MOVEMENTS OF THE ENEMY—COUNCILS OF WAR—QUESTION OF THE ABANDONMENT OF
THE CITY—DISTRIBUTION OF THE ARMY—SHIPS IN THE EAST RIVER—THE ENEMY AT
HELL GATE—SKIRMISH AT TURTLE BAY—PANIC OF THE CONNECTICUT MILITIA—RAGE
AND PERSONAL PERIL OF WASHINGTON—PUTNAM’S PERILOUS RETREAT FROM THE
CITY—BRITISH REGALE AT MURRAY HILL.
Since the retreat from Brooklyn, Washington had narrowly watched the
movements of the enemy to discover their further plans. Their whole
force, excepting about four thousand men, had been transferred from
Staten to Long Island. A great part was encamped on the peninsula
between Newtown Inlet and Flushing Bay. A battery had been thrown up
near the extremity of the peninsula, to check an American battery at
Horen’s Hook opposite, and to command the mouth of Harlem River. Troops
were subsequently stationed on the islands about Hell Gate. “It is
evident,” writes Washington, “the enemy mean to enclose us on the island
of New York, by taking post in our rear, while the shipping secures the
front, and thus, by cutting off our communication with the country,
oblige us to fight them on their own terms, or surrender at discretion;
or by a brilliant stroke endeavor to cut this army in pieces, and secure
the collection of arms and stores, which, they well know, we shall not
be able soon to replace.”[109]
The question was, how could their plans be most successfully opposed? On
every side, he saw a choice of difficulties; every measure was to be
formed with some apprehension that all the troops would not do their
duty. History, experience, the opinions of able friends in Europe, the
fears of the enemy, even the declarations of Congress, all concurred in
demonstrating that the war on the American side should be defensive; a
war of posts; that, on all occasions, a general action should be
avoided, and nothing put at risk unnecessarily. “With these views,” said
Washington, “and being fully persuaded that it would be presumption to
draw out our young troops into open ground against their superiors, both
in number and discipline, I have never spared the spade and pickaxe.”
In a council of war, held on the 7th of September, the question was
discussed, whether the city should be defended or evacuated. All
admitted that it would not be tenable, should it be cannonaded and
bombarded. Several of the council, among whom was General Putnam, were
for a total and immediate removal from the city; urging that one part of
the army might be cut off before the other could support it; the
extremities being at least sixteen miles apart, and the whole, when
collected, being inferior to the enemy. By removing, they would deprive
the enemy of the advantage of their ships; they would keep them at bay;
put nothing at hazard; keep the army together to be recruited another
year, and preserve the unspent stores and the heavy artillery.
Washington himself inclined to this opinion. Others, however, were
unwilling to abandon a place which had been fortified with great cost
and labor, and seemed defensible, and which, by some, had been
considered the key to the northern country; it might dispirit the
troops, and enfeeble the cause. General Mercer, who was prevented by
illness from attending the council, communicated his opinion by letter.
“We should keep New York if possible,” said he, “as the acquiring of it
will give eclat to the arms of Great Britain, afford the soldiers good
quarters, and furnish a safe harbor for the fleet.”
General Greene, also, being still unwell, conveyed his opinion in a
letter to Washington, dated Sept. 5th. He advised that the army should
abandon both city and island, and post itself at King’s Bridge and along
the Westchester shore. That there was no object to be obtained by
holding any position below King’s Bridge. The enemy might throw troops
on Manhattan Island, from their camps on Long Island, and their ships on
the Hudson, and form an intrenched line across it, between the city and
the middle division of the army, and support the two flanks of the line
by their shipping. In such case, it would be necessary to fight them on
disadvantageous terms or submit.
