Our detachment now consisted of the following numbers:--_Narrative of the Operations of a Detachment in an Expedition to Candy, in the Island of Ceylon, in the Year 1804 With Some Observations on the Previous Campaign, and on the Nature of Candian Warfare, etc., etc., etc.

+----------------+-----------------------+-------------------------+------+

| +-----------------------+-------------------------+------+

| |Captains. | |

+----------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---------+------+

|Royal Artillery | | | | 1| | 6| | | | | | 7 |

| 19th Regiment | | 2 | | 3| 1| 64| | | | | | 70 |

|--Malay ditto | | 1 | | | | | 1| 1| 4| | 46 | 53 |

| Volunteers | | 1 | | | | | | 1| 9| 2| 75 | 88 |

|2nd Batt. ditto | | 2 | | | | | 1| 1| 5| 2| 76 | 87 |

+----------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---------+------+

| Coolies 550). | | 6 | | 4| 1| 70| 2| 3| 18| 4| 197 | 305 |

+----------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---------+------+

N.B. One one-pounder, and one 4-2/3 coehorn.

Sept. 22.--Marched at day-light to the westward, keeping in a southerly

direction as much as the nature of the country would admit, in order to

approximate the route of Colonel Maddison's detachment.

23, 24, 25, 26.--Followed the same course, expecting, as we drew nearer

to the place of rendevouz, to hear of the Hambingtotte division.

27.--Reached Sambapelly after a very fatiguing march of above seventy

miles (from Surcamony), over a country wild and mountainous in the

highest degree. During the last sixty miles we had not seen a house or

a human being, nor was there anything except the paths through the

forests and round the bases of the mountains, to induce a belief that

this quarter had ever been peopled. We crossed one broad river, and

several smaller streams, none of which fortunately impeded our march.

The weather during the day was close and sultry, the circulation of the

air being impeded by the forests; the nights, on the contrary, were

foggy and cold. These changes of climate began to take effect on the

troops, and I found it necessary to send back from hence two Malays and

twenty-two Bengal Sepoys, who were indisposed. Sambapelly is a small

village, near which stands the residence of a Candian chief. The

country in the vicinity assumes a more favourable appearance. Some

villages are discernible, and the valleys are in many parts cultivated.

28.--Marched at daylight, the country continuing mountainous, but the

slopes of the hills in many places cleared, and the valleys in general

cultivated. Passed through some villages, which were entirely deserted.

Numerous parties of the enemy were seen at a distance, along the sides

of the mountains, watching our movements, by which they seemed to be

directed. About three o'clock, as the advanced guard was descending

into a deep valley, close to the village of Kieratavally, they were

fired upon by a party of the enemy, posted on the opposite hills, who

fled as soon as they had discharged their pieces. Luckily one man, who

was wounded, fell into our hands. Although we had now marched 124 miles

from Batticolo, this was the first native to whom we had been enabled

to speak. It was here that I expected to meet the Hambingtotte

division, but our prisoner had heard nothing of it, nor of any

detachment than that under my command; a circumstance which, cut off as

I was from communication by the surrounding enemy, created considerable

anxiety. As it was impossible to remain stationary with a corps in a

country where there was no possibility of procuring provisions of any

kind, every article of that description having been removed to the

mountains, and as I conceived there could be no doubt of the

Hambingtotte division bringing up the rear, I lost no time in

advancing, and the more so as I expected I must soon meet some of the

other columns, which I imagined must shortly be concentrating

themselves towards the capital. During the night we heard the shouts of

the enemy, and saw their numerous fires in various directions along the

sides of the mountains.

Kieratavally is a neat Candian village, situated in a well-cultivated

part of the country. Before leaving it I set fire to a large house

belonging to the Dessauve, that the Hambingtotte division on arriving

there might see that we had already passed.

29.--Continued our route at daylight in the direction of Candy,

anxiously looking out for other detachments of our troops. After

marching sixteen miles over a country similar to what we had lately

traversed, reached Pangaram, a large village, inhabited chiefly by

Lubbies (a trading caste), and situated on the banks of the great river

which passes Candy, and which is here about 150 yards broad. The

village was, as usual, entirely deserted. The river being much swollen,

we immediately began to prepare rafts. During the day the enemy hung on

our flanks in considerable numbers, but did not oppose our progress

otherwise than by exchanging a few shots with our advanced and rear

guards. Towards night, however, they lined the opposite bank of the

river, and seemed resolved to dispute the passage.

30.--The river having fallen considerably during the night, the enemy

fled from the opposite bank, after a few discharges of round shot. A

few volunteers made good their passage, and the river continuing to

fall, the rest of our men were enabled to ford it. The stores were

carried over on rafts. While this was going on, I detached Lieutenant

Virgo, with a party of about sixty men, to destroy a palace of the King

of Candy, situated seven miles down the river, in which I understood

was a depôt of arms and military stores. They completely effected their

object.

Oct. 1.--Continued our march towards Candy, and encamped in the evening

in a small plain called Catavilly, distant fifteen miles from Pangaram.

The country showed less appearance of cultivation. The enemy continued

to hang on our flanks, firing now and then a few shots, but making no

serious resistance.

2.--After marching eight miles, reached the ford of Padrapelly, where

we crossed for the second time the Candian river, the course of which

is very circuitous. Our passage was attended with great difficulty,

owing to the rapidity of the stream, and the rockiness of the bottom.

During the last two days, our path was extremely rugged, lying along

the banks of the river, where the hills ended in high and shelving

rocks, the soil being washed away by torrents. Encamped on the opposite

bank, in a small opening, where we could procure no forage for our

bullocks.

3.--Marched at daylight. During this morning the enemy seemed disposed

to close with us; they killed a soldier of the 19th, and wounded some

followers. After marching about eight miles, we began ascending the

pass of Ourané, which we found steep, rocky, and intersected by deep

ravines. About half way up we halted in the plain of Ourané, where we

found plenty of excellent water, a most welcome refreshment to our men,

who were exhausted by climbing up the mountains under the rays of a

vertical sun, reflected from rocks, which, as the day advanced, became

more and more heated. Meantime the enemy assembled in considerable

numbers higher up the mountain, but were dislodged by Lieutenant Virgo,

whom I had sent forward to secure the pass. Late in the evening we

reached the summit, after a painful march of fourteen miles, and halted

in a small village called Comanatavillé.

4.--The road on this day's march was worse than any we had yet passed;

it lay along the brow of a mountain, in several places nearly

perpendicular, where a false step would have caused a fall of several

hundred feet. Being very narrow, many of the bullocks tumbled headlong

down, and the path would have been altogether impracticable for these

animals, had they not been habituated to carry merchandize along the

hills. Here and there, where the earth had been washed away, or a rock

fallen down, the natives had driven stakes horizontally into the sides

of the mountain, forming a kind of bridge, over which travellers could

pass. Had these given way under any of the men, they must have been

dashed to pieces; or had they been previously removed, the hill would

have been rendered impassable. This is one of the paths through which

the King of Candy retreats to Ouva, when he is obliged to fly from his

capital.

That the enemy should have forborne to check our advance by destroying

the paths, can be accounted for only by supposing, that they thought it

unlikely so small a force could push forward to the capital, and were

in hourly expectation of our retreat by the same road, which I

afterwards understood they had rendered impassable; or, unless, as is

more likely, they wished, in compliance with their favourite system, to

draw us into the heart of the country, and attack us when enfeebled by

sickness and skirmishes.

We encamped, late in the evening, in a paddy (rice) field on the bank

of the river, under a steep hill, which was occupied by the 3rd company

of Bengal Sepoys, under Lieutenant Povelary.

5.--At daylight the enemy covered the opposite bank, and opened a fire

of musketry and gengals (Candian field-pieces) on our camp; but as it

was situated in a hollow, most of the shot passed over our heads; two

Sepoys, however, were killed, and several Sepoys and Coolies wounded,

and the tents much injured. The enemy attacked the hill above the camp,

but were repulsed by Lieutenant Povelary with considerable loss. Our

position was, notwithstanding, much exposed, both when in camp, and

when prosecuting our march. On the right ran the river, nowhere

fordable, and lined on its opposite bank by the enemy; on the left was

a steep mountain, confining our march to the vicinity of the river. Our

flankers on the left, it is true, occupied the summit of the mountain,

and could, by a lateral movement, prevent our being galled from that

side. We began our march at nine A.M., our flankers on the right firing

across the river on the enemy; but, as they were chiefly concealed

behind rocks and trees, with little effect. The most distressing

circumstance however was, that many of the bullocks, unaccustomed to

the appearance of Europeans and to heavy firing, became wild and

unmanageable, broke from their drivers, cast off their loads, and,

rushing among the Coolies, created much confusion and delay.

