiral Togo by wireless telegraphy the number and disposition
of his ships. Rojesvensky had in all thirty-eight vessels, and
they entered the strait in two parallel columns.
"The Russians, of course, saw on their left flank and in their
rear the squadrons of Admirals Kamimura, Kataoka, Uriu, and
Dewa, but, as these ships showed no disposition to attack,
they (the Russians) were confirmed in their belief that only a
part of the Japanese fleet was there, and that they should get
through the strait without a serious fight. They remained
under this delusion until half past one o’clock in the
afternoon, when, to their great surprise, Admiral Togo, with
four battle-ships and eight armored cruisers, appeared
directly ahead. … At 1.55 p. m., when the flag-ships of the
two fleets were a little more than four miles apart, Togo
hoisted the following signal: ‘The fate of the Empire depends
upon this battle. Let every man do his best.’ At two o’clock
the Japanese squadrons on the flank and rear of the Russians
closed in a little, and eight minutes later the fight began,
Admiral Togo opening fire at a distance of about four miles.
It became evident at once to the officers of the Orel that in
the matter of marksmanship they were wholly outclassed. The
fire of the Japanese was a little wild at first, but in a few
minutes they got the range with surprising accuracy, and
struck the leading battle-ships of the two Russian columns
with almost every shot. Ten minutes after the fight began, a
twelve-inch shell entered the forward turret of the Kniaz
Suvaroff, burst there with terrific violence, exploded three
or four rounds of ammunition that had just been brought up
from the magazine, wrecked both guns, and blew the top of the
turret completely off. In less than an hour the Russian
flag-ship had lost one mast and both funnels, and had taken
fire fore and aft; the Oslabya and the Alexander III. were
also in flames; the Orel, the Sissoi Veliki, and the Borodino
had been severely if not fatally injured; the Russian columns
had been broken up and thrown into disorder; and the issue of
the battle had been fully determined. In other words, the
Baltic fleet had been overwhelmed and defeated, by gun-fire
alone, in less than forty-five minutes. Most of the
second-class Russian vessels were still in fighting condition,
but the battle-ship section had lost more than half of its
original efficiency, and there was no longer any doubt as to
the outcome of the engagement. … Admiral Togo says, in his
detailed official report, that ‘at 2.45 p. m. the result of
the battle had been decided.’ And in this judgment the
officers of the Orel virtually coincide. They frankly admit
that they were overwhelmed from the very first by the accuracy
and destructiveness of Admiral Togo’s long-range gun-fire."
Though the result of the battle was made certain within its
first hour, the destruction of Russian ships went on to the
end of the day and through most of the night, with pursuit of
those in flight continued until the 26th. Twenty-two of the
Russian vessels of all classes were sunk, 6 were captured, 6
were afterwards interned in neutral ports, and two only made
their way to Valdivostok. The Japanese lost 3 torpedo boats;
116 of their officers and men were killed, and 538 received
wounds. The prisoners they captured numbered about 6000.
Admiral Rozhdestvensky, accused of cowardice in the battle,
was tried by court-martial and acquitted by a verdict rendered
in July, 1906.
JAPAN: A. D. 1904: A. D. 1904-1905.
War with Russia: Japan’s greatest achievement.
Sanitation of the Army.
"Without minimizing for a moment the splendor of Japanese
victories on land and sea, at Mukden, Port Arthur, Liao-Yang,
or with Togo off Tsushima, in the Korean Straits (and two of
these battles are among the bloodiest in history), I yet
unhesitatingly assert that Japan’s greatest conquests have
been in the humanities of war, in the stopping of the needless
sacrifice of life by preventable diseases. This dreadful and
unnecessary waste of life, especially in conflicts between
so-called civilized and Anglo-Saxon races, is one of the most
ghastly propositions of the age. The Japanese have gone a long
way toward eliminating it. …
"Longmore’s tables, which are accepted as the most reliable
statistics of war, and which are based on the records of
battles for the past two hundred years, show that there has
rarely been a conflict of any great duration in which at least
four men have not perished from disease for every one from
bullets. In the Russo-Turkish War, 80,000 men died from
disease and 20,000 from wounds. In the Crimean campaign, it is
asserted on eminent French authority that in six months the
allied forces lost 50,000 soldiers from disease and only 2,000
from casualties.
{355}
In the French campaign in Madagascar, in 1894, of the 14,000
men sent to the front 29 were killed in action and 7,000 from
disease, most of which was preventable. In our Spanish
American War, in 1898, in a campaign the actual hostilities of
which lasted six weeks, the deaths from casualties, as given
me by the surgeon-general of the United States army, last
week, were 293, while those from disease amounted to 3,681, or
nearly 14 to 1.
"Compare these frightful figures with the record of killed,
wounded, and sick in the Japanese army from February, 1904, to
May, 1905, as furnished me by Minister of War General
Terauchi, in Tokio, in August last. There were killed on the
field 43,892, or 7.32 per cent. of the entire army in the
field; there were wounded 145,527, or 24.27 percent.; there
died of wounds 9,054, or 1.51 percent.; there died from
sickness and disease, including contagious cases, 11,992, or
about 2 per cent. of the army. In other words, the total
number of deaths from casualties and wounds amounted to
52,946, or nearly 9 per cent, of the army, while the total
deaths from sickness amounted to 11,992, or 2 per cent. of the
army. This record is unparalleled and unapproached in the
history of warfare. How did the Japanese accomplish it? In
three preeminently fundamental ways. First, thorough
preparation and organization for war, such as was never before
made in history; second, through the simple, non-irritating,
easily digested ration furnished the troops; and third,
because of the brilliant part played by the members of the
medical profession in the application of practical sanitation
and the stamping out of preventable disease in the army,
thereby saving its great hosts for the legitimate purpose of
war, the defeating of the enemy in the field. …
"She organized her medical department on broad, generous
lines, and gave its representatives the rank and power their
great responsibilities merited, recognizing that they had to
deal with a foe which history has shown has killed 80 percent.
of the total mortality in other wars. She even had the
temerity (strange as it may seem to an American or an English
army official) to grade her medical men as high as the
officers of the line, who combat the enemy who kills only 20
per cent., and to accord them equal authority, except, of
course, in the emergency of battle, when all authority
devolves, as it should, on the officers of the line. In her
home land she organized the most splendid system of hospitals
that has ever been devised for the treatment of sick and
wounded, and with her army at the front she put into execution
the most elaborate and effective system of sanitation that has
ever been practised in war. Upon the declaration of war, she
was prepared to house, scientifically treat, and tenderly care
for 25,000 wounded in Japan alone, and as the war progressed
the hospital capacity was rapidly increased, so that one and
one-half years after its commencement, or on the sixth day of
July, 1905, the twelve military home hospitals possessed a
normal capacity of 58,261."
_Major Louis L. Seaman, M. D.,
Lessons for America in the Japanese Medical Service
(American Review of Reviews November, 1905)._
JAPAN: A. D. 1904-1905. War with Russia:
Casualties of the entire war on the Japanese side.
The following is an official Japanese statement of the
casualties of the entire war on the Japanese side:
"Killed in battle. 47,387
Died of wounds 11,500
Wounded, but recovered 161,925
Total killed and wounded 220,812
Died of sickness 27,158
Sick, but recovered 209,065
Total sick 236,223
Total of killed,
wounded, and sick 457,035
Total of fatal casualties 86,045
"These figures relate to the field only, not including cases
among the troops in Japan or Formosa, and they may be slightly
altered when all the reports of hospitals are compiled. Of
those who succumbed to disease nearly three-fourths died in
the field and one-fourth after reaching home.
"To find the total number of killed in battle and patients
treated the following additions must be made:
Total of killed, wounded,
and sick in the field 457,035
Patients treated at home 97,850
Russian prisoner patients 77,803
Grand total 632,688
"The above figures do not include slight cases remaining with
the Japanese regiments. In April, 1906, when these figures
were published, the Japanese missing had been reduced to
3,000.
"Comparative statement of the result of treatment, by wars:
Sick and wounded Wounded treated
treated in Hospital. in Hospital.
Recovered Died. Recovered Died.
completely. completely.
Per cent. Per cent. Per cent. Per cent.
Chinese-Japanese war 50.94 14.24 63.23 7.49
Russo-Japanese war 54.81 7.65 71.58 8.83
"The difference between each of the totals and 100 represents
men incapacitated for active service.
"Comparative statement of cases and deaths from sickness and
wounds, by wars:
Wounded. Sick. Died of Died of
Wounds. Disease.
Chinese-Japanese 1 6.93 1 12.09
North China 1 4.37 1 1.97
Russo-Japanese 1 1.07 1 0.46
"Comparative statement of percentage of sickness in total
number of troops in field, by war:
Percentage of Percentage of deaths
sickness for all from sickness for
troops engaged. all troops engaged.
Chinese-Japanese 59.20 9.29
North China war 34.88 4.33
Russo-Japanese 36.04 2.99
"The average monthly percentage of sickness during the
twenty-one months of the Russo-Japanese war was 8.69, while
the average monthly percentage for 1902, which is said to have
had an exceptionally good medical record, was 10.21."
_Charles Lynch,
Report (United States War Department,
Reports of Military Observers …
during the Russo-Japanese War, part 4)._
{356}
JAPAN: A. D. 1904-1905.
General Consequences in Europe of the Russo-Japanese War.
See (in this Volume)
EUROPE: A. D. 1904-1909.
JAPAN: A. D. 1904-1905.
Conventions with Korea, establishing a Protectorate over
that Empire, with Control of its Finances and its
Foreign Relations.
See (in this Volume)
KOREA: A. D. 1904-1905.
JAPAN: A. D. 1904-1905.
The Red Cross Society.
See (in this Volume)
RED CROSS SOCIETY.
JAPAN: A. D. 1905.
Report on treatment of the Opium Problem in Formosa.
See (in this Volume)
OPIUM PROBLEM.
JAPAN: A. D. 1905 (June-October).
Ending of the war with Russia.
Mediation offered by the President of the United States
and accepted.
Negotiation and Conclusion of the Peace Treaty of Portsmouth.
In the third article of the Convention for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes agreed to and signed at
the First International Peace Conference, at The Hague, in
1898, it was recommended, "in case of serious disagreement or
conflict," "that one or more Powers, strangers to the dispute,
should on their own initiative, and as far as circumstances
may allow, offer their good offices or mediation to the States
at variance." To this recommendation was added the declaration
that "Powers, strangers to the dispute, have the right to
offer good offices or mediation, even during the course of
hostilities"; and "that the exercise of this right can never
be regarded by one or the other of the parties in conflict as
an unfriendly act."
The first important action on this recommendation was taken by
the President of the United States, Mr. Roosevelt, on the 8th
of June, 1905, when he directed a communication from the then
acting Secretary of State, Mr. Loomis, to be dispatched by
telegraph to the Ambassadors of the United States at Tokyo and
St. Petersburg, identically the same to each, and to be
presented by the latter to the Governments of Russia and
Japan. The communication was in the following words:
"The President feels that the time has come when, in the
interest of all mankind, he must endeavor to see if it is not
possible to bring to an end the terrible and lamentable
conflict now being waged. With both Russia and Japan the
United States has inherited ties of friendship and good will.
