WASHINGTON CLOTHED WITH ADDITIONAL POWERS—RECRUITMENT OF THE
ARMY—INCREASED PAY—COLONEL JOHN CADWALADER—ARRIVAL OF
SULLIVAN—GATES—WILKINSON—A COUP DE MAIN MEDITATED—POSTURE OF AFFAIRS AT
TRENTON—GATES DECLINES TO TAKE A PART—HIS COMMENTS ON WASHINGTON’S
PLANS—PREPARATIONS FOR THE COUP DE MAIN—CROSSING OF THE DELAWARE—ATTACK
ON THE ENEMY’S FORCES AT TRENTON—DEATH OF RAHL—HIS CHARACTER.
“Before you receive this letter,” writes Washington to his brother
Augustine, “you will undoubtedly have heard of the captivity of General
Lee. This is an additional misfortune; and the more vexatious, as it was
by his own folly and imprudence, and without a view to effect any good
that he was taken. As he went to lodge three miles out of his own camp,
and within twenty miles of the enemy, a rascally tory rode in the night
to give notice of it to the enemy, who sent a party of light-horse that
seized him, and carried him off with every mark of triumph and
indignity.”
This is the severest comment that the magnanimous spirit of Washington
permitted him to make on the conduct and fortunes of the man who would
have supplanted him; and this is made in his private correspondence with
his brother. No harsh strictures on them appear in his official letters
to Congress or the Board of War; nothing but regret for his capture, as
a loss to the service.
In the same letter he speaks of the critical state of affairs: “If every
nerve is not strained to recruit the army with all possible expedition,
I think the game is pretty nearly up. * * * You can form no idea of the
perplexity of my situation. No man I believe ever had a greater choice
of evils and less means to extricate himself from them. However, under a
full persuasion of the justice of our cause, I cannot entertain an idea
that it will finally sink, though it may remain for some time under a
cloud.”
Fortunately, Congress, prior to their adjournment, had resolved that
“until they should otherwise order, General Washington should be
possessed of all power to order and direct all things relative to the
department and to the operations of war.” Thus empowered, he proceeded
immediately to recruit three battalions of artillery. To those whoso
terms were expiring, he promised an augmentation of twenty-five per
cent. upon their pay, and a bounty of ten dollars to the men for six
weeks’ service. “It was no time,” he said, “to stand upon expense; nor
in matters of self-evident exigency, to refer to Congress at the
distance of a hundred and thirty or forty miles.” “If any good officers
will offer to raise men upon continental pay and establishment in this
quarter, I shall encourage them to do so, and regiment them when they
have done it. It may be thought that I am going a good deal out of the
line of my duty, to adopt these measures, or to advise thus freely. A
character to lose, an estate to forfeit, the inestimable blessings of
liberty at stake, and a life devoted, must be my excuse.”[151]
The promise of increased pay and bounties, had kept together for a time
the dissolving army. The local militia began to turn out freely. Colonel
John Cadwalader, a gentleman of gallant spirit, and cultivated mind and
manners, brought a large volunteer detachment, well equipped, and
composed principally of Philadelphia troops. Washington, who held
Cadwalader in high esteem, assigned him an important station at Bristol,
with Colonel Reed, who was his intimate friend, as an associate. They
had it in charge to keep a watchful eye upon Count Donop’s Hessians, who
were cantoned along the opposite shore from Bordentown to the Black
Horse.
On the 20th of December arrived General Sullivan in camp, with the
troops recently commanded by the unlucky Lee. They were in a miserable
plight; destitute of almost every thing; many of them fit only for the
hospital, and those whose terms were nearly out, thinking of nothing but
their discharge. About four hundred of them, who were Rhode Islanders,
were sent down under Colonel Hitchcock to reinforce Cadwalader; who was
now styled brigadier-general by courtesy, lest the Continental troops
might object to act under his command.
On the same day arrived General Gates, with the remnants of four
regiments from the Northern army. With him came Wilkinson, who now
resumed his station as brigade major in St. Clair’s brigade, to which he
belonged. To his Memoirs we are indebted for notices of the
commander-in-chief. “When the divisions of Sullivan and Gates joined
General Washington,” writes Wilkinson, “he found his numbers increased,
yet his difficulties were not sensibly diminished; ten days would
disband his corps and leave him 1,400 men, miserably provided in all
things I saw him in that gloomy period; dined with him, and attentively
marked his aspect; always grave and thoughtful, he appeared at that time
pensive and solemn in the extreme.”
