THE ARMY AND NAVY OF MEXICO.
THE MILITARY IN MEXICO BEFORE AND AFTER THE
REVOLUTION--CONFIRMATION OF ARMY--ITS POLITICAL USE.--CHARACTER OF
MEXICAN SOLDIERS--RECRUITING--TACTICS--OFFICERS.--DRAMATIC
CHARACTER OF ARMY--RECRIMINATIONS.--CONDITION OF THE ARMY AT THE
PEACE.--ARMY ON THE NORTHERN FRONTIER--MILITARY
COLONIES.--CHARACTER OF THE
TRIBES.--FORTRESSES--PEROTE--ACAPULCO--SAN JUAN DE
ULUA.--REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY--TABULAR VIEW OF MEN AND
MATERIEL.--NAVY--EXTENT OF COAST ON BOTH SEAS.--NAVAL
ESTABLISHMENT--VESSELS AND OFFICERS.--EXPENSES OF WAR AND NAVY.
We have already alluded, in the historical portion of this work to some
of the fostering sources of the Mexican army and to the evil results its
importance has produced in the country. The colonial forces designed for
the maintenance of order and due subjection in New Spain, were chiefly
sent from the old world until the wars in Europe required the mother
country to hoard its military resources. These foreign stipendiaries for
a long time sufficed to secure the loyalty of the emigrants; but as the
country grew in importance and numbers, and as the Indians revolted
against their task-masters, it became necessary from time to time to
call out reinforcements from the colonists; and when foreign invasion
was dreaded, these levies, as we have seen, were largely augmented from
all parts of the viceroyalty.
The idea of military service was, accordingly, not altogether unfamiliar
to the Mexican mind when the first insurrectionary movements occurred
under the lead of Hidalgo; but when the violent outbreak threatened to
degenerate into a war of _castes_, and to array the Indians against all
in whose veins circulated Castilian blood, it became the duty of the
settlers to cultivate that spirit and discipline which would, at least,
preserve them from utter destruction. The succeeding war of independence
converted the whole country for eleven years into a camp, and when the
strife terminated in success, it was found that a people, whose natural
temperament addicted them to military spectacles, had become habituated
and enured to a military career.
When the war was over and the power of Spain effectually broken, the
contest was transferred from a foreign enemy to domestic foes. Men who
had been accustomed for so long a period to military rule did not
immediately acquire the habit of self-government. National police
required a national army. Officers who had distinguished themselves in
an epoch when laws were silent and the only authorities recognized wore
the insignia of military life, did not forsake willingly the power they
enjoyed. Indeed, they were the only authentic personages capable of
enforcing obedience; and their adherents were soon armed against each
other in all the contentions for political position which vexed the
republic during the dawn of its national existence. Civil wars became
habitual. An army was an element of strength and success which no
military chieftain thought proper to crush. Rallying his disciplined
partizans, as long as his friends or his fortune supplied their support,
he was ready at a moment to take the field either for the maintenance of
a leader's cause or to secure his own elevation. Nor was this mode of
life disagreeable to the body of the army and inferior officers who were
lodged and fed at the public expense during a period when it was
difficult to find easy or agreeable civil employments in the distracted
realm. Each petty subaltern and even every common soldier, clad in the
livery of the state and carrying arms, was regarded by the unshod
_leperos_ and homeless vagrants as a personage of superior position; and
thus, whilst the army became at that epoch popular with the people it
had liberated from Spanish bondage, it ripened into a necessity of the
aspiring politicians who craved a speedier access to power than by the
slow and toilsome process of a republican canvass. The state, itself,
perceiving these manifold causes of military favor, utility, and
supposed need, preserved the army from all assaults by patriotic
congressmen, and thus the greatest curse and burthen of the nation,--the
origin and means of all its woes and all its despots,--was, from the
first, riveted to the body politic of Mexico.
