------------------------------------------------------------------------
Professor Titchener (19) states concerning emotions in general three
essential factors for their formation. First, a series of ideas shall be
interrupted by a vivid feeling; second, the feeling shall mirror a
situation or incident in the outside world; and third, the feeling shall
be enriched by organic sensations created by the course of bodily
adjustment to the situation. It has been well agreed from casual
introspection that the stimulus to an emotion is a total mental
situation or predicament. It is evidently necessary in the psychology of
the emotions that each emotion should be studied in connection with its
predetermining mental situation giving rise to it. Anger because of its
slowness to develop, lends itself more readily to a study of the
situation from which it arises, than some other emotions.
It is well known that there is little constancy in the outside
situation, associated with the emotion of anger. What one will take as
an insult, another will regard as a joke. With the same individual,
what will at one time excite anger, will at another be scarcely
noticed. We commonly say, referring to some incident, “There was
nothing for him to be angry about,” and the statement may be correct
if the outside situation is viewed as the stimulus to the emotion.
With the insane and hysterical, an observer is often baffled by the
apparently harmless idea that will excite anger. The fact is, the
situation stimulating anger is a psychic one. We fail in viewing our
emotional life in the same manner as we do in observing our sensations.
Whatever the outside conditions, it is the psychic situation as
only a partial reflection of outside conditions, that is of primary
importance. A few instances of the current views of the situation
exciting anger may be given. What may be called a genetic view is
illustrated in McDougall’s (15) statement, “The condition of its
(anger) excitement is rather any opposition to the free exercise of
any impulse, any obstruction to the activity to which the creature
is impelled by any one of the other instincts.” Dewey (6) in his
conception of instincts has pointed out that we are not angry when we
are fighting successfully. Only when the pugnacious instinct is impeded
does emotion arise. An introspective view may be taken from Bain (2),
“When we have suffered harm at the hands of another, it leaves a sting
in the violation of the sanctity of our feelings. This pre-supposes a
sentiment of self regarding pride, the presence of which gives rise to
the best developed form of anger.” David Irons (12), who did some keen
work in the analysis of the emotions, does not qualify his statement
that anger appears only when we feel that we have been injured.
From the pathological side, Féré (7) and Magnan (11) have described slow
accumulation of anger in paranoiacs, which seems to re-enforce the
casual introspective view stated above. These insane persons first
believe they are persecuted. They suspect all about them. Even their
very best friends are trying to injure their business or reputation.
Gradually reactionary impulses begin and they themselves become the
persecutors and concern themselves with the business of revenge. They
find gratification in every sort of angry outburst,—insult, abuse,
threat, murderous attack, irony, witticism, etc.
The same view has been advanced by Steinmetz (18) in the observation of
the behavior of primitive people. He holds that revenge is essentially
rooted in the feeling of power and superiority. It arises upon the
experience of injury and its aim is to enhance self-feeling, which has
been lowered by the injury suffered.
The next few pages will be devoted to an examination of the mental
situations from which anger develops as found in the results of the
introspections. About six hundred introspections from the various
observers have been used for this study.
_Feelings of Irritation._ One of the characteristic mental situations
from which anger arises is that connected with feelings of irritation.
These feelings are described as unpleasant nervous tension with a
tendency to motor activity. Awareness of the feeling may be present
while attention is directed elsewhere. It may or may not be referred to
any particular incident. C.—“It is a sort of diffused unpleasant
consciousness that things in general are going wrong.”
Irritation in connection with pain or illness is a condition from which
anger may develop. From this a trivial incident may give rise to anger.
A note from E.’s records says, “I had a severe headache to-day and felt
irritable. When X. would try to sympathize with me, the irritation would
increase and I tended to be angry.” G, who has relatively few emotions
of anger, introspected upon ten cases of anger, arising from a
fore-period of irritation during a day’s illness. Subject I. states with
reference to pain, “While the pain was on I felt as though I wanted to
be angry at somebody or something, X. spoke to me and at once I was
angry.” Feelings of irritation may increase, gradually, accompanying the
increased intensity of pain. A. states, “Irritableness at the first
beginning of the pain increased to intense anger at the moment the pain
was most severe. There was a strong motor tension in the hands and face
muscles with the impulse to look about, vaguely aware that I was trying
to find something to refer the anger to.... A decrease of the pain was
accompanied by a decrease of the anger to a feeling of irritation
again.”