There were vivid schemes forming under that solemn aspect. The time
seemed now propitious for the _coup de main_ which Washington had of
late been meditating. Every thing showed careless confidence on the part
of the enemy. Howe was in winter quarters at New York. His troops were
loosely cantoned about the Jerseys, from the Delaware to Brunswick, so
that they could not readily be brought to act in concert on a sudden
alarm. The Hessians were in the advance, stationed along the Delaware,
facing the American lines, which were along the west bank. Cornwallis,
thinking his work accomplished, had obtained leave of absence, and was
likewise at New York, preparing to embark for England. Washington had
now between five and six thousand men fit for service; with these he
meditated to cross the river at night, at different points, and make
simultaneous attacks upon the Hessian advance posts.
He calculated upon the eager support of his troops, who were burning to
revenge the outrages on their homes and families, committed by these
foreign mercenaries. They considered the Hessians mere hirelings; slaves
to a petty despot, fighting for sordid pay, and actuated by no sentiment
of patriotism or honor. They had rendered themselves the horror of the
Jerseys, by rapine, brutality, and heartlessness. At first, their
military discipline had inspired awe, but of late they had become
careless and unguarded, knowing the broken and dispirited state of the
Americans, and considering them incapable of any offensive enterprise.
A brigade of three Hessian regiments, those of Rahl,[152] Lossberg, and
Knyphausen, was stationed at Trenton. Colonel Rahl had the command of
the post at his own solicitation, and in consequence of the laurels he
had gained at White Plains and Fort Washington. We have before us
journals of two Hessian lieutenants and a corporal, which give graphic
particulars of the colonel and his post. According to their
representations, he, with all his bravery, was little fitted for such an
important command. He lacked the necessary vigilance and forecast.
One of the lieutenants speaks of him in a sarcastic vein, and evidently
with some degree of prejudice. According to his account, there was more
bustle than business at the post. The men were harassed with watches,
detachments, and pickets, without purpose and without end. The cannon
must be drawn forth every day from their proper places, and paraded
about the town, seemingly only to make a stir and uproar.
The lieutenant was especially annoyed by the colonel’s passion for
music. Whether his men when off duty were well or ill clad, whether they
kept their muskets clean and bright, and their ammunition in good order,
was of little moment to the colonel, he never inquired about it;—but the
music! that was the thing! the hautboys—he never could have enough of
them. The main guard was at no great distance from his quarters, and the
music could not linger there long enough. There was a church close by,
surrounded by palings; the officer on guard must march round and round
it, with his men and musicians, looking, says the lieutenant, like a
Catholic procession, wanting only the cross and the banner, and chanting
choristers.
According to the same authority, Rahl was a boon companion; made merry
until a late hour in the night, and then lay in bed until nine o’clock
in the morning. When the officers came to parade between ten end eleven
o’clock, and presented themselves at head-quarters, he was often in his
bath, and the guard must be kept waiting half an hour longer. On parade,
too, when any other commander would take occasion to talk with his staff
officers and others upon duty about the concerns of the garrison, the
colonel attended to nothing but the music—he was wrapped up in it to the
great disgust of the testy lieutenant.
And then, according to the latter, he took no precautions against the
possibility of being attacked. A veteran officer, Major Von Dechow,
proposed that some works should be thrown up, where the cannon might be
placed, ready against any assault. “Works!—pooh—pooh:”—the colonel made
merry with the very idea—using an unseemly jest, which we forbear to
quote. “An assault by the rebels! Let them come! We’ll at them with the
bayonet.”
The veteran Dechow gravely persisted in his counsel. “Herr Colonel,”
said he, respectfully, “it costs almost nothing; if it does not help, it
does not harm.” The pragmatical lieutenant, too, joined in the advice,
and offered to undertake the work. The jovial colonel only repeated his
joke, went away laughing at them both, and no works were thrown up.
