A skirmish with the French near Barba del Puerco. The whole of our
battalion moves up to the Agueda, and occupies an extended line of
posts. Massacre of a French soldier by some Spanish shepherds, near
Almofala. Night attack made on four companies of our battalion at
the pass of Barba del Puerco. The enemy is repulsed with loss.
Observations. Letter from Lord Wellington to Colonel Beckwith,
expressing his approbation of the conduct of his corps on the
occasion. General Crawford also thanks the regiment in orders. The
French force at San Felices reinforced from Salamanca. Character of
General Loison. General Crawford withdraws the troops from Barba del
Puerco. We occupy Villa de Ciervo. Our ten companies reduced to
eight, and some officers sent to England to recruit. Fine specimens
of crystal found near Villa de Ciervo. My establishment is augmented
by a young wolf. Two Portuguese light battalions join General
Crawford. We are reinforced also by a troop of horse artillery, the
14th and 16th Light Dragoons. Extensive line of posts guarded by
General Crawford’s corps. A large army under Marshal Massena
assembles near Ciudad Rodrigo, intended to invade Portugal. The
three different corps which composed it. By whom commanded.
Massena’s proclamation to the Portuguese. He lays siege to Rodrigo.
The light division watch him closely, and are constantly getting
under arms from various causes. Invidious feeling of certain persons
in the army towards the light division. The French batteries open on
Rodrigo. Their cavalry drive our pickets over the Azarva.
Prognostications of some wiseacres in the army that the siege of
Rodrigo would be raised by Lord Wellington. General Junot crosses
the Azarva to reconnoitre our force. Captain Krauchenberg, of the
1st German Hussars, distinguishes himself. General Crawford retires
across the Duas Casas, and takes up a position behind the Touron.
General Junot’s cautious manner of advancing. Query: Why did Massena
never attempt to cut off the light division from the Coa with his
numerous cavalry? Rodrigo surrenders to the French. General Crawford
surprises a French detachment. Colonel Talbot, of the 14th Light
Dragoons, killed. Gallantry of his regiment. Exemplary conduct of
the French infantry in square. Observations.
On the 27th of February the first company of the battalion for
detachment (Captain Creagh’s) was ordered to march from Escarigo, to
reconnoitre the village of Barba del Puerco, in which he found a strong
detachment of French cavalry and infantry, with whom he had a skirmish,
and fell back, agreeable to his orders, to Escarigo, where I joined him
with my company; and a third company was pushed forward from Villar
Torpim to Vermiosa, to support us.
The following day I was ordered to reconnoitre Barba del Puerco again,
which, finding that the French had vacated, I occupied as a picket-post,
sending a small party to the bridge at the foot of the pass; opposite to
which was a picket of infantry and cavalry, detached from the French
force at St. Felices.
By information collected at Barba del Puerco, from the padre of the
village (who afterwards proved himself a vile traitor to his country),
the French force at St. Felices consisted of 3000 men, infantry,
cavalry, and artillery, under the command of Baron Ferez, a German in
the French service, and a general of brigade belonging to General
Loison’s division. Our whole battalion was about this time ordered to
close up to the Agueda, and, in conjunction with the 1st German Hussars,
we held Villa de Ciervo, with four companies; Barba del Puerco, with
four companies; Almofala and Escalhao, each with one;—thus watching all
the fords on the river, from Villa de Ciervo on the right, to beyond
Escalhao on the left, at the junction of the Agueda and Douro;—a long
line of country for so small a force, and at such a distance from
support.
With a view of keeping us on the _qui vive_, and of enabling every
officer in the battalion to make himself acquainted, in the event of
being driven back, with the line of the river, the roads leading from it
towards the Coa, and the general features of the district entrusted to
our charge, our companies frequently exchanged posts.
Being stationed at Almofala early in March, I witnessed a disgusting and
cruel sight. Having gone with another officer to the mountainous bank
which overhangs the river not far from the village, to visit the picket,
we perceived a French soldier, _unarmed_, running down the mountain on
the opposite side of the river, no doubt with the intention of trying to
cross over and desert to us. Three Spanish shepherds who were tending
their sheep on the same side of the river, intercepted him, and beat him
to death with their clubs in less time than it has taken me to write an
account of the sickening sight. We called out, and made signals to them
to desist, and to spare him, but in vain. We fired several shots over
their heads to intimidate them, but it had no effect, and the butchery
went on without our being able to interfere, or to interrupt those
savages in what they considered, no doubt, a most patriotic and
meritorious exploit. A deluge of rain had so swollen the river, which
roared at the foot of the mountain, that to pass it was impossible; and,
indeed, could we have effected it, the blood-thirsty shepherds would
have escaped, before we could by possibility have reached them. To have
inflicted the summary punishment on them with a rifle ball, which we all
felt well inclined to do, would have been only an act of justice; but it
was a step, nevertheless, which the higher authorities would have
visited with a heavy punishment.