Feelings of irritation follow as a result of the thwarting of some
desire or mental attitude and are consequently predetermined by the
attitude of the moment. From this, anger develops for the most part, as
a result of a series of stimuli, which have a cumulative effect. Each
thwarting of the impulse intensifies the irritation until anger is
developed. One or two failures may stimulate unpleasant feelings, which
at the time are ignored; but with an increase of the number of stimuli,
there is an accumulative effect in which the awareness of the previous
failures becomes more intense than at the moment when they occurred. The
following from B.’s observations will illustrate, “I was writing a
letter to an important personage and was making special effort to write
it neatly. I made an error and felt unpleasantly irritated. Still
feeling quite unpleasant, I turned to look for my eraser and could not
find it. I looked in several places. Each failure was followed by a
sudden increase in intensity of unpleasant feelings.” Finally B. found
himself using defamatory language prolifically, giving expression to a
rather well developed case of anger. One is usually aware in anger of
this type, that the emotion is the cumulative effect of a number of
previous stimuli. It appears from the reports, that if the mental
predisposition is intense enough, one or two failures may suffice to
excite anger. In general the stronger the predisposition, the less
number of failures is required before anger is fully developed.
Another characteristic of the feeling of irritation is its indefinite
objective reference. It may not refer definitely to any object at first.
The tendency is usually present to refer it to some object or person,
regardless of the real cause of the feeling. E. states, “I felt I wanted
to get angry at somebody or something and I did not care much what.”
While it is common with all the persons studied, to be irritated and
burst out angrily at objects, the tendency to transfer the anger from
objects which may be the real objective cause to unoffending persons, is
a matter in which there is a wide individual difference. C. when
irritated by objects, finds a partial relief if he can lay the blame on
some person and take an imaginary vent against him. He states, “I have
been cross and grouchy all day; ‘felt out’ with everybody. Several times
the association of X. and Y. came up with a little rising anger and an
attitude that they were somehow to be blamed. I was aware that they were
not to be blamed, but at times I would find myself ignoring this and
taking pleasure in criticising them adversely.” This tendency to
personify the source of anger is illustrated in another incident from C.
He lost his umbrella. He looked for it in several places with an
increased feeling of irritation; following a line of other associations,
he imagined Z., a person whom he dislikes, walking off with it. He says,
“All this was mildly pleasant. I was scarcely aware how improbable it
was that Z. had taken it, till the act of introspecting on the emotion.
I really wanted to believe that he had taken it.” The personal objective
reference to somewhat suppressed feelings of irritation frequently
facilitates the sudden development of the emotion. The tendency to refer
the anger to some innocent person, ignoring for the moment the real
facts and forgetting one’s sense of justice for the time being, is a
matter in which there are marked individual differences in the subjects
studied.
It is a common characteristic of the initial stage of anger, that
although there is an awareness that the emotion is due to a series of
irritating stimuli, the entire situation exciting the anger is ignored
and the anger is referred to some person, frequently one recently
associated in time. Thus objectified, anger seems to find a more ready
expression. Anger is more successfully developed from a fore-period of
irritation if the present predicament is in any way associated with a
person or situation against which there is already an emotional
disposition of dislike. A feeling of pleasurable satisfaction is often
reported to follow the successful expression of anger after feelings of
irritation.
Anger with a fore-period of irritation is common with all the subjects
studied, but the manner in which the anger arises from these feelings is
a matter of wide individual difference. They all get angry at objects
when they act as hindrances. With B. and C., who live alone, this
tendency is more marked. With all the persons studied, anger with a
fore-period of irritation occurs more frequently against objects and
situations than against persons. When persons are involved in anger of
this type, they are usually those with whom there is close intimacy or
with servants and children.
The sentiment of justice may facilitate the development of anger arising
from feelings of irritation. Irritable feelings may more readily develop
into anger if a situation is associated in which fairness and justice
are violated, although the point of justice may be far removed from the
actual cause of the irritation. Under the influence of irritation, there
is frequently a little more sensitiveness to injustice if the idea of
unfairness can facilitate in the objective reference to the emotion. The
following instance will illustrate. A. was walking along the street at
night in an irritable state of mind in connection with a series of
incidents just past. In this state of mind he came to a place where a
new house was being built and the builders had left an accumulation of
dirt on the sidewalk. When it rained, the water would collect making the
walk bad. He had previously noted that they had made enough progress
with the building that it was unnecessary to leave the dirt on the walk.