The lieutenant, sorely nettled, observes sneeringly: “He believed the
name of Rahl more fearful and redoubtable than all the works of Vauban
and Cohorn, and that no rebel would dare to encounter it. A fit man
truly to command a corps! and still more to defend a place lying so near
an enemy having a hundred times his advantages. Every thing with him was
done heedlessly and without forecast.”[153]
Such is the account given of this brave, but inconsiderate and
light-hearted commander; given, however, by an officer not of his
regiment. The honest corporal already mentioned, who was one of Rahl’s
own men, does him more justice. According to his journal, rumors that
the Americans meditated an attack had aroused the vigilance of the
colonel, and on the 21st of December he had reconnoitred the banks of
the Delaware, with a strong detachment, quite to Frankfort, to see if
there were any movements of the Americans indicative of an intention to
cross the river. He had returned without seeing any; but had since
caused pickets and alarm posts to be stationed every night outside the
town.[154]
Such was the posture of affairs at Trenton at the time the _coup de
main_ was meditated.
Whatever was to be done, however, must be done quickly, before the river
was frozen. An intercepted letter had convinced Washington of what he
had before suspected, that Howe was only waiting for that event to
resume active operations, cross the river on the ice, and push on
triumphantly to Philadelphia.
He communicated his project to Gates, and wished him to go to Bristol,
take command there, and co-operate from that quarter. Gates, however,
pleaded ill health, and requested leave to proceed to Philadelphia.
The request may have surprised Washington, considering the spirited
enterprise that was on foot; but Gates, as has before been observed, had
a disinclination to serve immediately under the commander-in-chief; like
Lee, he had a disparaging opinion of him, or rather an impatience of his
supremacy. He had, moreover, an ulterior object in view. Having been
disappointed and chagrined, in finding himself subordinate to General
Schuyler in the Northern campaign, he was now intent on making interest
among the members of Congress for an independent command. Washington
urged that, on his way to Philadelphia, he would at least stop for a day
or two at Bristol, to concert a plan of operations with Reed and
Cadwalader, and adjust any little questions of etiquette and command
that might arise between the continental colonels who had gone thither
with Lee’s troops and the volunteer officers stationed there.[155]
He does not appear to have complied even with this request. According to
Wilkinson’s account, he took quarters at Newtown, and set out thence for
Baltimore on the 24th of December, the very day before that of the
intended _coup de main_. He prevailed on Wilkinson to accompany him as
far as Philadelphia. On the road he appeared to be much depressed in
spirits; but he relieved himself, like Lee, by criticising the plans of
the commander-in-chief. “He frequently,” writes Wilkinson, “expressed
the opinion that, while Washington was watching the enemy above Trenton,
they would construct bateaux, pass the Delaware in his rear, and take
possession of Philadelphia before he was aware; and that, instead of
vainly attempting to stop Sir William Howe at the Delaware, General
Washington ought to retire to the south of the Susquehanna, and there
form an army. _He said it was his intention to propose this measure to
Congress at Baltimore_, and urged me to accompany him to that place; but
my duty forbade the thought.”
Here we have somewhat of a counterpart to Lee’s project of eclipsing the
commander-in-chief. Evidently the two military veterans who had once
been in conclave with him at Mount Vernon, considered the truncheon of
command falling from his grasp.
The projected attack upon the Hessian posts was to be threefold.
1st. Washington was to cross the Delaware with a considerable force, at
McKonkey’s Ferry (now Taylorsville), about nine miles above Trenton, and
march down upon that place, where Rahl’s cantonment comprised a brigade
of fifteen hundred Hessians, a troop of British light-horse, and a
number of chasseurs.
2d. General Ewing, with a body of Pennsylvania militia, was to cross at
a ferry about a mile below Trenton; secure the bridge over the Assunpink
creek, a stream flowing along the south side of the town, and cut off
any retreat of the enemy in that direction.
3d. General Putnam, with the troops occupied in fortifying Philadelphia,
and those under General Cadwalader, was to cross below Burlington, and
attack the lower posts under Count Donop. The several divisions were to
cross the Delaware at night, so as to be ready for simultaneous action,
by five o’clock in the morning.
Seldom is a combined plan carried into full operation. Symptoms of an
insurrection in Philadelphia, obliged Putnam to remain with some force
in that city; but he detached five or six hundred of the Pennsylvania
militia under Colonel Griffin, his adjutant-general, who threw himself
into the Jerseys, to be at hand to co-operate with Cadwalader.
A letter from Washington to Colonel Reed, who was stationed with
Cadwalader, shows the anxiety of his mind, and his consciousness of the
peril of the enterprise.