The city and island, he observed, were objects not to be put in
competition with the general interests of America. Two thirds of the
city and suburbs belonged to tories, there was no great reason,
therefore, to run any considerable risk in its defence. The honor and
interest of America required a general and speedy retreat. But as the
enemy, once in possession, could never be dislodged without a superior
naval force; as the place would furnish them with excellent winter
quarters and barrack room, and an abundant market, he advised to burn
both city and suburbs before retreating.[110]
Well might the poor, harassed citizens feel hysterical, threatened as
they were by sea and land, and their very defenders debating the policy
of burning their houses over their heads. Fortunately for them, Congress
had expressly forbidden that any harm should be done to New York,
trusting, that though the enemy might occupy it for a time, it would
ultimately be regained.
After much discussion a middle course was adopted. Putnam, with five
thousand men, was to be stationed in the city. Heath, with nine
thousand, was to keep guard on the upper part of the island, and oppose
any attempt of the enemy to land. His troops, among whom were Magaw’s,
Shee’s, Hand’s, and Miles’s Pennsylvanian battalions, and Haslet’s
Delaware regiment, were posted about King’s Bridge and its vicinity.
The third division, composed principally of militia, was under the
command of Generals Greene and Spencer, the former of whom, however, was
still unwell. It was stationed about the centre of the island, chiefly
along Turtle Bay and Kip’s Bay, where strong works had been thrown up,
to guard against any landing of troops from the ships or from the
encampments on Long Island. It was also to hold itself ready to support
either of the other divisions. Washington himself had his head-quarters
at a short distance from the city. A resolution of Congress, passed the
10th of September, left the occupation or abandonment of the city
entirely at Washington’s discretion. Nearly the whole of his officers,
too, in a second council of war, retracted their former opinion, and
determined that the removal of his army was not only prudent, but
absolutely necessary. Three members of the council, however, Generals
Spencer, Heath, and George Clinton, tenaciously held to the former
decision.
Convinced of the propriety of evacuation, Washington prepared for it by
ordering the removal of all stores, excepting such as were indispensable
for the subsistence of the troops while they remained. A letter from a
Rhode Island officer, on a visit to New York, gives an idea of its
agitations. “On the 13th of September, just after dinner, three frigates
and a forty gun ship sailed up the East River with a gentle breeze,
toward Hell Gate, and kept up an incessant fire, assisted by the cannon
at Governor’s Island. The batteries of the city returned the ships the
like salutation. Three men agape, idle spectators, had the misfortune of
being killed by one cannon ball. One shot struck within six feet of
General Washington, as he was on horseback, riding into the fort.”[111]
On the 14th, Washington’s baggage was removed to King’s Bridge, whither
head-quarters were to be transferred the same evening; it being clear
that the enemy were preparing to encompass him on the island. “It is now
a trial of skill whether they will or not,” writes Colonel Reed, “and
every night we lie down with the most anxious fears for the fate of
to-morrow.”[112]
About sunset of the same day, six more ships, two of them men-of-war,
passed up the Sound and joined those above. Within half an hour came
expresses spurring to head-quarters, one from Mifflin at King’s Bridge,
the other from Colonel Sargent at Horen’s Hook. Three or four thousand
of the enemy were crossing at Hell Gate to the islands at the mouth of
Harlem River, where numbers were already encamped. An immediate landing
at Harlem, or Morrisania, was apprehended. Washington was instantly in
the saddle, spurring to Harlem Heights. The night, however, passed away
quietly. In the morning the enemy commenced operations. Three ships of
war stood up the Hudson, “causing a most tremendous firing, assisted by
the cannons of Governor’s Island, which firing was returned from the
city as well as the scarcity of heavy cannon would allow.”[113] The
ships anchored opposite Bloomingdale, a few miles above the city, and
put a stop to the removal by water of stores and provisions to Dobbs’
Ferry. About eleven o’clock, the ships in the East River commenced a
heavy cannonade upon the breastworks between Turtle Bay and the city. At
the same time two divisions of the troops encamped on Long Island, one
British, under Sir Henry Clinton, the other Hessian, under Colonel
Donop, emerged in boats from the deep, woody recesses of Newtown Inlet,
and under cover of the fire from the ships, began to land at two points
between Turtle and Kip’s Bays. The breastworks were manned by militia
who had recently served at Brooklyn. Disheartened by their late defeat,
they fled at the first advance of the enemy. Two brigades of Putnam’s
Connecticut troops (Parsons’ and Fellows’) which had been sent that
morning to support them, caught the panic, and regardless of the
commands and entreaties of their officers, joined in the general
scamper.
