EPISODE—COLONEL GRIFFIN IN THE JERSEYS—DONOP DECOYED—INROAD OF
CADWALADER AND REED—RETREAT AND CONFUSION OF THE ENEMY’S
OUTPOSTS—WASHINGTON RECROSSES THE DELAWARE WITH HIS TROOPS—THE GAME
REVERSED—THE HESSIANS HUNTED BACK THROUGH THE COUNTRY—WASHINGTON MADE
MILITARY DICTATOR.
There was a kind of episode in the affair at Trenton. Colonel Griffin,
who had thrown himself previously into the Jerseys with his detachment
of Pennsylvania militia, found himself, through indisposition and the
scanty number of his troops, unable to render efficient service in the
proposed attack. He sent word to Cadwalader, therefore, that he should
probably render him more real aid by making a demonstration in front of
Donop, and drawing him off so far into the interior as to be out of the
way of rendering support to Colonel Rahl.
He accordingly presented himself in sight of Donop’s cantonment on the
25th of December, and succeeded in drawing him out with nearly his whole
force of two thousand men. He then retired slowly before him,
skirmishing, but avoiding any thing like an action, until he had lured
him as far as Mount Holly; when he left him to find his way back to his
post at his leisure.
The cannonade of Washington’s attack in Trenton on the morning of the
26th, was distinctly heard at Cadwalader’s camp at Bristol. Imperfect
tidings of the result reached there about eleven o’clock, and produced
the highest exultation and excitement. Cadwalader made another attempt
to cross the river and join Washington, whom he supposed to be still in
the Jerseys, following up the blow he had struck. He could not effect
the passage of the river with the most of the troops, until mid-day of
the 27th, when he received from Washington a detailed account of his
success, and of his having recrossed into Pennsylvania.
Cadwalader was now in a dilemma. Donop, he presumed, was still at Mount
Holly, whither Griffin had decoyed him; but he might soon march back.
His forces were equal, if not superior in number to his own, and
veterans instead of raw militia. But then there was the glory of
rivalling the exploit at Trenton, and the importance of following out
the effort for the relief of the Jerseys, and the salvation of
Philadelphia. Beside, Washington, in all probability, after disposing of
his prisoners, had again crossed into the Jerseys and might be acting
offensively.
Reed relieved Cadwalader from his dilemma, by proposing that they should
push on to Burlington, and there determine, according to intelligence,
whether to proceed to Bordentown or Mount Holly. The plan was adopted.
There was an alarm that the Hessian yagers lurked in a neighboring wood.
Reed, accompanied by two officers, rode in advance to reconnoitre. He
sent word to Cadwalader that it was a false alarm, and the latter took
up his line of march.
Reed and his companions spurred on to reconnoitre the enemy’s outposts,
about four miles from Burlington, but pulled up at the place where the
picket was usually stationed. There was no smoke, nor any sign of a
human being. They rode up and found the place deserted. From the country
people in the neighborhood they received an explanation. Count Donop had
returned to his post from the pursuit of Griffin, only in time to hear
of the disaster at Trenton. He immediately began a retreat in the utmost
panic and confusion, calling in his guards and parties as he hurried
forward. The troops in the neighborhood of Burlington had decamped
precipitately the preceding evening.
Colonel Reed sent back intelligence of this to Cadwalader, and still
pushed on with his companions. As they rode along, they observed the
inhabitants pulling down red rags which had been nailed to their doors;
tory signs to insure good will from the British. Arrived at Bordentown
not an enemy was to be seen; the fugitives from Trenton had spread a
panic on the 26th, and the Hessians and their refugee adherents had fled
in confusion, leaving their sick behind them. The broken and haggard
looks of the inhabitants showed what they had suffered during the
Hessian occupation. One of Reed’s companions returned to Cadwalader, who
had halted at Burlington, and advised him to proceed.
Cadwalader wrote in the night to Washington, informing him of his
whereabouts, and that he should march for Bordentown in the morning. “If
you should think proper to cross over,” added he, “it may easily be
effected at the place where we passed; a pursuit would keep up the
panic. They went off with great precipitation, and pressed all the
waggons in their reach; I am told many of them are gone to South Amboy.
If we can drive them from West Jersey, the success will raise an army
next spring, and establish the credit of the Continental money to
support it.”
There was another letter from Cadwalader, dated on the following day,
from Bordentown. He had eighteen hundred men with him. Five hundred more
were on the way to join him. General Mifflin, too, had sent over five
hundred from Philadelphia, and three hundred from Burlington, and was to
follow with seven or eight hundred more.