It hopes for the prosperity and welfare of each, and it feels
that the progress of the world is set back by the war between
these two great nations. The President accordingly urges the
Russian and Japanese Governments, not only for their own
sakes, but in the interest of the whole civilized world, to
open direct negotiations for peace with one another. The
President suggests that these peace negotiations be conducted
directly and exclusively between the belligerents—in other
words, that there may be a meeting of Russian and Japanese
plenipotentiaries or delegates without any intermediary, in
order to see if it is not possible for these representatives
of the two powers to agree to terms of peace. The President
earnestly asks that the Russian Government do now agree to
such meeting, and is asking the Japanese Government likewise
to agree. While the President does not feel that any
intermediary should be called in in respect to the peace
negotiations themselves, he is entirely willing to do what he
properly can if the two powers concerned feel that his
services will be of aid in arranging the preliminaries as to
the time and place of meeting; but if even these preliminaries
can be arranged directly between the two powers, or in any
other way, the President will be glad, as his sole purpose is
to bring about a meeting which the whole civilized world will
pray may result in peace."
The despatch to Tokyo was delayed in transmission and did not
reach Minister Griscom until the evening of the 9th, but was
delivered to the officials of the foreign office the same
night, and the following reply from Baron Komura was handed to
Mr. Griscom at 1 o’clock on the morning of the 10th:
"The Imperial Government have given to the suggestion of the
President of the United States, embodied in the note handed to
the minister for foreign affairs by the American minister on
the 9th instant, the very serious consideration to which,
because of its source and its import, it is justly entitled.
Desiring in the interest of the world as well as in the
interest of Japan the reestablishment of peace with Russia, on
terms and conditions that will fully guarantee its stability,
the Imperial Government will, in response to the suggestion of
the President, appoint plenipotentiaries of Japan to meet
plenipotentiaries of Russia at such time and place as may be
found to be mutually agreeable and convenient, for the purpose
of negotiating and concluding terms of peace directly and
exclusively between the two belligerent powers."
At St. Petersburg, the reply from Count Lamsdorff, Minister
for Foreign Affairs, was given to Ambassador Meyer on the 12th
as follows:
"I have not failed to place before my august master the
telegraphic communication which your excellency has been
pleased to transmit to me under instructions of your
government. His Majesty, much moved by the sentiments
expressed by the President, is glad to find in it a new proof
of the traditional friendship which unites Russia to the
United States of America, as well as an evidence of the high
value which Mr. Roosevelt attaches, even as His Imperial
Majesty does, to that universal peace so essential to the
welfare and progress of all humanity. With regard to the
eventual meeting of Russian and Japanese plenipotentiaries,
‘in order to see if it is not possible for the two powers to
agree to terms of peace,’ the Imperial Government has no
objection in principle to this endeavor if the Japanese
Government expresses a like desire."
This Russian response seemed somewhat equivocal to the
Japanese Government, and Foreign Minister Komura asked for an
assurance as to the powers to be conferred on the peace
plenipotentiaries from St. Petersburg. How the assurance was
obtained has not been made known to the public; but Japan
received it soon through President Roosevelt, and Baron Komura
requested Mr. Griscom to "assure the President that the
attitude taken by the Japanese Government regarding the nature
of the powers to be conferred on the peace plenipotentiaries
was not in any degree inspired by a desire to raise
difficulties or delay negotiations.
{357}
Experience has taught the necessity of caution, and the
Japanese Government thought that by securing at the outset a
common understanding upon this subject they would preclude
possibility of any difficulty arising in the initial stage of
negotiations and would smooth the way for the real work of the
negotiators; but having entire confidence in the wisdom of the
President, the Japanese Government accepts his interpretation
of the intention of Russia and will without further question
appoint plenipotentiaries with full powers to negotiate and
conclude terms of peace."
In consultations as to the place of meeting, Russia suggested
Paris and Japan proposed Chefu, but objections were raised to
both, as well as to The Hague and Geneva, recommended by
President Roosevelt. Japan wanted it nowhere in Europe and
Russia would have it nowhere in the East; so Washington became
the chosen point. But, when one of the first ten days of
August became the appointed time of assembly for the
negotiation, the probable heat of Washington was forbidding,
and Portsmouth, New Hampshire, where the Government of the
United States possesses an island domain of its own, for
navy-yard uses, was finally fixed on for the most important
peace-parley that has taken place in the world within a
century, at the least.
The plenipotentiaries commissioned by Japan were Baron Komura
Iutaro and Mr. Takahira Kogoro, then Japanese Minister at
Washington. Mr. Nelidoff, Russian Ambassador at Paris, was
named in the first instance for chief plenipotentiary by the
Tzar, but illness prevented his serving. Mr. Nicholas
Mouravieff, Ambassador at Rome, was then appointed, but became
equally disabled in health, and M. Sergius Witte took his
place, with Baron Roman Rosen, Russian Ambassador at
Washington, associated in the mission. On Saturday, the 5th of
August, on board the Government yacht _Mayflower_, at
Oyster Bay, the summer residence of President Roosevelt, the
four plenipotentiaries, attended by members of their
respective suites, were received by the President, introduced
to each other, and entertained at a lunch. Thence they were
conveyed, by separate vessels, first to Newport, where Sunday
was spent, and afterwards to Portsmouth. Their conference was
opened on Wednesday, the 9th, and the resulting Treaty of
Peace was signed by the negotiators, September 5th.
At the outset of their communications with each other the
differences of mind seemed insurmountable. How they were
brought to agreement has been told by two writers who had
better opportunities, perhaps, for knowing the inner
circumstances of the negotiation than any other persons
outside of the plenipotentiaries themselves. One of these was
Dr. Frederick de Martens, the eminent Russian Professor of
International Law, who came as a special consulting delegate
with M. Witte. In an article on "The Portsmouth Peace
Conference," published in _The North American Review_ of
November, 1905, he wrote:
"During three long weeks the _pourparlers_ between the
representatives of the two Powers seemed to show the absolute
impossibility of attaining the desired object, that is, peace.
There were especially two obstacles in the way—the Japanese
demands that Russia should cede Saghalin and that Russia
should pay Japan a war indemnity. These two conditions Russia
categorically rejected, and the failure of the Conference
seemed inevitable. Then it was that the President of the
United States, again basing his action on the principles of
the Hague Convention, considered himself once more justified
in intervening between the two disputing nations. At first,
Mr. Roosevelt proposed that a Commission composed of neutrals,
whose decision however, would not be binding on the contending
parties, should fix the amount of the sum that Russia should
pay to Japan. But this proposal was immediately abandoned
because of its evidently impracticable nature. The second
intervention of the President was more effective and happy.
Japan was now to be asked to withdraw her demand for an
indemnity, and the Tsar, who desired sincerely to see the
unfortunate war ended, was to consent to the cession of the
southern portion of the island of Saghalin. It was at the
sitting of August 29th that an accord, based on these mutual
concessions, was brought about; and, during the six days that
followed, the stipulations of the definitive treaty of peace
were drawn up by a commission named for that purpose. At last,
on September 5th, the treaty was concluded, and a battery of
artillery, in front of the building where the sittings had
been held, fired a salute of nineteen guns in honor of the
great event."
_F. de Martens,
The Portsmouth Peace Conference
(North American Review, November, 1905)._
To the same effect Dr. E. J. Dillon, the well known publicist,
who had been an intermediary in some of the preliminary
unofficial diplomacy, wrote in _The Contemporary Review_
of October as follows:
"The Peace of Portsmouth is the outcome of rare moral courage
meeting, assailing and worsting a combination of forces, the
classification and labelling of which had best be left to the
future historian and biographer who can appreciate, without
bias and blame, without apprehension. The first man to display
that unwonted moral courage was Theodore Roosevelt, whose
influence for good on the living and working of nations is a
beneficent force to which the world is beginning to look as to
some permanent institution. It is not too much to say that if
Japan and Russia are at peace today, if countless human beings
doomed seemingly until a few weeks ago to a terrible death on
the battlefield are now about to return to their homes and
families and set about building up instead of pulling down,
the credit for this welcome change in international relations
is due in the first place to the President of the United
States. …
"There was hardly a man in Russia acquainted with the elements
of the problem who considered Mr. Roosevelt’s invitation to a
peace conference as other than a voice crying in the
wilderness. He had felt his way some months before and
convinced himself that it then led nowhither. Soon afterwards
I was myself authorised to put forth a feeler and inquire
whether a war indemnity formed part of Japan’s irreducible
minimum. And the result of that inquiry was that hostilities
were allowed to take their course.
{358}
"After the Battle of Mukden Mr. Roosevelt again returned to
the attack, moving slowly and very cautiously, but creating
his opportunity as well as utilising it, advising as well as
questioning, exhorting almost as much as he argued. With
Japan, whose statesmen he knew well, and with the mainsprings
of whose action he was perfectly familiar, he experienced no
difficulty. What Nippon said, she really meant; what she
promised—but not one iota more—she religiously fulfilled; and
both her declarations and her promises apparently flowed from
a desire to do what every man in the forum of his own
conscience would term the right thing. Probably never before
in human history has the world’s cultivated sense of what is
fair and just been taken by any nation, Christian or
non-Christian, as its own standard of ethics, its own rule of
action regardless of immediate consequences. …
"And Japan’s capacity and readiness to sacrifice the less to
the greater, the material to the moral, was, so to say, the
fulcrum on which Mr. Roosevelt rested his lever. All the force
of his endeavours was concentrated here, all his fund of
optimism was derived from this source.
"But it takes two to make peace as well as to make war. And
the President’s great and greatest difficulty was to persuade
Russia, not indeed to imitate Japan’s example, but to consult
what to outsiders appeared to be her own national interest and
to make peace on acceptable terms."
_E. J. Dillon,
The Story of the Peace Negotiations
(Contemporary Review, October, 1905)._
The Treaty of Peace thus happily agreed upon at Portsmouth was
duly ratified by the Emperors of Russia and Japan, at St.
Petersburg and at Tokyo simultaneously, on the 14th of
October, 1905. The following is the text of the Treaty in
full:
JAPAN:
The treaty of peace signed at Portsmouth.
By the helping grace of God, we, Nicholas II, Emperor and
Autocrat of all the Russias, etc., hereby declare that, in
consequence of a mutual agreement between us and His Majesty,
the Emperor of Japan, our plenipotentiaries concluded and
signed at Portsmouth, August 23, 1905, a treaty of peace
which, word for word, reads as follows:
His Majesty, the Emperor of all the Russias, on the one hand,
and His Majesty, the Emperor of Japan, on the other baud,
being animated by the desire to restore the benefits of peace
for their countries and their peoples, have decided to
conclude a treaty of peace and have appointed for this purpose
their plenipotentiaries, to wit:
His Majesty the Emperor of Russia—
His Excellency, Mr. Sergius Witte, his secretary of state and
president of the committee of ministers of the Empire of
Russia, and
His Excellency, Baron Roman Rosen, master of the Imperial
Court of Russia and his ambassador extraordinary and
plenipotentiary to the United States of America:
And his Majesty, the Emperor of Japan—
His Excellency, Baron Komura Iutaro, Iusammi, knight of the
Imperial Order of the Rising Sun, his minister of foreign
affairs, and His Excellency, Mr. Takahira Kogoro, Iusammi,
knight of the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, his envoy
extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to the United
States of America;
Who, after having exchanged their full powers, found in good
and due form, concluded the following articles:
Article I.
