A SHORT COMPARISON OF THE TROOPS
A few notes on the equipment, methods, formations, and arms used
by the different contingents seems to be not out of place; and as
our friends the enemy had such a lot to do with the campaign, it is
merely courteous to treat them first. They must be considered in
two quite different classes—the Boxers, and the Regular Army. The
former were the cause of the whole trouble, and comprised a large
percentage of the total male population of Chibliat at the beginning
of the outbreak; but their fanaticism rapidly waned as their power
decreased, and by the middle of August they became despised even
by the Chinese troops, who had once held them in great dread. An
extraordinary feature about their composition was the large number
of immature youths and senile old men who flocked to their banner.
Their arms consisted of swords and spears, until towards the close
of the Tientsin campaign, when they were largely armed with old
rifles: a chance of wasting an exceptional amount of ammunition which
was eagerly seized upon by these ignorant peasants, who doubtless
succeeded in expending considerably more than the ton of lead which
is somewhere named as each man’s allowance before he is struck. Thus
it proves that as foes they were contemptible.
Without formation, without arms, with readers as ignorant as the
common ruck, all that they could hope to do was to murder the few
outlying missionaries that stuck to their missions, and to burn their
residences over their dead bodies. Women and children became, once
their male protectors had been accounted for, an easy prey to the
inhuman murderers, who afterwards gloated over their mangled and
unrecognisable corpses. Before bitter experience had taught these
ruffians a lesson, they were daring in the extreme, and looked down
on the Imperial troops with great disdain; but having been placed in
the forefront of the engagement on one or two occasions, and having
suffered accordingly, they lost their contempt for death surprisingly
quickly, and losing spirit, were seen to real advantage for the last
time in their attacks on the Peh-tang Cathedral.
Among other incidents of their earlier share in the Campaign must
be mentioned their attacks on Seymour’s column, in which they
displayed wonderful faith in the efficacy of their supposed charms,
and a still more wonderful fearlessness. In the matter of dress
each one pleased himself, but there was a “rig” which proclaimed a
Boxer immediately, and which was affected by those able to get the
necessary materials. Made, as nearly all Chinese clothes are, of
cotton, with the typical Mancha jacket, and loose baggy trousers
caught in at the ankle with strings, their attire was in colour blue
with a red sash, red waistbands, and red anklets. The leaders were
distinguishable by the large amount of yellow they wore, as did the
Buddhists among them, and a final distinctive mark were their red and
black standards. These gaudy flags had various mottoes on them; and
on seeing a literal translation of one of them, one is not inclined
to believe that “Live and let live” chanced to be inscribed on any
of the others. The sum total of their achievements from beginning
to end amounts to very little, consisting as it did of murdering a
hundred or so defenceless Europeans; a thousand certainly, probably
thousands, of equally defenceless Chinamen, who had either offended
them or refused to join them; and doing thousands of pounds’ worth
of damage to railway, telegraph, and house property, irrespective of
their owner’s nationality.
Very different in every respect were the regular troops. These were
of the best in China,—in fact the troops of Generals Nieh, Ma,
and Tung-fu-Hsiang are second only to those of Yuan-Shi-Kai, the
enlightened governor of Shantung, who, as some think luckily for
the Europeans, preferred to sit on the gate and watch the trend of
events, before taking any decisive and possibly disastrous move. He
is a very able and progressive man, who doubtless saw the futility
of attempting to cope with the world in arms, and so maintained a
most correct attitude throughout. Many if not most of the troops who
confronted the allies were foreign trained, it being an interesting
fact that among the first instructors who were employed by the
government was a naval gunnery instructor from H.M.S. “Cambridge,”
also that among the British force during the attack on the Taku Forts
was a gunner who had served the Chinese in the late Chinese-Japanese
War. Their tactics and movements were certainly somewhat out of
date, and consisted for the most part of parade movements, but
several times the “attack” was carried out as laid down in the
drill book, with the exception of the “Charge and Cheer,” without
which, of course, the attack is doomed to failure against an enemy
who is always disobliging enough to wait for “close quarters.” The
efficiency of the various armies was to a great extent impaired by
the diversity of their arms, and a great deficiency in knowledge of
the simplest strategy. Another point, and an important one, was the
utter want of ability to lead their men which was markedly displayed
throughout by their company officers. Their general officers seemed
capable of drawing their men up to an engagement skilfully, their
guns were well posted, and their defensive positions good almost
without exception; yet when the range became close there always
appeared to be no one in command of the fighting line; the men acted
independently, and what had often promised to be an overwhelming
attack gradually fizzled away to a bloody repulse.