Having advanced about three miles in this state, we approached a large

house standing nearly across the road, and about a hundred yards

distant from the river. This house was filled with the enemy, who fired

on the head of our column from holes pierced in the walls. Exactly

opposite, on the other side of the river, I perceived a battery with

one heavy gun (which I afterwards found to be a Dutch iron

eight-pounder), and several gengals ready to open on us whenever we

came within range. This made it necessary for me to pause: our loss had

already been considerable; our troops, as well as Coolies, were falling

fast. To attempt to pass the battery with so lengthened a column as

ours, disordered as it was by the confusion that had been occasioned by

the bullocks, would have been highly imprudent, especially as our only

field-piece upset at this time, by which the axletree of the carriage

was broken; I therefore determined to storm the house, and, when in

possession of it, to construct rafts for the purpose of passing the

river and carrying the battery. Our vanguard accordingly drove the

enemy from the house, which we entered, and finding plenty of room for

our whole corps, were enabled to dress the wounded and replace the

axletree of our gun-carriage. We passed the remainder of the day in

constructing a large raft of such materials as could be procured.

Before Lieutenant Povelary, who flanked our left, could get possession

of a high hill immediately above the house, the enemy were enabled to

fire a volley through the roof, by which a bombardier of the Royal

Artillery (Malcolm Campbell) was unfortunately killed. Though only a

non-commissioned officer, his loss was severely felt by our small

party, having rendered himself particularly useful by his exertions in

getting the stores up the mountains during the march. The enemy's fire

was now wholly directed against the house. They had luckily but little

round shot for the large gun, and the grape and fire of the gengals did

no material injury.

The night presented a scene different from what we had yet witnessed.

On the opposite bank and the adjoining hills were thousands of the

enemy, every fourth or fifth man carrying a choulou or torch. At

intervals, a shout of exultation was set up from the battery in our

front, which was repeated by those around, and re-echoed by others on

the neighbouring hills. The object of this was to terrify our native

troops, and induce them to desert.

During the night, the enemy contrived to turn aside a stream, which

passed close to the house, and had supplied us with water the day

before; after which we could not procure any, even for the sick and

wounded. I here endeavoured, but with little effect, to use the

coehorn.

Owing to the wretched state of the fuzees nineteen shells out of

twenty-three thrown into the enemy's work fell dead, although these

shells had been sent us for service from Trincomalé a few days only

before we set out.

6.--Our spirits were greatly raised this morning by a report from that

active and zealous officer, Lieutenant Povelary, who occupied the hill

above the house, stating that he heard distinctly a heavy firing in

the neighbourhood of Candy. This I concluded must be some of our

detachments crossing the river at Wattapalogo or Kattagastoly. About

seven A.M., after much labour and loss, we carried our raft to the

river, which sunk as soon as a couple of soldiers got upon it, being

composed of iron wood, the only material within our reach. We were thus

under great embarrassment, when a sentry, on the top of the hill,

called out that he saw a boat crossing the river about three quarters

of a mile above the house. I instantly directed Lieutenant Vincent with

the soldiers of the 19th to seize it at all risks. On reaching the spot

where the boat had been seen, he found it had been conveyed to the

opposite side. This obstacle was no sooner known than two gallant

fellows, whose names it would be unfair to omit (Simon Gleason and

Daniel Quin) volunteered to swim over and bring it back; which they

boldly accomplished under protection of the fire of the party.

Lieutenant Vincent instantly leaped into the boat with as many men as

it would carry (between fifteen and twenty), and having crossed the

river, marched quickly down its bank to take the enemy in flank.

Panic-struck, the Candians deserted the battery, and fled in confusion

at his approach. Such was the promptitude and decision with which this

service was executed, that the whole was accomplished with only the

loss of two men wounded. The Candians, formidable in their fastnesses,

are so feeble in close combat, that in a quarter of an hour nearly the

whole of that mass which had a short time before covered the opposite

banks, and threatened our annihilation, had disappeared in the woods.

I lost no time in prosecuting our march; about two hundred yards in

rear of the battery stands the palace of Condasaly, the King's

favourite residence, a beautiful building, richly ornamented with the

presents received by the kings of Candy from the Portuguese, Dutch, and

English. This palace had been carefully preserved by General Macdowal

in 1803. And the King had availed himself of this respect shown to it

at that time to make it a principal depôt of arms and ammunition;

which, as I was unable to remove, and it being my object to destroy,

wherever found, I was under the necessity of setting the building on

fire. We afterwards continued our march to the capital, expecting, from

the firing heard in the morning, a speedy meeting with our countrymen

forming the co-operating columns. Indeed, so confident was I of joining

some of them, that I had the reports of my detachment made out ready to

present to the officer commanding in the town.

Candasaly is only five miles from Candy, and the road good. When half

way from hence to this capital, we passed a heavy Dutch gun which the

enemy were bringing up to the battery on the river.

Our advanced guard had scarcely got within range of a temple which is

situated on a hill above the town of Candy, when they sustained a

volley of musketry; a few minutes afterwards I could plainly perceive

the enemy flying through the streets in great confusion. It was now

evident that none of the other divisions had arrived. After detaching

Lieutenant Rogers with a party of Sepoys to occupy the heights

commanding the town, our troops once more took possession of the

capital, which they found, as usual, entirely deserted by its

inhabitants. The palace being in the most favourable situation for

resisting any immediate attack, I took possession of it, and looked

with great anxiety for the arrival of the other detachments.

7.--This day passed without any intelligence of our friends. Towards

evening, a Malay officer and some soldiers formerly in our service, but

forced into that of the Candians after Major Davie's surrender, arrived

amongst us, and informed me, that a fortnight before a rumour had

prevailed of six English divisions having entered the Candian

territory; that many of his countrymen had accompanied the Candians to

oppose these divisions, but had returned without having seen an enemy.

It was generally believed that these divisions had been driven back.

He added that the Candians were in great force in the neighbourhood,

and delayed their attack only until the climate should begin to take

effect upon us; and that the firing which Lieutenant Povelary had taken

for that of our columns on the morning of the 6th was a rejoicing at

our embarrassed situation, which seemed to them to admit neither of

advance nor retreat, but to lead inevitably to surrender, and

consequent massacre.

I was greatly at a loss what to make of this statement. The officer's

character I knew to be respectable; and their report of the number of

divisions corresponded exactly with the fact.

8.--Early this morning detached Lieutenant Povelary with a party to the

top of the hills, to ascertain whether a camp, or any part of our

troops, could be discerned. He brought no tidings of them.

In the forenoon, some gun Lascars, who had been taken prisoners with

Major Davie, effected their escape to us, and related that they had

just returned from the frontiers, whither they had marched with a body

of Candians for the purpose of opposing the English troops that were

advancing into the country; that they had actually seen one detachment

with whom their party had exchanged a few shots, by which a Candian

chief was wounded; that soon after, this detachment marched back to the

English territory, whereupon the whole corps in which they served was

recalled to the capital; that a rumour prevailed amongst the Candians

that all the English troops except my detachment were repulsed; that

the King had proclaimed to his people that he had driven five English

armies back to the sea, and that it only remained for them to chastise

a few banditti who had stolen up from Batticolo.

My anxiety for the safety of my detachment had been hourly increasing

since my arrival in Candy, and was now wrought up to the highest pitch.

I considered its situation as eminently perilous. The army under

General Macdowal had been only twenty days getting to Candy in 1803,

though encumbered by six-pounders, and obliged to halt several days for

want of Coolies. The detachment that I conceived to be coming up were

lighter, and consequently would have been enabled to march much

quicker.

The distance from Columbo to Candy is only 103 miles, and that from

Trincomalé, 142, and the roads from both places perfectly known whereas

my route lay partly through the province of Ouva, the most mountainous

and least known of the whole island; and, in consequence of my being

obliged to make a circuit for the purpose of forming a junction with

Colonel Maddison, amounted to 194 miles.

The time elapsed even since one of the detachments had been seen on the

frontiers was enough, and more than enough, for its arrival; that they

were driven back by the Candians, could not for a moment be believed. I

considered the King's proclamation merely as an artifice to encourage

his troops, yet the non-arrival of our divisions still continued to

increase my surprise and uneasiness. Our provisions were now

considerably reduced, and much of our ammunition expended. Our

situation began also to make a powerful impression on the Europeans, as

well as on the native troops. The former, with the exception of a few

artillery-men, consisted of the 19th regiment, a great part of which

corps had been sacrificed the year before, under Major Davie. Many of

these men had been in Candy with General Macdowal; the massacre was

still fresh in their recollection. They saw displayed in savage triumph

in several of the apartments of the palace, the hats, shoes, canteens,

and accoutrements of their murdered comrades, most of them still marked

with the names of their ill-fated owners.

