The anger consciousness in its development, especially in its initial
stage is characterized by restraint. The subject is aware of hostile
unlawful impulses that must be controlled. Its initial stage is usually
reported as unpleasant. The second characteristic of the anger
consciousness is reaction of some sort. What takes place on the mental
side, is along the line of least resistance for the moment. Mental life
is rather versatile in providing subjective reaction to anger. Motor and
visual imagery play an important role involving lessened resistance. A
third characteristic of the anger consciousness is what the Germans call
“Verschiebung.” The emotive tendency is inhibited. A substitution
follows for the tendencies restrained. It may be purely subjective or
only partly subjective. But the subject in the observation of his anger
is fully aware that he would behave in some more drastic fashion if the
restraint were off.
_Substitution of Visual and Motor Imagery._ With the subjects studied
there occurred no real pugnacious attack in which blows were struck
except with those persons who have the correction of children; there are
also but few real quarrels reported. But the versatility of
consciousness in substituting and providing merely mental reaction for
other hostile tendencies that the subject really wished fulfilled is
quite striking. Visual and motor imagery may take the place of
tendencies which are inhibited and allow a successful expression. An
observation from A. will illustrate. “I found myself saying cutting
remarks as if speaking directly to X., and I planned a course of
behavior toward him that I considered would humiliate him. I finally
ended by imagining myself kicking him down the street, telling him I
wanted no more to do with him. The imagery of this act was pleasant. I
felt victorious. X. was imagined as penitent.” The imagery of the
pugnacious attack in some form is a quite common characteristic of the
mental reaction to anger. It occurs after a period of restraint when
there seems nothing else to be done; imagination and fancy appear at
such a crisis and assume the role of a surrogate for hostile tendencies,
which the subject has controlled. The awareness of the direct end of the
initial tendency of the anger may be present in consciousness or the aim
may be indefinite. Subject I. observes, “I felt as if I wanted to say
something or do something at once that would get even with X. The thing
to do was vague, but the impulse to do something in a hostile manner was
strong.” The aim of behavior may be rather definitely formed in the
early stage of the anger consciousness as soon as the irascible feelings
are definitely referred to some object. An illustration from A.
follows:—“The impulse to take X. (a child) and shake him, was strong on
the first stimulus of the emotion; suppressing this I spoke crossly to
him, at the same time there appeared motor imagery of my holding him
with both hands and shaking him.” Another instance from the same
subject: “I had an impulse to punish X., restraint was immediately
followed by a motor and visual imagery of the act of punishment.”
Subject C. observes, “The first impulse was to kick X., the restraint
was accompanied by motor images of kicking him, followed by the image of
his being hurt in the face.” E. states, “I felt as if I would like to
shake him and imagined myself doing it.” G. developed a case of anger
from a series of irritating stimuli. Describing his anger, he says, “I
felt like I wanted to bite or hit something.” B. reports a case when he
had been humiliated by some boys along the street. The tendency to anger
at the time was controlled, but as he passed on, the emotion arose with
greater intensity. “I imagined myself beating one of the boys, I gave
him several good punches; he had no show at all. I came out victor and
was enjoying it all.” One of the many sorts of mental reactions that H.
reports to a case of anger that extended over three quarters of an hour,
is, “I imagined myself charging at him and his looking frightened at my
behavior.”
_Substitution of Irascible Play._ The imagined fight and victory take
the place of tendencies which would have a more objective expression.
Another sort of substitution of the initially restrained emotional
reaction, is first to lessen the restraint by inhibition and react in
some less crude manner in a slightly disguised form, which gives a
feeling of satisfaction in inner victory and at the same time lacks the
objective hostility. A. felt humiliated because of X.’s remark in the
presence of others. “Resenting his familiarity, I went out of my way to
pass him; I grabbed his arm and gave it a tremendous grip, at the same
time I smiled playfully. I really aimed to hurt him and was fully aware
that I wished to hurt him worse than I did. What I did was merely a
substitution, but now that the act was over, I felt fully satisfied and
pleased with what I had done.” The playful attack is a rather common
sort of reaction to resentment with observers A., C. and D. D. observes,
“I was angry at X. and was trying to control myself; suddenly I grabbed
him and punched him several times in the ribs, at the same time I
smiled. I did not want him or the others to know I was angry. I enjoyed
pummelling him, as I felt I had demonstrated to him that I could handle
him.” In such observations the subject’s awareness that what he does in
a playful fashion is but a substitution of what he would like to do in
another manner, is significant. This sort of awareness seems to be
ignored in the every-day experience of our emotional life. Attention is
directed to the reaction; we involuntarily seek a place of lessened
resistance, but the act of introspection allows the subject to be more
clearly aware of the inhibited reaction and the substituted expression
which follows.