“Christmas day at night, one hour before day, is the time fixed upon for
our attempt upon Trenton. For Heaven’s sake keep this to yourself, as
the discovery of it may prove fatal to us; our numbers, I am sorry to
say, being less than I had any conception of; yet nothing but necessity,
dire necessity, will, nay must, justify an attack. Prepare, and in
concert with Griffin, attack as many of their posts as you possibly can,
with a prospect of success; the more we can attack at the same instant,
the more confusion we shall spread, and the greater good will result
from it. * * I have ordered our men to be provided with three days’
provision ready cooked, with which, and their blankets, they are to
march; for if we are successful, which Heaven grant, and the
circumstances favor, we may push on. I shall direct every ferry and ford
to be well guarded, and not a soul suffered to pass without an officer’s
going down with the permit. Do the same with you.”
It has been said that Christmas night was fixed upon for the enterprise,
because the Germans are prone to revel and carouse on that festival, and
it was supposed a great part of the troops would be intoxicated, and in
a state of disorder and confusion; but in truth Washington would have
chosen an earlier day, had it been in his power. “We could not ripen
matters for the attack before the time mentioned,” said he in his letter
to Reed, “so much out of sorts, and so much in want of every thing are
the troops under Sullivan.”
Early on the eventful evening (Dec. 25th), the troops destined for
Washington’s part of the attack, about two thousand four hundred strong,
with a train of twenty small pieces, were paraded near McKonkey’s Ferry,
ready to pass as soon as it grew dark, in the hope of being all on the
other side by twelve o’clock. Washington repaired to the ground
accompanied by Generals Greene, Sullivan, Mercer, Stephen, and Lord
Stirling. Greene was full of ardor for the enterprise; eager, no doubt,
to wipe out the recollection of Fort Washington. It was, indeed, an
anxious moment for all.
We have here some circumstances furnished to us by the Memoirs of
Wilkinson. That officer had returned from Philadelphia, and brought a
letter from Gates to Washington. There was some snow on the ground, and
he had traced the march of the troops for the last few miles by the
blood from the feet of those whose shoes were broken. Being directed to
Washington’s quarters, he found him, he says, alone, with his whip in
his hand, prepared to mount his horse. “When I presented the letter of
General Gates to him, before receiving it, he exclaimed with
solemnity,—’What a time is this to hand me letters!’ I answered that I
had been charged with it by General Gates. ’By General Gates! Where is
he?’ ’I left him this morning in Philadelphia.’ ’What was he doing
there?’ ’I understood him that he was on his way to Congress.’ He
earnestly repeated, ’On his way to Congress!’ then broke the seal, and I
made my bow, and joined General St. Clair on the bank of the river.”
Did Washington surmise the incipient intrigues and cabals, that were
already aiming to undermine him? Had Gates’s eagerness to push on to
Congress, instead of remaining with the army in a moment of daring
enterprise, suggested any doubts as to his object? Perhaps not.
Washington’s nature was too noble to be suspicious; and yet he had
received sufficient cause to be distrustful.
Boats being in readiness, the troops began to cross about sunset. The
weather was intensely cold; the wind was high, the current strong, and
the river full of floating ice. Colonel Glover, with his amphibious
regiment of Marblehead fishermen, was in advance; the same who had
navigated the army across the Sound, in its retreat from Brooklyn on
Long Island, to New York. They were men accustomed to battle with the
elements, yet with all their skill and experience, the crossing was
difficult and perilous. Washington, who had crossed with the troops,
stood anxiously, yet patiently, on the eastern bank, while one precious
hour after another elapsed, until the transportation of the artillery
should be effected. The night was dark and tempestuous, the drifting ice
drove the boats out of their course, and threatened them with
destruction. Colonel Knox, who attended to the crossing of the
artillery, assisted with his labors, but still more with his “stentorian
lungs,” giving orders and directions.
It was three o’clock before the artillery was landed, and nearly four
before the troops took up their line of march. Trenton was nine miles
distant; and not to be reached before daylight. To surprise it,
therefore, was out of the question. There was no making a retreat
without being discovered, and harassed in repassing the river. Beside,
the troops from the other points might have crossed, and co-operation
was essential to their safety. Washington resolved to push forward, and
trust to Providence.
He formed the troops into two columns. The first he led himself,
accompanied by Greene, Stirling, Mercer, and Stephen; it was to make a
circuit by the upper or Pennington road, to the north of Trenton. The
other led by Sullivan, and including the brigade of St. Clair, was to
take the lower river road, leading to the west end of the town.