It must not be supposed, however, that in speaking of the Mexican army
we design to compare it, either in detail or as an organized body, with
the troops of this country or of Europe. Neither in the mass of its
_materiel_, nor in its officers, does it vie with the trained and
disciplined forces of other civilized countries. Soldiers in Mexico are
rather actors in a political drama,--dressed and decorated for imposing
display,--than efficient warriors whose instruction and power make them
irresistible in the field. In all the engagements, or attempts to
engage, which occurred in Mexico since the termination of the war of
independence, there has been a laudable desire, at least among the
troops, to avoid the shedding of blood. Cities have been besieged and
bombarded; magnificent arrays of forces have been made on adjacent
fields; large camps have been formed and held in readiness; cannons,
loaded with cannister and grape, have been discharged along the crowded
highways of towns; marksmen have been placed in towers, steeples, and
_azoteas_, to pick off unwary passengers; divisions have been reviewed
and manœuvred in sight of each other, but, in all these revolts or
_pronunciamientos_, no pitched battles were fought which actually
terminated the contest by the gun and sword. The aspirant chief, or the
hero he designed to displace, managed to secure the _majority_ of the
neighboring military forces, and as soon as the fact was unequivocally
ascertained, the one who was in the _minority_ fled from the scene
without provoking a trial by battle. In 1840, 1841, and 1844, during the
administrations of Bustamante and Santa Anna, there were various
exhibitions of these sham contests; but, in all of them, we have reason
to believe that the innocent non-combatant people were the greatest
sufferers, and that the army escaped comparatively unscathed.
These observations are not designed to impugn the military nerve or
spirit of the Mexicans, for the war with the United States and the war
of their revolution, demonstrated that they unite both in quite an
eminent degree. Our officers believe that the Mexican possesses the
elements of a good soldier, but that he is neither trained, disciplined,
nor led, so as to make him a dangerous foe. This is demonstrated by the
result of the recent war and of every action fought during it. A brave
show and a bold assault were not stubbornly followed up with
pertinacious resolution, in spite of all resistance. The Mexicans were
fighting on their own soil, for their own country, against a hated foe,
yet they failed in every conflict, and with every conceivable disparity
of numbers.
The great body of the army is of course composed either of Indians or
mixed breeds, and the idea of nationality in its high love of a loveable
country, does not in all probability, animate or inspire these classes
in the hour of danger. They did not fight with a common or an understood
purpose. They were rather forced mercenaries than patriots. It was not a
war of enthusiasm. Every effort was made by grandiloquent proclamations
and false allegations to rally and nerve them; but whenever they crossed
arms with our forces, if they failed in the onset, like lions foiled in
their spring, they retreated to their lair. Nevertheless, throughout the
contest, there were repeated instances of courage, constancy, endurance,
and persistence which satisfied our officers that under a different
system of education and command, the Mexicans would make excellent
soldiers. Their horsemen, probably the best riders on the continent,
paid more attention to the management of their animals than to the use
of their horse's force in the charge; while their infantry and artillery
avoided those close quarters which make the bayonet so powerful a weapon
when directed by intrepid, unquailing arms in the presence and under the
lead of unflinching company officers. Their lancers did more damage to
dismounted victims than to erect and fighting foes.
With the majority of the rank and file, the army is, in all likelihood,
not a profession of choice. Enlistment is now scarcely ever voluntary.
When men are required for a new regiment or to fill companies thinned by
death or desertion, a sergeant is despatched with his guard to recruit
among the Indians and _peons_ of the neighborhood. The subaltern
probably finds these individuals laboring in the fields, and without
even the formality of a request, selects the best men from the group and
orders them into the ranks. If they resist or attempt to escape, they
are immediately _lazo'd_, and, at nightfall the gang is marched, bound
in pairs, to the nearest barrack, where the wretched victims of military
oppression are pursued by a mournful procession of wives and children
who henceforth follow their husbands or parents during the whole period
of service. From the hands of the recruiting sergeant the conscript
passes into those of the drill sergeant. The chief duty of this
personage is to teach him to march, countermarch, and to handle an
unserviceable weapon. From the drill sergeant he succeeds to the company
officer, and here, perhaps, he encounters the worst foe of his ultimate
efficiency.
Officers in Mexico have no thorough military and scientific education.
There is a military school at Chapultepec, near the capital, but it has
never been carefully and completely organized, nor has it furnished many
men who have distinguished themselves in the field. The politicians,
relying on the dramatic power of the army, made that army the means of
reward and influence in civil life, by selecting its officers of all
grades from every employment or occupation. Merchants, tradespeople,
professional men, children of wealthy or ambitious families, all
attained rank in the army by this unwise means, and the consequence has
been that the majority of company, and perhaps even of field officers,
was rather fitted to display the magnificent uniforms to which their
grades entitle them than to discipline the rank and file when organized
in battalions, regiments and divisions.