“On this occasion,” he states, “I now become quite indignant, and
suddenly found myself in imagination telephoning the street commissioner
in an angry attitude and tone of voice, telling him about the dirt and
where the house was located, and ending with the sentence, ‘It is an
outrage to tax payers.’” But this did not fully satisfy his resentment.
He imagined himself the next day walking up to the overseer of the
construction gang and assuming a rather indignant air, telling him among
other things that the way he had left the walk was an outrage to the
public. On the other hand, the sense of justice may be ignored for the
time if it does not aid expression. In some extreme cases the subject
may assume a make-believe attitude and trump up reasons to suit his own
ends regardless of the facts. The tendency is strong to give some
justifiable expression to the present mental predicament. In such cases
reason serves the purpose of feeling. All other mental processes may
become subservient to the rising indignation till the point of anger is
reached, but with the expression of anger, the illusion of fairness
usually disappears. The behavior that seemed so commendable while angry
may excite shame or regret after the emotion has been vented.
_Negative Self-feeling._ A second characteristic mental situation from
which anger arises, is that connected with negative self-feeling; the
self-feeling has been lowered and anger follows. In the observation
of all the observers, it appears at times in the initial stage of
anger. Whatever outside situation occasions lowered self-feeling
may indirectly give rise to anger. And just as there are feelings
of irritation, which do not pass into anger, so there are negative
self-feelings which are not followed by anger. In the description
of this feeling, it appears in marked contrast to the anger that
follows. As to time, it may last but a moment before anger arises. In
other instances the feeling of humiliation may be rather prolonged or
repeated before anger arises. The feeling is described as unpleasant,
as a lack of motor tension, a feeling like shrinking up, an impulse
to get away, a confused inco-ordinated state of mind. A rather wide
vocabulary referring to self and the feeling side of experience is
used by the subjects to designate this feeling in colloquial language.
Examples of such phrases from the observations are as follows:—“I felt
sat on,” “Was humiliated,” “Felt inefficient,” “Felt imposed upon,”
“Felt stepped on,” “A feeling of self depreciation,” “Felt offended,”
“A feeling of subjection,” “Felt as if he thought I were no good,”
“Felt worried,” “Felt as if he were hitting at me,” “Felt that what
he said reflected on my ability,” “Disappointed in myself,” “Felt
ashamed,” “My feelings were wounded,” “Felt that that was insult
added to injury,” “Felt slighted,” “Feeling of abasement,” “I was
embarrassed,” “Felt as if I had been caught with the goods on.”
Unlike the feeling of irritation, negative self-feeling has a more
definite reference to the outside situation and for the most part refers
to persons. It will be noted that the origin of anger from the mental
situation of lowered self-feeling, and that from a condition of
irritable feelings, comes about by quite different processes. The latter
is reached by an increased complexity till the anger point is suddenly
attained. In the former case the anger comes about as a rather sudden
reaction from a state of consciousness that is in marked contrast to
anger. Notes from the reports will illustrate this characteristic. B.
had made some errors at a public meeting. X. in a speech jokingly called
attention to the errors. At first B. was confused and felt a little
worried and embarrassed. In a few moments he found himself mildly angry
at X. and was planning to retaliate. B. states that his anger did not
refer to the fact that he had made the error, but to X. who had
humiliated him by calling public attention to it. F. went to get a check
cashed and was refused. He states, “I felt belittled and became
indignant as I walked away.... With the appearance of the imagery of
another person getting his check cashed the day before, I became quite
angry.” He adds that he was not angry because of the failure to get the
check cashed, but because of the discrimination against himself. The
anger referred to the cashier. The idea that he was acting according to
rules and not personally responsible, appeared, but was ignored by a
recall of the imagery of the other person getting his check cashed.