There shall be in the future peace and friendship between
Their Majesties the Emperor of all the Russias and the Emperor
of Japan, as well as between their respective nations and
subjects.
Article II.
The Imperial Government of Russia, recognizing that Japan has
predominant political, military, and economic interests in
Korea, agrees not to interfere or place obstacles in the way
of any measure of direction, protection, and supervision which
the Imperial Government of Japan may deem necessary to adopt
in Korea.
It is agreed that Russian subjects in Korea shall be treated
in exactly the same manner as the citizens of other foreign
countries; that is, that they shall be placed on the same
footing as the citizens of the most-favored nation.
It is likewise agreed that, in order to avoid any cause of
misunderstanding, the two high contracting parties shall
refrain from adopting, on the Russo-Korean frontier, any
military measures which might menace the security of the
Russian or Korean territory.
Article III.
Russia and Japan mutually engage:
1. To completely and simultaneously evacuate Manchuria, with
the exception of the territory over which the lease of the
peninsula of Liao tung extends, in accordance with the
provisions of additional Article I annexed to this treaty, and
2. To entirely and completely restore to the exclusive
administration of China all parts of Manchuria now occupied by
Russian and Japanese troops, or which are under their control,
with the exception of the above-mentioned territory.
The Imperial Government of Russia declares that it has no
territorial advantages or preferential or exclusive
concessions in Manchuria of such a nature as to impair the
sovereignty of China or which are incompatible with the
principle of equal opportunity.
Article IV.
Russia and Japan mutually pledge themselves not to place any
obstacle in the way of general measures which apply equally to
all nations and which China might adopt for the development of
commerce and industry in Manchuria.
Article V.
The Imperial Government of Russia cedes to the Imperial
Government of Japan, with the consent of the Government of
China, the lease of Port Arthur, of Talien, and of the
adjacent territories and territorial waters, as well as the
rights, privileges, and concessions connected with this lease
or forming part thereof, and it likewise cedes to the Imperial
Government of Japan all the public works and property within
the territory over which the above-mentioned lease extends.
The high contracting parties mutually engage to obtain from
the Government of China the consent mentioned in the foregoing
clause.
The Imperial Government of Japan gives on its part the
assurance that the property rights of Russian subjects within
the above-mentioned territory shall be absolutely respected.
{359}
Article VI.
The Imperial Government of Russia obligates itself to yield to
the Imperial Government of Japan, without compensation and
with the consent of the Chinese Government, the Chan-chun
(Kwan-Chen-Tsi) and Port Arthur Railroad and all its branches,
with all the rights, privileges, and property thereunto
belonging within this region, as well as all the coal mines in
said region belonging to this railroad or being operated for
its benefit.
The two high contracting parties mutually pledge themselves to
obtain from the Chinese Government the consent mentioned in
the foregoing clause.
Article VII.
Russia and Japan agree to operate their respective railroads
in Manchuria for commercial and industrial purposes
exclusively, but by no means for strategic purposes. It is
agreed that this restriction does not apply to the railroads
within the territory covered by the lease of the Liao tung
peninsula.
Article VIII.
The Imperial Governments of Russia and Japan, with a view to
favoring and facilitating relations and traffic, shall
conclude, as soon as possible, a separate convention to govern
their operations of repair on the railroads in Manchuria.
Article IX.
The Imperial Government of Russia cedes to the Imperial
Government of Japan, in perpetuity and full sovereignty, the
southern part of the island of Saghalin, and all the islands
adjacent thereto, as well as all the public works and property
there situated. The fiftieth parallel of north latitude is
adopted as the limit of the ceded territory. The exact
boundary line of this territory shall be determined in
accordance with the provisions of additional Article II
annexed to this treaty.
Japan and Russia mutually agree not to construct within their
respective possessions on the island of Saghalin, and the
islands adjacent thereto, any fortification or similar
military work. They likewise mutually agree not to adopt any
military measures which might hinder the free navigation of
the Straits of La Perouse and Tartary.
Article X.
The right is reserved to Russian subjects inhabiting the
territory ceded to Japan to sell their real property and
return to their country; however, if they prefer to remain in
the ceded territory, they shall be guarded and protected in
the full enjoyment of their property rights and the exercise
of their industries, provided they submit to the laws and
jurisdiction of Japan. Japan shall have perfect liberty to
withdraw the right of residence in this territory from all
inhabitants laboring under political or administrative
incapacity, or to deport them from this territory. It pledges
itself, however, to fully respect the property rights of these
inhabitants.
Article XI.
Russia obligates itself to reach an understanding with Japan
in order to grant to Japanese subjects fishing rights along
the coast of the Russian possessions in the Seas of Japan,
Okhotsk, and Bering. It is agreed that the above-mentioned
obligation shall not impair the rights already belonging to
Russian or foreign subjects in these regions.
Article XII.
The treaty of commerce and navigation between Russia and Japan
having been annulled by the war, the Imperial Governments of
Russia and Japan agree to adopt as a basis for their
commercial relations, until the conclusion of a new treaty of
commerce and navigation on the basis of the treaty in force
before the present war, the system of reciprocity on the
principle of the most favored nation, including import and
export tariffs, custom-house formalities, transit and tonnage
dues, and the admission and treatment of the agents, subjects,
and vessels of one country in the territory of the other.
Article XIII.
As soon as possible, after the present treaty takes effect,
all prisoners of war shall be mutually returned. The Imperial
Governments of Russia and Japan shall each appoint a special
commissioner to take charge of the prisoners. All prisoners in
the custody of one of the governments shall be delivered to
the commissioner of the other government or to his duly
authorized representative, who shall receive them in such
number and in such suitable ports of the surrendering nation
as the latter shall notify in advance to the commissioner of
the receiving nation.
The Governments of Russia and Japan shall present to each
other, as soon as possible after the delivery of the prisoners
has been completed, a verified account of the direct
expenditures made by them respectively for the care and
maintenance of the prisoners from the date of capture or
surrender until the date of their death or return. Russia
agrees to refund to Japan, as soon as possible after the
exchange of these accounts, as above stipulated, the
difference between the actual amount thus spent by Japan and
the actual amount likewise expended by Russia.
Article XIV.
The present treaty shall be ratified by Their Majesties the
Emperor of all the Russias and the Emperor of Japan. This
ratification shall, within the shortest possible time and at
all events not later than fifty days from the date of the
signature of the treaty, be notified to the Imperial
Governments of Russia and Japan, respectively, through the
ambassador of the United States of America at St. Petersburg
and the minister of France at Tokyo, and from and after the
date of the last of these notifications this treaty shall
enter into full force in all its parts. The formal exchange of
the ratifications shall take place at Washington as soon as
possible.
Article XV.
The present treaty shall be signed in duplicate, in the French
and English languages. The two texts are absolutely alike;
however, in case of difference of interpretation the French
text shall prevail.
In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have
signed the present treaty of peace and affixed thereto their
seals.
Done at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, the twenty-third day of
August (fifth of September) of the year one thousand nine
hundred and five, corresponding to the fifth day of the ninth
month of the thirty-eighth year of Meiji.
IUTARO KOMURA. [L. S.]
K. TAKAHIRA. [L. S.]
SERGIUS WITTE. [L. S.]
ROSEN. [L. S.]
In conformity with the provisions of Articles II and IX of the
treaty of peace between Russia and Japan under this date, the
undersigned plenipotentiaries have concluded the following
additional articles:
{360}
I. To Article III:
The Imperial Governments of Russia and Japan mutually agree to
begin the withdrawal of their military forces from the
territory of Manchuria simultaneously and immediately after
the entrance into force of the treaty of peace; and within a
period of eighteen months from this date the armies of the two
powers shall be entirely withdrawn from Manchuria, with the
exception of the leased territory of the peninsula of
Liao-tung.
The forces of the two powers occupying advanced positions
shall be withdrawn first.
The high contracting parties reserve the right to maintain
guards for the protection of their respective railroad lines
in Manchuria.
The number of these guards shall not exceed 15 men per
kilometer, and within the limit of this maximum number the
commanders of the Russian and Japanese armies shall, by mutual
agreement, fix the number of guards who are to be employed,
this number being as low as possible and in accordance with
actual requirements. The commanders of the Russian and
Japanese forces in Manchuria shall reach an understanding
regarding all the details connected with the evacuation, in
conformity with the principles herein above set forth, and
shall, by mutual agreement, adopt the measures necessary to
carry out the evacuation as soon as possible and at all events
within a period not exceeding eighteen months.
II. To Article IX:
As soon as possible after the present treaty takes effect, a
boundary commission composed of an equal number of members
appointed respectively by the two high contracting parties
shall mark on the spot and in a permanent manner the exact
line between the Russian and Japanese possessions on the
island of Saghalin. The commission shall be obliged, as far as
topographical conditions permit, to follow the 50th parallel
of north latitude for the line of demarcation, and in case any
deviations from this line are found necessary at certain
points compensation shall be made therefor by making
corresponding deviations at other points. It shall also be the
duty of said commission to prepare a list and description of
the adjacent islands which are comprised within the cession,
and finally the commission shall prepare and sign maps showing
the boundaries of the ceded territory. The labors of the
commission shall be submitted to the approval of the high
contracting parties.
The additional articles mentioned hereinabove shall be
considered as being ratified by the ratification of the treaty
of peace, to which they are annexed.
Portsmouth, August 23 (September 5), 1905, corresponding to
the 5th day, 9th month and 28th year of Meiji.
IUTARO KOMURA.
K. TAKAHIRA.
SERGIUS WITTE.
ROSEN.
The ratification by the Tsar was in the following terms:
Therefore, after mature consideration of this treaty and the
two additional articles, we approved, confirmed, and ratified
them, and do hereby approve, confirm, and ratify them in their
full purport, pledging our imperial word for ourselves, our
successors, and our heirs, that everything set forth in the
above-mentioned acts shall be inviolably observed. In witness
whereof we, having signed this, our imperial ratification,
with our own hand, have ordered affixed thereto our imperial
seal.
Given at Peterhoff, the first day of October, in the year of
our Lord one thousand nine hundred and five and of our reign
the eleventh.
On the original is written in His Imperial Majesty’s own hand:
L. S. "NICHOLAS."
countersigned
COUNT LAMSDORFF,
_Secretary of State, Minister of Foreign Affairs._
JAPAN: A. D. 1905 (August).
New Defensive Agreement between Great Britain and Japan.
On the 12th of August, 1905, three days after the
plenipotentiaries of Japan and Russia had held their first
meeting at Portsmouth and opened the negotiations which
resulted in a Treaty of Peace, a new Agreement of defensive
alliance between Japan and Great Britain, replacing that of
three years before, was signed at London, but not made public
until the 6th of September, the day following the conclusion
of the Russo-Japanese Treaty of Peace.
See, above,
JAPAN: A. D. 1902.
It was then communicated to the Governments of Russia and
France, through the medium of the British Ambassadors at St.
Petersburg and Paris, with an accompanying explanatory
despatch from Lord Lansdowne, as follows:
"Sir, I inclose, for your Excellency's information, a copy of
a new Agreement concluded between His Majesty’s Government and
that of Japan in substitution for that of the 30th January,
1902. You will take an early opportunity of communicating the
new Agreement to the Russian Government. It was signed on the
12th August, and you will explain that it would have been
immediately made public but for the fact that negotiations had
at that time already commenced between Russia and Japan, and
that the publication of such a document whilst those
negotiations were still in progress would obviously have been
improper and inopportune.