The movement of a Chinese army must prove a terrible imposition on
the people of the district through which it moves, for it lives
entirely on the country, and it is doubtful if military mandarins are
more honest in their dealings with inferiors than other officials;
which means that the army leaves a track of desolation wherever it
goes. For the greater part of the campaign the Imperial troops
were well fed, but towards the latter stages of the retreat from
the Allies, they appear to have been actually starving, and in two
instances government granaries were burst into and robbed by the
famished men. Their arms were generally excellent, but the ammunition
supply must have been a sore trial to whoever was responsible for it.
I have seen the following types of firearms in use by Chinese troops
myself, and doubtless others. Sniders, Springfield, Martinis, Marlin,
three kinds of Winchesters, three kinds of Mausers, one Mauser
carbine, two kinds of Mannlicher, one Mannlicher carbine, and by the
Boxers several kinds of Jingals, Sniders, Marlins, and Winchesters.
As a matter of fact the arms which were used by far the most were
the best Mauser and Mannlicher magazine rifles, and whoever did look
after the ammunition supply was an excellent organiser, for the
enemy had always a seemingly unlimited amount. On several occasions
millions of rounds of small arms ammunition were destroyed at a time;
but although at all times extremely wasteful, and often firing all
through a pitch dark night, they never ran short up to the end.
It is a much debated point whether the Chinese are good rifle shots.
Some undoubtedly are, but taking into consideration that the
Europeans were generally the aggressors over open country, and always
in great numerical inferiority, it would seem that, as their fire
was always exceedingly heavy and sustained, the Allies should have
suffered more. And yet, glancing at the statistics of the fighting
outside Tientsin, and seeing 775 casualties in one day, nearly all
from rifle fire, the fact is brought home to one that the Chinese
soldiery were not the contemptible foemen that they were supposed
to have been by people ignorant alike of their training and arms.
The infantry uniform was usually blue or black in colour, with red
and yellow facings. Instead of showing his regiment and battalion on
shoulder straps, like his European _confrère_, the Chinese soldier
has a white parchment, circular in shape, sewn on to his chest and
back, which at any range under 400 yards makes an ideal bullseye;
and doubtless this idiotic idea was responsible for the death of a
great number of them. In shape their uniform approaches very nearly
to the national dress, and is admirably adapted to free movement
of the limbs. Their headgear was usually missing, but consists of
either the little round Chinese hat; or a species of sun hat white
in colour. Their boots were of the Wellington variety, into which
their trousers were tucked; they had _papier maché_ soles, and
either cotton or velvet uppers lined with canvas. These boots were
both serviceable and comfortable, but owing to the smallness of a
Chinaman’s foot, when compared to a European’s, it was seldom that
any of the Allies were able to replace their worn-out footgear from
any captured stock. Their accoutrements were simple, consisting only
of a leather belt, on which were carried their ammunition pouches,
the frog for their bayonets, and an entrenching tool, very similar to
the Wallace spade used by the British. Some carried their ammunition
in woollen bandoliers, but the majority were armed with clip-loading
rifles, and so pouches Were the usual form of carrier to be met with.
Their heavy marching order I am unable to describe, never having seen
a soldier, either living or dead, so attired. This is explained by
the fact that, like the Allies, their radius of action was limited to
a few miles round their position, and there was no need of carrying
even food with them for more than twenty-four hours. They carried no
water-bottle for presumably the same reason. Finally, the Chinese
infantryman of to-day only wants good leading to become a formidable
foe. With a little more training in addition, there is every reason
to believe that they would become a fighting force worthy to rank
with our excellent Indian troops.