Sullivan’s column was to halt a few moments at a cross-road leading to
Howland’s Ferry, to give Washington’s column time to effect its circuit,
so that the attack might be simultaneous. On arriving at Trenton, they
were to force the outer guards, and push directly into the town before
the enemy had time to form.
The Hessian journals before us enable us to give the reader a glance
into the opposite camp on this eventful night. The situation of
Washington was more critical than he was aware. Notwithstanding the
secrecy with which his plans had been conducted, Colonel Rahl had
received a warning from General Grant, at Princeton, of the intended
attack, and of the very time it was to be made, but stating that it was
to be by a detachment under Lord Stirling. Rahl was accordingly on the
alert.
It so happened that about dusk of this very evening, when Washington
must have been preparing to cross the Delaware, there were alarm guns
and firing at the Trenton outpost. The whole garrison was instantly
drawn out under arms, and Colonel Rahl hastened to the outpost. It was
found in confusion, and six men wounded. A body of men had emerged from
the woods, fired upon the picket, and immediately retired.[156] Colonel
Rahl, with two companies and a field-piece, marched through the woods,
and made the rounds of the outposts, but seeing and hearing nothing, and
finding all quiet, returned. Supposing this to be the attack against
which he had been warned, and that it was “a mere flash in the pan,” he
relapsed into his feeling of security; and, as the night was cold and
stormy, permitted the troops to return to their quarters and lay aside
their arms. Thus the garrison and its unwary commander slept in fancied
security, at the very time that Washington and his troops were making
their toilsome way across the Delaware. How perilous would have been
their situation had their enemy been more vigilant!
It began to hail and snow as the troops commenced their march, and
increased in violence as they advanced, the storm driving the sleet in
their faces. So bitter was the cold that two of the men were frozen to
death that night. The day dawned by the time Sullivan halted at the
cross-road. It was discovered that the storm had rendered many of the
muskets wet and useless. “What is to be done?” inquired Sullivan of St.
Clair. “You have nothing for it but to push on, and use the bayonet,”
was the reply. While some of the soldiers were endeavoring to clear
their muskets, and squibbing off priming, Sullivan despatched an officer
to apprise the commander-in-chief of the condition of their arms. He
came back half-dismayed by an indignant burst of Washington, who ordered
him to return instantly and tell General Sullivan to “advance and
charge.”
It was about eight o’clock when Washington’s column arrived in the
vicinity of the village. The storm, which had rendered the march
intolerable, had kept every one within doors, and the snow had deadened
the tread of the troops and the rumbling of the artillery. As they
approached the village, Washington, who was in front, came to a man that
was chopping wood by the roadside, and inquired, “Which way is the
Hessian picket?” “I don’t know,” was the surly reply. “You may tell,”
said Captain Forest of the artillery, “for that is General Washington.”
The aspect of the man changed in an instant. Raising his hands to
heaven, “God bless and prosper you!” cried he. “The picket is in that
house, and the sentry stands near that tree.”[157]
The advance guard was led by a brave young officer, Captain William A.
Washington, seconded by Lieutenant James Monroe (in after years
President of the United States). They received orders to dislodge the
picket. Here happened to be stationed the very lieutenant whose censures
of the negligence of Colonel Rahl we have just quoted. By his own
account, he was very near being entrapped in the guard-house. His
sentries, he says, were not alert enough; and had he not stepped out of
the picket house himself and discovered the enemy, they would have been
upon him before his men could scramble to their arms. “Der feind! der
feind! heraus! heraus!” (the enemy! the enemy! turn out! turn out!) was
now the cry. He at first, he says, made a stand, thinking he had a mere
marauding party to deal with; but seeing heavy battalions at hand, gave
way, and fell back upon a company stationed to support the picket; but
which appears to have been no better prepared against surprise.
By this time the American artillery was unlimbered; Washington kept
beside it, and the column proceeded. The report of fire-arms told that
Sullivan was at the lower end of the town. Colonel Stark led his advance
guard, and did it in gallant style. The attacks, as concerted, were
simultaneous. The outposts were driven in; they retreated, firing from
behind houses. The Hessian drums beat to arms; the trumpets of the
light-horse sounded the alarm: the whole place was in an uproar. Some of
the enemy made a wild and undirected fire from the windows of their
quarters; others rushed forth in disorder, and attempted to form in the
main street, while dragoons hastily mounted, and galloping about, added
to the confusion. Washington advanced with his column to the head of
King Street; riding beside Captain Forest of the artillery. When
Forest’s battery of six guns was opened the general kept on the left and
advanced with it, giving directions to the fire. His position was an
exposed one, and he was repeatedly entreated to fall back; but all such
entreaties were useless, when once he became heated in action.
