VII.

THE same line of argument applies to the next statement that

is criticised by the Archdeacon: _Can the human mind conceive a

beginningless being?_

We know that there is such a thing as matter, but we do not know that

there is a beginningless being. We say, or some say, that matter is

eternal, because the human mind cannot conceive of its commencing. Now,

if we knew of the existence of an Infinite Being, we could not conceive

of his commencing. But we know of no such being. We do know of the

existence of matter; and my mind is so, that I cannot conceive of that

matter having been created by a beginningless being. I do not say that

there is not a beginningless being, but I do not believe there is, and

it is beyond my power to conceive of such a being.

The Archdeacon also says that "space is quite as impossible to conceive

as God." But nobody pretends to love space--no one gives intention and

will to space--no one, so far as I know, builds altars or temples to

space. Now, if God is as inconceivable as space, why should we pray to

God?

The Archdeacon, however, after quoting Sir William Hamilton as to the

inconceivability of space as absolute or infinite, takes occasion to say

that "space is an entity." May I be permitted to ask how he knows that

space is an entity? As a matter of fact, the conception of infinite

space is a necessity of the mind, the same as eternity is a necessity of

the mind.

The Works of Robert G. Ingersoll, Vol. 06 (of 12) Dresden Edition—Discussions · 第 57 / 64 题