LEE EXPECTED IN CAMP—HIS LETTER OF ADVICE TO THE PRESIDENT OF
CONGRESS—THE ENEMY AT THROG’S NECK—WASHINGTON’S ARRANGEMENTS—RIDES TO
THROG’S NECK—THE ENEMY BROUGHT TO A STAND—MILITARY MOVEMENTS—ARRIVAL OF
LEE—A COMMAND ASSIGNED TO HIM—CRITICISES THE CONDUCT OF CONGRESS AND THE
ARMY—COUNCIL OF WAR—THE ARMY TO MOVE TO THE MAINLAND—FORT WASHINGTON TO
BE KEPT UP.
“If General Lee should be in Philadelphia,” writes John Jay to Rutledge,
“pray hasten his departure—he is much wanted at New York.” The successes
of Lee at the South were contrasted by many with the defeat on Long
Island, and evacuation of New York, and they began to consider him the
main hope of the army. Hazard, the postmaster, writing from Harlem
Heights to General Gates on the 11th, laments it as a misfortune that
Lee should have been to the southward for several months past, but adds
cheeringly, “he is expected here to-day.”
Joseph Trumbull, the commissary-general, also writes to Gates under the
same date: “General Lee is to be here this evening. He left Philadelphia
on the 8th.”
Lee, the object of so many hopes, was actually in the Jerseys, on his
way to the camp. He writes from Amboy on the 12th, to the President of
Congress, informing him, that the Hessians, encamped opposite on Staten
Island, had disappeared on the preceding night, quitting the island
entirely, and some great measure was believed to be in agitation. “I am
confident,” writes he, “they will not attack General Washington’s lines;
such a measure is too absurd for a man of Mr. Howe’s genius; and unless
they have received flattering accounts from Burgoyne, that he will be
able to effectuate a junction (which I conceive they have not), they
will no longer remain kicking their heels at New York. They will put the
place in a respectable state of defence, which, with their command of
the waters, may be easily done, leave four or five thousand men, and
direct their operations to a more decisive object. They will infallibly
proceed either immediately up the river Delaware with their whole
troops, or, what is more probable, land somewhere about South Amboy or
Shrewsbury, and march straight to Trenton or Burlington. On the
supposition that this will be the case, what are we to do? What force
have we? What means have we to prevent their possessing themselves of
Philadelphia? General Washington’s army cannot possibly keep pace with
them. The length of his route is not only infinitely greater, but his
obstructions almost insuperable. In short, before he could cross Hudson
River, they might be lodged and strongly fortified on both banks of the
Delaware, * * For Heaven’s sake, arouse yourselves! For Heaven’s sake
let ten thousand men be immediately assembled, and stationed somewhere
about Trenton. In my opinion, your whole depends upon it. I set out
immediately for head-quarters, where I shall communicate my apprehension
that such will be the next operation of the enemy, and urge the
expediency of sparing a part of his army (if he has any to spare) for
this object.”[121]
On the very morning that Lee was writing this letter at Amboy,
Washington received intelligence by express from General Heath,
stationed above King’s Bridge, that the enemy were landing with
artillery on Throg’s Neck[122] in the Sound, about nine miles from the
camp. Washington surmised that Howe was pursuing his original plan of
getting into the rear of the American army, cutting off its supplies,
which were chiefly derived from the East, and interrupting its
communication with the main country. Officers were ordered to their
alarm posts, and the troops to be ready, under arms, to act as occasion
might require. Word, at the same time, was sent to General Heath to
dispose of the troops on his side of King’s Bridge, and of two militia
regiments posted on the banks of Harlem River opposite the camp, in such
manner as he should think necessary.
Having made all his arrangements as promptly as possible, Washington
mounted his horse, and rode over towards Throg’s Neck to reconnoitre.
Throg’s Neck is a peninsula in Westchester County, stretching upwards of
two miles into the Sound. It was separated from the mainland by a narrow
creek and a marsh, and was surrounded by water every high tide. A bridge
across a creek connecting with a ruined causeway across the marsh, led
to the mainland, and the upper end of the creek was fordable at low
water. Early in the morning, eighty or ninety boats full of men had
stood up the Sound from Montresor’s Island, and Long Island, and had
landed troops to the number of four thousand on Throg’s Point, the
extremity of the neck. Thence their advance pushed forward toward the
causeway and bridge, to secure that pass to the mainland. General Heath
had been too rapid for them. Colonel Hand and his Philadelphia riflemen,
the same who had checked the British advance on Long Island, had taken
up the planks of the bridge, and posted themselves opposite the end of
the causeway, whence they commenced firing with their rifles. They were
soon reinforced by Colonel Prescott, of Bunker’s Hill renown, with his
regiment, and Lieutenant Bryant of the artillery, with a three-pounder.
Checked at this pass, the British moved toward the head of the creek;
here they found the Americans in possession of the ford, where they were
reinforced by Colonel Graham, of the New York line, with his regiment,
and Lieutenant Jackson of the artillery, with a six-pounder. These
skilful dispositions of his troops by General Heath had brought the
enemy to a stand. By the time Washington arrived in the vicinity, the
British had encamped on the neck; the riflemen and yagers keeping up a
scattering fire at each other across the marsh; and Captain Bryant now
and then saluting the enemy with his field-piece.
Having surveyed the ground, Washington ordered works to be thrown up at
the passes from the neck to the mainland. The British also threw up a
work at the end of the causeway. In the afternoon nine ships, with a
great number of schooners, sloops, and flat-bottomed boats full of men,
passed through Hell Gate, towards Throg’s Point; and information
received from two deserters, gave Washington reason to believe that the
greater part of the enemy’s forces were gathering in that quarter.