The enemy were training a couple of cannon in the main street to form a
battery, which might have given the Americans a serious check; but
Captain Washington and Lieutenant Monroe, with a part of the advance
guard rushed forward, drove the artillerists from their guns, and took
the two pieces when on the point of being fired. Both of these officers
were wounded; the captain in the wrist, the lieutenant in the shoulder.
While Washington advanced on the north of the town, Sullivan approached
on the west, and detached Stark to press on the lower or south end of
the town. The British light-horse, and about five hundred Hessians and
Chasseurs, had been quartered in the lower part of the town. Seeing
Washington’s column pressing in front, and hearing Stark thundering in
their rear, they took headlong flight by the bridge across the
Assunpink, and so along the banks of the Delaware toward Count Dunop’s
encampment at Bordentown. Had Washington’s plan been carried into full
effect, their retreat would have been cut off by General Ewing; but that
officer had been prevented from crossing the river by the ice.
Colonel Rahl, according to the account of the lieutenant who had
commanded the picket, completely lost his head in the confusion of the
surprise. The latter, when driven in by the American advance, found the
colonel on horseback, endeavoring to rally his panic-stricken and
disordered men, but himself sorely bewildered. He asked the lieutenant
what was the force of the assailants. The latter answered that he had
seen four or five battalions in the woods; three of them had fired upon
him before he had retreated—“but,” added he, “there are other troops to
the right and left, and the town will soon be surrounded.” The colonel
rode in front of his troops:—“Forward! march! advance! advance!” cried
he. With some difficulty he succeeded in extricating his troops from the
town, and leading them into an adjacent orchard. Now was the time,
writes the lieutenant, for him to have pushed for another place, there
to make a stand. At this critical moment he might have done so with
credit, and without loss. The colonel seems to have had such an
intention. A rapid retreat by the Princeton road was apparently in his
thoughts; but he lacked decision. The idea of flying before the rebels
was intolerable. Some one, too, exclaimed at the ruinous loss of leaving
all their baggage to be plundered by the enemy. Changing his mind, he
made a rash resolve. “All who are my grenadiers, forward!” cried he, and
went back, writes his corporal, like a storm upon the town. “What
madness was this!” writes the critical lieutenant. “A town that was of
no use to us; that but ten or fifteen minutes before he had gladly left;
that was now filled with three or four thousand enemies, stationed in
houses or behind walls and hedges, and a battery of six cannon planted
on the main street. And he to think of retaking it with his six or seven
hundred men and their bayonets!”
Still he led his grenadiers bravely but rashly on, when, in the midst of
his career, he received a fatal wound from a musket ball, and fell from
his horse. His men, left without their chief, were struck with dismay;
heedless of the orders of the second in command, they retreated by the
right up the banks of the Assunpink, intending to escape to Princeton.
Washington saw their design, and threw Colonel Hand’s corps of
Pennsylvania riflemen in their way; while a body of Virginia troops
gained their left. Brought to a stand, and perfectly bewildered,
Washington thought they were forming in order of battle, and ordered a
discharge of canister shot. “Sir, they have struck,” exclaimed Forest.
“Struck!” echoed the general. “Yes, sir, their colors are down.” “So
they are!” replied Washington, and spurred in that direction, followed
by Forest and his whole command. The men grounded their arms and
surrendered at discretion; “but had not Colonel Rahl been severely
wounded,” remarks his loyal corporal, “we would never have been taken
alive!”
The skirmishing had now ceased in every direction. Major Wilkinson, who
was with the lower column, was sent to the commander-in-chief for
orders. He rode up, he says, at the moment that Colonel Rahl, supported
by a file of sergeants, was presenting his sword. “On my approach,”
continues he, “the commander-in-chief took me by the hand, and observed,
’Major Wilkinson, this is a glorious day for our country!’ his
countenance beaming with complacency; whilst the unfortunate Rahl, who
the day before would not have changed fortunes with him, now pale,
bleeding, and covered with blood, in broken accents seemed to implore
those attentions which the victor was well disposed to bestow on him.”
