REV. SIR,

I had long resisted an Inclination to desire your Thoughts upon the

difficulty mentioned in my last, till I considered that the trouble in

answering it would be only carrying on the general purpose of your Life,

and that I might claim the same right to your Instructions with others;

notwithstanding which, I should not have mentioned it to you had I not

thought (which is natural when one fancies one sees a thing clearly) that

I could easily express it with clearness to others. However I should by

no means have given you a second trouble upon the subject had I not had

your particular leave. I thought proper just to mention these things

that you might not suspect me to take advantage from your Civility to

trouble you with any thing, but only such objections as seem to me of

Weight, and which I cannot get rid of any other way. A disposition in

our natures to be influenced by right motives is as absolutely necessary

to render us moral Agents, as a Capacity to discern right motives is.

These two are I think quite _distinct_ perceptions, the _former_

proceeding from a desire inseparable from a Conscious Being of its own

happiness, the _latter_ being only our Understanding, or Faculty of

seeing Truth. Since a _disposition_ to be influenced by right motives is

a _sine qua non_ to Virtuous Actions, an Indifferency to right motives

must _incapacitate_ us for Virtuous Actions, or render us in that

particular not moral agents. I do indeed think that no Rational Creature

is _strictly speaking Indifferent_ to Right Motives, but yet there seems

to be somewhat which to all intents of the present question is the same,

viz. _a stronger disposition to be influenced by contrary or wrong

motives_, and this I take to be always the Case when any vice is

committed. But since it may be said, as you hint, that this stronger

disposition to be influenced by Vicious Motives may have been contracted

by repeated Acts of Wickedness, we will pitch upon the _first Vicious

Action_ any one is guilty of. No man would have committed this first

Vicious Action if he had not had a _stronger_ (at least as strong)

_disposition_ in him to be influenced by the _Motives of the Vicious

Action_, than by the _motives of the contrary Virtuous Action_; from

whence I infallibly conclude, that since every man has committed some

first Vice, every man had, _antecedent_ to the commission of it, a

_stronger disposition_ to be influenced by the _Vicious_ than the

_Virtuous_ motive. My difficulty upon this is, that a _stronger natural

disposition_ to be influenced by the Vicious than the Virtuous Motive

(which every one has antecedent to his first vice), seems, to all

purposes of the present question, to put the Man in the same condition as

though he was _indifferent to the Virtuous Motive_; and since an

_indifferency to the Virtuous Motive_ would have _incapacitated_ a Man

from being a _moral Agent_, or _contracting guilt_, is not a _stronger

disposition_ to be influenced by the _Vicious_ Motive as great an

_Incapacity_? Suppose I have two diversions offered me, _both_ of which

I could not enjoy, I like both of them, but yet have a _stronger_

inclination to one than to the other, I am not indeed strictly

_indifferent_ to either, because I should be glad to _enjoy both_; but am

I not exactly _in the same case_, _to all intents and purposes of

acting_, as though I was _absolutely indifferent_ to that diversion which

I have the _least_ inclination to? You suppose Man to be endued

naturally with a _disposition to be influenced by Virtuous Motives_, and

that _this Disposition is a sine qua non to Virtuous Actions_, both which

I fully believe; but then you _omit_ to consider the natural Inclination

to be influenced by Vicious Motives, which, _whenever a Vice is

committed_, is at least _equally strong_ with the other, and in the first

Vice _is not affected by Habits_, but is as _natural_, and as much _out

of a man's power_ as the other. I am much obliged to your offer of

writing to Mr. Laughton, which I shall very thankfully accept of, but am

not certain when I shall go to Cambridge; however, I believe it will be

about the middle of the next month.

I am, Rev. Sir,

Your most obliged humble Servant,

Some Remains (hitherto unpublished) of Joseph Butler, LL.D. · 第 12 / 27 题