If the number of men which the French army lost by assassinations of a
similar kind, during the whole of the war in the Peninsula, could be
ascertained, it would be an interesting and extraordinary document. Much
as every man possessing the slightest degree of humanity must abhor the
inhuman system of killing stragglers, adopted by the Spaniards, great
allowance must, nevertheless, be made for them, who thus retaliated for
the countless acts of cruelty committed by their invaders.
NIGHT ATTACK ON OUR POST AT BARBA DEL PUERCO.
The French general, Ferrez, who commanded at St. Felices, made a
strenuous effort at midnight of the 19th of March to surprise the post
at Barba del Puerco, which four companies of our battalion under Colonel
Beckwith occupied. At the head of six hundred chosen men, grenadiers and
light infantry, this general placed himself; and having concealed his
force as near the bridge as possible, unheard by our double sentry on
the other side of it, (for the roaring of this mountain-river, swollen
by the late rains, was such, that no other sound but the rushing of its
waters amongst the rocks could be heard,) dashed across, and driving
before him a sergeant’s piquet posted near the bridge, up the face of
the pass, pressed on rapidly until met by our companies; when a conflict
took place of the most extraordinary kind, both from the nature of the
terrific mountain-pass in which the combatants met, and the unusual hour
which the French general had selected for the attack.
One blaze of fire on the head of their column, as soon as it could be
distinguished, followed instantly by a cheer and a charge, sent the
enemy headlong down the side of the mountain in the utmost confusion,
and across the bridge, to which they were pursued by our men, pouring in
a constant fire, and with good effect.
On the opposite bank, lining the broken ground near the bridge, General
Ferrez had placed the reserve of his infantry, stated to have been
fifteen hundred men, to cover the retreat of the attacking party. Those
men kept up a random fire across the river as soon as their routed
countrymen had rejoined them, which did but little execution. It soon
ceased; and thus terminated this nocturnal affray.
If a man be permitted to speak of his own corps in terms of approbation,
I most assuredly feel myself entitled to do so on this occasion. Of the
four companies stationed at Barba del Puerco for the defence of the
pass, one was detached to a path far to the right of the village, to
check any body of the enemy which might advance in that direction; and
meeting no enemy there, of course it was not engaged; consequently,
_three_ companies, suddenly roused out of their sleep at midnight, beat
back, in a short space of time, _six_ hundred chosen veterans on their
reserve of fifteen hundred men, and inflicted on them no trifling loss.
Two French officers were found dead in the pass, with many of their
soldiers killed and wounded; some prisoners were also taken. We lost one
officer killed (Mr. Mercer), and from fifteen to twenty sergeants and
privates killed and wounded. Colonel Beckwith received a shot through
his cap, whilst in the act of rolling a huge piece of rock down on the
fugitives, by way of accelerating their retreat. Lord Wellington sent a
handsome letter of thanks to Colonel Beckwith, expressive of his
approbation of the conduct of the regiment; and General Crawford, never
lavish of praise, issued an order complimentary to the corps.
A few days after this affair, the post at Barba del Puerco was
reinforced by one company of the 43d and two of the 52d, which regiments
had recently been sent across the Coa from Pinhel; but the day after
their arrival, the whole of the troops were withdrawn from the pass to
Villa de Ciervo, and a small party of the German Hussars left as a
picket.
Intelligence reached us on the 25th of March, that the French force at
San Felices had been augmented by the arrival of the remainder of
General Loison’s division from Salamanca. The name of Loison will not be
forgotten by the Portuguese of the present generation; for he was one of
the most cruel of their invaders, and at the time he commanded a
division in Junot’s army, in 1808, previous to the convention of Cintra,
permitted such atrocities to be perpetrated by the troops under his
command, as would have disgraced a band of untutored savages.
Early in April, orders reached us from England that the ten companies of
which our battalion was composed should be formed into eight, and that
two captains and a proportion of subalterns, with a few sergeants and
privates, should proceed home to recruit. This arrangement was carried
into effect soon afterwards, and the eight companies numbered about one
hundred men each. It will, therefore, be perceived, that in less than
nine months after our arrival from England with nearly eleven hundred
men, we were melted down to about eight hundred; and for this we were
principally indebted to the Alemtejo fever during the previous autumn,
having as yet sustained but a trifling loss from the enemy.