A different state of affairs is disclosed on coming to discuss the
artillery. Here is a thoroughly well-trained and efficient branch of
the army, of whom many of the Allied officers spoke with considerable
respect, and who, having excellent weapons, used them with effect in
nearly every engagement. Their fortress artillery was of the best,
comprising guns of the following sizes and denominations: 6-in.
Armstrong Q.F., 6-in. Krupp Q.F., 4.7-in. Krupp Q.F., 9.4-in. Krupp
B.L. (nominally Q.F.), 8.2-in. Krupp Q.F., 5-in. B.L. on Vavasseur
mountings, and many other breech and muzzle-loading guns of but
little value. Their field guns consisted of 3.8-in. Q.F. Krupp,
17-pr. and 15-pr. batteries, 6-pr., 3-pr., and 1-pr. batteries, all
of a modern type, and for the most part turned out by the great
German gun factory at Essen. In addition to these, they had several
1-pr. Maxims (Pom-Poms), and in one arsenal alone a large number
of Maxims were found, and taken or destroyed. It is impossible to
estimate the numbers of each type above mentioned, but their guns
were very numerous, and, as in the case of small arms, the supply
was good and in plenty; and when it is added that the officers chose
good positions for the guns and handled them well, and the gunners
were quick at picking up ranges, and accurate in their fire when the
range had been found, it goes without saying that the Allies found
them a nuisance, the only mitigation of which lay in their capture or
destruction.
Of the cavalry but little was seen. They were somewhat _en evidence_
during the relief of Admiral Seymour’s expedition, when they shaped
but poorly; and on one occasion they gave battle to the Bengal
Lancers, who entirely defeated a body of Tartars several times as
numerous as themselves. They are armed with good German-made swords
and excellent magazine Mannlicher carbines, large stores of each
weapon being taken at Hsi-Ku arsenal. They were well-mounted on hardy
Tartar ponies, well led, and should be a serviceable body of troops.
The Chinese soldier then, may be said to be a fair infantryman, a
good gunner, but a poor cavalryman. In each case there is room for
much improvement, not so much among the rank and file, as among the
company leaders and the “Brain” of the army.
BRITISH.—At first sight it may seem unnecessary to touch upon either
the equipment or the internal economy of any British Force; but it
is an unpleasant fact that but few Englishmen really know what a
bluejacket looks like even on board his ship, and still fewer have
any idea of his organisation when “clearing up decks” ashore in the
out-of-the-way parts of the world, in which his services as a soldier
are more often required than is commonly supposed. Thus the matter
becomes of interest; and as the looks and methods of the soldiers,
both British and Indian, are more easily read about, and therefore
more widely known, it is only proposed to treat of the Naval Brigade
and the Chinese regiment, which latter was at the time the growth
of little more than a year. The organisation of a body of seamen
working ashore is much as follows: A battleship, on receiving orders
to land every available man for service like the one we are dealing
with, would probably have the following numbers told off: Marines 80
to 100, four companies of bluejackets consisting of one lieutenant,
two midshipmen, with fifty petty officers and men each. Two Maxim
guns, crews consisting of two officers and twelve men each; two
field guns, crews consisting of eighteen men and two officers each.