The picturesque and scenic efficiency of such an army will be easily
admitted, and the causes of its failure in the late war will be quite as
easily understood. What can be more deplorable in battle, even for the
victors, than to behold an undisciplined man badly led or driven into
conflict? What can be more disastrous for an officer than to stand in
the midst of blood and carnage, without knowing what to do in the moment
of trial when knowledge and presence of mind are imperatively needed?
Can it be surprising, therefore, to observe that the columns of Mexican
gazettes and pages of Mexican pamphlets published during the war, are
filled with the basest crimination and recrimination or the lamest
attempts at exculpation from disgraceful defeat?
A writer in the Monitor Republicano, speaking of the Mexican army, says,
you have nothing to do but to read the writings of its generals from the
commencement of the campaign, through the different actions and
skirmishes in chronological order, and it will be seen that they have
mutually called one another traitors, cowards, and imbeciles. He gives
the following list of recriminations:--"Arista accused Torrejon, Ampudia
and others; Torrejon Ampudia, while Uraga charged Arista; Jarregui
accused Carrasco and various chiefs; Carrasco accused Jarregui and other
generals; Mejia brought charges against Ampudia; Ampudia against him and
several leaders, as Carrasco, Enciso and others, principal officers of
the army. Urrea and others charged Parrodi with cowardice and treason;
Parrodi accused Urrea and Romero, and Romero accused the famous Miramon
of Mazatlan, the speculator in the goods taken by the troops of Urrea
from those of Gen. Taylor.
Requena accused Santa Anna; Santa Anna in his turn, Requena; Torrejon
and Juvera recriminate Requena; Requena, in his turn, Torrejon, Juvera
and Portilla. Santa Anna accused Miñon; Miñon accused Santa Anna and his
confederates. Santa Anna brought charges against Valencia, in Ciudad
Victoria; Valencia in his turn, accused Santa Anna. Viscayno accused
Heredia and Garcia Conde; these in turn, Viscayno. Santa Anna
recriminates against Canalizo, Uraga and others at Cerro Gordo;
Canalizo, Uraga, Gaona and others against Santa Anna. Santa Anna again
accuses Valencia in Padierna; Valencia accuses Santa Anna, Salas and
others, and Salas accuses Valencia, Torrejon and others. Santa Anna, in
the first actions in the valley, accuses everybody; he accuses Rincon,
Anaya, and the National Guard at Churubusco; in the other actions of
September, Terrés, Bravo and others. Bravo, Terrés and others in turn,
recriminate Santa Anna, Perdigon and Simeon Ramirez. Perdigon accuses
Simeon Ramirez and Terrés himself. Alvarez accuses Don Manuel Andrade,
and Andrade in turn accuses him. Alcorta accuses the Andrade of the
hussars, while he accuses Alcorta;--and in fine, we have before us the
letters and despatches of the whole of them--we have before us their
actions and skirmishes, from the battle of San Jacinto up to the
ignominious capture of Gaona and Torrejon by the Poblano robber,
Dominguez."
We have quoted these passages, to prove, by Mexican authority, that our
remarks upon the army are not made in a captious spirit or with a desire
to undervalue its officers ungenerously.
Bad as had been the organization and conduct of the army, they were not,
of course, improved by the results of the war. The _morale_ and the
_materiel_ were both destroyed, so that when our troops withdrew during
the summer of 1848, little more than a skeleton of the regiments
remained to preserve order. This was, indeed, one of the greatest
sources of dread to orderly Mexicans, for they feared that when all
foreign restraint was suddenly removed, the country would be given up to
anarchy. Without men and without means, the government justly
apprehended the uprising of the mob, nor were there demagogues wanting
to excite the evil passions of the masses by an outcry against the
treaty. At the head of this disgraceful movement was General Paredes,
who had returned from exile, but had not been trusted by the government
during the conflict. The payment of the first instalment of the sum
agreed upon in the treaty, however, enabled the authorities to maintain
tranquillity, and as soon as comparative order was enforced by a new
administration, the army was reorganized under a law passed on the 4th
of November, 1848. By this act, the military establishment was greatly
reduced, even on paper, and, in 1849, not more than five thousand two
hundred, rank and file, were in actual service.