_Substitution of Imaginary Invective and Cutting Remarks._ The vocal
expression of anger is one of primary significance. Swearing, grumbling,
invective, quarrelling, interjectional obloquy, etc., are very common
signs of anger. The results would very strongly suggest that anger
rarely, if ever, occurs without its vocal expression in some manner, if
not by direct vocalization either by inner speech or voco-motor imagery.
Introspection of slight emotions or anger lasting momentarily, show as
their most marked sensation, one of tightening of the throat muscles.
Defamatory language or mild swearing is common with all the subjects
studied while in the privacy of their own rooms when the restraint is
off. The expression of the vocal cords is one of the most successful
vents. B. was instructed to abandon himself to vigorous invective and
interjectional obloquy when the emotion first began and note the result.
He followed these instructions on three occasions when the emotion from
the beginning was unpleasant, developing from a fore-period of
irritation. With this sort of voluntary vigorous vocal expression, the
anger soon passed into rather pleasurable excitement.
The reaction to anger in its initial stage may be a vocal tendency to
express one’s anger, referring the emotion directly to some person or to
an object. When the restraint is on, either from motives of decency or
the absence of the offender, the thinking of cutting remarks may be
substituted for the actual verbal attack. The subject is aware that what
he says to himself he would like to say to the offender. Methods of
procedure are elaborately planned for a future verbal attack, just what
he expects to say and wants to say, how he will say it, the inflection
of the voice, the emphasis of words and dramatic attitude. He may
imagine the effect of the attack on his opponent, the latter may talk
back. The imagined verbal combat is usually a one-sided affair and ends
in victory for the subject. Drastic remarks and the most cutting
sarcasms are planned at times by the subjects studied. However there are
wide individual differences which cannot be referred entirely to the
difference in intensity of the emotional life. Habit apparently plays an
important role. D. felt that he had been imposed upon by X. and Y. After
the humiliating incident had passed, D. suddenly found himself in the
midst of an anger reaction. “I found myself having a verbal combat with
them. I imagined I was telling X., ‘I should think it costs but little
to act like a gentleman, but I presume this is an illustration of your
piggishness.’ Then I imagined Y. beginning to talk. Just what he was
saying was not clear, but I was aware that he was helping X. I
interrupted by telling him, ‘I understand you are from —— and of course
I can’t expect anything better of you.’ They began to talk back several
times, but I got the better of them and felt pleased about it.”
The cutting remarks are at times crude and abusive. The subject may
swear at the offender. Persons who do not swear in actual life
frequently do in imagination. In such imaginative verbal attacks the
offender’s bad qualities are displayed before him, at other times the
same subject may resort to imagery, sarcasm, witticism or joking of a
hostile nature. The motivation seems to be to imagine remarks that would
humiliate the offender. The visual imagery of the astonished humble
opponent is usual in these imaginary attacks. Crude and abusive remarks
may at times seem entirely appropriate; at others, sarcasm and irascible
joking seem more adequate. Sarcasm usually develops rather slowly with a
period of restraint preceding it, unless it is ready made for the
occasion. When the fitting sarcastic remark is found, it is usually
accompanied by pleasantness in some degree. F. observes, “I could get no
imaginative remark that would suit me at first, but after the emotion
appeared several times in succession I suddenly discovered one and found
myself saying it over and over again. It rather pleased me, I practiced
it to get the right inflection and emphasis that I desired.”