I could easily collect, from the conversation of the officers, that few

of them agreed with regard to what ought to be done. I therefore

avoided calling a council of war, persuaded that it would only give

rise to unpleasant differences. Added to this, the rains had already

set in with considerable violence, and I was perfectly aware of the

difficulty of passing the Candian river during the monsoon. Under these

circumstances, to have remained longer in the capital would, in the

event of the other divisions not arriving (of whose appearance there

was now scarcely any hope), have occasioned the certain destruction of

my detachment. On the other hand, should they come up (and I had no

reason to doubt that one of them had been seen on the frontiers), what

must the General think on finding that my detachment had thus returned

without co-operation? Added to this, I had to dread the censure and

disgrace that might result from a step thus precipitately taken.

Balancing between these opposite motives, the state of my mind, on this

distressing occasion, it is impossible to describe; it can only be

conceived by those who have had the misfortune to be placed in

circumstances of similar anxiety.

Obliged to assume an air of gaiety amongst the troops, whilst my mind

was agitated by the most melancholy reflections; feeling that not only

the honour, but the life, of every man in the detachment depended on my

conduct, I may truly say that even those individuals who were suffering

around me from sickness and from wounds had no reason to envy the

situation of their commander.

Though strongly prompted by my own feelings to continue following up

what I deemed to be the object of my orders, I at this period regarded

the safety of the detachment entrusted to my command as paramount to

every other consideration. I therefore determined, in the first

instance to cross the Candian river, so as, at all events, to ensure my

retreat, and take post on the left bank, where I might wait a day or

two longer for the tidings of the other detachments. I clearly foresaw

that this movement would draw the whole of the enemy upon me, and

consequently lead to a considerable expenditure of ammunition. They

were in great force in the neighbourhood, and had for the last two days

abstained from molesting us, waiting to see what steps I should pursue:

yet of the two evils this appeared the least. By encamping on the left

bank of the river, we should be in readiness to co-operate with any of

the other detachments that might arrive. We should also be enabled to

retreat either on Columbo or Trincomalé, whereas returning by the

Batticolo road was completely out of the question. In addition to its

length, and the difficulties which the country presented, I knew that

the Candians had been employed in blocking up the passes to prevent our

return. Besides, I must have crossed the Mahavilla Gonga twice, at the

fords of Padrepelly and Pangaram.

Having weighed these circumstances, I came to the resolution of

marching out of Candy the next morning.

9.--At six A.M. commenced my march, abstaining from destroying or even

injuring the town of Candy, that in the event of our troops still

coming up, the followers might not be deprived of shelter. On the

outside of the town, we passed a number of skeletons hanging on the

trees, the remains of our massacred officers. We next reached the

banks of the river, the scene of the cruel catastrophe which closed

the career of Major Davie's detachment, and found the ground still

covered with the bones of the victims. The river not being fordable,

we were under the necessity of encamping on this ominous spot, while a

party returned to Candy for materials to make rafts. Meanwhile the

enemy were seen assembling in vast numbers on the opposite bank. They

took care to remind us of the danger of our situation, calling to us

to observe the bones of our countrymen, and assuring us that ere long

we should experience a similar fate. They repeatedly urged the natives

to desert, as the only means of preserving their lives. It is but

justice here to remark, that of the native troops, whether Sepoys or

Malays, not a man proved unfaithful to his colours. Even from the

followers, I had hitherto experienced a degree of fidelity scarcely to

be expected from their general character, not a man having yet

deserted me. But our situation was now about to become too trying for

their resolution.

At three P.M. two rafts were completed; but the current was so rapid

that our tow-ropes immediately gave way. Punting was therefore the only

expedient, and this was attended with much delay.

Late in the evening Lieutenant Rogers having crossed with a few

Europeans, attacked and drove from the hill above the ferry a strong

party of the enemy, with the loss of one of their chiefs who was

bayoneted. This considerably checked their ardour. The greater part of

the night was taken up in getting over our invalids.

10.--In the course of the morning, the river having fallen, some of the

troops and followers forded it. We were also enabled to get over part

of the stores. But towards noon the rain set in, and, as is usual in

mountainous countries, the river became almost immediately too deep to

be passed in that manner. By the rapidity of the current, one of our

two small rafts was completely carried away, and the other became

nearly unmanageable. Our tents, the 3rd company of Sepoys, and our rear

guard were still on the right bank of the river.

Apprehending that if these men were not quickly brought over, they

would be lost to us for ever, I ordered them to cross without delay,

which was effected with great difficulty by four o'clock, leaving the

tents behind.

The constant skirmishing of the last two days had reduced our stock of

ammunition to two small barrels of 800 rounds each, and several of the

troops were without cartridges. Nearly two days had now elapsed since

my departure from Candy; and no intelligence had reached me of the

other detachments. I felt, therefore, the necessity of coming to an

immediate decision relative to my future proceedings; and the troops

and followers having now all passed, I determined without loss of time

to commence my retreat.

The Trincomalé road, though longer, appeared upon the whole to present

fewer obstacles than that leading to Columbo. In following the latter,

we should have been under the necessity of taking by storm the two

posts of Geeriagamme and Garlgaddray, situated at the top of the

Columbo passes, through both of which the road runs. I therefore gave

the preference to the former route. We were 142 miles from Trincomalé,

with a road before us less rugged indeed in its nature than that which

we had traversed, but in which we were likely to be equally exposed to

annoyance from the enemy. As the bullocks would only impede our

progress, I determined to leave them behind, and directing each soldier

to take six days' rice on his back, abandoned the rest of the stores.

Whilst destroying the other stores, a parcel of loose powder, which had

unfortunately been left near one of the boxes containing shells, took

fire, which was immediately communicated to the fuses, and the shells

continued to burst amongst us for some time, killing and wounding

several of the Coolies who were to have carried them, and desperately

wounding a serjeant of artillery. This accident occasioned some

confusion, of which the enemy took advantage, and commenced a general

attack, with a trifling loss on our side; in which, however, they were

repulsed.

About five o'clock in the afternoon, we were enabled to commence our

march, our Coolies carrying a long train of sick and wounded.

It was late before we reached the top of the Trincomalé pass, and the

rain, the darkness, and the ruggedness of the mountains put it quite

out of our power to descend. We here passed a distressing night,

exposed to incessant rain, without the means of preparing victuals, and

hearing the fall of the trees which the Candians were felling lower

down on the mountain to obstruct our next day's march.

11.--Found the Candians posted on the different hills that command the

pass, while the road was blocked up in many places with large trees,

and in some with breastworks. After several hours' labour and exposure

to the enemy's fire, we gained the bottom of the pass with the loss of

five Europeans, eight Sepoys, and thirty followers, killed and wounded;

a loss considerable in itself, but smaller than I had expected from the

opposition that awaited us. Here I was deprived of the services of

Lieutenant Vincent, who received a wound in the thigh; a deprivation

which I felt severely, from the very able assistance he had hitherto

afforded me.

We now continued our route, proceeding very slowly on account of the

great increase of our wounded. Towards evening we passed the ruins of

Fort Macdowal, which the Candians had entirely destroyed, and halted

only when the darkness and rain prevented us from finding our way

further.

12.--Continued our march without stopping, harassed as usual by the

enemy, who were indefatigable in blocking up the roads before us.

During this morning, Lieutenant Smith, of the 19th, a most promising

young officer, received a severe wound in the breast, which completely

deprived me of his services. At five P.M. perceiving that the enemy had

strongly fortified a hill over which we had to pass, I attacked and

carried it by the bayonet, with the loss of two Europeans and five

Sepoys killed. On reaching the summit, we found the road so completely

closed up, that we could not attempt to pursue it that night; and to

aggravate our misfortune, we had lost the guides acquainted with this

part of the country, two of them having deserted and one having been

shot this day.

13.--As soon as it was daylight, I perceived a path lying in a

northerly direction, which I followed as our only guide; concluding

that if it did not conduct us to Trincomalé, it would lead to some of

our other settlements.

The enemy this morning appeared more resolute than they had hitherto

showed themselves. Led on by our own Malays and gun Lascars who had

formerly deserted to them, they attacked our line both in front and

rear, and actually cut in amongst the Coolies, who became perfectly

panic-struck, threw down the sick and wounded, and either ran into the

forests to conceal themselves, or rushed in among the troops, whom they

threw into confusion. Unfortunately, two wounded Europeans, a serjeant

of the Royal Artillery and a private of the 19th, who were in charge of

the rear-guard, on this occasion fell into the hands of the enemy.