If there were, in reality, no need of an army in Mexico to oppose a
foreign enemy, or, to preserve domestic peace, one would still be
required to secure the Northern Frontier against the incursions of
Indians. From the earliest periods, the Spaniards were vexed by their
savage assaults, and, since the establishment of independence, the
Mexicans have every year seen their people and property carried off by
the robber tribes, whilst their villages, _ranchos_ and _haciendas_ were
totally destroyed or partially ravaged.
Mexican engineers have calculated that the new boundary line, following
the course of the Rio Grande and the Gila and including a mathematical
line of seventy leagues between these streams, is six hundred and
forty-six leagues or about nineteen hundred miles in length.
Three-fourths of this line pass through an uninhabited region, and,
consequently, the savages have free access across it to the few and
small settlements on the border. Such an extent of frontier, though
considerably reduced from the former line anterior to the treaty, became
at once an object of concern to the government, especially as the people
of the United States immediately opened communications through the
Indian country with the Pacific, and would probably soon control the
important passes through the whole region north of the boundary.
Accordingly on the 20th of July, 1848, it was decreed that eighteen
MILITARY COLONIES should be created, and placed within easy
communication, so as to protect the southern settlers in some degree, or
to encounter and punish the savages in their forays. The greater
portions of the most warlike tribes were transferred by the treaty to
the United States, and, by one of its articles, we bound ourselves to
aid, at least, in saving the Mexicans from their plunder if we could not
totally destroy their inimical power. In the neighborhood of the
boundary, from near the mouth of the Gila to the commencement of the
mathematical line, before alluded to, we find the tribes known as
Coyotes, Mimbreños and Gileños, the former of whom wage war against
Sonora, whilst the latter attack Chihuahua. The Apaches and Cumanches
spread their numerous hordes from the vicinity of Chihuahua to the
sources of the Nueces, twenty-five leagues beyond the Rio Grande.
Besides these, there are, throughout this district many savage bands,
supporting themselves entirely by the chase, and it is probable,
according to the opinion of soldiers and captives, who have been among
the tribes, that all these clans can unite thirty thousand warriors,
whilst they still leave a sufficient number to protect their wigwams and
villages.
Fortunately for the white races, these barbarians are not able to
maintain peace among themselves. The Apaches and Cumanches are in
continual strife, and never return from the "war path" without serious
losses. It is not to be feared, therefore, that they will voluntarily
join in a general rising against our pioneers; yet a common danger, or a
common attack, might soon cement their hatred against the supposed
usurper, and, directed by a man of capacity, produce even a more
disastrous war than that with the Seminoles of Florida.
The Cumanches are numerous and active. They are divided into Caihuas,
Yamparicas, and Llaneros. The Apaches are braver than the Cumanches, and
are known as Meselaros and Lipanes. These barbarians arm themselves with
guns, rifles, lances, bows and arrows. They manage their weapons
admirably, are agile horsemen, and shoot with unerring aim. Tall and
majestic in figure; muscular and capable of enduring fatigue; accustomed
to live on the simplest food of the forest and to win it when necessary
by the arrow alone; uniting the sagacity of men with the instinct of
animals, these knights of the southern wilderness realize perfectly our
ideas of the daring aborigines who peopled this continent before it was
subdued by the white man. Their hatred of the Mexicans and the savage
fury with which they pursue their male captives of adult age, appear to
denote even a stronger, if not a worthier motive than robbery in their
attacks. At least six hundred women and children are borne off by them
every year from the settlements to their mountain fastnesses, and they
openly confess that they are not unwilling to improve their race by
mingling it with the white.
In order to maintain the southern frontier intact from these savages,
Mexico designs the establishment of these military colonies, and will,
in all probability, support them by a second or rear line of troops from
the regular army as well as by forts and strongholds erected in
positions affording easy access from the wilderness to inhabited
regions. A frontier so open, and thronged with such barbarous hordes,
could not be protected by military colonies alone.