Near Villa de Ciervo our officers discovered some good specimens of
crystal, which, when afterwards sent to England, polished, and set, made
seals much resembling white cornelian. Soon after this discovery,
another of the natural productions of the country came into my hands, in
the shape of a young wolf, which I purchased from a peasant, but which
could never, whilst he remained in my possession, be made to receive the
same fine polish of which the crystals were susceptible; for he was such
a savage and untameable brute at six months old, and, moreover, so
ravenous, that I found it no easy matter to satisfy his appetite, and
that of my greyhound puppy likewise, which was his foster-brother. I
made a present of him, after being tormented five months with his
society in camp, bivouac, or quarters; and he found his way to England,
in the autumn of the year of which I am now treating, under the especial
protection of a noble lord, at that time one of Lord Wellington’s
aides-du-camp.
Towards the end of April, the 1st and 3d regiments of Portuguese
caçadores were added to General Crawford’s command, and, with the three
British light regiments, formed what was from that period ever
afterwards termed the Light Division.
In addition to the 1st German Hussars and his division of infantry, the
following troops were sent across the Coa during the spring, to
reinforce Brigadier-General Crawford: a troop of horse artillery,
commanded by Captain Ross; the 14th and the 16th Light Dragoons; the
whole forming a command of which a lieutenant-general might have been
ambitious. With this force, General Crawford observed a long line of
country through which the Agueda flows; patroling with his cavalry as
far to the right as the fords in the neighbourhood of Fuente Guinaldo,
and even yet higher up the river; and to the left as far as the junction
of the Agueda and Douro, near Escalhao. His artillery, infantry, and the
greater part of his cavalry, were stationed behind the Azarva (a small
river running into the Agueda) in Gallegos and Espeja. He had cavalry
pickets at Carpio, Marialva, Moulina dos Flores, at the ford of Val
d’Espina, in front of Villa de Ciervo, and at Barba del Puerco, which,
as a glance at the map will shew, was an extensive line to guard. He
supported the cavalry posts on the Azarva by pickets of infantry.
A powerful French army, destined to invade Portugal, began to assemble
in the beginning of May, on the right bank of the Agueda, preparatory to
its laying siege to the Spanish fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo, which is
distant three or four leagues from Gallegos, the head-quarter village of
General Crawford’s corps. That active guerilla chief, Don Julian
Sanchez, hovered about the French army, and lost no opportunity of
annoying and incommoding it.
This army, styled by the French “the Army of Portugal,” was commanded by
Marshal Massena, the Prince of Esling, and was to be composed of three
distinct corps: the 2d corps, commanded by General Regnier; the 6th
corps, by Marshal Ney, Duke of Elchingen; and the 8th corps, by General
Junot, Duke of Abrantes. The cavalry had for its chief General Montbrun.
Massena, in his proclamation to the Portuguese nation, previous to his
entering their country, declared, that he came _not_ to invade Portugal,
but to rescue it from the English, whom he intended forthwith to “drive
into the sea, and to plant the imperial eagles on the citadel of
Lisbon,” and some more trash of the same nature. He added, that he was
at the head of one hundred and ten thousand Frenchmen for the express
purpose, and that resistance to the imperial decree was useless. The 6th
and 8th corps only had been collected on the Agueda at the period now
alluded to, the 2d corps being employed elsewhere.
A minute and detailed account of every different movement made by the
enemy, for the purpose either of covering their large foraging parties,
of reconnoitering our line of posts, or of trying the various fords, &c.
&c. from the time of the affair at Barba del Puerco, on the 19th March,
up to the period of General Crawford’s corps recrossing the Coa, on the
24th of July, would fill a volume, and, moreover, afford but little
interest to any one now living, except an odd one or two remaining on
this side the river Styx, who were actors in the scenes to which I
allude. It is sufficient to observe, that from the beginning of March
until the 24th of July, we were stationed so close to the outposts of
the French, as to render it necessary for the soldiers to sleep fully
accoutred, and the officers, consequently, with their clothes on, ready
to get under arms in an instant; and we were, as a matter of course,
always under arms one hour before break of day. In short, the French
cavalry were eternally in motion, in large bodies, towards our chain of
posts, and we as often under arms waiting for them.