The Bengal Lascars and Malays in the Candian service repeatedly

addressed their country-men in our ranks, informing them that the King

of Candy did not consider them as his enemies, and promising that such

of them as would come over to join him should be appointed Captains in

his army; but that, if they persisted in continuing with the Europeans,

whom they represented as an impure beef-eating race, they would be

massacred along with them, the moment they should fall into their

hands. All these endeavours to shake the fidelity of the native troops,

however, still continued unavailing. As the day advanced, the path

became so narrow and intricate that I foresaw it would be impossible to

make much farther progress after dark, without entangling the

detachment in the woods. I therefore halted, and directed Lieutenant

Virgo to go forward and order back the advanced guard with the sick and

wounded. This officer not returning, I sent on a corporal to know the

cause of the delay, and to bring back a part of the 19th for the

purpose of assisting to charge the enemy, who had by this time

collected a considerable force in a village in our rear. The corporal

returned, unable to find our advanced guard. I sent him forward again

in quest of them with an escort, and after a considerable time had

elapsed, he returned a second time, reporting that he had been three

miles in front, without being able to gain the least intelligence of

them, or even to trace what path they had followed. The enemy were now

assembled in considerable force in our rear, with the apparent

intention of closing with us. I determined immediately to charge them

with the few Europeans belonging to the rear-guard and the native

troops; leaving a strong party on the spot where we had been stationed,

for the purpose of directing our vanguard (if they should return) to a

village at some distance, where I intended to pass the night.

Our brave fellows advanced to the charge, gallantly led on by

Lieutenants Povelary and Smith of the Bengal Sepoys; they soon routed

the Candians, and the few who still had strength to pursue, occasioned

a considerable loss to the enemy. Among their slain, I was happy to

find two of our Malay deserters, who had made themselves particularly

conspicuous for the last three days, not only in animating the enemy,

but in encouraging our men to desert. On this occasion, we took four

large gengals and a quantity of muskets. The village afforded us

shelter from the inclemency of the weather, and, what was still more

welcome, a quantity of boiled rice.

Since our departure from Candy on the 9th, our only food had consisted

of raw rice, which latterly had become musty and mildewed. We had been

engaged in one continued skirmish, exposed without intermission

alternately to a scorching sun and a violent rain; and glad at night,

when we could get a stone or log of wood, to raise our heads from the

wet ground. From seven o'clock till two, it generally continued fair,

and the effects of the sun were powerfully felt. After two, the rain

set in, and continued incessantly during the whole of the night.

14.--I was much concerned at the advanced guard not returning, and on

resuming my march, followed the road which I thought it most likely

they had taken. We had now the satisfaction to find that the enemy's

pursuit had considerably slackened, owing chiefly to the spirited

attack of the preceding evening, which showed them that, although

weakened, we were far from being conquered; and owing in some measure

also to the inconvenience they too suffered from the incessant rains.

Passed this night in the woods without shelter.

15.--The enemy's fire continued to decrease; a few shots only were

fired at us in the course of the day, and those without effect. Halted

at night in a small village, where we were enabled to procure shelter,

and some refreshment.

16.--Saw a few of the enemy at a distance; they did not attempt to

molest us. We here found ourselves in the Trincomalé road. Halted at

night in a small village a few miles from Minery Lake, where I was

surprised to find the advanced guard with Lieutenant Virgo, but

(painful to add) without Lieutenants Vincent and Smith, and two wounded

soldiers of the 19th. I was informed that Lieutenant Smith had died of

his wounds; and there was every reason to suppose that Lieutenant

Vincent had met a similar fate, or perhaps the more distressing one of

falling into the merciless hands of the Candians. Thus were lost to the

service two excellent officers, in the prime of life, who had conducted

themselves throughout this arduous expedition with a degree of zeal,

intrepidity, and perseverance, highly creditable to themselves, and

consolatory to their friends. I shall ever regret the loss of these

meritorious young men, from whose conduct I had on so many occasions

derived considerable aid. The guard alleged that they had lost their

way in the woods, and were nearly starved; that the Coolies had

completely deserted them; that they were themselves so exhausted as to

be scarcely able to walk, and had no means of carrying the sick, whom

they were under the necessity of abandoning; that they were without

guides, and found their way to the village where we then were by mere

chance. Considering Lieutenant Virgo as the cause, in the first

instance, of this disaster, by not bringing back the guard, I ordered

him into arrest.

This officer pleaded, in vindication of his conduct, that the soldiers

had refused to obey his orders. On further inquiry, I found that the

situation in which the soldiers were placed had in some degree shaken

their discipline, and that they were even encouraged in insubordination

by one of the non-commissioned officers, over whom Lieutenant Virgo,

from belonging to another corps, had not sufficient control.

Under these circumstances, I thought it best to release this officer

from arrest, and to submit the whole affair to the Commanding Officer

of Trincomalé.

17.--Continued our march unmolested by the enemy, and passed the night

in the woods.

18.--Reached the lake of Candelly, where we were again exposed to the

inclemencies of the monsoon without the least shelter.

In proportion as the annoyance of the enemy slackened, and the

necessity of personal exertion diminished, I had more time for

reflection; and I may truly say, that the last few days of our march

were not to me those in which I least suffered either in body or mind.

In common with the rest of the detachment, I had performed the greater

part of the retreat barefooted. Had I possessed, indeed, changes of

boots and shoes, I could not have used them, my feet having swelled,

and become so tender from constant wet, that I could not without

considerable pain put them to the ground.

In this condition, emaciated by fatigue, and labouring besides under a

severe dysentery, arising, I presume, from the nature of the water,

cold, and want of proper food, I was for the two last days obliged to

be carried in my cloak, fastened to a stick.

These bodily sufferings, however, severe as they were, were only shared

in common with many of those around me, and fell far short of the

anguish of my mind. Whilst I witnessed the melancholy state of my brave

companions, I could not help reflecting, that, perhaps, my precipitate

retreat from Candy had brought all this distress and misery upon them;

that the other divisions were possibly now in Candy, carrying into

execution the General's plans; and that, in such case, I must, by my

premature retreat, incur the censure of the General, and perhaps of the

whole army.

On the other hand, in the event of our troops not coming up, I was

satisfied that, had I remained a single day longer in Candy, the river,

from the constant rains which we had experienced, would have become

completely impassable; that our provisions would have been expended,

without the possibility of procuring any fresh supply; and that, though

determined not to capitulate under any extremity, we must, in the end,

have been over-powered, owing to the want of ammunition, as well as

from the pressure of sickness and famine.

While my mind was agitated by these conflicting reflections, we arrived

at Tamblegamme on the 19th, where we were met by some officers from

Trincomalé, who had heard that morning of our approach.

No words can express my surprise on now learning, for the first time,

that it was not intended that I should proceed to Candy; that the

General, on arriving at Jaffnapatam, had found obstacles to the

combined attack, which he considered to be insurmountable--(the

principal of these I have since understood to be the want of Coolies;

but of this, or of any other impediment to the success of the

expedition, I was at the time totally unapprized)--that the orders of

the 8th were intended as a countermand of the former plan; and that my

having gone to Candy was deemed a disobedience of orders; that it was

merely meant that the divisions should enter those parts of the enemy's

territory adjacent to their respective districts, and return after

laying waste the country; that the other five divisions had accordingly

made these incursions, and had long since returned; and that the

Government, having learnt from the Cingalese on the borders of my

detachment having been in Candy, had despaired of our ever returning.

It does not become me to decide on the origin of this unfortunate

mistake, or to pronounce whether the fault lay in the orders, or in my

interpretation of them.

The General, on making the tour of our stations, had taken great pains

to explain to me the nature of his plans, the ultimate object of which

was the possession of Candy; nor did he, in the various conversations I

had the honour to hold with him on that subject, seem to entertain any

doubt of the practicability of the proposed plan of operations.

These conversations were followed by an order to march, transmitted

from Trincomalé; and so fully convinced was I that everything was in a

complete state of preparation, that I considered the orders of the 8th

in no other light than as a modification of the preceding instructions,

as a change of the day of march and of the route; I never entertained

the most distant idea that _the plan_ was relinquished; as, after

the devastation of that part of the country pointed out in the

instructions, no ulterior object being presented, the original purport

of the occupation of the enemy's capital remained unrevoked, and

consequently to be followed up.

Cut off as I was by the remoteness of Batticolo from any intercourse

with the other stations, I had no intimation of the changes that had

taken place with respect to the destination of the other columns, to

the commanders of which the orders had, it seems, been more explicit.

I hope that it may be allowed me to remark, that the General had seen

some of them more recently than he had communicated with me; that the

territory adjoining their districts was in general better known, and of

course susceptible of clearer description than the province of Ouva.

It appeared, however, necessary that an affair attended with such

serious consequences should undergo investigation, and I was ordered

round to Columbo, where a Court of Inquiry was held upon my conduct.

The decision of the Court was, that I had not disobeyed my orders in

going to Candy.

The success of so small a force in penetrating unsupported to the

Candian capital, and afterwards effecting its retreat, created

considerable surprise throughout the island. The capital had never

before been attempted with so inconsiderable a force. The troops under

General Macdowal, in 1803, exceeded 3,000 men, and those the flower of

the Ceylon army.

I have before remarked, that 1,000 men were even considered necessary

to defend the town during the monsoon, though protected by works; and

intervening events had rendered the Candians more formidable.