The imaginative cutting remark may be in the second person as if
addressed directly to the offender, especially when the emotion is
intense. It may be in the third person about the offender, his
unfavorable qualities are recalled with no plan or intention of
repeating his remarks to him. The contemplation of his unworthiness is
accompanied by an agreeable feeling. B. became righteously indignant at
X. because of an incident of ungentlemanly conduct toward a friend. He
observes, “A moment later (that is after the first instance of anger) I
imagined myself in my alcove in the Library, and imagined some other
person, I did not know, who came in and said to me, ‘What do you think
of X?’ I replied with a good deal of pleasurable indignation, ‘I think
he is a damned ass.’ Three-quarters of an hour later as I was walking
along the street, the emotion arose again, and I imagined some one
asking the same question, I replied the same as before with a like
feeling of pleasure. I really wanted some one to ask me what I thought
of X.” The subject may be aware that what he says to and about the
opponent is a little unfair, but at the time that the emotion is
progressing, he ignores it and wants to believe ill of the offender.
The results of this study abundantly show that a make-believe attitude
plays an important role in the anger consciousness, in both the
development of the anger and the reactive consciousness. It is believed
momentarily, when the anger is most intense, that the offender is really
a bad man. Pausing for introspection in the midst of such emotional
reaction, it is frequently reported, “I knew very well I would say
nothing of the sort and that X. was not so bad as I believed him.” While
the emotion is most intense, ill reports about the offender which were
previously ignored are now believed and assumed as true, and
satisfaction is derived by degrading the best qualities of the offender,
by believing stories of ill repute, by suspecting or imagining evil of
him. The degree in which this tendency is present, depends partly on the
intensity of the emotion, and evidently in part on the individual habits
of reaction to anger. The chronic irascible gossiper is evidently a
characteristic type of person who has specialized in this mode of
reaction to anger.
_Substitutions by Witticism and Irony._ Witticism, sarcasm, irony,
teasing and joking make up a large class of vocal and imaginal reactions
which may take the place of the initially restrained emotional tendency.
The crude remarks, transformed into wit or fitting sarcasm, overcome the
consciousness restraint that was initially present in the emotion and
lessen resistance. It is accompanied by a pleasant feeling and may be
keenly delightful. A thrust in a half serious tone accompanied by a
smile, the jest and hostile joke follow a state of mind characterized by
restraint. In the observations of the subjects studied there is evidence
supporting Freud’s (8) theory of wit. What he calls “tendency wit”; that
is, wit with a definite aim has two divisions, the hostile joke and the
obscene joke. The first is a reaction to irascible anger and the latter
to the sexual emotions. The introspection of the reactive stage of anger
consciousness shows the Freudian mechanism for “tendency wit.” The
following case will illustrate a crude kind of wit. H. whose husband had
stayed out late at night became angry following a period of worry.
Fluctuating intensities of anger and periods of worry lasted over an
hour. After a number of reactions such as planning verbal attacks;
recalling his thoughtless behavior at other times; crying, assuming an
attitude of self-pity; devising some means of making him sorry; at times
trying to assume the attitude that it was no use to be angry; taking
observations of the emotion at a number of places, motivated by a wish
that her husband would see the results and feel sorry; imagining herself
going to him and talking rather abusively. Finally she found a remark
that gave the keenest pleasure of all. “I imagined myself saying, ‘Petty
dear, you have been out pretty late tonight.’” This was a condensed
veiled statement expressing about all she would like to say. “Petty” is
a character portrayed in a current illustrated newspaper as being mean
to his wife and flaring up angrily at every little incident. The
character of “Petty” was fully understood by her husband. The crude
hostile reaction was followed by a rather condensed acute remark; it was
reported as pleasant, “because it seemed so fitting.”
C. in a discussion with X. became angry and gives the following
observation, “I noted I was getting angry and wanted to say something
hostile, but instead I turned away suddenly and laughed, saying in a
joking, half-serious manner, ‘Oh you old bottle head, you don’t know
anything.’ Although I laughed, I really meant it. That gave complete
satisfaction. He laughed too.” Let us illustrate further. A., with four
others, was walking along the street, coming from a clinic at the
hospital, where a case of flight of ideas had just been observed. X.,
one of the party, was talking in a manner that seemed to A. a little
superfluous. He resented his attitude, and turning he said to X. in a
joking manner, “What did you say? The malady must be catching,”
(referring to the case observed). X. retorted, “I never have any fixed
ideas.” A. replied, “No, they do fly away pretty fast.” A. observed, “I
felt pleased and victorious with my remark, my resentment was entirely
gone and I entered into conversation with X. in a friendly manner.”
