On this aim the group system bestows but a secondary attention.

Regarding primarily studies, not men, it attempts to organize single

connected departments of knowledge. Accordingly it permits only those

studies to be pursued together which immediately cohere. It lays out

five, ten, any number of paths through the field of knowledge, and to

one of these paths the pilgrim is confined. Each group constitutes a

specialty,--a specialty intensified in character as, in order to escape

the difficulties of maintenance just pointed out, the number of groups

is allowed to increase. By insistence on specialization regard for

general culture is driven into a subordinate place. The advocates of

prescription maintain that there are not half a dozen ground-plans of

perfected humanity. They say there is but one. If we introduce variety

of design into a curriculum, we neglect that ideal man who resides alike

in all. We trust, on the contrary, in our power to hit some line of

study which may deservedly appeal to one human being while not so

appealing to another. We simply note the studies which are most

congruous with the special line selected, and by this congruity we shape

our group. In the new aim, congruity of studies, adaptation to a

professional purpose, takes precedence of harmonious development of

powers.

I have no doubt that specialization is destined to become more marked in

the American education of the future. It must become so if we are to

produce the strong departmental scholars who illuminate learning in

other countries; indeed, it must become so if we are to train competent

experts for the affairs of daily life. The popular distrust of

specializing is sure to grow less as our people become familiar with its

effects and see how often narrow and thorough study, undertaken in early

life, leads to ultimate breadth. It is a pretty dream that a man may

start broad and then concentrate, but nine out of every ten strong men

have taken the opposite course. They have begun in some one-sided way,

and have added other sides as occasion required. Almost in his teens

Shakespeare makes a specialty of the theatre, Napoleon of military

science, Beethoven of music, Hunter of medicine, Faraday of chemistry,

Hamilton of political science. The great body of painters, musicians,

poets, novelists, theologians, politicians, are early specialists. In

fact, self-made men are generally specialists. Something has aroused an

interest, and they have followed it out until they have surveyed a wide

horizon from a single point of view. In offering wider opportunities for

specialization, colleges have merely been assimilating their own modes

of training to those which prevail in the world at large.

It does not, therefore, seem to me objectionable that group systems set

a high value on specialization. That is what every man does, and every

clear-eyed college must do it too. What I object to is that group

systems, so far as they adhere to their aim, _enforce_ specialization.

Among every half-dozen students, probably one will be injured if he

cannot specialize largely; two or three more might wisely specialize in

lower degree; but to force the remaining two or three into curricula

shaped by professional bias is to do them serious damage. There are

sober boys of little intrepidity or positive taste, boys who properly

enough wish to know what others know. They will not make scholars. They

were not born to enlarge the boundaries of knowledge. They have another

function: they preserve and distribute such knowledge as already exists.

Many of them are persons of wealth. To furnish them glimpses of varied

learning is to save them from barbarism. Still another large class is

composed of boys who develop late. They are boys who will one day

acquire an interest of their own, if they are allowed to roam about

somewhat aimlessly in the domain of wisdom until they are twenty-one.

Both of these classes have their rights. The prescribed system was built

to support them; the elective shelters and improves them; but a group

system shuts them all out, if they will not on leaving school adopt

professional courses. Whenever I can hear of a group system which like

the old college has a place for the indistinct young man, and like the

new elective college matures him annually by suggesting that he take

part in shaping his own career, I will accept the group system. Then,

too, the public will probably accept it. Until then, rigid groups will

be thought by many to lay too great a strain on unseasoned powers of

choice, to present too many practical difficulties of construction, and

to show too doctrinaire a confidence that every youth will fit without

pinching into a specialized class.

FOOTNOTES:

[6] These conditions of intellectual nourishment were long ago

recognized in other, less formal, departments of mental training.

In his essays on _Books and Reading_ President Porter wrote in

1871: "The person who asks. What shall I read? or, With what

shall I begin? may have read for years in a mechanical routine,

and with a listless spirit; with scarcely an independent thought,

with no plans of self-improvement, and few aspirations for

self-culture. To all these classes the advice is full of meaning:

'Read what will satisfy your wants and appease your desires, and

you will comply with the first condition to reading with interest

and profit.' Hunger and thirst are better than manifold

appliances and directions, in respect to other than the bodily

wants, towards a good appetite and a healthy digestion. If a man

has any self-knowledge or any power of self-direction, he is

surely competent to ask himself what is the subject or subjects

in respect to which he stands most in need of knowledge or

excitement from books. If he can answer this question, he has

gone very far towards answering the question, 'What book or books

can I read with satisfaction and profit?'" (Chap. iv, p. 39.)