They had gained to their service 500 well-disciplined Malays and

Sepoys, with a number of gun Lascars, and 1,000 stand of serviceable

English muskets, with a supply of ammunition. The continued skirmishes

in which they had been engaged with us since that period, together with

their occasional successes, had made them more expert, and given them a

greater degree of confidence than they had at the commencement of the

war.

A larger force than had been employed under General Macdowal and

Lieutenant-Colonel Barbut was, therefore, prepared for the combined

attack. Of the six divisions, mine was not only the smallest in point

of numbers, but certainly the worst equipped.

Colonel Maddison, who commanded the Hambingtotte detachment, with which

I was to have formed a junction at the entrance of the province of

Ouva, I now learnt did not receive my letter till after his return, and

his guides led him into a part of the country where there was no water

to be procured; consequently he was under the necessity of changing his

route; and instead of advancing to the northward and westward and

entering Ouva, where his presence, though we might not have met, would

have embarrassed the enemy, he was forced to keep entirely to the

southward, so that I derived no assistance from the co-operation of

that officer.

The other four divisions which entered the enemy's country, had they

remained long enough, would have caused a powerful diversion in my

favour; but, after having carried into execution their instructions,

the completion of which required but a few days, they returned to their

respective districts, where the whole of them had arrived some days

before I reached the capital. It was on the return of these detachments

that the King issued the proclamation, stating that he had driven five

English armies back to the sea.

Thus the Candians were enabled to bring their whole force, which had

been completely put in motion for the purpose of opposing all our

divisions, against my detachment alone; with which, too, the King had

every cause to be exasperated, in consequence of our having burnt his

favourite palace of Condasaly, as well as that near Pangaram.

Harassed continually by the enemy, with, latterly, not a round of

ammunition to return his fire (the few cartridges which were preserved

by some of the Europeans as their last hope, being rendered useless by

the rain, and their muskets entirely unserviceable), it cannot be

surprising that our loss should have been great.

In these respects the enemy had the advantage of us, their powder being

preserved from damp in cocoa-nut shells, and their arms provided with

guards made of skin or waxed cloth, which completely secured the locks

from wet.

But the Candians were not our only enemies, we had to contend with

hunger, fatigue, extremes of heat and cold, besides all the diseases

incidental to so unhealthy a climate.[4]

[4] The following instances are convincing proofs of the

insalubrity of the interior of Ceylon. On the 13th of March,

1803, the grenadier company of the 65th, under Captain

Bullock, consisting of 3 officers and 75 men, marched from

Columbo for Cattadinia, a small post in the interior. At the

end of the month, without any loss by the enemy, the whole

fell victims to the climate, excepting Lieutenant Hutchins

and two privates. They were all robust young men, from 18 to

23 years of age, and had only landed from the Cape of Good

Hope early in November. On the 11th of April, 400 men of the

51st regiment appeared under arms at Columbo, on their

arrival from Candy. In little more than two months 300 of

them were buried, having laid the foundation of disease in

the interior.

At an early stage of the retreat, I had been obliged to leave behind me

the doolies, from the impossibility of getting them on, in consequence

of abattis and other obstacles being placed in the line of our march.

Many of the Coolies had been either killed or wounded, several had

deserted, and of those that remained few were in a situation to carry a

burthen. I was, therefore, obliged to have the men whose cases were the

most desperate, carried along on cloths fastened to poles, whilst the

others got on by leaning on their less exhausted comrades. Our progress

was consequently very slow; nor was it, for the first three days,

permitted us to halt, during the day, even for a single moment, to

dress our wounded men, the least delay enabling the enemy to oppose

fresh obstacles to our retreat. Latterly, when less pressed by the

enemy, it was out of the surgeon's power to be of much assistance to

the wounded, the Coolie who carried the medicines and instruments

having deserted; consequently the wounds in general became

ill-conditioned, and at length so offensive to the patients themselves

as scarcely to be borne.

Those of the detachment who had hitherto escaped sickness and wounds,

were emaciated, sallow, and debilitated to an extreme degree.

They were almost all barefooted; and many of those who had escaped the

fire of the enemy, fell victims, after our arrival at Trincomalé, to

the effects of their previous sufferings.

Amongst those, I am sorry to mention Lieutenant Rogers, of the Bengal

Sepoys, who died of a fever a few days after his return. This officer,

by his exertions during the retreat, and especially after I had lost

the services of Lieutenants Vincent and Smith, had, by his activity and

zeal, rendered most essential services to the detachment. He was ever

foremost in danger.

To the exertions, indeed, and animating example of the officers in

general, and the persevering courage of the soldiers, particularly

those of the Royal Artillery and 19th, may be principally attributed

the safety of the detachment.

_Return of killed, wounded, and missing of the detachment under

the command of Captain Johnston._

+---------+---------------------------+

| Detail. | Royal Artill. |

+---------+------------+--------------+

| | Sergeants. | Bombardiers. |

+---------+------------+--------------+

| Killed | | 1 |

| Wounded | 1 | |

| Missing | | |

+---------+------------+--------------+

| Total | 1 | 1 |

+---------+------------+--------------+

+----------+-------------------------------------------------------------+

| Detail. | 19th Regiment. |

+----------+-----------+------------+------------+-----------+-----------+

+----------+-----------+------------+------------+-----------+-----------+

| Killed | | | 1 | | 4 |

| Wounded | | 1 | 2 | | 2 |

| Missing | 2 | | | | 2 |

+----------+-----------+------------+------------+-----------+-----------+

| Total | 2 | 1 | 3 | | 8 |

+----------+-----------+------------+------------+-----------+-----------+

+-------+----------------------------------------------------------------+

|Detail.| Malay Regiment. |

+-------+-----------+--------+-----------+----------+----------+---------+

+-------+-----------+--------+-----------+----------+----------+---------+

|Killed | | | | | | 3 |

|Wounded| | | | | | 4 |

+-------+-----------+--------+-----------+----------+----------+---------+

| Total | | | | | | 7 |

+-------+-----------+--------+-----------+----------+----------+---------+

+---------+--------------------------------------------------------------+

| Detail. | Bengal Sepoys. |

+---------+------------+---------+----------+--------+---------+---------+

+---------+------------+---------+----------+--------+---------+---------+

|Killed | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 9 |

|Wounded | | | 1 | 1 | | 27 |

|Missing | | | 1 | | | 12 |

+---------+------------+---------+----------+--------+---------+---------+

| Total | | | 3 | 2 | 1 | 48 |

+---------+------------+---------+----------+--------+---------+---------+

N.B.--Owing to the great desertion (during the latter part of the march)

amongst the Coolies and Pioneers, the amount of their killed and wounded

could never be ascertained; but there is every reason to believe it was

very considerable.

Having now related the whole of the circumstances which attended the

detachment I had the honour to command during its march to Candy and in

its retreat, I must still trespass on the attention of my readers to

make a few observations connected with the subject.

With respect to the policy or expediency of invading the Candian

territory, occupying the capital, cutting roads through the country, or

dividing it into several governments, these are considerations, which,

however important in their nature, do not come within the scope of my

design. The propriety of such measures must greatly depend upon

existing circumstances, of which the Government for the time being must

be supposed to be the best qualified to judge. This much, however, I

think I may venture to suggest, from some experience of the Candian

character; that, considering that each European soldier, at his arrival

in India, costs the nation at least £100, these objects, even in a

financial view of the subject, might be much better attained by the

application of a smaller sum to secure, if necessary, an influence at

the Court of Candy.

But should it be deemed more expedient to have recourse to arms as the

best mode of maintaining and extending our ascendancy in Ceylon, I am

not without hope that my remarks will be of service to those who may in

future be appointed to conduct our military expeditions into the

interior of that country. They are perhaps the more necessary, as of

the few survivors of the last war, whose experience might be useful,

scarcely any are now remaining in the island.

What I shall first advert to, as being of most essential importance to

our military operations, not only in Ceylon, but in every part of

India, is the expediency of European officers learning the native

languages.

The disadvantages arising from an ignorance of the language of a people

whom we command, or with whom we have to negotiate, have been so

frequently exemplified in Ceylon, without an adequate remedy having

been applied to the evil, that I think it necessary here to offer my

sentiments on the subject.

The circumstance of being obliged to carry on a conversation by means

of an interpreter, forms an almost insuperable bar to confidential

intercourse, or acquiring secret information. Many of the Candians are

well disposed to communicate the information they possess, in the

expectation of reward; but in common with the natives of every part of

India, are unwilling to commit themselves in the presence of an

interpreter, in whose secrecy they cannot confide, knowing that if

betrayed, not only their own lives, but the lives of their families

will be forfeited, and their property confiscated.