* * * * *
The principal FORTRESSES and strongholds of Mexico have hitherto been
those of Perote, Acapulco, Ulua, and the citadels at Mexico and
Monterey. The present government has ordered the citadel of Mexico,
situated a short distance out of the town to be abandoned, as it only
formed a nucleus for the assemblage of the military factionists who have
constantly disturbed the peace of the republic. The citadel of Monterey
is to be maintained and suitably supported.
The castle at Acapulco, an extremely important point on the southern or
Pacific coast, is greatly impaired, and will require at least a hundred
thousand dollars to adapt it for defence. The fortress of Perote was
designed originally by the Spanish government as a depot for the
treasure intended for shipment from Vera Cruz, in which the gold and
silver would be safer than at an exposed sea port during that dangerous
period of Castilian history, when all the nations of Europe were anxious
to plunder her colonies. Situated far in the interior of the country
and in the midst of a wide plain, it does not absolutely command any of
the approaches either from the coast to the inner states, or to the
coast from the capital. It is, however, well placed as a military
arsenal, and demands an expenditure of about thirty thousand dollars to
render it useful to the nation.
The Castle of San Juan de Ulua, built on a reef opposite the town of
Vera Cruz, is in so ruinous a state that scarcely a million and a half
of dollars will suffice to restore it to its ancient splendor and power.
The one hundred and twenty-four guns now within its walls are all more
or less injured or dismounted. "To garrison this Castle properly," said
General Arista in his report as Minister of War in 1849, "two thousand
men will be required at a yearly cost of four hundred thousand dollars.
If this immense treasure is squandered on the Castle, it will surely be
wasted alone to preserve a vain luxury; for, as Mexico has no hope of
becoming a maritime power, San Juan de Ulua must always fall into the
possession of such a naval nation whenever it makes war upon us.
Experienced Spanish officers have recommended the dismantling of San
Juan, and they now urge it more strongly than ever, as there is far
greater reason to believe that it neither defends the nation nor even
the city of Vera Cruz. The French, and recently the Americans, have
convinced us of this fact; the first possessed themselves early of the
Castle, and the latter took the town without hindrance from the Castle."
Such is the opinion of one of the most experienced Mexican generals in
regard to a fortress which has hitherto been deemed impregnable, and,
although we do not agree with him in regard to its entire worthlessness
in the hands of abler engineers, we doubt whether its use is not greater
in checking the city of Vera Cruz itself, than in commanding the
approaches to it from the sea. It must be remembered that the lee of
this very Castle is the only comparatively safe harbor on the gulf at
present, and that until a _mole_ or breakwater shall be erected
elsewhere, it is only in certain seasons and under favorable
circumstances that large bodies of troops may be prudently disembarked
on the adjacent shores. The landing of General Scott, in 1847, was
singularly fortunate in time and circumstances, for, soon after, a
furious norther arose and prevented all communication between the land
and the squadron. These violent gales are sudden and terrific in their
rise and action at Vera Cruz, and the dreadful havoc they made among the
American shipping on the coast during the war, attests the value of a
military defence whose protective duties are seconded by the very
spirit of the storm. The introduction of steam power into the national
marine must of course greatly modify the character of coast defences;
but we would deem it not only unwise but imbecile to abandon altogether
a work which at least makes, if it does not perfectly protect, an
important harbor. The city of Vera Cruz, itself, is a regular
fortification, and with some important improvements and repairs, may not
ultimately require San Juan de Ulua to defend it from assault. These two
strongholds, combined, under the command of skilful generals and
garrisoned with efficient soldiers, would offer a churlish welcome to
any modern power either maritime or military. Their seizure, during the
winter months of tempest, would be almost impossible, and their
occupation, during the summer would be as fatal, as was unfortunately
proved by our troops in the June, July, and August, after the brilliant
siege and inglorious surrender.
The following tabular sketch prepared from Ministerial reports, exhibits
the condition of the Mexican forces at this epoch.
TABULAR VIEW OF THE RE-ORGANIZATION OF THE MEXICAN ARMY IN 1849.
STAFF OF THE ARMY.
12 Generals of divisions.
34 Brigadier generals.
4 Colonels.
5 Lieutenant Colonels.
1 Commandant of battalion.
13 Captains.
8 Lieutenants and 2d adjudants.
3 Ensigns.
--
80 Total.
ENGINEER CORPS.