"The Russian Government will, I trust, recognize that the new
Agreement is an international instrument to which no exception
can be taken by any of the Powers interested in the affairs of
the Far East. You should call special attention to the objects
mentioned in the preamble as those by which the policy of the
Contracting Parties is inspired. His Majesty’s Government
believe that they may count upon the good-will and support of
all the Powers in endeavouring to maintain peace in Eastern
Asia, and in seeking to uphold the integrity and independence
of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities
for the commerce and industry of all nations in that country.
"On the other hand, the special interests of the Contracting
Parties are of a kind upon which they are fully entitled to
insist, and the announcement that those interests must be
safeguarded is one which can create no surprise, and need give
rise to no misgivings.
"I call your especial attention to the wording of Article II,
which lays down distinctly that it is only in the case of an
unprovoked attack made on one of the Contracting Parties by
another Power or Powers, and when that Party is defending its
territorial rights and special interests from aggressive
action, that the other Party is bound to come to its
assistance.
{361}
"Article III,
dealing with the question of Corea, is deserving of especial
attention. It recognizes in the clearest terms the paramount
position which Japan at this moment occupies and must
henceforth occupy in Corea, and her right to take any measures
which she may find necessary for the protection of her
political, military, and economic interests in that country.
It is, however, expressly provided that such measures must not
be contrary to the principle of equal opportunities for the
commerce and industry of other nations. The new Treaty no
doubt differs at this point conspicuously from that of 1902.
It has, however, become evident that Corea, owing to its close
proximity to the Japanese Empire and its inability to stand
alone, must fall under the control and tutelage of Japan.
"His Majesty’s Government observe with satisfaction that this
point was readily conceded by Russia in the Treaty of Peace
recently concluded with Japan, and they have every reason to
believe that similar views are held by other Powers with
regard to the relations which should subsist between Japan and
Corea.
"His Majesty’s Government venture to anticipate that the
alliance thus concluded, designed as it is with objects which
are purely peaceful and for the protection of rights and
interests the validity of which cannot be contested, will be
regarded with approval by the Government to which you are
accredited. They are justified in believing that its
conclusion may not have been without effect in facilitating
the settlement by which the war has been so happily brought to
an end, and they earnestly trust that it may, for many years
to come, be instrumental in securing the peace of the world in
those regions which come within its scope.
JAPAN:
Agreement between the United Kingdom and Japan.
"PREAMBLE.
The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, being desirous of
replacing the agreement concluded between them on the 30th of
January, 1902, by fresh stipulations, have agreed upon the
following articles, which have for their object—
(a) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in
the regions of Eastern Asia and of India.
(b) The preservation of the common interests of all powers in
China, by insuring the independence and integrity of the
Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for
the commerce and industry of all nations in China.
(c) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the high
contracting parties in the regions of eastern Asia and of
India, and the defense of their special interests in the said
regions.
"ARTICLE I.
It is agreed that whenever in the opinion of either Great
Britain or Japan any of the rights and interests referred to
in the preamble of this agreement are in jeopardy, the two
governments will communicate with one another fully and
frankly and will consider in common the measures which should
be taken to safeguard those menaced rights or interests.
"ARTICLE II.
If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action,
wherever arising, on the part of any other power or powers
either contracting party should be involved in war in defense
of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in
the preamble of this agreement, the other contracting party
will at once come to the assistance of its ally and will
conduct the war in common and make peace in mutual agreement
with it.
"ARTICLE III.
Japan possessing paramount political, military, and economic
interests in Korea, Great Britain recognizes the right of
Japan to take such measures of guidance, control, and
protection in Korea as she may deem proper and necessary to
safeguard and advance those interests, provided always that
such measures are not contrary to the principle of equal
opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations.
"ARTICLE IV.
Great Britain having a special interest in all that concerns
the security of the Indian frontier, Japan recognizes her
right to take such measures in the proximity of that frontier
as she may find necessary for safeguarding her Indian
possessions.
"ARTICLE V.
The high contracting parties agree that neither of them will
without consulting the other enter into separate arrangements
with another power to the prejudice of the objects described
in the preamble of this agreement.
"ARTICLE VI.
As regards the present war between Japan and Russia, Great
Britain will continue to maintain strict neutrality unless
some other power or powers should join in hostilities against
Japan, in which case Great Britain will come to the assistance
of Japan and will conduct the war in common and make peace in
mutual agreement with Japan.
"ARTICLE VII.
The conditions under which armed assistance shall be afforded
by either power to the other in the circumstances mentioned in
the present agreement, and the means by which such assistance
is to be made available, will be arranged by the naval and
military authorities of the contracting parties, who will from
time to time consult one another fully and freely upon all
questions of mutual interest.
"ARTICLE VIII.
The present agreement shall, subject to the provisions of
Article VI., come into effect immediately after the date of
its signature and remain in force for ten years from that
date. In case neither of the high contracting parties should
have notified twelve months before the expiration of the said
ten years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain
binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which
either of the high contracting parties shall have denounced
it. But if when the date fixed for its expiration arrives
either ally is actually engaged in war the alliance shall
_ipso facto_ continue until peace is concluded."
JAPAN: A. D. 1905 (December).
Treaty with China relative to Manchuria.
See (in this Volume)
CHINA: A. D. 1905 (DECEMBER).
JAPAN: A. D. 1905-1909.
Korea under Japanese Control.
The rule of Prince Ito.
Insurrection and its suppression.
Constructive and Reformative Work.
See (in this Volume)
KOREA: A. D. 1905-1909.
JAPAN: A. D. 1905-1909.
Disputes with China.
The Fa-ku-menn Railway and
the Antung-Mukden Railway Questions.
Settlement of the latter by Japanese Ultimatum.
See (in this Volume)
CHINA: A. D. 1905-1909.
JAPAN: A. D. 1906.
Chinese Students in the Country.
See (in this Volume)
EDUCATION: CHINA: A. D. 1906.
{362}
JAPAN: A. D. 1906.
Resentment at Segregation of Oriental Children in
San Francisco Schools.
See (in this Volume)
RACE PROBLEMS: UNITED STATES: A. D. 1904-1909.
JAPAN: A. D. 1907.
Riotous attacks on Japanese laborers in British Columbia
and the State of Washington.
See (in this Volume)
RACE PROBLEMS: CANADA.
JAPAN: A. D. 1907 (June).
Treaty with France concerning affairs in the East.
A treaty between the governments of Japan and France was
signed on the 10th of June, 1907, according to which France
recognizes the rights of Japan in Korea and her special
interests in Manchuria, and Japan, on her side, promises not
to interfere with French possessions in Siam and Indo-China.
JAPAN: A. D. 1908 (May).
Slender victory of the Saionji Ministry in
the Parliamentary Elections.
Parliamentary elections in May, 1908, gave the Ministry a bare
probability of support by combinations of the party of Prince
Ito—the Rikken Seiyu-kai—with some of the other partly
sympathetic groups. The maintenance of the prudent policy of
Government since the close of the great war, against the Jingo
element, was left somewhat precarious.
JAPAN: A. D. 1908 (November).
Exchange of Notes with the United States, embodying an
important Declaration of Common Policy in the East.
On the 30th of November, 1908, distinct form was given to a
common understanding between Japan and the United States, as
to their agreement in purposes and policy touching affairs in
the East. The form was not that of a treaty, but of a simple
Declaration, identical in notes exchanged at Washington
between Secretary Root and Ambassador Takahira. The following
is the text of the Declaration:
"I.
It is the wish of the two Governments to encourage the free
and peaceful development of their commerce on the Pacific
Ocean.
"II.
The policy of both Governments, uninfluenced by any aggressive
tendencies, is directed to the maintenance of the existing
_status quo_ in the region above mentioned, and to the
defense of the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and
industry in China.
"III.
They are accordingly firmly resolved reciprocally to respect
the territorial possessions belonging to each other in said
region.
"IV.
They are also determined to preserve the common interests of
all Powers in China by supporting, by all pacific means at
their disposal, the independence and integrity of China and
the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry
of all nations in that Empire.
"V.
Should any event occur threatening the _status quo_ as
above described, or the principle of equal opportunity as
above defined, it remains for the two Governments to
communicate with each other, in order to arrive at an
understanding as to what measures they may consider it useful
to take.
JAPAN: A. D. 1908-1909.
Suppression of Race-track Gambling.
See (in this Volume)
GAMBLING.
JAPAN: A. D. 1909.
Material Development of the Country.
"The mileage of Japanese railways, now over 5,000 miles, has
been quadrupled within 20 years—without counting the Korean
and South Manchurian railways, which are owned by Japanese
companies. The development of posts, telegraphs, and
telephones has proceeded on an even greater scale, and the
revenues of the department, which only amounted in 1899 to
£1,740,000, exceeded £3,850,000 in 1909, whilst the amount
invested in postal savings banks rose during the same decade
from under £2,200,000 to £10,698,409. The Japanese merchant
flag, represented by a steam tonnage of nearly one and a
quarter million tons, is known in every sea, and the Nippon
Yusen Kaisha, on one of whose excellent steamers I crossed the
Pacific a few weeks ago, has alone a well-equipped fleet of
265,000 tons in the aggregate, running not only to the United
States and to Europe, but to South America and Australia,
besides local services in Japanese, Chinese, and Korean
waters. …
"Powerful firms like the Mitsui, the Mitsubishi, Messrs.
Okura, Messrs. Takata, &c., take a leading part in every
branch of a national import and export trade which has risen
within 30 years from under £6,000,000 to nearly £100,000,000
in 1907. Great industrial cities have grown up like Osaka, the
centre of the cotton-spinning industry, whose population, less
than 400,000 a quarter of a century ago, now exceeds
1,200,000. The aggregate capital of Japanese industrial
companies, which in 1882 was estimated at £10,000,000, rose
within the same period to more than £126,000,000, and in the
cotton industry alone the number of spindles increased from
65,000 to over one and a half million. According to statistics
collected by Mr. Takahashi and Mr. Igarashi, the national
wealth of Japan was assessed at the beginning of 1905 at close
upon £2,500,000,000, to which must now be added, over and
above any normal increment, the economic value of the position
she has acquired in Southern Manchuria and Korea."
_Correspondent of The Times, London._
JAPAN: A. D. 1909.
Parties in Domestic Politics.
The present parties in the lower house of the Japanese
Parliament were thus described by the Tokio correspondent of
the London _Times_, in January, 1909:
"The Lower House consists of 379 members. These are divided
into five sections—namely,
the _Seiyu-kai_ (192 members),
the Progressists (67),
the _Boshin_ Club (42),
the _Yushin-kai_ (44) and
the _Daido_ Club (34).
If any man were required to indicate clearly the lines of
division between these sections, he would be much perplexed to
do so. On the broad bases of Liberalism and Conservatism the
first four occupy the same Liberal platform, while the last
stands as the sole exponent of Conservative views. Yet the
four Liberal sections are not more hostile to each other than
the fifth is to all. They are held asunder by traditions and
by prejudices.