Witticism is one of the more refined modes of substitution for the
more directly hostile attack. Sarcasm is cruder. Its mechanism depends
for the most part upon the inflection and tone of voice in speaking.
The words themselves in sarcasm are innocent enough, but the mode of
expression and the meaning involved are the sources of hostility. The
following statement represent sarcastic remarks. A.—“I think I will
come around to your Club,” emphasis on the word “your.” A.—again, “You
surely must be right,” emphasis on “surely.” J.—“You are not the boss,
then?”—emphasis on “not,” with a little sneer and an accompanying
laugh. Sarcasm is a rather cheap and easy reaction to anger. It is
consequently more easily attained than wit. The period of conscious
restraint preceding sarcasm is usually less, unless the witticism
is already made for the occasion. Its feeling effect is also not so
pleasant as of wit. At times sarcasm may be combined with rather
crude wit, but wit of a more refined type will exclude sarcasm. The
following is a combination of this kind. C., having become angry at X.
for his “bragging attitude,” says, “I was conscious of the tendency
to say something hostile, but could think of nothing appropriate. In
the course of his remarks X. finally said, ‘I never read anything for
an experiment as I fear it might bias my results.’ I suddenly found
a remark that seemed entirely fitting at the time and at once the
restraint was off. I said a little sarcastically, ‘No, you never
want to read anything, it might hurt your intellect.’ As soon as the
statement was made I saw I had gone too far and felt a little cheap.
I at once noted that he did not take my remark seriously, and felt
relieved. My former resentment had entirely disappeared.”
_Substitution by Disguise._ There are many devices less refined than wit
which are commonly resorted to in slightly disguising the hostile
attack. The offender may be attacked indirectly and impersonally. The
following case will illustrate. F. became angry at a merchant because,
when he went to pay for an article, the price was marked more than he
had previously agreed to pay. Feeling resentful, he said, “I suppose the
bill is all right, the clerk said it would be less, but people in this
town don’t know what they are talking about anyway.” F. observes, “What
I really meant was that you don’t know what you are talking about.” To
avoid making the direct attack, the indefinite pronoun is substituted at
times for the definite. The use of “some one” or “somebody” instead of
“you,” in talking to the offender blunts the remark. The device is
rather cheap affording little pleasure and has but a short fore-period
of restraint. It is carried to an extreme when the subject pretends he
does not know the perpetrator of the offense and in fact may assume it
is some one else, so that he may speak his mind directly to the
offender. I. observes, “I was angry, and talked to her about the affair
as if I did not know that she did it. I wouldn’t have had her to know
that I knew for anything. I told her what I thought of a person who had
acted in that way and noted that she looked cheap. That pleased me.”
Some gossip and vituperate against their enemies and derive a moiety of
ill-gotten pleasure if a sympathetic hearer is found. One subject
states, “I went to tell X., hoping he would be angry too, and felt just
a little disappointed when he was not.” Hints and insinuations often
become devices to avoid a too hostile direct attack.
_Imaginary Exaltation of Self._ Another rather important reaction of
the attributive type is an idealistic one. Imagination and ideational
processes are active. Lowered self-feeling has been accomplished in
the subject usually by a number of repeated offenses by some one that
the subject really respects. The offender is frequently not imagined
as degraded, but he is left as he is, and the subject proceeds to
imagine,—it may be to fancy or day-dreams that he is the offender’s
superior. As the reaction to moments of humiliation, he may later plan
to surpass him. An attitude of make-believe may be momentarily assumed
that he is already the offender’s superior. Fantastic schemes of a
successful career may appear in which he imagines some distant future,
in which he has gained renown and the offender is glad to recall that
he knew him in other days. Sometimes he is imagined as seeking his
friendship or advice, or favor, and is refused with dignity. At the
next moment he may be graciously bestowing favors upon the offender.