In addition to these there would be officer commanding and staff,
officer commanding marines and staff, one doctor, two sick-berth
attendants with medical necessities, four or five signalmen,
buglers, blacksmiths, armourers, carpenters, cook’s mate, an officer
of the accountant branch, and two or three subordinates, one ship’s
corporal, and a strong stretcher party of stokers under an engineer
officer. Thus it will be seen that each battleship can with ease
land 450 men, and is turned out as a complete unit, the men being
under their own officers, and self contained in every detail. A
bluejacket’s arms are identical with those used by the army, but
his accoutrements differ somewhat widely. One of the most important
differences is the number of rounds carried, and another one is the
method of carrying them. In the one case the bluejacket carries 160
cartridges, and the soldier or marine nominally 70, which latter
number, however, is, always augmented by stowing other packets of
ammunition on the person, in the haversack, etc. In the other case
the bluejacket is provided with braces on to which two bandoliers
are fastened, one going across the body, the other passing along
the belt which carries the haversack, bayonet, water-bottle, and
the two ammunition pouches. These two pouches carry—one 60 rounds,
the other 40; the bandoliers 25 each, which with 10 rounds in the
magazine of the rifle, total 160. Now the marines have only two
pouches, both carried in front on the belt, in each of which are
carried 30 rounds. The reason for this smaller supply of ammunition
is not quite obvious, unless it be that the Army always have an
ammunition and baggage train, whereas the Navy endeavour to carry as
much as possible on their persons. It is a point open to debate as
to which equipment is the better, but the bandolier system has great
advantages. The cartridges are more easily got at in a hurry, and men
are not apt to lose half their ammunition by leaving their pouches
open. This generally occurs when advancing to the attack by rushes,
and a serious wastage occurs. The fault of the bandolier seems to
be that it smothers the men on a long march, by which is meant that
it allows of no air passage inside their jumpers. Another point of
difference is the gaiter. The navy wear a stout brown canvas legging,
very serviceable and much more comfortable than the stiff black
leather one worn by the marines, though not so supporting as the
more modern puttie. Our men landed in blue serge uniform, and this
is the usual fighting rig; the alternatives being white duck—which
is, of course, too conspicuous, and was dyed khaki with Condy’s
fluid, until some of the real article was forthcoming. The marines
for the most part landed in their working rig, and generally fought
in their shirt sleeves, the exception being the detachment from the
“Terrible,” who wore the khaki they had used whilst fighting in South
Africa. Their equipment is so nearly akin to the infantry as to
require no description.
Warehouses were used as barracks, and all the routine was carried
out in a naval manner as much as possible. There was the fo’c’sle,
the quarterdeck, forward and aft, just the same as on board ship,
the time was registered by striking bells (in this case empty 4-in.
cartridge cases) and all orders were given by the pipe,—in fact it
was quite evident that the men had in no wise changed from sailor to
soldier, just because they were fighting off their own element. For
a hospital the British had the English club, and the way that the
many cases were treated by a very short-handed staff, with almost
no appliances, was little short of marvellous. In this respect the
British force compared very favourably with all other nations, until
the main body of the Japanese army arrived. When moving out from
the defences for any distance, the men always carried forty-eight
hours’ provisions. These consisted of tinned meat and ship’s biscuit,
palatable and sustaining; each man carried his water-bottle capable
of containing about a quart, and it must be noted that several of
the ship’s companies were supplied with the obsolete wood pattern,
which were not especially satisfactory. The commissariat was run by
assistant paymasters, and worked smoothly and efficiently throughout,
the only wants being vegetables, fresh provisions, and good water
in any quantity. The position of the author makes it not only out
of place, but impossible, to criticise the methods, tactics, or
strategy of the Naval Brigade; but he may be allowed to express an
opinion that in keenness, discipline, pluck, and powers of endurance,
they, bluejackets and marines, were second to none. Good alike in
attack and defence, it is probable that the results achieved by
their labours were at least as important as those obtained by the
representatives of any other power. The role played by them in this
Campaign was almost entirely that of infantrymen, but of course there
were occasions when they used their guns. These consisted of two
4-in. Q.F. naval guns on modified “Scott” mountings, several 12-pr.
muzzle-loading field guns, which although a disgrace to the service,
were used on several occasions with great effect, several 6-pr. Q.F.
(used in trains), Maxims and Nordenfelts. The part of artilleryman
too was played with striking success at Taku Forts, and speaking
generally, the guns of the Brigade may be said to have done work of
exceptional merit throughout.
The Wei-Hai-Wei regiment was, it can hardly be gainsaid, a great
success. Only eighteen months enlisted, they were sent to a
neighbouring province to fight under their new officers, against
possibly their own flesh and blood, and the way they did it makes
Gordon’s praise of the Chinese fighting man easily understandable.
