“He thought it evident that the concession was wholly on one
side, that of the large States; the privilege of originating
_money bills_ being of no account.”[34]
At a later stage of the debates the subject was resumed, and the two
propositions still appear together.
“Mr. Rutledge [of South Carolina] proposed to reconsider the
two propositions touching the originating of _money bills_ in
the first, and the _equality of votes_ in the second branch.”
“Mr. Sherman [of Connecticut] was for the question on the whole
at once. It was, he said, _a conciliatory plan_. It had been
considered in all its parts.”
“Mr. Luther Martin [of Maryland] urged the question on the
whole. He did not like many parts of it.… He was willing,
however, to make trial of the plan, rather than do nothing.”
“Mr. Gerry [of Massachusetts] did not approve of a
reconsideration of the clause relating to _money bills_. It
was of great consequence. _It was the corner-stone of the
accommodation._”[35]
At a still later stage Mr. Pinckney moved to strike out the section
on money bills, “as giving no peculiar advantage to the House of
Representatives, and as clogging the Government.” Mr. Gorham “was
against allowing the Senate to _originate_, but was for allowing
it only to _amend_.” Mr. Gouverneur Morris urged, that it was
“particularly proper that the Senate should have the right of
originating _money bills_. They will sit constantly, will consist of
a smaller number, and will be able to prepare such bills with due
correctness, and so as to prevent delay of business in the other
House.” To all this Colonel Mason replied, in the strong language which
seems to have been natural to him, that he “was unwilling to travel
over this ground again. _To strike out the section was to unhinge the
compromise of which it made a part._”[36]
I might adduce other authorities; but here surely is enough to show
that the provision was in reality one of the important compromises of
the Constitution.
* * * * *
This brings me, Sir, to the precise meaning of the provision. The
seeming indefiniteness of the term, “bills for raising revenue,”
may alone furnish apology for the present debate. It may be argued,
that, while the Senate is placed under certain restrictions, it may
nevertheless originate “appropriation bills.” This, of course, is a
question of interpretation. Does this interdict upon the Senate extend
to bills by which money is appropriated to the support of Government,
as well as to bills by which it is directly obtained? Are appropriation
bills included under the term, “bills for raising revenue”? Now I
cannot accord with opinions so confidently expressed by the Senator
from Virginia [Mr. HUNTER], and the Senator from Georgia [Mr. TOOMBS],
that it was clearly the intention of the Constitution to concede to the
Senate the power of originating all appropriation bills; nor, on the
other hand, do I assert that such exercise of power is in the strict
sense unconstitutional. I approach the question as an inquirer anxious
to find the real purpose.
Several considerations seem to shed light on the path to our conclusion.
_First._ The compromise between the small States and large States
can be made completely effective, according to obvious intent of
the authors of the Constitution, only by interdicting the Senate
from originating the great appropriation bills. If this interdict is
restricted simply to tariff bills, which occur only at rare intervals,
it becomes a very inadequate compensation for the surrender by the
large States to the small States in the constitution of the Senate.
According to the reason of the rule, the great appropriation bills must
be equally within its intendment. The reason is as strong in one case
as in the other.