He was, in fact, conveyed with great care to his quarters, which were in
the house of a kind and respectable Quaker family.
The number of prisoners taken in this affair was nearly one thousand, of
which thirty-two were officers. The veteran Major Von Dechow, who had
urged in vain the throwing up of breastworks, received a mortal wound,
of which he died in Trenton. Washington’s triumph, however, was impaired
by the failure of the two simultaneous attacks. General Ewing, who was
to have crossed before day at Trenton Ferry, and taken possession of the
bridge leading out of the town, over which the light-horse and Hessians
retreated, was prevented by the quantity of ice in the river. Cadwalader
was hindered by the same obstacle. He got part of his troops over, but
found it impossible to embark his cannon, and was obliged, therefore, to
return to the Pennsylvania side of the river. Had he and Ewing crossed,
Donop’s quarters would have been beaten up, and the fugitives from
Trenton intercepted.
By the failure of this part of his plan, Washington had been exposed to
the most imminent hazard. The force with which he had crossed,
twenty-four hundred men, raw troops, was not enough to cope with the
veteran garrison, had it been properly on its guard; and then there were
the troops under Donop at hand to co-operate with it. Nothing saved him
but the utter panic of the enemy; their want of proper alarm places, and
their exaggerated idea of his forces: for one of the journals before us
(the corporal’s) states that he had with him 15,000 men, and another
6,000.[158] Even now that the place was in his possession he dared not
linger in it. There was a superior force under Donop below him, and a
strong battalion of infantry at Princeton. His own troops were exhausted
by the operations of the night and morning in cold, rain, snow and
storm. They had to guard about a thousand prisoners, taken in action or
found concealed in houses; there was little prospect of succor, owing to
the season and the state of the river. Washington gave up, therefore,
all idea of immediately pursuing the enemy or keeping possession of
Trenton, and determined to recross the Delaware with his prisoners and
captured artillery. Understanding that the brave but unfortunate Rahl
was in a dying state, he paid him a visit before leaving Trenton,
accompanied by General Greene. They found him at his quarters in the
house of a Quaker family. Their visit and the respectful consideration
and unaffected sympathy manifested by them, evidently soothed the
feelings of the unfortunate soldier; now stripped of his late won
laurels, and resigned to die rather than outlive his honor.[159]
We have given a somewhat sarcastic portrait of the colonel drawn by one
of his lieutenants; another, Lieutenant Piel, paints with a soberer and
more reliable pencil.
“For our whole ill luck,” writes he, “we have to thank Colonel Rahl. It
never occurred to him that the rebels might attack us; and, therefore,
he had taken scarce any precautions against such an event. In truth I
must confess we have universally thought too little of the rebels, who,
until now, have never on any occasion been able to withstand us. Our
brigadier (Rahl) was too proud to retire a step before such an enemy;
although nothing remained for us but to retreat.
“General Howe had judged this man from a wrong point of view, or he
would hardly have intrusted such an important post as Trenton to him. He
was formed for a soldier, but not for a general. At the capture of Fort
Washington he had gained much honor while under the command of a great
general, but he lost all his renown at Trenton where he himself was
general. He had courage to dare the hardiest enterprise; but he alone
wanted the cool presence of mind necessary in a surprise like that at
Trenton. His vivacity was too great; one thought crowded on another so
that he could come to no decision. Considered as a private man, he was
deserving of high regard. He was generous, open-handed, hospitable;
never cringing to his superiors, nor arrogant to his inferiors; but
courteous to all. Even his domestics were treated more like friends than
servants.”
The loyal corporal, too, contributes his mite of praise to his dying
commander. “In his last agony,” writes the grateful soldier, “he yet
thought of his grenadiers, and entreated General Washington that nothing
might be taken from them but their arms. A promise was given,” adds the
corporal, “and was kept.”
Even the satirical lieutenant half mourns over his memory. “He died,”
says he, “on the following evening, and lies buried in this place which
he has rendered so famous, in the graveyard of the Presbyterian church.
Sleep well! dear Commander! (theurer Feldherr.) The Americans will
hereafter set up a stone above thy grave with this inscription:
“Hier liegt der Oberst Rahl,
Mit ihm ist alles all!
(Here lies the Colonel Rahl,
With him all is over.)”