A part of them had already been tried a few months before, when
there was a small rising at Wei-Hai-Wei, in connection with the
delimitation of the frontier line, and on this occasion they showed
an extraordinary devotion to their officers, and a pride in their
discipline worthy of great praise. A story is told to the effect
that on the day following a skirmish with the disturbing element,
one of the privates asked for a day’s leave to go and bury his
father. On being questioned as to the truth of the matter, he assured
the officer that it was correct, saying, “Oh yes, me shootee him
yesterday.” On the present occasion the desire to go to the front was
so keen, that crowds of them used to wait on the shore for a ship to
come to take them to Taku, and some of them becoming disappointed,
deserted. It is worthy of remark that not one deserter took even
a cartridge belonging to the Government away with him, and they
must have deserted in a state of nudity. Their uniform consists of
a neat Khaki suit—tunic and knee breeches—a sailor straw hat, blue
putties, and serviceable boots. The queue is worn coiled up beneath
the hat. The men are very big, finely built fellows who carry
themselves and their uniform well, so that the _tout ensemble_ is
smart and workmanlike. The winter uniform consists of a blue turban,
blue serge uniform, shaped as before with a red cummerbund, and a
warm grey overcoat in addition. Their appearance in this uniform is
exceptionally clean and businesslike. For arms each man carries one
of the excellent Martini-Metfords, a single loader of the same bore
as the Lee-Metford and Lee-Enfield rifles, but having the old Martini
triangular (section) bayonet. The service water-bottle and other
fittings are carried in the same way as the infantry. Their share
in the campaign was somewhat small owing to lack of numbers, but
whenever called upon, they fought well, marched well, drilled well,
and behaved creditably always.
The FRENCH forces with whom the Naval Brigade had anything to do
consisted for the most part of the Infanterie de la Marine, and some
Tonquinese troops. Some of the regular line regiments, and some
excellent artillery, arrived in time to take a not very glorious
share in the relief of Pekin, but as they had no opportunities of
working with the Naval contingents, it is not proposed to attempt a
description of them. The French Marines, as they were fallaciously
called, were clad in a hideous ill-fitting suit of blue cotton.
They wore a white helmet trimmed with blue, likewise hideous, and
generally worn with the back side foremost. Their heavy marching
order was of the heaviest description, and in common with the uniform
already mentioned, went far to create a slovenly and unsoldierlike
appearance. Their arms consisted of the Le-Bel rifle, an 8-shot
magazine weapon, differing from the majority of magazine rifles in
that the magazine is after the old Winchester type, carrying the
cartridges up underneath the barrel, and unsatisfactory, because each
round fired must materially alter the balance of the weapon. Their
ammunition was carried in side pouches, and they had a serviceable
water-bottle. The bayonet was totally unlike any used by the various
other troops, and was a most cruel-looking article. About 18 inches
long, with a white metal handle, and a good method of attachment, its
extraordinary feature lies in the blade. It can be likened to nothing
better than a long steel used for sharpening knives, yet it was not
so thick, and it had four deep grooves running along it from the base
to within an inch of the point. It certainly looked a very deadly
weapon, but appears to lack strength. Also, unlike our sword-bayonet,
which seems to be the commonest type in use, it is quite useless for
any other purpose but man-killing, as it has no edge. The hospital
and transport arrangements seemed good, and the behaviour of the
men, until all danger was over, was all that could be desired.
Unfortunately, however, there appeared to be a great diminution of
discipline after each engagement, and still more so when affairs at
Tientsin had quietened down. The men seemed to lack the much vaunted
qualities of the French _piou-piou_ to a most lamentable degree,
and on the only occasion on which a really hard march was called
for, before the dreary advance to Pekin, the men straggled terribly.