"The Seiyu-kai has fought its way to an overwhelmingly strong
position in the face of perennial opposition from the
Progressists. Once only did the two join hands, but their
union lasted no more than a few weeks, and they separated with
a strong access of mutual rancour. Yet both had entered the
arena originally as champions of the same cause,
constitutional government, and nothing held them apart save
personal rivalries. In the course of their 28 years of
strenuous evolution, they gradually sloughed off their
extremists, and these constitute the present
_Yushin-kai_, a coterie of brilliant Radical free-lances,
whose hand may be said to be against every one.
{363}
The _Daido_ Club are frank Conservatives. They are the
only unequivocal supporters of the Cabinet now in office. …
There remain the _Boshin_ Club. They are an association
of business men—the first political association of that
complexion in Japan. The early Diets were all conspicuously
deficient in representatives of the commercial and
manufacturing classes; mainly because politics had become a
more or less discredited pursuit before ever a general
election was held, and partly because the urban population did
not return a due proportion of members. The latter defect
having been remedied by the new election law of 1901, there
was thereafter found in the Lower House a group of men calling
themselves ‘Independents,’ but always seen in the Government
lobby. In fact their sense of business interests prompted them
to lend their support to the principle of stable Cabinets
above everything."
JAPAN: A. D. 1909.
Present Status of Christianity.
See (in this Volume)
MISSIONS, CHRISTIAN.
JAPAN: A. D. 1909 (July-September).
The State of the War Debt and its Payment.
The following is a Press despatch from Tokyo to London, July
17, 1909:
"At the close of 1906, when Japan came to make out the
accounts of her war with Russia, she found that she had
incurred a total expenditure of about 1,700 million yen
(£170,000,000). By that amount her national debt was
increased. She then determined to lay aside every year a sum
of at least 110 million yen (£11,000,000) for the service of
the debt. That did not mean, of course, that redemptions
aggregating 110 millions were to be made annually. These 110
millions were for the service of the debt; in other words,
they were for the purpose of paying interest as well as
principal. The portion applicable to redemption would be from
30 to 37 millions yearly, and the loan would thus be
completely paid off in about 30 years. That was the programme
when the Marquis Katsura came into office. But very soon he
announced the Treasury’s intention of increasing the
redemption fund to 50 millions. That is to say, he added some
16 millions to the money available for paying off the debt;
and evidently, if the increase were permanent, the whole
indebtedness would be wiped off in about 20 years instead of
30, as originally planned. Still better things, however, are
said to be contemplated. The sum actually devoted to the
sinking fund during the last fiscal year was 50,800,000 yen,
and since the interest on that amount will go to augment the
redemption fund during the current year, the amount paid off
from that source will be 53,340,000 yen. To this it is
proposed to add another 10 millions obtained from the national
growth of the State’s income, for the experience of the last
year encourages the belief that such growth may be confidently
expected, the actual development of the ordinary revenue
having reached a sum of over 30 millions. It is further
expected that from 1912 onwards the yield from the Customs
duties will advance from 38 to 53 millions, unless Japan
manages her negotiations for tariff revision clumsily."
Speaking to the Bankers’ Club at Tokyo in September, 1909,
Premier Katsura expressed the belief that the financial
condition of the country was encouraging, and while
maintaining that the present system of finances was excellent,
he expressed the hope to improve it steadily until perfection
is reached. The premier said that the government’s policy
would begin this year, and the development of resources and
the avoidance of unproductive expenditure would be
consistently followed. He announced the following measures as
forming part of the financial programme for the ensuing year:—
1. Reduction and modification of the war taxes in order to
relieve the pressure on the people.
2. Increase of the sinking fund. By the allocation of a
considerable amount out of the surplus of previous years the
sum of 53,000,000 yen (£5,300,000) previously fixed for this
service will be greatly exceeded.
3. The raising of the salaries of all Government officials by
30 per cent. This reform had been delayed by the outbreak of
the Russo-Japanese war.
JAPAN: A. D. 1909 (August).
The Burning of Osaka.
See (in this Volume)
OSAKA.
JAPAN: A. D. 1909 (September).
Visit of a Commercial Commission to the United States.
A large party of prominent Japanese business men, headed by
Baron Shibusawa, and coming as a Commercial Commission to seek
more intimate commercial relations between Japan and the
United States, landed at Seattle on the 1st of September,
1909, and toured the country for a number of weeks. The party
received much attention and were entertained most hospitably
everywhere, nowhere with more warmth than on the Pacific
Coast, where ill-feeling toward Japan had been manifested in
some circles a few years before. In a statement to the Press
at Seattle Baron Shibusawa said: "It is interesting to note
that while different European nations are talking about the
increase of armament, and when especially great rulers are
exchanging visits accompanied by warships, the Japanese people
are perfectly satisfied in sending us plain business men on a
peaceful mission to this great commercial country. I have been
told that Japan is spoken of as a warlike nation, but this is
altogether absurd. We are all deeply interested in the
development of the Japanese-American commercial relations,
which, of all reasons, prompts us to pay a visit to your
country. Let us therefore work for the extension of commercial
relations to our mutual interests. We must go hand in hand
with you to develop the vast field in the East."
JAPAN: A. D. 1909 (October).
Assassination of Prince Ito.
Prince Hirobumi Ito, the man of most light and leading, as he
appears to have been, in the transformation of Japan within
the past half century, was foully assassinated on the 26th of
October, 1909, at Kharbin, or Harbin, Manchuria. He had gone
to Kharbin to meet M. Kokovsoff, Russian Minister of Finance,
for a conference on the Manchurian questions that had arisen
between Russia and Japan. As he stepped from the railway train
which brought him to the city, and was approaching the
Minister, who came to welcome him, he was fired upon from the
surrounding crowd. Three revolver shots struck the Prince, two
of which inflicted wounds that caused his death within twenty
minutes. Three of his attendants were wounded, not fatally, by
other shots. All were found to have been fired by one
bystander, who proved to be a Korean. The assassin made no
attempt to escape, but exclaimed when seized: "I came to
Kharbin for the sole purpose of assassinating Prince Ito, to
avenge my country." He had two companions who boasted of being
parties to the crime. He was subsequently identified as Indian
Angan, formerly editor of a newspaper at Seoul.
{364}
Since retiring from his responsible post in Korea, as
Resident-General, Prince Ito had resumed the presidency of the
Privy Council, in the Japanese Government, which Prince
Aritomo Yamagata had filled during his absence. Prince
Yamagata was now reappointed to that office. He and Prince Ito
had been intimate friends, and yet political opponents,
differing in opinions and heading rival parties, but always
acting together on the vital questions of national policy.
JAPAN: A. D. 1909 (December).
Naval Armament, Present and Prospective.
See (in this Volume)
WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR: NAVAL: JAPAN.
----------JAPAN: End--------
JAPANESE IMMIGRATION:
The Resistance to it in America, Australia, and South Africa.
See (in this Volume)
RACE PROBLEMS.
JEANES, Miss Anna T.:
Great Gift to Schools for Southern Negroes.
See (in this Volume)
EDUCATION: UNITED STATES. A. D. 1907.
JEROME, William Travers:
Reelection as District Attorney of the County of New York.
See (in this Volume)
NEW YORK CITY: A. D. 1905.
JEWS, THE: In Roumania.
Oppressions.
Remonstrance of the United States.
See (in this Volume)
BALKAN AND DANUBIAN STATES: ROUMANIA.
JEWS, THE:
Persecution and Massacre in Russia.
See (in this Volume)
RUSSIA: A. D. 1901-1904, and 1903 (APRIL).
JIMENEZ, President: His overthrow.
See (in this Volume)
SAN DOMINGO: A. D. 1904-1907.
JOAN OF ARC, Beatification of.
See (in this Volume)
PAPACY: A. D. 1909 (APRIL).
JOINT STATEHOOD ACT.
See (in this Volume)
UNITED STATES: A. D. 1906.
JOLO, Sultan of.
See (in this Volume)
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1901-1902.
JONES, John Paul:
Recovery and removal of his remains from Paris.
See (in this Volume)
UNITED STATES: A. D. 1905 (FEBRUARY-JUNE).
JOUBERT-PIENAAR, General F.:
On Slavery in Portuguese Africa.
See (in this Volume)
AFRICA: PORTUGUESE: A. D. 1905-1908.
JUAREZ, BENITO:
Celebration of his centenary.
See (in this Volume)
MEXICO: A. D. 1906.
JUDSON, Harry Pratt:
President of the University of Chicago.
See (in this Volume)
EDUCATION: A. D. 1901-1909.
JUNIOR REPUBLIC, The.
See (in this Volume)
CHILDREN, UNDER THE LAW: AS OFFENDERS.
JUSTH, M. de.
See (in this Volume)
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: A. D. 1908-1909.
JUVENILE COURTS.
See (in this Volume)
CHILDREN, UNDER THE LAW: AS OFFENDERS.
JUVENILE REFORM.
See (in this Volume)
CHILDREN, UNDER THE LAW: AS OFFENDERS.
K.
KAFFIR, The Problem of the.
See (in this Volume)
RACE PROBLEMS: IN SOUTH AFRICA.
KAIPING.
See (in this Volume)
JAPAN: A. D. 1904 (FEBRUARY-JULY), and (JULY-SEPTEMBER).
KAJAR TRIBE, The:
The Tribe of the Persian Imperial Dynasty.
See (in this Volume)
PERSIA: A. D. 1905-1907.
KAMIMURA, Admiral.
See (in this Volume)
JAPAN: A. D. 1904 (FEBRUARY-AUGUST).
KANO:
British capture.
See (in this Volume)
AFRICA: A. D. 1903 (NIGERIA).
KANSAS: A. D. 1904.
Legislation and action against the Standard Oil Company.
See (in this Volume)
COMBINATIONS, INDUSTRIAL, &c.:
UNITED STATES: A. D. 1904-1909.
KARAGEORGEVICH.
See (in this Volume)
BALKAN AND DANUBIAN STATES: SERVIA.
KATANGA, Railway Lines to.
See (in this Volume)
RAILWAYS: CENTRAL AFRICA.
KATSURA, Count:
His Ministry strengthened by Marquis Ito.
See (in this Volume)
JAPAN: A. D. 1903 (JUNE).
KAULBARS, General.
See (in this Volume)
JAPAN: A. D. 1904-1905 (SEPTEMBER-MARCH).
KAWAMURA, General.
See (in this Volume)
JAPAN: A. D. 1904-1905 (SEPTEMBER-MARCH).
KELANTAN:
Cession of Suzerainty to Great Britain.
See (in this Volume)
SIAM: A. D. 1909.
KELLY, Charles F.:
Confessions as a "Boodler."
See (in this Volume)
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT.
KENNEDY, John Stewart, the Bequests of.
See (in this Volume)
GIFTS AND BEQUESTS.
KENTUCKY: A. D. 1905-1909.
The Tobacco Farmers’ Union and its Night Riders.
"Kentucky has been having an experience unique, costly,
tragic, and probably to some extent valuable, with the farmers
engaged in the chief agricultural industry of the state—
growing tobacco. Some 80,000 of them, representing probably
400,000 of the population of the state, have been engaged in a
union demonstration for the purpose of securing higher pay.