General McDougall’s brigade, in which were Colonel Smallwood and the
independent companies, was sent in the evening to strengthen Heath’s
division at King’s Bridge, and to throw up works opposite the ford of
Harlem River.
Greene, who had heard of the landing of the enemy at Throg’s Neck, wrote
over to Washington, from Fort Constitution, informing him that he had
three brigades ready to join him if required. “If the troops are wanted
over your side,” said he, “or likely to be so, they should be got over
in the latter part of the night, as the shipping may move up from below,
and impede, if not totally stop the troops from passing. The tents upon
Staten Island,” he added, “had all been struck, as far as could be
ascertained.” It was plain the whole scene of action was changing.
On the 14th, General Lee arrived in camp, where he was welcomed as the
harbinger of good luck. Washington was absent, visiting the posts beyond
King’s Bridge, and the passes leading from Throg’s Neck; Lee immediately
rode forth to join him. No one gave him a sincerer greeting than the
commander-in-chief; who, diffident of his own military knowledge, had a
high opinion of that of Lee. He immediately gave him command of the
troops above King’s Bridge, now the greatest part of the army, but
desired that he would not exercise it for a day or two, until he had
time to acquaint himself with the localities and arrangements of the
post; Heath, in the interim, held the command.
Lee was evidently elevated by his successes at the South, and disposed
to criticise disparagingly the military operations of other commanders.
In a letter, written on the day of his arrival to his old associate in
arms, General Gates, he condemns the position of the army, and censures
Washington for submitting to the dictation of Congress, whose meddlesome
instructions had produced it. “_Inter nos_,” writes he, “the Congress
seem to stumble every step. I do not mean one or two of the cattle, but
the whole stable. I have been very free in delivering my opinion to
them. In my opinion General Washington is much to blame in not menacing
’em with resignation, unless they refrain from unhinging the army by
their absurd interference.
“Keep us Ticonderoga; much depends upon it. We ought to have an army in
the Delaware. I have roared it in the ears of Congress, but _carent
auribus_. Adieu, my dear friend; if we do meet again—why, we shall
smile.”[123]
In the mean time, Congress, on the 11th of October, having heard of the
ingress of the Phœnix, Roebuck and Tartar, passed a resolution that
General Washington be desired, if it be practicable, by every art, and
at whatever expense, to obstruct effectually the navigation of the North
River between Fort Washington and Mount Constitution, as well to prevent
the regress of the enemy’s vessels lately gone up as to hinder them from
receiving succors.
Under so many conflicting circumstances, Washington held a council of
war on the 16th, at Lee’s head-quarters, at which all the major-generals
were present excepting Greene, and all the brigadiers, as well as
Colonel Knox, who commanded the artillery. Letters from the Convention
and from individual members of it were read, concerning the turbulence
of the disaffected in the upper parts of the State; intelligence gained
from deserters was likewise stated, showing the intention of the enemy
to surround the camp. The policy was then discussed of remaining in
their present position on Manhattan Island, and awaiting there the
menaced attack: the strength of the position was urged; its being well
fortified, and extremely difficult of access. Lee, in reply, scoffed at
the idea of a position being good merely because its approaches were
difficult. How could they think of holding a position where the enemy
were so strong in front and rear; where ships had the command of the
water on each side, and where King’s Bridge was their only pass by which
to escape from being wholly enclosed? Had not their recent experience on
Long Island and at New York taught them the danger of such positions?
“For my part,” said he, “I would have nothing to do with the islands to
which you have been clinging so pertinaciously—I would give Mr. Howe a
fee-simple of them.”
“After much consideration and debate,” says the record of the council,
“the following question was stated: Whether (it having appeared that the
obstructions in the North River have proved insufficient, and that the
enemy’s whole force is now in our rear on Frog Point) it is now deemed
possible, in our situation, to prevent the enemy from cutting off the
communication with the country, and compelling us to fight them at all
disadvantages or surrender prisoners at discretion?”
All agreed, with but one dissenting voice, that it was not possible to
prevent the communication from being cut off, and that one of the
consequences mentioned in the question must follow.
The dissenting voice was that of General George Clinton, a brave
downright man, but little versed in the science of warfare. He could not
comprehend the policy of abandoning so strong a position; they were
equal in number to the enemy, and, as they must fight them somewhere,
could do it to more advantage there than any where else. Clinton felt as
a guardian of the Hudson and the upper country, and wished to meet the
enemy, as it were, at the very threshold.
As the resolve of Congress seemed imperative with regard to Fort
Washington, that post, it was agreed, should be “retained as long as
possible.”
A strong garrison was accordingly placed in it, composed chiefly of
troops from Magaw’s and Shee’s Pennsylvania regiments, the latter under
Lieutenant-colonel Lambert Cadwalader, of Philadelphia. Shee having
obtained leave of absence, Colonel Magaw was put in command of the post,
and solemnly charged by Washington to defend it to the last extremity.
The name of the opposite post on the Jersey shore, where Greene was
stationed, was changed from Fort Constitution to Fort Lee, in honor of
the general. Lee, in fact, was the military idol of the day. Even the
family of the commander in-chief joined in paying him homage. Colonel
Tench Tilghman, Washington’s aide-de-camp, in a letter to a friend,
writes: “You ask if General Lee is in health, and our people bold. I
answer both in the affirmative. His appearance amongst us has
contributed not a little to the latter.”