[7] In deference to certain writers I employ their favorite term

"university" in contrast with the term "college," yet I must own

I do not know what it means. An old signification is clear. A

university is an assemblage of schools, as our government is

an assemblage of states. In England, different corporations,

giving substantially similar instruction, are brought together

by a common body which confers the degrees. In this country, a

group of professional schools--law, medicine, theology, and

science--are associated through one governing body with the

college proper, that is, with the candidates for the B.A. degree.

In this useful sense, Tufts and Bowdoin are universities; Amherst

and Brown, colleges. But Germany, which has thrown so many

parts of the world into confusion, has introduced exaltation

and mystery here. A university now appears to mean "a college

as good as it can be," a stimulating conception, but not a

finished or precise one. I would not disparage it. It is a term

of aspiration, good to conjure with. When we want to elevate

men's ideas, or to obtain their dollars, it is well to talk

about creating a true university: just as it is wise to bid the

forward-reaching boy to become "a true gentleman."

X

NECESSARY LIMITATIONS OF THE ELECTIVE SYSTEM

The preceding paper has sufficiently discussed the impossible

limitations of the elective system, and has shown with some minuteness

the grounds of their impossibility. The methods there examined are the

only ones suggested by my critics. They all agree in this, that they

seek to narrow the scope of choice. They try to combine with it a

hostile factor, and they differ merely in their mode of combination. The

first puts a restraining check before election; the second puts one by

its side; the third makes the two inseparable by allowing nothing to be

chosen which is not first prescribed. The general purpose of all these

methods is mine also. Election must be limited. Unchartered choice is

licentious and self-destructive. I quarrel with them only because the

modes of effecting their purpose tend to produce results of a transient

and inappropriate sort. The aim of education, as I conceive it, is to

spiritualize the largest possible number of persons, that is, to teach

them how to do their own thinking and willing and to do it well. But

these methods effect something widely different. They either

aristocratize where they should democratize, or they belittle where they

should mature, or else they professionalize where they should humanize.

A common trouble besets them all: the limiting authority is placed in

external and arbitrary juxtaposition to the personal initiative which it

professes to support. It should grow out of this initiative and be its

interpreter and realization. By limitation of choice the proposers of

these schemes appear to mean making choice less. I mean fortifying it,

keeping it true to itself, making it more. Control that diminishes the

quantity of choice is one thing; control that raises the quality, quite

another. How important is this distinction and how frequently it is

forgotten! Words like "limitation," "control," "authority," "obedience,"

are words of majesty, but words also of doubtful import. They carry a

freight of wisdom or of folly, according to the end towards which they

steer. In order to sanction or discard limitations which induce

obedience, we must bear that end in mind. Let us stop a moment, and see

that we have it in mind now.

Old educational systems are often said to have erred by excess of

authority. I could not say so. The elective system, if it is to

possess the future, must become as authoritative as they. More

accurately we say that their authority was of a wrong sort. A father may

exercise an authority over his child no less directive than that of

the master over the slave; but the father is trying to accomplish

something which the master disregards; the father hopes to make the

will of another strong, the master to make it weak; the father

commands what the child himself would wish, had he sufficient

experience. The child's obedience accordingly enlightens, steadies,

invigorates his independent will. Invigoration is the purpose of the

command. The authority is akin--secretly akin--to the child's own

desires. No alien power intervenes, as when a slave obeys. Here a

foreign will thwarts the slave's proper motions. Over against his own

legitimate desires, the desire of a totally different being appears

and claims precedence. Obedience like this brings no ennoblement.