The result has been in some sections anarchy, in all great
distress. …
"A trust having arisen in New York which was able to control
the output, and therefore to make prices to suit itself, the
farmers have answered this trust by forming under the equity
society a union of their own, and going on a strike for higher
prices. … The union to which I refer is the Burley Tobacco
Society, in Kentucky. It is organized to oppose the exactions
of the American Tobacco Company of New Jersey. Tobacco is
grown in several distinct districts in Kentucky, and there, as
elsewhere, each district has, by reason of soil or climate, a
virtual monopoly of its own type. Down in the southwestern
corner, in the so-called Black Patch, embracing several
counties of Tennessee, a dark and heavy leaf is grown and
fire-cured for the foreign trade. This is bought by
government, or so-styled ‘regie’ buyers. North of this is a
heavy leaf stemmed for the British trade. North and east of
this is the region in which a dark air-cured leaf is grown for
domestic uses. East of this, embracing all Blue Grass and
extending to Maysville, is the Burley district, in which is
grown the famous red and white Burley tobacco. …
{365}
"Pooling tobacco in Kentucky started down in the Black Patch,
or received its greatest impetus there. The regie buyers
combined, or were formed into a combination by their
superiors, and the Patch was districted, each man being given
an exclusive territory, and no farmer being allowed to sell to
any one but his own buyer. In this way a set price as low as
four cents was made, and the farmer had no option but to take
it; no option, at least, that was open to the farmer not rich
enough to ship his crop to Bremen and seek European
competition. In this situation a group of canny planters
formed a tight little corporation of $200 capital, for the
avowed purpose of holding, handling, buying, and selling
tobacco. They induced about a thousand of their
neighbors—there are forty thousand dark-tobacco growers in the
Patch—to pledge their crops with them, and they planned to
hold this much off the market and compel the regie buyers to
pay a higher price for it. This proving popular, they soon had
five thousand pledges. Then they—or interests closely allied
with them—organized a band of Ku-Klux, called Night Riders,
who, first by so-called ‘peace armies,’ and then by raiding at
night all who resisted, frightened or forced—during the next
three years—all the forty thousand to sign.
"The tight little corporation thus had a monopoly of the dark
tobacco. It forced the regie buyers to pay a price raised by
slow degrees to 11 cents round, exacted large commissions and
profits,—as much as 1500 per cent a year on the capital,—and
now controls the Black Patch absolutely. All its pledges
expire in January, 1909, and the situation will then become
anarchistic. The success of this Black Patch plan was entirely
due to the employment of Night Riders, who correspond to the
professional ‘sluggers’ of a labor union, or the hired
assassins of a Black-Hand league."
_J. L. Mathews,
The Farmers’ Union and the Tobacco Pool
(Atlantic Monthly, October, 1908)._
KHARBIN, OR HARBIN, RUSSIAN CONTROL AT.
See (in this Volume)
CHINA: A. D. 1909 (MAY).
KHARBIN: A. D. 1909.
Assassination of Prince Ito.
See (in this Volume)
JAPAN: A. D. 1909 (OCTOBER).
KHARKOFF, DISTURBANCES IN.
See (in this Volume)
RUSSIA: A. D. 1904-1905.
KHARTUM, THE NEW.
See (in this Volume)
SUDAN, THE: A. D. 1907.
KHARTUM, THE NEW:
Gordon Memorial College.
See (in this Volume)
EDUCATION: EGYPT.
KIAMIL PASHA: GRAND VIZIER.
See (in this Volume)
TURKEY: A. D. 1908 (JULY-DECEMBER), and after.
KIEFF, DISTURBANCES IN.
See (in this Volume)
RUSSIA: A. D. 1904-1905.
KINCHOU, BATTLE OF.
See (in this Volume)
JAPAN: A. D. 1904 (February-July), and
1904-1905 (May-January).
KINGSTON, Jamaica: A. D. 1907.
Destruction of Kingston.
See (in this Volume)
EARTHQUAKES: JAMAICA.
KINSHU-MARU, THE INCIDENT OF THE.
See (in this Volume)
JAPAN: A. D. 1904 (FEBRUARY-AUGUST).
KIPLING, RUDYARD.
See (in this Volume)
NOBEL PRIZES.
KIRDORF, HERR:
Head of the Coal and Steel Syndicates in Germany.
His attitude towards the Workingmen.
See (in this Volume)
LABOR ORGANIZATION: GERMANY: A. D. 1905-1907.
KISHINEFF, JEWISH MASSACRE AT.
See (in this Volume)
RUSSIA: A. D. 1903 (APRIL).
KITCHENER OF KHARTUM, GENERAL LORD:
In South Africa.
See (in this Volume)
SOUTH AFRICA: A. D. 1901-1902.
KITCHENER OF KHARTUM, GENERAL LORD:
In India.
See (in this Volume)
INDIA: A. D. 1905 (AUGUST).
KLERKSDORP CONFERENCE.
See (in this Volume)
SOUTH AFRICA: A. D. 1901-1902.
KNIAZ POTEMKIN, MUTINY ON THE.
See (in this Volume)
RUSSIA: A. D. 1905 (FEBRUARY-NOVEMBER).
KNIGHTS OF LABOR.
See (in this Volume)
LABOR ORGANIZATION: UNITED STATES.
KNOX, PHILANDER C.:
Attorney-General.
See (in this Volume)
UNITED STATES: A. D. 1901-1905.
KNOX, PHILANDER C.:
Secretary of State.
See (in this Volume)
UNITED STATES: A. D. 1909 (MARCH).
KOCH, Robert.
See (in this Volume)
NOBEL PRIZES.
KOCHER, E. T.
See (in this Volume)
NOBEL PRIZES.
KOMURA, BARON IUTARO,
Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs.
See (in this Volume)
JAPAN: A. D. 1901-1904.
KOMURA, BARON IUTARO,
Japanese Plenipotentiary for negotiating
Treaty of Peace with Russia.
See (in this Volume)
JAPAN: A. D. 1905 (JUNE-OCTOBER).
KONDRATENKO, General.
See (in this Volume)
JAPAN: A. D. 1904-1905 (MAY-JANUARY).
KOREA: A. D. 1901-1904.
Japanese distrust of Russian designs.
Negotiations and demands.
See (in this Volume)
JAPAN: A. D. 1901-1904.
KOREA: A. D. 1902.
Agreement respecting Korea between Great Britain and Japan.
See (in this Volume)
Japan: A. D. 1902.
KOREA: A. D. 1904 (February).
Occupation by the Japanese.
See (in this Volume)
JAPAN: A. D. 1904 (FEBRUARY-JULY).
KOREA: A. D. 1904-1905.
Conventions with Japan, creating Protectorate Relations
with that Empire and submitting Financial and
Diplomatic Affairs to Japanese control.
On the 25th of February, 1904, the text of a protocol,
concluded on the 23d, between the Governments of Japan and
Korea, was communicated to the Government of the United States
(and, of course to others), by the Government of Japan, with
an accompanying explanation, as follows:
"In the prosecution of the present war the use of some of the
ports and some portions of the territory of Korea is found
inevitable, and therefore, with a view to facilitate military
operations and to show that such use of ports and territory is
made with the full knowledge and consent of Korea, and not in
disregard or violation of her independence or territorial
integrity, and also in order to prevent future complications,
the Japanese Government concluded with the Korean Government
on the 23d instant the following protocol. …
"ARTICLE I.
For the purpose of maintaining permanent and solid friendship
between Japan and Korea and firmly establishing peace in the
Far East, the Imperial Government of Korea shall place full
confidence in the Imperial Government of Japan and adopt the
advice of the latter with regard to improvements in
administration.
"ARTICLE II.
The Imperial Government of Japan shall, in a spirit of firm
friendship, insure the safety and repose of the Imperial House
of Korea.
{366}
"ARTICLE III.
The Imperial Government of Japan definitively guarantee the
independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire.
"ARTICLE IV.
In case the welfare of the Imperial House of Korea or the
territorial integrity of Korea is endangered by the aggression
of a third power or internal disturbances, the Imperial
Government of Japan shall immediately take such necessary
measures as circumstances require, and in such case the
Imperial Government of Korea shall give full facilities to
promote the action of the Imperial Japanese Government. The
Imperial Government of Japan may, for the attainment of the
above-mentioned object, occupy, when circumstances require it,
such places as may be necessary from strategic points of view.
"ARTICLE V.
The Government of the two countries shall not in future,
without mutual consent, conclude with a third power such an
arrangement as may be contrary to the principles of the
present protocol.
"ARTICLE VI.
Details in connection with the present protocol shall be
arranged as the circumstances may require between the
representative of Japan and the minister of state for foreign
affairs of Korea."
On the 30th of August, 1904, an additional Agreement between
the Governments of Japan and Korea, signed in part on the 19th
and in part on the 22d of that month, was communicated by the
Japanese Ambassador to the United States to the State
Department at Washington, with a note saying: "In
communicating this agreement to the Government of the United
States I am instructed to say that it is nothing more than the
natural consequence or development of the protocol concluded
between the Japanese and Korean Governments on the 23rd of
last February, which I had the honor to communicate at that
time for the information of the Government of the United
States. I am further directed to say that the agreement does
not in anywise interfere with the full operation or validity
of Korea’s existing treaties; and that Article II thereof is
not intended to place any impediment in the way of legitimate
enterprise in Korea, but merely to check, as far as possible,
the future conclusion of unwise and improvident engagements,
which in the past have been fruitful sources of trouble and
complication."
The Agreement thus announced was in the following terms:
"ARTICLE I.
The Korean Government shall engage a Japanese subject
recommended by the Japanese Government as financial adviser to
the Korean Government, and all matters concerning finance
shall be dealt with after his counsel shall have been taken.
"ARTICLE II.
The Korean Government shall engage a foreigner recommended by
the Japanese Government as diplomatic adviser to the foreign
office, and all important matters concerning foreign relations
shall be dealt with after his counsel shall have been taken.
"ARTICLE III.
The Korean Government shall consult the Japanese Government
before concluding treaties and conventions with foreign
powers, and also in dealing with other important diplomatic
affairs, such as grants of concessions to or contracts with
foreigners."
Writing of this Agreement a few days later to the State
Department at Washington, the American Minister to Japan, Mr.
Lloyd Griscom, remarked:
"It is interesting to note that Mr. Megata, selected to be
financial adviser to the Korean Government, was educated in
America and is a graduate of Harvard University, and Mr.
Stevens, who has been chosen as adviser to the foreign office,
is an American gentleman about whom it would be superfluous to
inform you."
Under a third Agreement, signed April 1, 1905, Japan took over
the control and operation of the post, telegraph, and
telephone services of Korea, in order to "rearrange the system
of communications in that country, and, by amalgamating it
with that of Japan, to unite the two systems into one."
Finally, on the 17th of November, 1905, a fourth Agreement was
signed, which definitely surrendered to Japan the "control and
direction of the external relations and affairs of Korea," in
the following stipulations:
"ARTICLE I.
The Government of Japan, through the department of foreign
affairs in Tokyo, will hereafter have control and direction of
the external relations and affairs of Korea and the diplomatic
and consular representatives of Japan will have the charge of
the subjects and interests of Korea in foreign countries.
"ARTICLE II.
The Government of Japan undertake to see to the execution of
the treaties actually existing between Korea and other powers,
and the Government of Korea engage not to conclude hereafter
any act or engagement having an international character,
except through the medium of the Government of Japan.
"ARTICLE III.