The troops are also in a great measure placed in the power of the

interpreter. Through the medium of the questions which he is

instructed to put to the guides and spies, he is enabled to penetrate

into the views of the commanding officer, and to betray them to the

enemy; or, in stating their answers, he may deceive him, by altering,

or entirely withholding, information of the greatest importance. The

interpreter is ready enough to perceive, and to avail himself of the

advantages of his situation. He takes care to place his own particular

friends about the commanding officer's person. He holds a sort of

court at the place of private residence, to which the guides and

spies, or others who have business with the commanding officer,

resort, in order to prepare their statements. Thus the spies, who

ought never to know each other, get acquainted; and the advantages

which might be derived from comparing their different accounts, are,

from their opportunities of communication with each other, totally

lost. The interpreter, being the immediate executive agent, at once

gains an ascendancy over all the natives in the camp, which he not

unfrequently abuses; and however ill he may treat them, they never

presume to complain, it being a maxim with the natives of India never

to complain of a man in power. In this case, also, they are deterred

by the consideration, that the person complained against forms their

only channel of communication with the commanding officer.

When the natives know that the commanding officer understands their

language, and that he does not make a confidant of the interpreter, who

is generally the Modiliar,[5] they are ever ready to come forward with

their information.

[5] In Ceylon the native chiefs of districts, and many

subordinate officers, have been designated Modiliars; which

title, at an early period of the Portuguese government of the

island, seems to have been peculiar to the chiefs of the

_military_ class; although now held by those who exercise not

only the command of _Lascoryns_ (the ancient soldiers of the

country), but various civil functions in the districts of

Ceylon.

Of the great caution observed by the natives of India in respect to

what they declare in public, or before interpreters, I have known some

striking instances, wherein men have given testimonies, even upon oath,

directly opposite to what they had previously stated to me in private

and confidential communication; and upon being afterwards reproached

for the contradiction, they have persisted in asserting that their

_private statement_ was the _true_ one, the declarations which they had

made on oath being prompted by fear of giving evidence in a public

court, which would tend to injure the cause of one of the chiefs who

had great power and influence in the country; that as it was uncertain

how long I might remain in command of the district, the offended chief

would, sooner or later, find the means of ruining the party; and that

the consequences would not even stop here, but the children of the

chief would continue to his children the hereditary vengeance of their

father.

A knowledge of the language also enables us to converse with the men of

education among the natives, who are generally communicative and well

informed, particularly with what relates to their own country--a

species of knowledge of which we stand the most in need. It farther

enables us to peruse the writings, and, by instructing us in their

origin, teaches us to respect prejudices of which the Indians are

extremely tenacious, and which we are too apt at first landing to

despise. What great political advantages might be derived from a proper

management of these prejudices, experience has amply shown.

In a contempt of them, and in an ignorance of the country languages,

have originated many of the greatest misfortunes which have befallen us

in India. All officers who have served long in that country, whether in

the King's or Company's service, must have had personal experience of

the great advantages that are to be derived, both in respect to

politics and military operations, from a knowledge of the languages:

even the reputation of this knowledge will attract to an officer

unreserved confidence in communication, and secure him from being

deceived by false reports.

In the management of the native corps, ignorance of the language is

attended with many and great disadvantages. The officer is in that case

obliged to employ some native soldier as an interpreter; and those of

this class who have, in menial situations, learned to speak a little

English, are generally the most unworthy of confidence.

Men of this description, for the most part educated in the kitchens of

Europeans, or servants in barracks or hospitals, acquire a degree of

quickness and intelligence that renders them useful as orderlies, or in

other capacities about the persons of European officers, who do not

understand the country languages.

On Courts-Martial, or in matters of grievance or disputes which the

soldiers may wish to submit to their officers, their statements come

through these men: but as a trifling bribe will incline them to either

side, the disadvantage of being obliged to have recourse to their

assistance is obvious.

The species of influence which they acquire among the soldiers, from

their situation, is almost always abused by them. They even assume more

authority than the oldest native commissioned or non-commissioned

officers, who may be men of caste and education, whose orders they not

only frequently presume to dispute, but encourage others to do the

same. This assumption of authority is for the most part acquiesced in,

from the danger of complaining against a man who so frequently has it

in his power to injure by misrepresenting the complainant to his

officers, whose ignorance of the language leaves him at the mercy of

his interpreter.

Having pointed out the evil, I shall now endeavour to suggest the

remedy. The officers belonging to the regular regiments of the line

stationed in Ceylon, who are not permanently attached to the island,

have no motive to exert themselves in applying to the languages of the

country. In the native corps, however, we might expect to find this

species of local knowledge. But the Ceylon regiments have been hitherto

officered from the line, and many of the captains and field-officers

nominated in England. They consequently, on their arrival, find

themselves in the command of men whose language they do not understand,

and who do not understand theirs. All communications between them are,

of course, carried on by means of interpreters. There being no

inducements to a permanent residence in Ceylon, either in respect to

society, allowances, or scope for military enterprise, it is the wish

of every officer to leave it as soon as possible. Under the present

state of the establishment, all the exertions of the officers of the

native corps (who can never otherwise expect to be removed), are

directed to procure an exchange into the line; and hence frequent

changes take place in those regiments--a circumstance which totally

prevents their applying to the native languages, a knowledge of which

can be useful there only.

Whilst the service continues to labour under these disadvantages, the

evil must remain in full force. It would, therefore, appear necessary

that it should in some measure become local, like that of the East

India Company's establishments; and that military promotion should be

made in some measure dependent on a knowledge of the native languages.

They would in that case consider themselves as permanently settled on

the island, and look upon their regiments as their homes. Under such a

plan, no officer could arrive at any important command without being

thoroughly acquainted with the language and customs of the country. And

the general would then find amongst his officers, in whose honour he

could confide, every species of local knowledge of which he would stand

in need; instead of being obliged to seek for it amongst Modiliars,

interpreters, and native orderlies.

_On the Dress of the Ceylon Troops._

I will now beg leave to submit a few observations on the dress of our

troops in Ceylon, which, experience has shown, is ill adapted to the

country and species of warfare in which they are likely to be employed.

In making these observation, the result of local experience, I trust I

shall not be considered as interfering unbecomingly with the existing

regulations of the army, the efficiency of which, so far as they relate

to the dress and equipment of the troops acting in our distant

colonies, may be best ascertained by those officers who have served

with them; as one of whom (but with the utmost deference to the

authority of men more competent to discuss and decide on the subject) I

merely submit my opinion.

Situated as England now is with her colonies, so extensive in

themselves, so widely dispersed, and consequently embracing a variety

of climates, it seems obvious that we must be guided in a great degree

in the formation and dress of our troops (particularly those raised in

the colonies), by the climate and nature of the country in which they

are to serve, and by the description of enemy against whom they are

most likely to contend; as well as by the character, habits, and

prejudices of the people who compose these corps.

Surely the same dress which is adapted to the snows of Canada would not

answer in the burning plains of Hindostan; nor ought the same tactics

that are practised in Europe, where armies are formed with numerous and

well-appointed bodies of cavalry, and immense trains of artillery, be

resorted to in the mountains of Ceylon, where a horse is scarcely

known, and where the smallest piece of ordnance cannot be transported

without the greatest difficulty.

The great objects to which we should direct our attention (next to the

health of the soldier), are a celerity of movement, and a facility of

approaching the enemy unperceived, so as to take him by surprise.

Throughout the late war the Candians always showed a disposition to

avoid our troops in the open field, by immediately betaking themselves

to the woods or mountains the instant they had notice of our approach,

from whence they could keep up a galling fire on our line, or whatever

division of our troops became, from their situation, most favourable

for this mode of attack; and unless an opportunity presented itself of

stealing on them unawares, we scarcely ever could boast of doing much

execution.

In a country so mountainous and woody as the interior of Ceylon, where

the route must frequently wind through narrow and rugged defiles, or

over heights ascended with vast labour and fatigue, it is of great

consequence that the soldier should be freed as much as possible from

every unnecessary incumbrance, in order to lessen the comparative

disadvantages under which he is to act against an enemy whose only

covering is a cloth wrapped round his loins, in the fold of which is

deposited a cocoa-nut shell containing his gunpowder, with a few dozen

balls, and who is, moreover, familiar with every little path by which

he may advance or retreat. It is easy to conceive how difficult it must

be for our troops, toiling as they are accustomed to do under heavy

burdens, ever to come up with such an enemy but by surprise.

The rays of the sun, however, reflected from the bright arms and large

brass plates in front of the soldier's cap, together with his red

jacket, white pantaloons, and white belts, discover him to the enemy

from a considerable distance, and not only render any surprise by day

impossible, but point him out as a fair object for the enemy's

marksmen. Of the comparative disadvantages arising from our dress I had

frequently the most striking proofs, in being able to discover any

movement of our troops at the distance of several miles, merely by the

glittering of their arms and appointments; whereas, though at the same

time surrounded by thousands of the enemy, I could scarcely distinguish

a man.