Negative self-feeling appears rather suddenly without any definite
conscious fore-period of its own. It is a state of consciousness
predetermined by pleasurable feelings of self regard. In taking the
report of C.’s emotions one evening, there was found to be an unusual
number. He had been usually observing from one to four emotions each
day, with occasionally a day having no experiences of anger. On this
particular day he had observed and taken notes on twelve rather strongly
developed cases of anger. An inquiry into the cause showed nothing
except that he had felt extra well all day and had turned off more than
the usual amount of work. This was a disturbing situation in connection
with evidence that had previously been collected from G. and D. These
two persons have few emotions of anger and have gone over a week with no
experience of anger. On December 4th, D. took observations on four cases
of anger. On inquiry it was found that he had been ill and not slept the
night before. G. on the two days that he was ill introspected on ten
cases of anger. An examination of G.’s and D.’s reports indicate a
fore-period of irritable feelings or a lack of immediate conscious
fore-period. In none of these cases was there any indication of lowered
self-feeling in the fore-period of the emotion, while with each of the
introspections of C. on the day he felt extra well and reported on the
unusual number of twelve cases, there was a fore-period of negative
self-feeling. With A. on the days when he feels best, there is an
increase in the number of cases of anger with an initial lowered
self- feeling. Such evidences as we have, indicate that anger with a
fore-period of negative self-feeling occurs most readily when the
sentiment of self-regard is active,—on the days when the person is well
pleased with himself. It is true that the play of this sentiment only
appears in consciousness, when it has been interfered with or enhanced.
It makes up an essential mental predisposition in connection with the
situation stimulating anger. The following note from C.’s observations
will illustrate. C. met X. and spoke to him; X. paid no attention. C.
states, “For a moment I felt humiliated.... I said to myself, ‘He does
not know my importance.’” C. then became quite angry thinking cutting
remarks about X. and ending the emotion by finding an excuse for X.’s
not seeing him.
Any remark, suggestion, chance association, it may be, attitude
of another or incident, which in any way lowers the sentiment of
self-respect may stimulate anger. In this regard there is a wide
individual difference with the persons studied and with the same person
at different times. A trivial incident may lower the play of the
self-regarding sentiment and consequently give rise to anger, while
at other times a direct thrust at one’s honor may be ignored. The
personality of the offender, his social and intellectual standing, his
general demeanor and attitude, play an important part in the entire
emotional situation, but at times personality is ignored and a “chip is
carried on the shoulder” for the chance passer-by.
It appears in the results that the anger of the person who is not
in authority against the one who is, or the anger of the man lower
down against the one higher up, usually has a fore-period of negative
self-feeling. A mental disposition toward the one in power in addition
to the sentiment of self-regard, is a predetermining mental situation
in exciting lowered self-feeling and consequently anger. The most
intense instances of anger that C., D. and E. experienced were against
persons in power. D.—“I was aware they were in authority and were
taking advantage of it to run us out. I felt a little humiliated but
not angry as I left the room. It occurred to me they were rather small
in usurping the place.” A little later D. became quite angry and
carried on in imagination a rather extensive verbal combat with the
usurpers in which he came out victor. E. states in his observation,
“If X. had been an ordinary man, I would not have given the occasion a
second thought. But being very high up ... I was inclined to take less
off of him than those I consider as not knowing better.”
On the other hand a certain mental disposition toward the person lower
down in connection with the self-regarding sentiment may be a
precondition of anger. Too great familiarity from an inferior may
momentarily lower the self-regarding sentiment to his level and in
consequence excite anger; we do not resent a slap on the back by one
whom we admire or recognize as our superior, but we do from our
inferior. The same act from the one may heighten our self-respect while
from the other it is lowered. D. reports a case of anger when he was in
a crowd. A boy kept purposely stepping on his heels. He states, “I was
not hurt but he acted too familiar for a boy under the circumstances. I
took his attitude as a personal matter and felt a little humiliated.” A.
reporting a case of anger stimulated by a person whom he holds in low
esteem, says, “It was not what X. did so much, but it was his familiar
confidential attitude before others that embarrassed me.”
It appears frequently in the observations that it is not what is done or
said, so much as it is the attitude of the person, that is so offensive.
A too positive and aggressive action, a too great display of wisdom, a
too familiar or condescending demeanor, may be the essential element in
the stimulus to anger. The following phrases are noted by the different
subjects as being an important part of the situation stimulating anger
of the type now being treated. C.—“I resented his too dignified air more
than anything else.” G.—“What angered me most was his condescending
attitude as if he knew it all.” I.—“He acted too wise and I was aware he
was trying to lord it over us. That was the most offensive part.” H.—“He
sat and stared at me as if he thought I didn’t know what I was talking
about.” F.—“He took on a wise air implying that he had already passed
through the stage in which I now was.” E.—“It was not his statement so
much as it was his rather spiteful attitude that angered me.” A.—“It was
not what he said. It was his haughty air and little condescending laugh
in dismissing the matter that rang in my ears.”