The Government of Japan shall be represented at the court of
His Majesty the Emperor of Korea by a resident general, who
shall reside at Seoul primarily for the purpose of taking
charge of and directing the matters relating to diplomatic
affairs. He shall have the right of private and personal
audience of His Majesty the Emperor of Korea. The Japanese
Government shall have the right to station residents at the
several open ports and such other places in Korea as they may
deem necessary.
"Such residents shall, under the direction of the resident
general, exercise the powers and functions hitherto
appertaining to Japanese consuls in Korea, and shall perform
such duties as may be necessary in order to carry into full
effect the provisions of this agreement.
"ARTICLE IV.
The stipulations of all treaties and agreements existing
between Japan and Korea not inconsistent with the provisions
of this agreement shall continue in force.
"ARTICLE V.
The Government of Japan undertake to maintain the welfare and
dignity of the Imperial House of Korea."
With the communication of this Agreement to foreign Powers
there went a declaration by the Japanese Government, in part
as follows:
"The relations of propinquity have made it necessary for Japan
to take and exercise, for reasons closely connected with her
own safety and repose, a paramount interest and influence in
the political and military affairs of Korea. The measures
hitherto taken have been purely advisory, but the experience
of recent years has demonstrated the insufficiency of measures
of guidance alone.
{367}
The unwise and improvident action of Korea, more especially in
the domain of her international concerns, has in the past been
the most fruitful source of complications. To permit the
present unsatisfactory condition of things to continue
unrestrained and unregulated would be to invite fresh
difficulties, and Japan believes that she owes it to herself
and to her desire for the general pacification of the extreme
East to take the steps necessary to put an end once for all to
this dangerous situation."
KOREA: A. D. 1904-1905.
Status of the Korean Empire under Japanese Control.
The Japanese View.
"After her quick entry into Seoul at the outbreak of the war,
Japan found herself precisely in the position which she had
long desired to establish. The plan of joint non-intervention
in Korean affairs as agreed upon between Japan and Russia in
1896 and 1898 [see, in Volume VI. of this work, Korea], which
had again and again resulted in competitive intervention, had
proved disastrous to the interest of Japan and of general
reform; but now Russia had abruptly withdrawn from Seoul, and
Japan found herself free to move alone. Thereupon she hastened
to impose upon the Korean Foreign Minister a treaty of
alliance [as above], on February 23, 1904, which laid the
foundation for all Japan’s subsequent conduct in the
peninsula. …
"An analysis and interpretation of the forces which the war
has set loose and which are bringing their inevitable
consequences would be highly instructive. Let us, however,
content ourselves here by pointing to the Korean clauses in
the three important documents concluded within the last two
years, in which the rapid development of the Korean problem is
easily traceable,—namely, the Korean-Japanese treaty of
alliance of February 23, 1904, the Russo-Japanese treaty of
peace signed on September 5, 1905 [see, in this Volume, JAPAN;
A. D. 1905 (June-October)], and the Anglo Japanese agreement
of alliance concluded on August 12 [see JAPAN: A. D. 1905
(August)], and published with Lord Lansdowne’s dispatch to the
British Ambassador at St. Petersburg on September 26, 1905. It
will be remembered that the first instrument at once placed
Korea under Japan’s military protection and administrative
guidance, and bound Japan to uphold Korea’s independence and
territorial integrity, including the safety of her Imperial
house. One will readily observe that two distinct points are
here involved. These two points the further progress of
events, some of which have already been described, seems to
have put so far apart, that in the treaty of Portsmouth
Japan’s preponderance over Korea was recognized by Russia,
while little was said of the independence of the peninsular
empire. It was even said that M. Witte insisted during the
discussion of the clause that Baron Komura should declare in
his proposed terms that Japan intended to make of Korea a
province of the Japanese Empire. This the Baron is reported to
have emphatically declined, presumably because he would not
consider the protection by Japan and the territorial integrity
of Korea incompatible with each other. The difference between
the theoretical and practical situation is, however, reflected
unmistakably in the Anglo-Japanese agreement, the third
article of which reads: ‘Japan possessing paramount political,
military, and economic interests in Korea, Great Britain
recognizes Japan’s right to take such measures for the
guidance, control and protection of Korea as she may deem
proper and necessary to safeguard and advance those interests,
providing the measures so taken are not contrary to the
principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry
of all nations.’ In other words, Japan is left free to control
Korea and then prevail upon the latter to open her door
equally wide to all nations, including Japan herself. After
specially dwelling on the substance of this article, Lord
Lansdowne says in his dispatch: ‘The treaty at this point
differs conspicuously from that of 1902. It has, however,
become evident that Korea, owing to its close proximity to the
Japanese Empire, and to its inability to stand alone, must
fall under the control and tutelage of Japan. His Majesty’s
Government observes with satisfaction that this point has been
readily conceded by Russia in the treaty of peace, and there
is every reason to believe that similar views are held by the
other Powers with regard to the relations which should subsist
between Japan and Korea.’ Thus are Korea’s alleged incapacity
of self-government and Japan’s need of control over the
peninsular affairs openly recognized by a third Power, and it
is taken for granted that no other Power will deny these
points. Such a declaration could not be made, it is admitted,
in 1902, when the first treaty of alliance was concluded, nor
perhaps even at the time when the Korean-Japanese protocol was
signed in February, 1904. Yet the doctrine of Korea’s
independence is still not theoretically contradictory with
this situation now recognized by the Russian and British
governments, nor has it become less effective than in the last
year, for, while the control by Japan has since been
tightened, Korea remains a separate empire with all the
sovereign rights of an independent State. Japan, speaking
technically, exercises a supervisory control and discharges
administrative functions entrusted to her care. The future
trend of affairs—whether the Korean independence will vanish
into a mere fiction as the Japanese control advances, or
whether under the latter the peninsular people will be trained
to an effective self-government—must largely be determined by
the mutual interaction of the complex factors, both Korean and
Japanese, public and private, conscious and unconscious, which
are steadily working out the destiny of the peninsula."
_K. Asakawa,
Korea and Manchuria under the New Treaty
(Atlantic Monthly, November, 1905)._
KOREA: A. D. 1905 (August).
New Agreement concerning Korea between Great Britain and Japan.
See (in this Volume)
JAPAN: A. D. 1905 (AUGUST).
KOREA: A. D. 1905-1909.
Japanese Control of Korean Affairs.
Under Prince Ito.
Attempted appeal of Korea to the Hague Conference of 1907.
Enforced abdication of the Emperor.
Elevation of his Son to the Throne.
Extensive and fierce Revolt rigorously fought down.
Retirement of Prince Ito.
Recent Measures.
As to the use made by the Japanese of the entireness of their
domination in Korea, as conceded to them in the treaties
referred to above, by the Government of Korea, primarily, and
by Great Britain and Russia, secondarily, in their recognition
and endorsement of the status thus established, there has been
much controversy since.
{368}
The Koreans themselves have been loud complainants of harsh
and oppressive exercises of Japanese power in their country,
and have found many sympathizers among the western peoples to
denounce their alleged wrongs. On the other hand, many foreign
visitors to Korea, after careful observation of conditions in
the country, have borne strong testimony in favor of the
Japanese conduct of Korean affairs. Professor George T. Ladd,
for example, of Yale University, is one of these witnesses
whose judgment has great weight. Having gone to Japan to give
a course of lectures there, Professor Ladd was asked by Prince
Ito, the Japanese Resident-General in Korea, to visit the
latter country as an observer, and lend counsel to the Prince
relative specially to some matters that touched American
missions. His subsequent book, entitled "In Korea with Prince
Ito," represents, beyond question, a careful and candid study
of conditions which he had the best of opportunities for
becoming rightly acquainted with. It does not approve or
justify everything that the Japanese dictators of Korean
administration were doing, but it represents the general
motive and intent of their undertakings to have been for the
improvement of the people and country whose affairs they had
taken into their hands. The same may be said of what has been
written of Korea since the Russo-Japanese war by Mr. George
Kennan, the experienced traveller in the East and student of
its peoples and their life.
The truth appears to be that the Japanese are using their
power in Korea as justly, as honestly, as rightly as the
English are using similar power in Egypt, as the Americans are
using it in the Philippine Islands, or as any people has ever
used the power to dictate government to another people. The
question of right and wrong in all such cases goes back of the
mode of using the overlordship, and is a question of the right
to hold it for any mode of use. That there was compulsion in
the procurement of the convention by which the Emperor of
Korea and his decadent Government surrendered themselves to
the dictatorial protection of Japan goes without saying. That
there is not a strong nation in the world to-day that would
not, in the same circumstances, have exercised the same
compulsion and wrung the same surrender, is just as
indisputable; but the political morality of the world is still
too undeveloped for that fact to be exonerating. It only
"sights" the political ethics of Japan along the level of our
Christendom, and finds her to be, at least, not below it.
Soon after the Convention of November 17, 1905 had been
signed, Marquis Ito, the Japanese Resident-General in Korea,
invited the newspaper editors in Seoul to a luncheon, at which
he addressed them, as reported at the time, partly in these
words:
"If the state of affairs in Korea be examined, it is found
that the relations between sovereign and subject, government
and governed, are of a very distant nature, and are by no
means so close as those in Japan. Hence it becomes inevitable
to adopt toward the Government measures of a more or less
compulsory nature. The people, however, are eminently peaceful
and quiet, and toward them, therefore, the policy pursued must
be one of gentle persuasion. Those are points which have to be
kept in view not merely by our officials, but also by all
Japanese subjects residing in Korea. Such Japanese subjects
must carefully refrain from all acts of violence to which
their country’s victories may prompt them, and must be guided
by a spirit of kindness in their dealings with the Koreans.
Already the United States representative in Seoul has received
instructions from his Government for the removal of the legation,
and it may be assumed that the other powers will similarly
recognize Japan’s convention. It will then be for Japan not to
forget the duties that heaven has delegated to her, but to
lead Korea gently and helpfully along the path of progress,
for assuredly anything like arbitrary or coercive conduct will
earn for Korea the sympathy of the nations, and will defeat
the true and abiding policy of Japan."
Discontent, complaint, resistance in Korea were inevitable,
whatever treatment the country in so helpless and humbled a
situation might receive. By a dexterous movement in 1907 it
compelled the world to take notice of its plight. The Emperor,
or his immediate entourage, succeeded by some means in fairly
smuggling out of the country a delegation commissioned to
claim a hearing before the Peace Conference at The Hague.
Their claim was effectually extinguished by the agreement of
1904, which turned over to Japan the whole management of the
foreign affairs of Korea; but the Korean situation was
discussed widely for a time. Nothing of benefit to the native
Korean Government, however, came from the event. The iron hand
of Japanese control was laid in heavier pressure on the feeble
court, at once. The nominal Korean Ministry was made to demand
and compel the abdication of the Emperor, on the ground that
he had endangered the national welfare by violation of the
treaty of August, 1904. His young son was crowned in his
stead, and Korea was required to submit to a new Agreement,
signed on the 24th of July, 1907, by which the
Resident-General "acquired initiative as well as consultatory
competence to enact and enforce laws and ordinances, to
appoint and remove Korean officials, and to place capable
Japanese subjects in the ranks of Korean officialdom." Special
provision was made for the separation of the Judiciary and the
Executive, so as to put an end, wrote an English
correspondent, "to the grievous corruption practised under a
system which invested provincial governors and district
magistrates with judicial functions, reducing the
administration of justice to a mere matter of favour or
interest." Under this new agreement the Resident-General
acquired authority sufficient to overcome obstruction, for it
pledged the Government of Korea to act under his guidance in
matters of administrative reform; not to enact any laws or
take any important measures without his previous assent; and
not to appoint or dismiss high officials without his
concurrence.