In order, therefore, to remedy these disadvantages, I would in the

first instance suggest, that, for the common musket, be substituted one

of a lighter kind (for instance, a carabine), and that the barrel be

stained like that of our light regiments. I would also provide every

lock with a guard composed of skin or oilcloth, which would always

preserve it dry and efficient. The heavy dews, which constantly fall

during the nights, have the same effect on the foliage of the woods as

that produced by violent rain; thus it frequently happened, that, from

the soldier's being incapable of securing his arms or the lock from the

wet, when marching through a close country, his musket became utterly

unserviceable; while the enemy, who invariably adopted the above plan,

were generally enabled (even during a heavy rain) to keep up a constant

fire from the midst of their woods, where it was impossible for us to

penetrate, in order to dislodge them with the bayonet.

With respect to the colour of the uniform, it ought to assimilate as

much as possible to that of the surrounding objects. I would,

therefore, recommend a green or grey jacket and trowsers, black belts,

with a hat free from all those ornaments now in use, which serve to

draw on the soldier the fire of the enemy.

The present cap appears, indeed, but ill calculated for the Ceylon

troops; as, in addition to the warmth that a large heated brass plate

must naturally communicate to the head, all the lower part of the

soldier's head and neck is entirely exposed to the sun and rain; and

there being nothing to convey the water that falls on the cap over the

cape of his jacket, it consequently runs down his back, and he finds

himself wet to the skin long before it has penetrated his great coat.

Thus circumstanced, he becomes cold and chilly, if not in continual

motion; and when on duty at night, or without the means of procuring

dry clothes, it must lay the foundation of many diseases, but

particularly that known by the name of the jungle fever, which

generally proved so fatal to our troops when serving in the interior.

The glazed peak in front of the cap reflects the glare from the hot

sand on the eyes, which for the time is unpleasant, and must in the end

injure the sight.

Some regiments adopted an entire glazed leather cap, which is assuredly

much worse than the beaver, as it becomes in a short time infinitely

more heated, and as soon as the soldier begins to perspire, the leather

becomes moist, and attaches itself so closely to the head as to prevent

all circulation of fresh air within; the confined air then, from the

heat occasioned by the warm leather as well as that of the man's head,

soon becomes many degrees warmer than the atmosphere.

These caps were introduced in Ceylon a short time before I left it; and

I always found that the sentries and soldiers, who were for any time

exposed to the sun, complained of headaches, which they attributed to

the cap. I can speak from my own experience, that even at a common

field-day, though in the morning, before the sun became very powerful,

I was regularly attacked by a violent headache, which generally

continued during the remainder of the day; though, after a much longer

exposure to the sun, even during the heat of the day (when in a round

hat), I felt little inconvenience.

Another disadvantage attending these caps is, that from the great

trouble of cleaning them, the soldiers were in the habit, when out of

sight of the officers, to take them from their heads, and carry them in

a cloth, to prevent the varnish from being melted by the sun or injured

by the rain; thus rather choosing to expose their bare heads to the

weather than undergo the labour of repolishing them.

White, from its being the greatest non-conductor of heat, is therefore

best calculated for warm climates.

The following extract from Dr. Franklin, on the subject of heat, may

not perhaps prove uninteresting or useless:--

"As to the different degrees of heat imbibed from the sun's rays by

cloths of different colours, since I cannot find the notes of my

experiment to send you, I must give it as well as I can from

memory.

"But first let me mention an experiment you may easily make

yourself. Walk but a quarter of an hour in your garden when the sun

shines, with a part of your dress white, and a part black; then

apply your hand to them alternately, and you will find a very great

difference in their warmth. The black will be quite hot to the

touch, the white still cool.

"Another. Try to fire the paper with a burning glass. If it is

white, you will not easily burn it, but if you bring the focus to a

black spot, or upon letters, written or printed, the paper will

immediately be on fire under the letters.

"Thus fullers and dyers find black cloths, of equal thickness with

white ones, and hung out equally wet, dry in the sun much sooner

than the white, being more readily heated by the sun's rays. It is

the same before a fire; the heat of which sooner penetrates black

stockings than white ones, and so is apt sooner to burn a man's

shins. Also beer much sooner warms in a black mug set before the

fire, than in a white one, or in a bright silver tankard.

"My experiment was this. I took a number of little square pieces of

broadcloth from a tailor's pattern-card, of various colours. There

were black, deep blue, lighter blue, green, purple, red, yellow,

white, and other colours, or shades of colours. I laid them all out

upon the snow in a bright sunshiny morning. In a few hours (I

cannot now be exact as to the time) the black, being warmed most by

the sun, was sunk so low as to be below the stroke of the sun's

rays; the dark blue almost as low, the lighter blue not quite so

much as the dark, the other colours less as they were lighter; and

the quite white remained on the surface of the snow, not having

entered it at all.

"What signifies philosophy that does not apply to some use? May we

not learn from hence, that black clothes are not so fit to wear in

a hot sunny climate or season as white ones; because in such

clothes the body is more heated by the sun when we walk abroad, and

are at the same time heated by the exercise, which double heat is

apt to bring on putrid dangerous fevers? That soldiers and seamen,

who must march and labour in the sun, should in the East or West

Indies have an uniform of white? That summer hats, for men or

women, should be white, as repelling that heat which gives

headaches to many, and to some the fatal stroke that the French

call the _coup de soleil_? That the ladies' summer hats, however,

should be lined with black, as not reverberating on their faces

those rays which are reflected upwards from the earth or water?

That the putting a white cap of paper or linen _within_ the

crown of a black hat, as some do, will not keep out the heat,

though it would if placed _without_? That fruit-walls being

blacked, may receive so much heat from the sun in the day-time, as

to continue warm in some degree through the night, and thereby

preserve the fruit from frosts, or forward its growth?--with sundry

other particulars of less or greater importance, that will occur

from time to time to attentive minds?"

But it might be objected to in Ceylon, as producing the very evils I

would endeavour to correct, that of rendering the soldier too

conspicuous. I would recommend, then, a light brown hat, with a brim

sufficiently broad to protect the lower part of the head and neck

against the sun or rain, and also to conduct the water over the cape of

the jacket, without being too large to interfere with the perfect use

of the musket; the under part of the brim to be green, as a relief to

the eyes.

It might also be advisable to have the hat a slight degree larger than

the head, to allow of a pad between it and the forehead, for the

purpose of leaving an open space round the temples to admit of a free

circulation of air.

This kind of hat might appear to some unbecoming; but we must

recollect, that the health and comfort of the soldier should be our

first consideration.

_Of the Carriage of Baggage and Stores._

There is nothing that embarrasses more the operations of our Ceylon

forces than the carriage of baggage and stores.

The general mode of conveyance is either by bullocks or Coolies.

Elephants have been also used; but I do not think them well calculated

for such a service on this island. Their movements are slow; they are

soon fatigued; and, unless long accustomed to the sound, easily alarmed

at the firing. They are a good mark for the enemy, and when wounded apt

to become unmanageable; in which case the march may even be wholly

stopped, as one of these animals, with his load, will completely fill

up a narrow pass. When exasperated, the Coolies are afraid to approach

him. If his wounds are such as to prevent his proceeding, his load is

generally obliged to be left behind; a loss that is much more felt than

that of the loads of a few Coolies.

In the choice between bullocks and Coolies, when either can be had, we

must be guided by the nature of the expedition upon which the troops

are to be employed. If the detachment be large, and likely to remain

long in the interior, bullocks are preferable, because their keep will

not diminish the stores, whilst the Coolies would soon eat up their own

loads.

The bullocks are of two sorts. They are either the immediate property

of Government, or belonging to the inhabitants, and are furnished by

the different villages upon requisition. In the latter case, it is

always desirable that the proprietors should have charge of them, and

be obliged to carry their bags and saddles along with them. The cattle

will thus be taken care of, the loads properly balanced, and their

backs preserved sound.

The bullocks which are the property of Government are usually given in

charge to Lascars, or common Coolies, who, having no particular

interest in their preservation, are careless in putting on their loads,

and neglect to put cloths under them. Thus in a few days the poor

animals' backs are dreadfully galled; and, if the greatest care be not

taken, their sores fester, and are filled with maggots: notwithstanding

which, the drivers will continue to load them, with the greatest

indifference. They will also, in order to save themselves the trouble

of looking after their cattle, frequently fasten seven or eight of them

to a log of wood, by way of security, which, by preventing them from

grazing in a manner sufficient for their support, soon reduces them to

a state wholly unfit for any kind of service.

In order to prevent these inconveniences, it would be advisable to put

the bullocks in several small divisions, each under the care of a

Congany or Tindal, who should be answerable for the treatment of the

bullocks of his divisions; and experienced drivers, accustomed to the

care of cattle and to load them properly, should be employed. It would

be also desirable that some trustworthy non-commissioned officer should

be directed to examine the backs of the cattle daily, and to see that

their loads are properly adjusted.