While in the presence of a situation that lowers self-feeling, even
though persons may not be connected with the situation, it is a common
characteristic to refer the anger to some person. The bounds of justice
may be, for the moment, overstepped. The dim awareness with some, that
the person is not to be blamed, is ignored for the time, while the
tendency is strongest in consciousness to give expression to the
emotion. The individual differences here are quite marked. G. apparently
has developed a habit of referring his anger to a principle, ignoring
the personality. In many of his observations, persons were connected
with a situation, but were neglected in his attention to the principle
violated. A business man had told him an untruth causing him difficulty.
G. states, “I was not angry at the man. That was his way of doing
business.” In the course of his emotional experience, his anger became
rather intense, referring to the business ethics practiced. The degree
in which the sense of justice is ignored under the influence of anger of
this type is also a matter of wide individual difference.
In the observations collected, anger at one’s self appears quite
frequently. There have been no cases found, in which anger at one’s self
develops purely from a fore-period of irritation. The subject takes the
matter to himself and feels a little humiliated and degraded and may
react against his own personality in the same manner that he would
against another. Two observers, B. and G., quite frequently get angry at
themselves. A. reports that this sort of anger rarely occurs with him.
G. observes the following case. After he had been repeatedly humiliated
by his own failure, he says, “I felt as if I were so inefficient. I said
to myself, ‘If I had a man working for me and he should do work in that
manner I would discharge him.’” G. then continued to talk to himself
like another person in rather severe condemnatory language. B. was
reading a book. He could not understand the author’s demonstration. He
had made several trials at it. He states, “I felt as if I must be
stupid, somehow; there was a slight feeling of worry and dejection. The
idea of my stupidity was followed by anger at myself for being so
stupid. I clinched my fists and threw my arms in angry demonstration,
feeling as if I would like to pummel myself. I went over the
demonstration again with an attitude of carefulness and finally
concluded that it was the author who was hazy instead of myself. I
slammed the book down on the table and broke forth angrily, ‘You, X.,
are the one who is stupid, you don’t make it clear.’ This anger at the
author was rather pleasant in quality. I felt a sort of triumph over
him.”
Another situation quite common in the origin of anger with a
fore-period of lowered self-feeling, is its appearance at times with
greater intensity after the actual outside stimulus is passed. One
becomes more angry in recalling afterward what was said, than he was
at the time of the offense. This belated origin of anger appears
in the observations of all the subjects studied. It may be noted
that anger with a fore-period of irritation does not appear in this
retarded manner. In the recall of an incident in imagination, anger
may become quite intense; while it may be at the time of the incident,
there was no awareness of any tendency to anger. Mild anger at the
time of the initial stimulus may become intensified in its recall.
In such cases there was evidently some element lacking in the mental
situation stimulating anger. An offensive statement in the heat of an
irascible discussion may be ignored. A rather severe thrust may seem
proper, but when recalled in connection with another mental situation,
the emotional content may be entirely changed. X. in the course of
an argument with E. implied, “You never will know as much about the
subject under discussion as Y.” “At the time I noted his statement and
was aware that it was a thrust at myself, but I had no feeling about
the matter then. I considered that I was producing the better argument,
and his personal thrust I was aware was an admission on his part that
he knew I was. To-day I recalled his statement and felt degraded and
angry.” Then C. proceeded to plan a series of cutting remarks that he
would like to tell X. In some instances the presence of a too active
aggressive attitude at the time of the stimulus seems to predispose
against a too easy lowering of self-esteem, and consequently anger with
a fore-period of negative self-feeling does not appear. But let one
momentarily lose faith in his point of view or fail in words to express
it, and he becomes more sensitive to the thrusts of his opponent’s
argument.
Another factor partly accounts for the greater emotional intensity of
the recalled incident. The conventional control of emotions during
social contact may be relaxed during the memory recall. The same ethical
standard is not required for one’s private thinking as in actual contact
with others. In this respect there is rather wide individual difference
with the subjects studied. Though in general with persons of rather
intense emotions, there is a marked difference in the ethical standard
they practice, when the incident is present to consciousness, and the
standard used when the anger occurs from the imaged situation; with all
persons studied at times during their most intense anger emotions, the
imaginative reaction is far more crude and unethical, and consequently
the imaged anger may be more intense. A third factor may be involved
here. A personal thrust may be partly ignored at the time without
lowered dignity because it is given with a smile or a friendly attitude,
but when recalled later, the friendliness may be neglected and
consequently anger is more intense. A fourth condition that partly
accounts for more intense anger in the imaged situation, is that the
anger consciousness of this type is usually cumulative. With an entirely
novel experience, a certain amount of resistance must be broken down
before the emotion develops. The emotion seems to develop by a
cumulative process through a series of stimuli. One personal thrust in a
situation in which there is involved no previous emotional excitement,
may be ignored or the humiliation may be borne at the time with no anger
reactions; but when it is repeated one or more times under similar
circumstances, there is present a characteristic mental situation for
the development of anger. The repeated occurrence of the incident in the
imagination intensifies the feelings till anger becomes fully developed.