The attempt to carry an appeal to the Hague Conference was not
fortunate for Korea in the result. As a coup it was skilfully
executed, but can hardly be regarded as shrewd in the
planning. It was attributed, in both plan and execution, to an
American, Mr. Homer B. Hurlbert, who went to Korea as an
educator some years before, under an appointment by the
Government of the United States, on an official request from
Korea; who had acquired much influence there and was
strenuously a partisan of the Koreans, as against the
Japanese.
{369}
Publishing a small periodical, the _Korean Review_, Mr.
Hurlburt became an effective champion of their cause, publicly
as well as privately in the native counsels of the overlorded
empire. In the latter capacity he was pitted against another
American, Mr. Durham White Stevens, whose appointment by
Japanese selection, in 1904, to be adviser to the Korean
Foreign Office, is mentioned above. Originally in the service
of his own country, Mr. Stevens had then become official
adviser to the Japanese Legation at Washington, and passed
from that to the service in Korea. His fidelity to Japanese
interests centered on him the animosity of the rebellious
element in Korea, and he fell a victim to their hate.
The forcing of the old Emperor from the throne and the
exaction of a more direct and complete submission of Korea to
Japanese rule had provoked an extensive revolt. This was made
more serious by an acknowledged mistake committed by Prince
Ito, in disbanding the Korean army. A correspondent of the New
York _Evening Post_, who wrote from Tokyo on the 14th of
December, 1908, gave this account of the effect, and of the
dreadful suffering of the country from the conflict that
followed, in 1907-1908:
"The discharged soldiers, stung by the disgrace of dismissal
and the dishonor of forced submission to hated intruders,
quickly spread all over the country, stirring up their
compatriots to a fearless and often a fatal zeal against the
alien administration. The Japanese authorities forthwith set
about a vigorous suppression of the malcontents, even to the
extent of a merciless annihilation of life and a wholesale
destruction of property. … The rebel forces only waxed more
formidable, until by the approach of spring the insurgent
bands were so widely distributed and menacing that no Japanese
could safely venture beyond the confines of well-guarded towns
and cities.
"Accordingly the imperial authorities were driven to replace
their new policy of remaining on the defensive by the former
one of extermination, and no quarter. Last summer, therefore,
a well-organized campaign for completely wiping out the
insurrectionary forces was resolved upon and put into
execution. … A proclamation had previously been issued to the
effect that all Koreans affording food or shelter to the
insurgents, or in any way rendering assistance liable to
involve a charge of complicity, would be summarily dealt with;
while those who surrendered to the proper authorities would be
pardoned. The message placed the people between the devil and
the deep sea. If the natives refused assistance to the
insurgents, obedience would be required of them at the point
of the bayonet by their insulted fellow-patriots; while if
they were suspected of thus acquiescing, they perished at the
hands of the Japanese soldiery. Under the circumstances the
Koreans naturally chose rather to die serving their own people
than to suffer the same fate by resisting them."
A tragical incident of this fierce struggle was the
assassination of Mr. Durham White Stevens, while visiting the
United States. He had been marked for death by the Korean
insurgents, and was slain by their emissaries, in March, 1908,
soon after his landing in California.
The correspondent above quoted regarded the insurrection as
having spent its force at the time of his writing, December,
1908. Against the enormous destruction of life and property
which the suppression of it had cost, he proceeded to set a
brief summary of the simultaneous constructive and reformative
work which the Japanese had been carrying on. This was
described more broadly, however, a little later, by a writer
in the London _Times_, from whom we quote;
"The coasts have been lighted and buoyed; posts, telegraphs,
and, telephones have been provided; roads and railways have
been built; public buildings have been erected; various
industrial enterprises have been started, as printing,
brick-making, forestry, and coal-mining; model farms have been
laid out; the cultivation of cotton has been commenced and
promises to become a great industry; an industrial training
school has been built and equipped; an exposition has been
held in Seoul; sanitary works have been inaugurated; fine
hospitals and medical schools have been opened; an excellent
educational system modelled on that of Japan has been
organized; waterworks have been constructed in several towns;
and, last though not least, complete freedom of conscience has
replaced the old anti-Christian bigotry."
In June, 1909, the veteran statesman, Prince Ito, was relieved
of the trying office of Resident-General in Korea, and
succeeded by Viscount Sone, who had previously served with him
as Vice Resident-General. A Tokyo correspondent wrote of the
change:
"It was first planned to appoint Viscount Terauchi, minister
of war in the Japanese Cabinet, to the residency in Korea, but
Prince Ito objected, pointing out to the ministers that the
selection of Viscount Terauchi, a lieutenant-general, would be
considered as a triumph for the military regime and an
abandonment and disavowal of Prince Ito’s policy for the
peaceful development of Korea. As usual, Prince Ito’s advice
was accepted by his fellow statesmen, and Viscount Sone, who
received his training in Korea under the administration of
Prince Ito, was named to the post.
"A high officer said to-day that when the Korea residency was
created it was incumbent upon Japan to send her most able
statesman, Prince Ito, to fill the important post. He
formulated his policy of administration without interference,
and while some of the leading men of Japan were inclined to
doubt the wisdom of that policy they are now virtually
converted to his ideas, and it is generally believed that the
feeling of confidence and friendship for Japan can be created
among the Koreans and make the country doubly valuable."
Further changes in the administration of Korean affairs
attended this official change. They were reported to the
London _Times_ by its Tokyo correspondent, July 18, as
follows:
"Japan has just taken some important steps in Korea, the
occasion chosen being the simultaneous presence of the
outgoing and the incoming Residents-General in Seoul. She has
made arrangements for the establishment of a central bank
under official auspices, and she has negotiated for the
abolition of the two Departments of War and Justice. … The
capital will be one million sterling in £10 shares, 30,000 of
which shares will be allotted to the Korean Government, the
remainder being offered for subscription in Korea and Japan.
… An important feature is that all the bank’s officers will
be nominated by the Japanese Government, though they may
include Korean subjects.
{370}
"This being a purely financial measure which falls naturally
into its place in the sequence of Japan’s protectorate
programme has not attracted any special attention. Not so,
however, the abolition of the Korean Department of Justice,
and its replacement by a bureau in the Residency-General. The
immediate effect of that change is to convert the Korean
Courts of law into branches of the Japanese tribunals of
justice. Korean laws will, of course, be administered—and
their revision and codification cannot be accomplished in a
moment—but all the occupants of the bench will be selected
and appointed by Japan, and if competent Koreans cannot be
found, or until they are educated, Japanese alone will be
nominated. Japan is to bear the charges of this arrangement—
namely, £50,000 annually. The innovation is not so radical as
it appears at first sight. Already the assistant Judges in the
principal Courts were Japanese subjects, so that what is now
done is to extend the system rather than to alter it. …
"These things may be regarded as a definite step towards the
reality of Japan’s control in Korea. There have been three
distinct stages in her attitude towards her neighbour: first,
the advisory stage; then the stage of subordinate
administration; and finally the stage of well-nigh effective
direction. The first stage was antecedent to the Convention of
November, 1906. During that period Japan limited herself to
tendering counsels which Korea adopted or rejected at will.
The second stage was marked by assumption of entire authority
in the realm of foreign affairs; entire authority in the
domain of communications; practically entire authority in
military and police affairs, and vicarious authority in the
Departments of State by means of Vice-Ministers, in the field
of justice by the agency of assistant judges, and in
provincial administration by means of secretaries who ranked
as assistant-governors. The third stage has just been
inaugurated; military control has been made complete; judicial
control has been made complete, and financial control has been
made well-nigh complete. Very little remains to be done."
----------KOREA: End--------
KOSSUTH, Ferencz:
Leader of the Independence Party in Hungary.
See (in this Volume)
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: A. D. 1902-1903; 1904;
1905-1906; 1908-1909.
KRATZ, Charles:
Municipal "Boodler" of St. Louis.
See (in this Volume)
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT.
KRONSTADT:
Revolutionary Disturbances.
The treachery that defeated the Rising of 1906.
See (in this Volume)
RUSSIA: A. D. 1905 (FEBRUARY-NOVEMBER), and
1906 (AUGUST).
KUANG-HSU: Emperor of China.
His death.
See (in this Volume)
CHINA: A. D. 1908 (NOVEMBER).
KUENSAN HILL, CAPTURE OF.
See (in this Volume)
JAPAN: A. D. 1904-1905 (MAY-JANUARY).
KULTURKAMPF, The.
See (in this Volume)
EDUCATION: PRUSSIA; A. D. 1904.
KURINO: JAPANESE MINISTER AT ST. PETERSBURG.
See (in this Volume)
JAPAN: A. D. 1901-1904.
KUROKI, General.
See (in this Volume)
JAPAN: A. D. 1904 (FEBRUARY-JULY), and after.
KUROPATKIN, General:
In the Russo-Japanese War.
See (in this Volume)
JAPAN: A. D. 1904 (FEBRUARY-JULY), and after.
KUYPER, REVEREND DR. ABRAHAM.
See (in this Volume)
NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1905-1909.
L.
LABOR EXCHANGES ACT, British.
See (in this Volume)
POVERTY, PROBLEMS OF: ENGLAND.
----------LABOR ORGANIZATION: Start--------
Trade Unions
Labor Parties
Strikes
Lockouts
Mediations
Arbitrations
Industrial Agreements
LABOR ORGANIZATION: Australia: A. D. 1886-1906.
The Rise of the Labor Party.
Its rigorous organization.
Some account of the part played in Australian politics by the
Labor Party is given elsewhere.
See, in this Volume,
AUSTRALIA: A. D. 1903-1904, and after.
The circumstances of the rise and growth of the party are
related briefly and the rigorousness of its organization is
described in the following:
"To trace the origin of the movement we must go back to the
fall of prices which began about 1886, to the succeeding lean
years 1886-1892, and the miseries of the consequent period of
unsuccessful strikes. The strikers and their working-class
sympathizers were taunted with appealing to brute force, and
recommended to depend rather upon constitutional political
methods for the redress of grievances. The workingmen took the
advice and bettered it. The trades unions devoted a portion of
their funds and much of their energy to political propaganda.
First in New South Wales, later in all the colonies and in
many widely separated districts, labor leagues were organized
which sketched out a policy and laid down a pledge which all
candidates supported by the leagues must sign. These formed
the nucleus of a new and independent political party which
gave their votes to either Liberal or Conservative
indifferently, regardless of which was in office, in return
for legislative concessions from either. The new party
springing thus almost simultaneously to life all over the
continent was at first regarded as a pathetic joke. They were
few in numbers, uneducated, inexperienced in affairs of state,
and had opposed to them all the wealth and the legal
astuteness in every chamber where they held seats. But they
were determined, united, and, with rare exceptions,
self-sacrificing. They were mutually bound not to take office
except with the consent of their fellow-laborites, so that
they were labeled from the first as ‘Not for sale.’ And from
their point of view the plan has succeeded.
{371}