1 Brigadier general.
2 Colonels.
4 Lieutenant colonels.
8 Captains.
--
15 Total.
MEDICAL STAFF, ACCORDING TO LAW.
1 Inspector.
1 Director of hospital.
8 Hospital professors.
40 Surgeons.
40 1st assistant surgeons.
40 2d " "
30 Apprentices.
18 Surgeons for military colonies.
2 Ambulance companies.
MATERIEL OF THE ARMY.
In actual service
1 Battalion of sappers, 399 individuals required by law, 220
8 Battalions of infantry, 6000 " " " 3526
12 Squadrons of cavalry, 1800 " " " 1911
2 Battalions of artillery, 1800 " " " 554
---- ----
Required by law, 9999 Only in service, 5211
THE ARMY AS REQUIRED BY LAW OF 4TH NOVEMBER, 1848.
17 Colonels.
16 Lieutenant colonels.
11 Commanders of squadrons, battalions and chiefs of division.
92 Captains.
108 2d adjudants, and lieutenants.
176 Sub-adjudants, sub-lieutenants and ensigns.
17 Chaplains.
133 1st serjeants; tambour majors; armorers; smiths.
384 2d serjeants.
1124 Corporals.
356 Musicians.
7954 Privates.
32 Wagon masters.
196 Drivers.
54 Arrieros.
1800 Cavalry horses.
214 Artillery horses.
687 Mules for purposes of traction.
422 Pack mules.
TABLE OF MILITIA REQUIRED IN ACTUAL SERVICE BY A DECREE OF 1ST DECEMBER,
1847.
For 6 active companies in Alvarado, Tehuantepec, Tuspan, Acayucan,
Acapulco.
For the battalion of Tampico. No. on the list. Of these there are in
actual service.
1 Lieutenant colonel, .... 1
1 1st adjudant--a captain, .... 1
1 Chaplain, .... ....
4 Captains, 6 7
5 Lieutenants, 6 7
9 Sub-lieutenants, 12 5
5 1st serjeants, 6 5
16 2d " 24 14
12 Musicians, 18 17
53 Corporals, 78 16
400 Privates, 600 181
--- --- ---
486 Total, 726 233
GARRISONS IN THE REPUBLIC.
In Guadalajara, 1
" Zacatecas, 2
" Jalapa, 4
" Perote, 1
" Vera Cruz, 2
" Puebla, 3
" Mexico, 7
" Queretaro, 1
" Guanajuato, 2
" S. Fernando de Rosas, 2
" Matamoros, 1
" Tampico, 1
" San Luis Potosi, 2
" Oajaca, 1
--
30
==
ARTILLERY.
Guns and mortars.
San Juan de Ulua, 124
Perote, 35
Acapulco, 22
Vera Cruz, 113
Monterey, ...
Campeche, ...
Mazatlan, ...
Mexico, 6
Tabasco, 1
Guadalajara, 9
San Luis Potosi, 8
Chiapas, 2
Chihuahua, ...
Bustamante's division, 4
---
324
===
Total number of _projectiles_, 52,019.
The field artillery consists of 16 batteries.
NAVY.
The coast of the republic, now greatly reduced by the treaty of
Guadalupe, extends on the Gulf of Mexico, from the Rio Grande or Rio
Bravo del Norte, to the port of Bacalar on the east of the peninsula of
Yucatan, and comprehends in this distance, about five hundred and
eighty-four leagues. The Pacific coast begins one league from San Diego
in Lower California, and terminates at the Barra de Ocos in the Gulf of
Tehuantepec, a distance of one thousand five hundred and twenty leagues,
including the coasts of the Gulf of California, or sea of Cortéz.
Consequently the coasts of the republic extend, in all, two thousand one
hundred and four leagues, demonstrating the admirable situation of this
country for commerce with all the world. The ports which are open for
foreign trade in the Mexican Gulf, are Matamoros, Tampico, Vera Cruz
Campeché, Sisal, and the island of Carmen; while, on the Pacific, there
are the ports of Guayamas, Mazatlan, San Blas, Manzanillo, and Acapulco,
the latter of these being the best in the possession of Mexico, on the
great western ocean. Its harbor is excellent; its distance from the
capital is comparatively short; its population is larger than that of
other towns on the coast, and in consequence of the difficulty of
landing elsewhere than in the actual port, the government is effectually
secured against illicit trade. It is a site which should unquestionably
be protected and fostered, not only on account of the advantages we have
mentioned, but because it will become a source of riches to the new
state of Guerrero, whose government will contribute to cement the peace
and tend to establish the permanent dominion of good order in that
quarter.