Their native troops, mostly Annamites, were small, of poor physique,
and compared in no way favourably with our strapping Wei-Hai-Wei
regiment. They were dressed in a sort of Khaki, and armed with an old
single-shot carbine with a long sword-bayonet. Their headgear was
a board, from which fell a neck covering of Khaki cloth, and their
footgear was usually wanting—by which it is not meant to infer that
no boots were provided, but that they preferred to march barefooted.
The detachment accompanied the French force as artillery, but seemed
to be usually employed at fatigue duties, at which they probably
excelled. It is at least likely that they were more useful thus,
for the little mountain battery which they occasionally laboriously
carried about, was as much use as our battery of 7-prs., manned by
the Hong-Kong artillery. Of them it was said by a French officer,
“_Ils n’aiment pas être tués_.” Whether he expected any one to affect
great surprise, or whether it was his way of saying that they were a
little “cold-footed,” may be left to the imagination of the reader.
RUSSIANS.—Considering the vast amount of experience the Russians
must have gained by their long occupation of, and constant service
in, Asiatic territories, it is surprising that their equipment was
perhaps the least adapted to the climatic conditions of the country,
and their accoutrements the least serviceable, of all the Allied
forces. This is the more strange when it is probably true that, with
the exception of our own troops, those of Russia do more service,
akin to active service, than those of any other country. It also
certainly seems to be a rash statement which I have seen made, in
view of the actual fact, that, after the Japanese, the Russians stood
the very trying march to Pekin the best. If so, it would seem to be a
case of superior adaptability rather than natural suitability; but of
this let more competent critics judge.
The infantry uniform consists of a white cap, with a nearly
vertically straight peak, and would seem to give little or no
protection to the head. On the upper part of their body they wear
a white smock, taken in at the waist by their cartridge belt, and
reaching below their hips. Then a pair of baggy trousers, tucked into
a pair of Russia leather boots reaching to the knees. The trousers
are either a very dark green or black. The various regiments are
distinguished by their shoulder straps, which are of various colours,
and on which are marked the number of the regiment. The method
employed of carrying cartridges is in one way rather exceptional.
There is a bandolier, reaching across the chest, which is simply
a series of pockets, into which are thrust loaded clips and loose
cartridges, all mixed up anyhow, with no attempt at arrangement. Two
pouches are also carried on the belt, which also contain clips and
cartridges. Their rifle is the “Mouzin.” It is loaded by the clip
system, each clip taking five cartridges, but the men carry only a
very limited number of clips, and have therefore to use the one clip
over and over again. This of course may not be the regulation idea,
but it was commonly, and in fact invariably, resorted to in China.
It appears objectionable in that it necessitates loading twice, and
moreover should a clip get at all dented, it would become difficult
to manipulate. There can be little doubt that the Lee-Metford, with
its 10-round magazine, would prove superior in rapidity of its fire
in any long engagement at close quarters, where magazine fire was
much resorted to. The bayonet is a long triangular one, which was
nearly always kept fixed, and it was a very noticeable fact that
not more than five men in each company had scabbards, and these,
where they existed, were of the flimsiest leather, and without any
steel cap to prevent the point from coming through. Only about ten
per cent. of the men were provided with water-bottles of a uniform
pattern. The rest carried flasks, beer bottles, lemonade bottles,
in fact anything that would hold water, suspended from their belts
with a piece of string. From this it may be gathered that their
equipment was very easily visible, of a very rough description, and
certainly neither the most formidable nor the most comfortable of
those amongst the Allies. The men themselves are brave and stolid
soldiers, excelling at defence rather than attack, in which latter
they are extremely slow, losing many men from gun fire while still
out of effective rifle range, and yet not appearing anxious to close.
A defect in their organisation appeared to be that the regiments were
under officered, and that the “non-coms” had not that command over
their men which they ought to have, when their commissioned rank is
placed _hors de combat_. The Russian bluejackets were dressed in a
somewhat similar style to ours, and their arms and accoutrements
were identical with those used by the army. To sum them up, it was
remarked in Tientsin, with great truth, that the Russian soldier in
battle was a splendid man, but afterwards a licentious brute. This,
though a very comprehensive accusation, was only too true on many
occasions in North China.