If, on the other hand, the detachment be small, and only intended for

an incursion for a few days into the enemy's country, when everything

will depend upon rapidity of movement, bullocks will not be found to

answer; their pace is much too slow for such operations, and it is

almost impossible to get them on by night. Coolies alone will here

answer the purpose; and with them a great deal of management is

necessary. The common mode of making up their loads in gunny bags, used

for holding rice on shipboard and in stores, is liable to two

objections.

1st.--They afford no defence against the weather, the rain penetrating

the bags, and mildewing the rice.

2ndly.--The cloth of which the bags are made is very coarse, and badly

sewed; and the rice consequently makes its way through the interstices.

The Coolies, also, nothing reluctant to diminish their burdens, will

often widen the seams. Thus the route of a detachment may frequently be

traced for several miles by the grain strewed on the road.

This waste may in some measure be prevented by doubling the bags. But

there is nothing equal to the common bags made of mats, which the

natives use for their _pingoes_, or loads; they not only prevent

waste, but keep the rice long dry.

The Coolies frequently plunder their loads; an evil which it is not

easy to remedy, as by slipping into the woods unperceived, the Coolie

can take out of his gunny bag as much rice as he chooses, and, having

concealed it in his cloth, returns to his comrades without having been

missed.

The best method of preventing this waste appears to be this. Let the

quantity of rice sufficient to load all his people be served out to

each Congany, for which he is to be held responsible; and let him be

punished in case of any remarkable defalcation, making a proper

allowance for inevitable wastage. He is the only man capable of

checking their thefts. But it is necessary to keep a good look-out on

the Congany himself, as it is a common practice among the Conganies to

sell the rice entrusted to their care.

The same precautions are necessary with regard to the bullock drivers.

Here, too, the bags used by the natives should be employed.

To persons not accustomed to the species of service which I have been

describing, these observations may appear trivial. But they will think

otherwise, when they consider that we are speaking of a country in

which, if the stock of provisions with which a detachment or an army

sets out is either wasted or expended prematurely, it is for the most

part impossible to procure a fresh supply. A Commanding Officer, who

should unwisely contemn these precautions, might find himself in the

disgraceful and dangerous predicament of discovering, when he expected

to have provisions enough left for twenty days, that his stock, having

been reduced by plunder or neglect, could not last beyond half the

period.

By these circumstances alone, after having incurred considerable

expense towards an expedition, the whole enterprise might be

frustrated, and the lives of many valuable soldiers sacrificed.

_Guides._

The necessity of experienced guides, so great in all military

operations, is more particularly urgent in a country like the interior

of Ceylon, intricate in its own nature, and to the knowledge of which

we have no access by the usual means of maps.

The difficulty of procuring good guides is very great. There are, it is

true, always men ready to undertake for hire the task of conducting our

troops through the Candian country; but these are either Candian

emigrants, who have settled in our possessions, or Lubbies.[6] These

persons are in general perfectly well acquainted with the common paths

that lead from one village to another, and, in consequence, imagine

themselves qualified to fulfil the office of guides. This might, no

doubt, be the case, were our troops always to march in daylight, and by

these paths only. But as circumstances often require that parties

should be sent in various directions about the country, and

particularly at night, the most favourable time for attacking the

enemy, in such cases, the Lubbies, as they only know the high-roads,

can give little or no assistance; and it is seldom that natives, even

of the spot on which the operations are to be conducted, are

sufficiently acquainted with all the paths and turnings in the forests,

to enable them to conduct troops through them at night. In these thick

forests it is so dark that, even in the brightest moonlight, it is

extremely difficult, and often impossible, for one not perfectly

acquainted with the track to discern the footpath.

[6] A sect of Mohammedans, supposed to be the descendants of

Arab traders, who, at a remote period, mixed with the natives

of India, and settled chiefly on the coasts of Malabar and

Coromandel. They conduct the chief interior trade of Ceylon,

and much of that with the neighbouring coasts. They are

considered by the other Mohammedans as a degenerate race, and

their character in India bears a near resemblance to that of

the _Jews_ in Europe.

The indolence of the Cingalese seldom allowing of their clearing away

any extent of ground, and the rapidity of vegetation, are other

circumstances which increase the difficulty. It is the practice of the

inhabitants of each village to join once a-year, for the purpose of

cutting away the trees for a considerable extent. After they have

remained for some time on the ground till they are dry, they set them

on fire, and burn all the branches and light wood, leaving the stumps,

which they never root up, as well as the trunks, untouched. This

process in some measure clears the ground, which is then hoed, and sown

with what is called dry grain. This ground is called by the natives

_Chanass_. It is found that soil which has been manured by the leaves

rotting upon it for thirty or forty, or, perhaps, a hundred years, and

by the ashes of the burnt wood, yields an excellent crop. It is seldom

sown above one season, being allowed the year following to run to wood,

and fresh spots successively cleared away. Thus, in the course of two

or three years, the face of the country is much changed; and a guide,

who expects to traverse miles of forest, finds himself all at once in a

large chanass. Here the ground is interspersed with stumps, and strewed

with trunks of trees, through which it is extremely difficult to march

by night. The guide may generally discern the borders of the forest on

the opposite side; but, the paths having been effaced by cultivation,

he can seldom know at what part to enter. Afraid to confess his

ignorance, he goes on entangling the party more and more in the forest,

where they wander about all night, finding themselves in the morning,

perhaps, many miles distant from the post which was to have been

surprised.

Neither can any advantage be derived in such situations from a compass.

It being impossible to march in a direct line through a thick forest,

intersected in many places by rivers and swamps, it is by the paths

alone that we must be directed. On such occasions, an officer sent to

surprise a post cannot be supposed to find his way to it by working a

traverse course.

It may also often happen that the guide is in the pay of the enemy, and

may first entangle the troops in the forest, and then leave them. It

is, therefore, always proper to have him fastened to one of the

soldiers. But admitting that the man has no evil intention, it must be

extremely difficult for him, from the circumstances stated, to conduct

troops properly to the place of their destination.

Seeing, then, how much depends, particularly in night enterprises, on

the experience and fidelity of the guides, it behoves us to spare

neither pains in procuring proper persons, nor expense in rewarding

those who faithfully discharge their duty.

_Modiliars._

Having, in the former part of this work, given some striking instances

of treachery on the part of the Modiliars, it is but justice to declare

that it was not meant to convey a general censure on that body. On the

contrary, I know there are now in Ceylon some men in that capacity who

have served the Dutch and English Governments with fidelity, and enjoy

the reputation of high honour; and I have myself derived the greatest

assistance from the zeal and exertions of the Modiliar of Batticolo,

not only whilst in command of that district, but during the whole of my

march to and from Candy.

I would take the liberty to recommend as the best line of policy, that

our officers, whilst, having the fate of Constantine De Sáa and his

army in their recollection, they guard against reposing too blind a

confidence in the Modiliars, should carefully conceal from them the

doubts which may be entertained of their fidelity, and treat them on

all occasions with respect; these people being extremely sensible to

slights, and particularly in the presence of their countrymen.

_Coolies._

I think it right here to call the attention of the officer to the

situation of a class of men, essential to all our military operations

in India, without whose aid, indeed, we cannot make the smallest

movement. I mean the Coolies. Besides the humanity due to them as

fellow-creatures, policy requires that this class of men should be

treated with attention and kindness. Hitherto I am sorry to say that

they have met with too little consideration in all our military

operations.

It will be proper, on the line of march, to allow time to the Coolies,

who are not provided with Talipot leaves, and even to encourage them to

construct huts or wigwams with branches and leaves. By this means their

healths might be in a great measure preserved, and, what is of no less

importance, they would be more reconciled to the service.

It is also essential that the commander of the troops should

superintend the payment of the Coolies in person, or by an European

officer; as, when the payment is left to their native chiefs, they are

frequently defrauded, even to half the amount of their pay, and the

odium thrown on the commanding officer.

In issuing or explaining orders either to the common Coolies, or their

Chiefs, we cannot be too explicit. Many of the interpreters understand

English but imperfectly; and when they do not comprehend the order,

rather than confess their ignorance by asking for an explanation, they

will interpret it according to their own notions of what is meant.

Instances of blunders daily occur from this source. Similar mistakes

may also arise from Europeans overrating their own knowledge of the

native languages.

Attention and kindness to the natives, and the exercise of justice

towards them, will secure their confidence and affection, which must

prove of great advantage to the officers acting with them individually,

and to the country at large.

Whilst we are lords of the coast, and every person bows to our will,

these considerations are of the less importance. But if it should be

our fate to contend for our Eastern possessions, against a powerful,

active, and intriguing European enemy, it is then we shall derive

advantages from the confidence and attachment of the natives.

Narrative of the Operations of a Detachment in an Expedition to Candy, in the Island of Ceylon, in the Year 1804 With Some Observations on the Previous Campaign, and on the Nature of Candian Warfare, etc., etc., etc. · 第 16 / 18 题