E.’s observations will illustrate. “During the argument with X., I was
in splendid humor, enjoying myself to the fullest and naturally supposed
everybody was.” Referring to a statement made by X. during the argument,
E. states, “The glow of the conflict had not entirely departed when I
began to see his statement in an entirely new light as reflecting on
myself, then I felt somewhat distressed and overcome to a slight degree,
by a feeling of abasement but no resentment against X. The next day at
ten o’clock I was recalling the events of the argument. There was still
a feeling of abasement but now it stirred me to anger. I found myself
going over it and thinking what I might have said, and what I would say
the next time.”
_Anger Without an Immediate Feeling Fore-period._ This study was begun
tentatively with the view held by Wundt (21) that each emotion of anger
has an immediate feeling fore-period. The study had not progressed far
till this view had to be abandoned. It early appeared in the
observations that anger may begin rather suddenly with no initial
feeling fore-period, which the observer is able to find. The subject
reports that he suddenly finds himself in the midst of an emotion of
anger before he is scarcely aware of it, and is giving verbal and motor
expressions usually accompanying such emotions. In many of the emotions
of this type there is evidence in the observations that the emotion
refers to a previous emotional experience. From the mental disposition
left over from the previous emotion, the emotion suddenly emerges
without passing through the cumulative process that is necessary with an
entirely novel emotional experience. In other words the way has
previously been broken so that it is not necessary to break down the
same amount of resistance. A. observes, “Sitting in my room, I imaged X.
At once I was angry, motor expression not marked at first. X. was imaged
in a rather positive and demonstrative attitude which he sometimes
takes. I found myself with quite a good deal of motor activity saying in
voco-motor fashion as if talking to X.——I was partly aware of three
former disagreements with X., the imagery of the circumstances of the
last one was most clearly defined. I imagined X. a little humbled by my
remark. The emotional experience from the first was pleasant. I felt a
little victorious in the imaginary act of dealing a telling thrust.”
With all persons studied, there is evidence of a previously developed
mental disposition against certain persons and against certain
principles which allows the anger point to be reached in a short cut
fashion. Anger is easily attained without the initial feeling either
of irritation or lowered self-feeling. Anger that rises from this
situation is usually pleasant in quality. The mental disposition which
is connected with this sudden origin of anger may be present during
the later recall of the emotion. It is also shown by the frequent
re-occurrence that the same situation may repeatedly give rise to
anger. B. has a rather strongly developed sentiment against ministers
who preach what they do not believe; G. against persons who do their
work carelessly, especially manufacturers who send out goods of
inferior quality. I. has a marked sentiment against acts of cruelty in
the treatment of animals. D. reacts rather vigorously against persons
who are disloyal to friendship. These sentiments go back to early
experiences in the life of the individuals.
B. in talking with X. directed the conversation to ministers who preach
what they really do not believe. He took Dr. Y. as an example. He had
previously seen Dr. Y. drinking beer with the boys and had resented his
behavior. He began to vituperate to X. against Y., giving instances and
telling his opinion rather vigorously about such men who have a double
personality. “Before I was scarcely aware of it, I was in the midst of
motor and verbal expressions of righteous indignation. I enjoyed it all
very much. I always take delight in making myself angry with ministers
of this sort.” B. has reported other instances of his anger against
ministers of this type. A case from I. will illustrate further. “I had
the same recurring anger for three weeks. A delivery boy who passes
about the same time each day goes by whipping and abusing his horse.
Anger arises each time the incident occurs. The sight made me pleasantly
indignant. I have the image of an old German, living near my home as a
child, who treated his horse so cruelly. The idea of telephoning to the
police occurs to me, but the boy goes on and the idea is abandoned.”
------------------------------------------------------------------------