Such imaginative processes are observed to afford pleasure to the
subject at the time and may lead to a new level of self-confidence
which has important influences on later behavior. Usually idealistic
reactions of this character appear in consciousness after more directly
hostile reactions have failed to satisfy the subject. A few cases
will illustrate. A., recalling an incident of the day before which
humiliated him, became angry. At first he began saying in voco-motor
fashion as if talking directly to X., “You are a conceited fellow. You
are hard to get along with. I will beat you. You are too nervous to get
very far.” “I imagined myself treating him in a superior, dignified
manner.” A. then laid plans how he would work, stick to one thing, make
himself a recognized authority, and how he would have little to do
with X. He imagined X. coming to him for favors when he had attained
the success he had planned, and himself taking a rather indifferent
attitude toward his requests. A. observes that his entire reverie
was pleasant, although the anger was unpleasant in the beginning. C.
reports a case of anger at X. who had taken a rather critical attitude
toward a problem which he was studying. He observes, “At first there
was a slight humiliated feeling. This was displaced by resentment. I
imagined myself standing before X. and giving him two good retorts
which I considered would have their ill effects on him. At this point
the theme changed, ‘I will leave you alone and have nothing to do with
you,’ I felt as if this behavior would somehow punish him, and that
pleased me a little.” But as a third and final reaction C. observes
the following. “I planned to do my work so well that X. would feel
sorry for what he had said, I imagined X. complimenting me after it
was finished.” The early stage of the emotion above was reported as
unpleasant, the final ending in which C. imagines X. complimenting him
on his success was a point of marked pleasure. Subject E. who had felt
humiliated by X. whom he considered had underestimated him, observed as
a final reaction, “I will show him in the next ten years, I am young
and can work, and he will see.” Then followed a number of plans for
the future. One subject reacts for a moment at times to resentment by
day dreams in which he imagines himself a man of wealth and deals out
favors to all except his enemy. He even uses his wealth and influence
against him. The feeling is rather pleasant in tone till the moment
he comes back to a sense of reality. The transition decreases the
pleasantness rather suddenly.
_Attitudinal Reactions._ Attitudinal reactions of a hostile nature are
an important part of the anger consciousness. What may be called
“resolutional attitudes” frequently occur as one of the final mental
reactions in the diminution of the emotion. The resolutional attitude to
do something in the future at a more convenient time when the effects
will be greater, becomes a convenient substitute for conscious
tendencies that require present restraint. The subject definitely
settles on a course of action which cannot be carried out at once. The
feeling tone of such conscious attitudes is pleasant. It is not unusual
to have a settled resolution and come to a definite conclusion in the
initial reactive stage of the emotion. Unless the attitude is ready made
for the occasion, it appears as one of the final resorts. A
characteristic of “nowness” belongs to anger. An attitude that portends
to future behavior is secondary, appearing after the possibilities of
present reactions are exhausted. Much of the initial restraint in
inhibitions is preparatory to the attainment of a settled conclusion; in
some cases initial reaction behaves in a trial and error fashion. The
results of a number of hostile impulses are imagined and are followed to
their end until finally one is selected that seems most fitting. The
conclusion reached may be temporary. Although it may be abandoned on the
reappearance of the emotion, there is a temporary satisfaction in having
attained a conclusive attitude even momentarily. The following case from
C. will illustrate. C. became angry on being told of X.’s behavior. He
first recalled a number of previous similar instances; second, he
transferred the anger momentarily to another person who told him of the
offense; third, he imagined himself cutting off all business relations
with X. and as a fourth reaction he observes, “I took on a pugnacious
attitude and concluded to fight it out according to the rules of the
game, and planned what I would do and say to make him come my way.” The
attitude of waiting for further developments, biding one’s time, being
cautious, is a frequent substitute for rising tendencies demanding
present action. Subject E. observes, “I finally came to the conclusion
not to lie in wait for the opportunity to get back at the offender, but
to be on guard against a future attack, but even after the conclusion
was formed it was not at once carried out though it pleased me. I still
found myself planning what I would say if the thing should be repeated.”
A. angry at X. and Y., finally came to the following hostile conclusive
attitude, “They had better be doing nothing like that, I will watch
them, and when I get a chance they will hear from me. I will be cautious
and sure first, with which final conclusion my anger disappeared.”