* * * * *
The navy of all countries originates in their commerce, but Mexico,
although situated as we have shown most advantageously for trade, has
hitherto possessed but few merchantmen and a small marine. The vessels
of war owned by the republic, previous to the conflict with the United
States, were either sold, or disarmed, dismantled and laid up, when the
nation was menaced with an attack. It was evident to the Mexican
cabinet, that the navy could not cope with ours, and in order to prevent
its total loss, the few vessels were voluntarily withdrawn from the sea.
The officers, however, were generally employed in land duties during the
contest, and most of them remained in service until the summer of 1848,
when the most efficient were permanently confirmed in their employments,
whilst the rest were allowed to retire on unlimited leave.
In considering the actual condition of the national trade and treasury,
the government did not believe, on the re-establishment of peace, that
it would be justified in creating at once an extensive naval
establishment, nevertheless it was convinced that the security of the
coasts, the protection of its own small trade, and the interest of its
maritime custom houses, rendered the creation of a _flotilla_
indispensable. With this view the minister of war and marine recommended
in 1849 the naval establishment which is shown in the following table.
NAVAL ESTABLISHMENT OF MEXICO, 1849.
The actual naval force consists at present of 1 schooner only; but
the secretary of war recommended, in addition, the construction of:
V {1 steamer mounting {1 swivel 32 paixhan and 2 short 12
E { { pounders.
S {
S {2 cutters suitable for coast service, capable of passing the shallow
E {bars of rivers, of 70 or 75 tons, and carrying 1 swivel 18
L {pounder, and one 12 pounder each.
S {
. {4 launches of 20 oars, each of which must be capable of carrying
{an 18 pounder.
Officers. In Service. On Leave
{ Captains _de Navio,_ 3 -
{ " _de Fragata,_ 6 3
{ 1st Lieutenant, 1 5
{ 2d " 7 11
{ 1st Midshipmen, - 4
{ 2d " - 1
{ Intendentes, 2 -
{ Commissaries, 7
{ 1° Officiales, 4 6
{ 2° " 5 11
{ 3° " 4 7
{ Clerks, - 11
Expenses of War and Navy of Mexico, 1849, estimated by the Minister.
Ministry of war and navy, $55,890..0..06
Supreme tribunal of war, 82,770..7..00
Staff of the army, 133,500..0..00
" of the president, 10,345..4..00
Headquarters of the army, 50,399..2..06
_Commandancias generales and militares_, 234,378..5..00
_Detall de plazas_, 10,320..0..00
Engineers, sappers, military college and school, 218,788..5..06
Permanent artillery, political ministry,
workmen and baggage train, 670,985..0..00
8 Battalions of permanent infantry, 1,290,567..1..00
1 Battalion of active infantry and 6 companies, 253,109..7..06
12 squadrons of permanent cavalry in 6 corps, 628,886..0..00
Military colonies, 727,572..0..00
Medical staff and ambulance companies, 144,025..4..00
Expenses at San Luis, 5,038..2..00
Invalids, 84,122..7..06
Staffs of the army, divisions and brigades, 43,460..3..00
Officers who by the law of 4th November, 1849, are to
receive unlimited leave, 328,644..0..06
Officers on unlimited leave, 292,762..5..10
" retired, 668,614..1..07
Disbanded troops, 101,283..3..00
Widows, orphans, and pensioners, 403,499..2..06
Rewards for bravery, 15,295..6..07
For military hospitals and extras, 100,000..0..00
For improvement and repair of military barracks, 30,241..0..00
Contract for mules for artillery trains, 34,875..6..00
Extra expenses of war, 500,000..0..00
Expenses of establishment of military colonies, 498,635..4..00
Military commission of statistics, 12,098..0..00
Naval employés, (military and political,) 55,623..7..00
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Total expenses war and navy in 1849, $7,685,733..6..06