Jealousy is a demon which rears its head in all communities and
societies, and, I fear, is to be found in military as well as in civil
life. Amongst a certain number (I hope a few only) of malecontents in
the army, the very name of the “Light Division,” or the “outposts,” was
sufficient to turn their ration wine into vinegar, and to spoil their
appetite for that day’s allowance of ration beef also. In good truth,
general officers were to be found, whom I could name, that bore towards
us no very good will; perhaps because it was not their lot to hold so
prominent a command as that of our more fortunate and favoured
brigadier. But, be that as it may, those invidious barkers and growlers,
whether in the subaltern or in the higher ranks, in whose mouths was
ever uppermost,—“Ah! the Light Division! what is the Light Division more
than any other?”—should have been briefly answered thus—The Light
Division never did affect to place itself on a pedestal, as being
superior to its comrades in arms; nor, on the other hand, when the most
honourable, dangerous, harassing, and responsible post was allotted to
it, and it was pushed across the Coa in the very teeth of Massena’s
numerous legions, which it watched night and day, month after month,
along a difficult and extensive line of country, whilst the other
divisions of the army were in cantonments behind the Coa, as perfectly
at their ease, and as safe from surprise, as if they had been in a
garrison in England,—could it have calculated on having its prominent
services called in question by men, many of whom scarcely ever saw the
Light Division in their lives, and were ignorant of the manner in which
it was constantly employed in every successive campaign. I feel that I
am justified in touching on this subject, (insignificant as it may
appear,) inasmuch as it concerns every Light Division-man of that day.
On the 24th of May, the French threw a pontoon bridge over the Agueda,
not far from Ciudad Rodrigo; and in the latter end of the month
commenced operations against that fortress. Their working parties were
constantly cannonaded, by day and night; and at times very heavily.
The French batteries, being at length completed, opened, at daybreak of
the 25th of June, a most tremendous fire on the town, which was returned
with equal spirit. At the same moment a large body of their cavalry
advanced, and drove back our hussar pickets across the Azarva, on those
of the infantry. Along the right bank of that river the enemy
established a strong chain of cavalry posts, which they held during the
remainder of the siege. This movement brought the pickets of the
opponents extremely close to each other at the bridge of Marialva.
Soon after the French batteries opened on the 25th, a tremendous
explosion was heard, which, we soon learnt, was occasioned by a shell
from the town having fallen into one of the enemy’s magazines. To detail
the daily progress of the siege is not in my power: all we knew was,
that the fire from the besiegers and the besieged was tremendous, and
was kept up night and day with unremitting fury. Some wiseacres asserted
roundly that Lord Wellington would cross the Coa, and advance with his
army to the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo. It required, however, but a small
allowance of consideration and common sense to be convinced, that to
have marched against an army so numerous and experienced as that of
Massena, with a force far inferior in numbers, and half that force made
up of raw Portuguese levies who had never smelt powder, was not a
measure likely to be adopted by so able and talented a commander as
ours. But in all regiments, brigades, and divisions of every army, there
are some few tacticians to be found of the same calibre, who fancy that
the commander-in-chief is a perfect ignoramus in such matters, when
compared with themselves.
Lord Wellington and General Spencer visited the outposts the day after
the French batteries opened on the town. We still occupied Gallegos by
day; but every evening General Crawford marched his infantry to a wood
on some heights behind the village, towards the river Duas Casas, where
we bivouacked, and returned soon after daybreak to the village. This, I
presume, was a precautionary measure, fearing the enemy might attempt a
night attack on the village, which their extreme proximity rendered
probable.
From some commanding ground in the French lines, the return of our
division from the heights to the village could plainly be perceived; and
possibly being deceived on that point, mistaking us for reinforcements
sent across the Coa to join General Crawford, Massena ordered General
Junot to cross the Azarva at Marialva Bridge on the 4th July, with, it
was supposed, about fifteen thousand men; and, by a close
reconnoissance, to ascertain how matters really stood.
_4th July._—Being under arms, as usual, an hour before day-break, on the
heights, some shots were heard from our cavalry pickets at Marialva, who
shortly afterwards retired slowly and in excellent order, keeping up a
continued skirmish. Captain Kraukenberg, of the 1st German Hussars, an
officer of the highest merit, distinguished himself on this occasion.
Forming his squadron on some eligible ground near a small narrow bridge
over a rivulet which runs through Gallegos, he waited until as many of
the French dragoons had crossed as he thought proper to permit, when he
instantly charged and put them into confusion, killing and wounding many
of them, and bringing some prisoners with him to the heights, where
General Crawford had drawn out the Light Division in line. The horse
artillery opened with effect on the head of Junot’s troops, who advanced
with caution; but General Crawford having ascertained their great
superiority of numbers, decided on retiring across the Duas Casas. This
movement was covered by some cavalry and our battalion, who skirmished
with the advance of the French until we had passed the river, which was
effected with a very trifling loss on our part. Two hundred riflemen and
some cavalry were left on the heights of Fort Conception as a picket,
the remainder being placed in a position near the Portuguese village of
Val de la Mula, behind the rivulet called the Turon, which is here the
boundary of the two countries.