At this moment Washington, who had mounted his horse at the first sound
of the cannonade, came galloping to the scene of confusion; riding in
among the fugitives, he endeavored to rally and restore them to order.
All in vain. At the first appearance of sixty or seventy red coats, they
broke again without firing a shot, and fled in headlong terror. Losing
all self-command at the sight of such dastardly conduct, he dashed his
hat upon the ground in a transport of rage. “Are these the men,”
exclaimed he, “with whom I am to defend America!” In a paroxysm of
passion and despair he snapped his pistols at some of them, threatened
others with his sword, and was so heedless of his own danger, that he
might have fallen into the hands of the enemy, who were not eighty yards
distant, had not an aide-de-camp seized the bridle of his horse, and
absolutely hurried him away.[114]
It was one of the rare moments of his life, when the vehement element of
his nature was stirred up from its deep recesses. He soon recovered his
self-possession, and took measures against the general peril. The enemy
might land another force about Hell Gate, seize upon Harlem Heights, the
strong central portion of the island, cut off all retreat of the lower
divisions, and effectually sever his army. In all haste, therefore, he
sent off an express to the forces encamped above, directing them to
secure that position immediately; while another express to Putnam,
ordered an immediate retreat from the city to those heights.
It was indeed a perilous moment. Had the enemy followed up their
advantage, and seized upon the heights, before thus occupied; or had
they extended themselves across the island, from the place where they
had effected a landing, the result might have been most disastrous to
the Americans. Fortunately, they contented themselves for the present
with sending a strong detachment down the road along the East River,
leading to the city, while the main body, British and Hessians, rested
on their arms.
In the mean time, Putnam, on receiving Washington’s express, called in
his pickets and guards, and abandoned the city in all haste, leaving
behind him a large quantity of provisions and military stores, and most
of the heavy cannon. To avoid the enemy he took the Bloomingdale road,
though this exposed him to be raked by the enemy’s ships anchored in the
Hudson. It was a forced march, on a sultry day, under a burning sun and
amid clouds of dust. His army was encumbered with women and children and
all kinds of baggage. Many were overcome by fatigue and thirst, some
perished by hastily drinking cold water; but Putnam rode backward and
forward, hurrying every one on.
Colonel Humphreys, at that time a volunteer in his division, writes: “I
had frequent opportunities that day of beholding him, for the purpose of
issuing orders and encouraging the troops, flying on his horse covered
with foam, wherever his presence was most necessary. Without his
extraordinary exertions, the guards must have been inevitably lost, and
it is probable the entire corps would have been cut in pieces.
“When we were not far from Bloomingdale, an aide-de-camp came to him at
full speed, to inform him that a column of British infantry was
descending upon our right. Our rear was soon fired upon, and the colonel
of our regiment, whose order was just communicated for the front to file
off to the left, was killed upon the spot. With no other loss, we joined
the army after dark upon the heights of Harlem.”[115]
Tradition gives a circumstance which favored Putnam’s retreat. The
British generals, in passing by Murray Hill, the country residence of a
patriot of that name who was of the Society of Friends, made a halt to
seek some refreshment. The proprietor of the house was absent; but his
wife set cake and wine before them in abundance. So grateful were these
refreshments in the heat of the day, that they lingered over their wine,
quaffing and laughing, and bantering their patriotic hostess about the
ludicrous panic and discomfiture of her countrymen. In the mean time,
before they were roused from their regale, Putnam and his forces had
nearly passed by, within a mile of them. All the loss sustained by him
in his perilous retreat, was fifteen killed, and about three hundred
taken prisoners. It became, adds the tradition, a common saying among
the American officers, that Mrs. Murray saved Putnam’s division of the
army.[116]