AMERICANS.—It is doubtful whether there was a more sensibly clothed
or better armed body of troops in China than the Americans. The
Marines wore soft brown felt hats, a blue flannel shirt, warm and
comfortable, and Khaki knickers with dust-coloured leggings. The
regulars dispensed with the shirt and wore a Khaki tunic instead.
Both forces wore brown lace-up boots with exceedingly soft and
comfortable uppers. The men carried blankets and ponchos for the
bivouac, the latter being merely a waterproof cape with a hole
for the head, comfortable, very light, useful, and, if necessary,
capable of being folded up and put in one’s pocket. The rifles used
were the Lee straight pull, and the Krag-Jorgensen, perhaps the
worst and the best types of rifle at the front. The first, a rather
complicated clip-loading rifle, firing a bullet of such a small
bore, and light weight, that it was a hopelessly inadequate stopping
weapon: this was only used by a small contingent of Marines straight
from the Philippines, who had had no opportunity of being re-armed.
The Krag-Jorgensen, on the other hand, is a .300 bore rifle, with a
magazine containing ten shots. The whole mechanism lends itself to
simplicity and speed, jams are infrequent, and structurally the rifle
is capable of standing a large amount of wear and tear. With these
advantages, in addition to very accurate sighting, the champions of
the Krag-Jorgensen may well claim that the American army possess the
most formidable rifle in existence. The bayonet is similar to ours,
but, whereas, our bayonet is fixed underneath the rifle barrel in the
same straight line, the American bayonet is fixed on the side of the
barrel, and horizontally to it. Their ammunition was mostly carried
in bandoliers round the waist. These are made of woollen material,
and are double all the way round. The water-bottle is of metal, very
large and most serviceable. The American cavalry were horsed on
very heavily built chargers which were not at all suitable to the
country. Their accoutrements differed but little from the infantry.
Of course riding-breeches and top boots took the place of knickers
and leggings, otherwise the dress was the same. They were armed with
carbine and sword, which, according to British ideas, never was an
ideal cavalry armament, and is now perhaps less so than ever. The
American organisation was undoubtedly good and thorough, but in
many cases the personal element spoilt everything. For instance,
whilst their hospital corps was better off for stores, instruments,
etc., than our own, we had fewer amputations by many, and no cases
of Gangrene, as against twenty or more which they had, a sad case
of which occurred after the severe fighting outside Tientsin City.
Leonard, a lieutenant of marines, was shot below the elbow. The arm
was amputated above the elbow, soon after which Gangrene set in,
making another amputation necessary. Again Gangrene supervened,
and a further operation was performed. But thanks to a splendid
constitution and indomitable pluck, this fine young fellow and
gallant officer survived not only the wound, but the drain and strain
of the operations it necessitated. Much more might be said and many
more incidents told of the American forces, but the brightest page in
their annals in China was the famous fighting at Pekin, where both
infantry and artillery distinguished themselves, and added a page to
the military history of their army of which no American will ever be
ashamed.
THE JAPANESE.—As was to be expected, the Mikado’s nation took a
large part in the Chinese imbroglio. Not only did Japan send the
largest contingent, but the _personnel_ perhaps excelled more than
that of any other nation. There are many reasons why this should
have been so, principally because the Japanese have once before
engaged in a war with China, whereby the officers and men gained
great experience of Chinese methods—a valuable asset totally lacking
among many of the other Forces, and an experience which, from the
first, ensured suitable organisation and equipment, and which the
British Indian troops, and the Russians in a lesser degree, alone
could hope to equal. Thus it was that, departmentally at any rate,
the young Eastern nation outshone its European _confrères_. There
were other reasons which led up to the result that the troops of
our new Ally came out of the war with such a monumental prestige.
It must be remembered that officers and men were for the first time
engaged shoulder to shoulder with their brothers-in-arms from the
West, and this alone was sufficient to put them on their mettle, and
to cause such patriots as they are to strain every nerve to uphold
the honour of their country. Their transport arrangements were
both sufficient and efficient, one point to be noticed being the
carrying of large numbers of Japanese coolies on board to do all the
disembarking, re-embarking, and general fatigue duties inseparable
from the moving of an army corps. The men themselves were excellent.