It has ever been a matter of surprise to those amongst us who have given
it a thought, that a general of so rash and ardent a temper as Junot has
been represented, should have displayed so much caution on this
occasion. Had he been aware that the only force in his front was about
four thousand infantry, a troop of light artillery, and some squadrons
of cavalry, and that it had no support within many leagues, it is to be
presumed he would have pushed us with much more vigour in our retrograde
movement to the heights of Fort Conception; and had he done so, he might
have made General Crawford fully sensible that he had delayed his
retreat across the Duas Casas too long, whereby the safety of his
division was in some measure endangered, and for no possible purpose.
Why Massena permitted the Light Division to remain so long between the
Azarva and the Duas Casas, it is not for me to question, as the Prince
of Esling was most indisputably a man of first-rate military ability.
With greater reason may we wonder that, near as we were to so large an
army for some months, with extensive plains between us and the Coa, no
attempt was made by the numerous French cavalry to surprise and cut us
off from that river.
We remained for some days in the position near Val de la Mula, having
cavalry pickets on the Duas Casas. Ciudad Rodrigo surrendered on the
10th of July, after having sustained a furious bombardment of sixteen
days, during the greater part of which the cannonade on both sides was
tremendous. There was a large and practicable breach in the walls, and a
numerous French army, highly exasperated at the obstinate defence of the
garrison, ready to storm and take it, cost what it might. Perfectly
aware that he had no chance of being relieved by the army of Lord
Wellington, or by any of the Spanish forces, the governor capitulated,
and the garrison became prisoners of war.
On the night of the 10th of July, General Crawford marched from Val de
la Mula with seven companies of our battalion, two of the 52d, two
pieces of artillery, the 14th Light Dragoons, and a part or the whole of
the 1st German Hussars, to surprise a post consisting of about two
hundred French infantry and a troop of cavalry, at the Spanish village
of Barkela. Before daybreak we reached our ground unperceived by the
French. The two field-pieces and the nine companies of infantry were
drawn up on some rising ground about half a mile, or thereabout, from
the village. As soon as day broke and shewed us the enemy, in search of
whom we had been marching the whole night, General Crawford ordered a
charge to be made on them, as they were seen moving out of Barkela
towards the French camp, on the other side of the Agueda. Their troop of
cavalry was soon sabred or made prisoners; but with their infantry it
was otherwise. Instantly forming a small square, they retired, rapidly
and in good order, in the direction of the ford. Colonel Talbot, at the
head of the 14th Light Dragoons, rode gallantly at and charged the
little phalanx with great impetuosity, but without being able to break
it.
No troops on earth could have conducted themselves with greater
gallantry than the old and often-tried 14th Light Dragoons; and in so
determined a manner did this distinguished corps make their charge, that
Colonel Talbot, whose body I saw a few minutes after he was killed, bore
the marks not only of bullets but of bayonets: and it is equally true,
that he and many of his brave followers who actually reached the square,
met their death by the bayonets of this invincible little body of
Frenchmen, who steadily resisted their charges, and, without leaving in
our hands one of their brave band, succeeded in making good their
retreat over the plain. Some hundreds of the finest cavalry of which the
British army could boast continued hovering about, ready to pounce on
and to break them, if the least disorder should be detected.
It was impossible not to respect and admire the exemplary conduct of the
French infantry; and this affair may probably tend to open the eyes of
many men who talk with great composure of riding down and sabring
infantry on a plain with cavalry, as if it was the most simple and
feasible operation imaginable. But it must be confessed that such
opinions are generally advanced by theoretical, not practical, soldiers.
If the simple little fact in question be not considered conclusive, I
must refer all sceptics on the subject to encounters of a more recent
date; and they will find that at Waterloo not one British square was
broken by cavalry on that bloody day.
It will be naturally asked, where were General Crawford’s nine companies
of infantry and his two pieces of artillery all this time? It may be
answered, that they were standing without orders on a hill about half a
mile distant; but _why_ they were not ordered to advance, is more than I
can explain. It is to be presumed that, had the field-pieces been
ordered to advance at a brisk pace, with the cavalry, a few discharges
of grape-shot would either have annihilated the square in ten minutes,
or caused it to surrender; and it is no great presumption on the part of
any individual belonging to the nine companies of British infantry
present to pronounce, that they would have proved rather an overmatch
for two companies of Frenchmen. Our loss on this occasion was,
Lieut.-Colonel Talbot and a quarter-master of the 14th Dragoons killed,
and about twenty-five men and horses killed and wounded.