Colonel Reed, too, wrote from Trenton on the 28th. He had found that
place without a single soldier of either army, and in a still more
wretched condition than Bordentown. He urged Washington to recross the
river, and pursue the advantages already gained. Donop might be
overtaken before he could reach Princeton or Brunswick, where the enemy
were yet in force.[161]
Washington needed no prompting of the kind. Bent upon following up his
blow, he had barely allowed his troops a day or two to recover from
recent exposure and fatigue, that they might have strength and spirit to
pursue the retreating enemy, beat up other of their quarters, and
entirely reverse affairs in the Jerseys. In this spirit he had written
to Generals McDougall and Maxwell at Morristown, to collect as large a
body of militia as possible, and harass the enemy in flank and rear.
Heath, also, had been ordered to abandon the Highlands, which there was
no need of guarding at this season of the year, and hasten down with the
eastern militia, as rapidly as possible, by the way of Hackensack,
continuing on until he should send him further orders. “A fair
opportunity is offered,” said he, “of driving the enemy entirely from
the Jerseys, or at least to the extremity of the province.”
Men of influence also were despatched by him into different parts of the
Jerseys, to spirit up the militia to revenge the oppression, the ravage,
and insults they had experienced from the enemy, especially from the
Hessians. “If what they have suffered,” said he, “does not rouse their
resentment, they must not possess the feelings of humanity.”
On the 29th, his troops began to cross the river. It would be a slow and
difficult operation, owing to the ice; two parties of light troops
therefore were detached in advance, whom Colonel Reed was to send in
pursuit of the enemy. They marched into Trenton about two o’clock, and
were immediately put on the traces of Donop, to hang on his rear and
harass him until other troops should come up. Cadwalader also detached a
party of riflemen from Bordentown with like orders. Donop, in
retreating, had divided his force, sending one part by a cross-road to
Princeton, and hurrying on with the remainder to Brunswick.
Notwithstanding the severity of the weather, and the wretchedness of the
road, it was a service of animation and delight to the American troops
to hunt back these Hessians through the country they had recently
outraged, and over ground which they themselves had trodden so painfully
and despondingly, in their retreat. In one instance the riflemen
surprised and captured a party of refugees who lingered in the
rear-guard, among whom were several newly-made officers. Never was there
a more sudden reversal in the game of war than this retreat of the heavy
German veterans, harassed by light parties of a raw militia, which they
so lately had driven like chaff before them.
While this was going on, Washington was effecting the passage of his
main force to Trenton. He himself had crossed on the 29th of December,
but it took two days more to get the troops and artillery over the icy
river, and that with great labor and difficulty. And now came a
perplexity. With the year expired the term of several regiments, which
had seen most service, and become inured to danger. Knowing how
indispensable were such troops to lead on those which were raw and
undisciplined, Washington had them paraded and invited to re-enlist. It
was a difficult task to persuade them. They were haggard with fatigue,
and hardship and privation of every kind; and their hearts yearned for
home. By the persuasions of their officers, however, and a bounty of ten
dollars, the greater proportion of those from the eastward were induced
to remain six weeks longer.
Hard money was necessary in this emergency. How was it to be furnished?
The military chest was incompetent. On the 30th, Washington wrote by
express to Robert Morris, the patriot financier at Philadelphia, whom he
knew to be eager that the blow should be followed up. “If you could
possibly collect a sum, if it were but one hundred, or one hundred and
fifty pounds, it would be of service.”
Morris received the letter in the evening. He was at his wits’ end to
raise the sum, for hard money was scarce. Fortunately a wealthy Quaker,
in this moment of exigency supplied the “sinews of war,” and early the
next morning the money was forwarded by the express.
At this critical moment, too, Washington received a letter from a
committee of Congress, transmitting him resolves of that body dated the
27th of December, investing him with military powers quite dictatorial.
“Happy is it for this country,” write the committee, “that the general
of their forces can safely be intrusted with the most unlimited power,
and neither personal security, liberty or property, be in the least
degree endangered thereby.”[162]
Washington’s acknowledgment of this great mark of confidence was noble
and characteristic. “I find Congress have done me the honor to intrust
me with powers, in my military capacity, of the highest nature and
almost unlimited extent. Instead of thinking myself freed from all
_civil_ obligations by this mark of their confidence, I shall constantly
bear in mind that, as the sword was the last resort for the preservation
of our liberties, so it ought to be the first thing laid aside when
those liberties are firmly established.”