Small and compactly built as they were, there was such a little
difference in size between them, it was a common joke that the whole
Japanese army were out-fitted by a ready-made firm who only made one
size of clothing. They were armed with an 8-shot Magazine rifle, a
weapon something on the lines of a Le-Bel, but differing essentially
in many ways. To begin with, the bore is nearly square, though the
bullets are conical, and the bayonet is a small edition of ours,
more slightly built and with a somewhat different attachment. The
rifle is called the “Murata” after its inventor, who by the bye, was
a Naval lieutenant. Their uniform consisted of a black tunic, white
German cap, white trousers, white spats, and serviceable boots. As
far as colour went, it was too visible, and the Japanese authorities
have decided henceforth to adopt Khaki. Their ammunition is carried
in pouches and on the person. Besides his weapons, the infantryman
carries a water-bottle and a day’s ration always when going out to
fight. The men march well, shoot well, are well disciplined, and
know no fear of anything; add to this skilful and fearless leaders,
and we have worthy rivals to our British infantry. Though small,
the Japanese have a decided _penchant_ for close quarters and cold
steel—yet another link between our Armies.
The cavalry are perhaps the weakest branch of the service, not on
account of any human deficiency, but rather because of the small size
of the horses. These are not altogether suitable for several reasons,
among others that, being entire horses, they are exceptionally
savage, and in camp cause great trouble as well as many casualties.
Then again, on account of their lack of weight, they are unsuitable
for shock tactics. This, however, did not prevent them from carrying
out one of the most effective charges in the campaign, nor did it
prevent them from rendering scouting services beyond all praise,
during the advance on the capital. Their weapons were the sword and
carbine. They appeared to be well trained, and with no defects except
those already mentioned.
The Japanese artillery are armed with a Q.F. gun, throwing a shell
of about 14 lb. weight. They are smart and efficient. The uniform
worn by them hardly differs from that worn by the infantry. The
hospitals, both base and field, were wonderfully good, prompt and
skilful attention being received by all the wounded, who were
certainly better off in this respect than those of any other nation.
From these few remarks it may be seen that we are allied to a Nation
with an Army strong in numbers, well skilled in war, brave to a
fault, and still further allied to our Army by many points of close
similarity. It should be mentioned that the behaviour of the Japanese
troops was exemplary, and that in this respect they could give points
and a beating to nearly all the other troops engaged. Among many
equally gallant actions performed by Japanese troops, one stands out
pre-eminent. It was the storming and blowing up of the south gate of
Tientsin, the deciding move in the most important engagement of the
war. In days to come the Japanese will talk of it as we talk of our
sappers at the Cashmir gate, Delhi!
The other nations engaged in the campaign were ITALY, AUSTRIA, and
GERMANY, but although the services of the representatives of the
first two named were valuable at a time when every rifle counted,
their numbers were too small to admit of an excuse to describe them,
and in doing so to spoil more paper. Even Germany hardly shone in
the operations, notwithstanding her shriek of vengeance, and the
soul-stirring speeches made by the Kaiser to his departing troops.
They, however, deserve some mention, even were it only because Field
Marshal Von Waldersee was the Commander-in-Chief, recognised by all
the Powers concerned. He, with most of the German troops, arrived too
late for any serious fighting, but for the rest of the operations he
showed the greatest capacity and tact, and did much not only to bring
the campaign to a close, but to preserve at any rate the semblance
of a Peace between the Allies, who, immediately after the fighting
was over, began to quarrel amongst themselves. The “Iltis” too, at
Taku forts, wrote a glorious page in the naval history of her empire,
which was added to by the devotion and gallantry of the German
sailors under Seymour. In conclusion, it may be said that it was
Germany’s misfortune, not her fault, which forbade her taking a more
glorious share in the work of punishing China, against whom she had a
more genuine grievance than most of the other Powers.