“In court the truth is the last thing to be thought of.”
“Oh!”
“Do you think the jury would credit allegations which M. Magloire did
not credit? No. Well, then, we had better not speak of them any more,
and try to find some explanation which will meet the charges brought
against you. Do you think we should be the first to act thus? By no
means. There are very few cases in which the prosecution says all it
knows, and still fewer in which the defence calls for every thing it
might call for. Out of ten criminal trials, there are at least three in
which side-issues are raised. What will be the charge in court against
you? The substance of the romance which the magistrate has invented in
order to prove your guilt. You must meet him with another romance which
proves your innocence.”
“But the truth.”
“Is dependent on probability, my dear client. Ask M. Magloire. The
prosecution only asks for probability: hence probability is all the
defence has to care for. Human justice is feeble, and limited in its
means; it cannot go down to the very bottom of things; it cannot judge
of motives, and fathom consciences. It can only judge from appearances,
and decide by plausibility; there is hardly a case which has not some
unexplored mystery, some undiscovered secret. The truth! Ah! do you
think M. Galpin has looked for it? If he did, why did he not summon
Cocoleu? But no, as long as he can produce a criminal, who may be
responsible for the crime, he is quite content. The truth! Which of us
knows the real truth? Your case, M. de Boiscoran, is one of those in
which neither the prosecution, nor the defence, nor the accused himself,
knows the truth of the matter.”
There followed a long silence, so deep a silence, that the step of
the sentinel could be heard, who was walking up and down under the
prison-windows. M. Folgat had said all he thought proper to say: he
feared, in saying more, to assume too great a responsibility. It was,
after all, Jacques’s life and Jacques’s honor which were at stake. He
alone, therefore, ought to decide the nature of his defence. If his
judgment was too forcibly controlled by his counsel, he would have had
a right hereafter to say, “Why did you not leave me free to choose? I
should not have been condemned.”