CHAPTER V

Another Blow at Senator Joe

When the Eisenhower administration took office in January 1953, I

had had high hopes that arbitrary government secrecy would be ended.

As a candidate, the President had talked much of his interest in

open government and had pledged to make all but national security

information available to the public. So had the Vice President,

Richard M. Nixon.

As late as November 6, 1953, Attorney General Herbert Brownell,

Jr., was continuing to stress the Republican party’s interest in

eliminating secrecy policies of the Truman administration. In

Chicago, before a convention of Associated Press Managing Editors,

Brownell said he was “very much aware of the great importance of

seeing to it that the obstacles to the free flow of information are

kept to an absolute minimum.

“I would like to call attention to some of the procedures which

we established,” Brownell said. “At the very outset of the new

Administration, we provided that any pardons or commutations of

sentence shall be a matter of public record. Throughout the prior

Administration, these executive actions were taken secretly, for

political purposes and over the objection of the Office of the Pardon

Attorney.

“We also started the policy of making a matter of public record

matters which our predecessors buried in secrecy, such as settlements

of all types of cases which we handle and involve monetary

considerations, such as tax claims, damage suits and Alien Property

settlements. We do not contend that we have achieved perfection in

our efforts to provide a full flow of information. But we are working

on it and each day find new ways to do our part.”

At this same meeting, Attorney General Brownell announced that

President Eisenhower was revoking a much criticized executive order

by President Truman dealing with defense information. He said

President Eisenhower was issuing a new order which “attains the

required balance between the need to protect certain types of defense

information, and the need for keeping the citizens of a republic as

fully informed as possible concerning what their government is doing.

“President Eisenhower considers the free flow of information from

the Government to the people to be basic to the good health of the

Nation,” Brownell told the editors. He declared that under the

Truman administration there “was a tendency to follow the dangerous

policy heretofore used by dictator nations of authorizing government

officials to use the term ‘National Security’ indiscriminately, and

thereby throw a veil of secrecy over many items which historically

have been open to the public in this country.”

The Attorney General said he viewed the new Republican policy as

an opportunity to “demonstrate to all the world the vivid contrast

between our system of government, which believes in and practices

freedom of the press, and the Communist system, which regards the

concept of freedom of information as a threat to the continuance of

its tyrannical rule.”

Such attitudes in November 1953 were difficult to reconcile with

those of May 1954, when the same Attorney General was helping fashion

a policy that was more devastating to a free flow of information

than simply refusing to give information to the press. The May 17,

1954, letter from President Eisenhower to the Defense Department

said in essence that any high officials of the Defense establishment

might refuse to produce records or testify even when subpoenaed by a

properly constituted congressional committee that was acting within

its jurisdiction.

The Army-McCarthy hearings that had given rise to the famous letter

ended on June 17, 1954. However, it was not necessary to wait for

the official reports made public on October 30, 1954, to know that

Senator McCarthy was finished as a political power—and that the

administration would use the “executive privilege” precedent again.

As an aftermath of the Army-McCarthy hearings, a charge was filed

that Senator McCarthy had conducted himself in a manner “unbecoming

a member of the United States Senate.” And on August 2, 1954, the U.

S. Senate decided by the overwhelming vote of 75 to 12 to investigate

Senator McCarthy’s conduct.

Senator Arthur V. Watkins, a Utah Republican, was named chairman of

the select McCarthy Censure Committee to determine recommendations

on Senator McCarthy’s conduct. In barely more than a month Chairman

Watkins ran smack into a roadblock of “executive privilege.”

The subject of inquiry was Senator McCarthy’s severe tongue lashing

of Brigadier General Ralph Zwicker, of Camp Kilmer, N. J. Major

General Kirke B. Lawton, a former commanding general of Fort

Monmouth, N. J., refused to testify about conversations with General

Zwicker. He claimed “executive privilege” under the May 17, 1954,

letter from President Eisenhower.

Edward Bennett Williams, who was serving as counsel for Senator

McCarthy, questioned the applicability of the May 17 letter: “Don’t

you know, General, that order of May 17, 1954, referred only to the

Government Operations Committee and the hearing then in session which

was commonly known as the Army-McCarthy hearing?”

General Lawton replied that he had been advised that the May 17

letter “not only applied to the so-called Mundt committee [the

Special Committee for the Army-McCarthy hearings] but it applies to

this or any other.”

Chairman Watkins excused General Lawton and wrote Defense Secretary

Charles E. Wilson asking clarification. Defense Secretary Wilson

replied that Generals Lawton and Zwicker would be allowed to testify

and produce documents unless their action would be “in violation of

national security regulations or a violation of the President’s order

of May 17, 1954.”

There could be little doubt now that the Defense Department intended

to make the May 17, 1954, letter a part of its basic doctrine with

all of the great blanket of secrecy that this would provide. I was

now more concerned than ever, for I had hoped that the May 17 letter

was the one-shot secrecy claim that so many of my colleagues thought

it was. But again the name of Joe McCarthy was mixed up in the

investigation, and in 1954 it would have been difficult to get any

cool thinking on a subject that remotely touched on the controversial

Wisconsin Republican.

Still, I couldn’t help worrying that the new and expanded doctrine

of “executive privilege” was just too convenient a cover for those

who wished to hide their activities from Congress, the press, or the

public. It could be used by the incompetent as well as the corrupt.

This doctrine of an “inherent right” of persons in the executive

departments to refuse testimony or documents threatened our whole

system of government. It seemed a naked claim of an authority

for unlimited secrecy, without regard for laws or the spirit of

a democracy. By claiming a right to withhold all information on

opinions, conclusions, recommendations, or suggestions, this doctrine

could allow the secrecy blanket to be dropped over virtually every

document in most agencies, for there are few governmental documents

that do not contain some opinions or suggestions. It carried within

it, in short, the seeds of dictatorship.

It seemed strange to me that this doctrine would be set forth in

the administration of a President who would be regarded as one

of the mildest Chief Executives, and certainly one of the least

inclined toward dictatorial action. I was not worried that President

Eisenhower would try to use it as a tool for totalitarianism.

But with this doctrine in force a man who was inclined toward

totalitarian methods might readily administer the laws as he pleased.

Washington cover-up · 第 5 / 18 章