“The other branch was more immediately the representatives of
the people, _and it was a maxim that the people ought to hold
the purse-strings_.”[38]
How, Sir, can the people hold the purse-strings, unless they hold the
bills by which the purse is appropriated?
And Colonel Mason broke forth in language clearly revealing his sense
of danger against which to guard.
“If the Senate can originate, they will, in the recess of
the legislative sessions, hatch their mischievous projects
for their own purposes, and have their _money bills_ cut and
dried (to use a common phrase) for the meeting of the House of
Representatives.”[39]
I repeat, then, according to the reason of the rule, the great
appropriation bills must be embraced by the prohibition.
_Secondly._ There is a further consideration, founded on the familiar
use of the term _money bills_ throughout the debates in the Convention,
as applicable to bills which the Senate cannot originate. I need not
occupy time by reference to instances; but whoever takes the trouble to
investigate the matter in Mr. Madison’s report of the debates, and also
in the report of the Virginia Convention, will find that this term is
universally employed,--unless, indeed, where Mr. Gouverneur Morris uses
the broader term “money plans,”[40] and Mr. Gerry “money matters.”[41]
Now all these phrases are clearly applicable to “appropriation bills,”
by which the Government is carried on; and the inference seems
irresistible, that the parties who used them must have had such bills
in mind.
In the Virginia Convention objection was made by Mr. Grayson “to the
power of the Senate to propose or concur with _amendments to money
bills_.” The objection is even to “amendments.” He pronounced this “a
departure from that great principle which required that the _immediate
representatives_ of the people only should interfere with _money
bills_.… The Lords in England had never been allowed to intermeddle
with money bills. He knew not why the Senate should.”[42]
_Thirdly._ This brings me to another consideration, founded on the
example of England, which was obviously present to the framers of
the Constitution. The Senator from Virginia [Mr. HUNTER] is clearly
mistaken on this point. It was often adduced in debate in the National
Convention, and, as we have just seen, in the Virginia Convention also.
In England the rule is explicit, and of ancient date. As early as July
3, 1678, the Commons resolved:--
“That all aids and supplies, and aids to his Majesty in
Parliament, are the sole gift of the Commons; _and all bills
for the granting of any such aids and supplies ought to begin
with the Commons; and that it is the undoubted and sole right
of the Commons to direct, limit, and appoint, in such bills,
the ends, purposes, considerations, conditions, limitations,
and qualifications of such grants_, which ought not to be
changed or altered by the House of Lords.”[43]
In pursuance of this rule, estimates for the annual expenditure are
submitted by the Ministry to the House of Commons, sitting as a
Committee of Supply. This process is explained as follows.
“The member of the Administration representing the department
for which the supplies are required first explains to the
Committee such matters as may satisfy them of the correctness
and propriety of the estimates, and then proceeds to propose
each grant in succession, which is put from the Chair in these
words: ‘That a sum not exceeding ---- be granted to her Majesty,
for the object specified in the estimate.’ … The Committee of
Supply votes every sum which is granted annually for the public
service,--the army, the navy, the ordnance, and the several
civil departments.”[44]
At the close of the session all the grants are embodied in a bill,
which is known as “Appropriation Bill,” and, as it is kindred in
character to that under our system, doubtless has given its name to
ours. This bill is thus described:--
“It enumerates every grant made during the whole session, and
authorizes the several sums, as voted by the Committee of
Supply, to be issued and applied to each service.”[45]
Thus, on three grounds,--first, by the reason of the thing,--secondly,
by the familiar use in all the debates of the descriptive term, “money
bills,”--and, thirdly, by the example of England,--the conclusion is
inevitable, that “appropriation bills,” _by which the Government is
carried on_, are within the spirit of the interdict upon the Senate,
and that this body cannot originate such bills without violation of a
well-established principle inherited from English jurisprudence, and
also without _unhinging_, according to the language of Colonel Mason,
that compromise by virtue of which the small States are admitted to
equality of representation on this floor.
I am not unmindful of the fact, on which the Senator from Virginia has
dwelt so emphatically, that the Senate is in the habit of originating
pension bills, also bills for payment of private claims, and kindred
measures. I was glad, to-day, to vote for the bill originating in
this body for the relief of our late distinguished Minister at
Constantinople.[46] But against this usage, which is exceptional
in character, and has probably attracted little attention, from
its considerable convenience and little importance, may be opposed
the uniform practice by which the great bills providing for the
necessities of the Government have always originated in the House of
Representatives. And you will bear in mind, Sir, that the question is
now on these bills.
Mr. President, it is a received maxim, that it is the part of a good
judge to amplify his jurisdiction; but it will hardly be accepted,
that it is the part of the American Senate to amplify its powers,
particularly in derogation of the popular branch. And it surely cannot
escape observation, that the present effort is launched at a moment
when the popular branch promises to differ from the Senate on important
questions of national policy. I am not insensible to the public
convenience, which has been pressed in this debate; but permit me to
say, Sir, that, should this convenience require the proposed departure
from our standing policy, we shall be wise, if we hearken to the
counsels of the Senator from New York, and refrain from any innovation,
unless assured of the consent and coöperation of the other House.