The oftener a child obeys, the less of a child is he; the oftener a

slave, the more completely he is a slave. Roughly to say, then, that

submission to authority is healthy for a college boy, argues a mental

confusion. There are two kinds of authority,--the authority of moral

guidance, and the authority of repressive control: parental authority,

respecting and vivifying the individual life and thus continually

tending to supersede itself; and masterly authority, whose command,

out of relation to the obeyer's wish, tends ever to bring the obedient

into bondage. Which shall college authority be? Authority is necessary,

ever-present authority. If the young man's choice is to become a

thing of worth, it must be encompassed with limitations. But as the

need of these limitations springs from the imperfections of choice,

so should their aim be to perfect choice, not to repress it. To impose

limitations which do not ultimately enlarge the youth they bind is to

make the means of education "oblige against its main end."

This moral authority is what the new education seeks. To a casual eye,

the colleges of to-day seem to be growing disorganized; a closer view

shows construction taking place, but taking place along the lines of the

vital distinction just pointed out. Men are striving to bring about a

germane and ethical authority in the room of the baser mechanical

authorities of the past. In this distinction, then, a clue is to be

found which, if followed up, will lead us away from impossible

limitations of the elective system, and conduct us at length to the

possible, nay, to the inevitable ones. As the elective principle is

essentially ethical, its limitations, if helpfully congruous, must be

ethical too. They must be simply the means of bringing home to the young

chooser the sacred conditions of choice; which conditions, if I rightly

understand them, may compactly be entitled those of intentionality,

information, and persistence. To secure these conditions, limitations

exist. In the very nature of choice such conditions are implied. Choice

is sound as they prevail, whimsical as they diminish. An education

which lays stress on the elective principle is bound to lay stress on

these conditions also. It cannot slip over into lazy ways of letting its

students drift, and still look for credit as an elective system. People

will distrust it. That is why they distrust Harvard to-day. The

objections brought against the elective system of Harvard are in reality

not levelled against the elective system at all. They are directed

against its bastard brother, _laissez-faire_. Objectors suspect that the

conditions of choice which I have named are not fulfilled. They are not

fulfilled, I confess, or rather I stoutly maintain. To come anywhere

near fulfilling them requires long time and study, and action unimpeded

by a misconceiving community. Both time and study Harvard has given, has

given largely. The records of scholarship and deportment which I

exhibited in my first paper show in how high a degree Harvard has

already been able to remove from choice the capricious, ignorant, and

unsteadfast characteristics which rightly bring it into disrepute. But

much remains to do, and in that doing we are hampered by the fact that a

portion of the public is still looking in wrong directions. It cannot

get over its hankering after the delusive modes of limitation which I

have discussed. It does not persistently see that at present the proper

work of education is the study of means by which self-direction may be

rendered safe. Leaders of education themselves see this but dimly, as

the papers of my critics naively show. Until choice was frankly accepted

as the fit basis for the direction of a person by a person, its

fortifying limitations could not be studied. Now they must be studied,

now that the old methods of autocratic control are breaking down. As a

moral will comes to be recognized as the best sort of steam power, the

modes of generating that power acquire new claims to attention.

Henceforth the training of the will must be undertaken by the elective

system as an integral part of its discipline.

I am not so presumptuous as to attempt to prophesy the precise forms

which methods of moral guidance will take. Moral guidance is a delicate

affair. Its spirit is more important than its procedure. Flexibility is

its strength. Methods final, rigid, and minute do not belong to it. Nor

can it afford to forget the one great truth of _laissez-faire_, that

wills which are to be kept fresh and vigorous will not bear much looking

after. Time, too, is an important factor in the shaping of moral

influences. Experiments now in progress at Harvard and elsewhere must

discriminate safe from unsafe limitations. Leaving then to the future

the task of showing how wide the scope of maturing discipline may

become, I will merely try to sketch the main lines along which

experiments are now proceeding, I will give a few illustrative examples

of what is being done and why, and I will state somewhat at large how,

in my judgment, more is yet to be accomplished. To make the matter

clear, a free exposition shall be given of the puzzling headings already

named; that is, I will first ramblingly discuss the limitations on

choice which may deepen the student's intentionality of aim; secondly,

those which increase his information in regard to means; and thirdly,

those which may strengthen his persistence in a course once chosen.

I. That intentionality should be cultivated, I need not spend many words

in explaining. Everybody acknowledges that without a certain degree of

it choice is impossible. Many persons assert also that boys come to

college with no clear intentions, not knowing what they want, waiting to

be told; for such, it is said, an elective system is manifestly absurd.

I admit the fact. It is true. The majority of the freshmen whom I have

known in the last seventeen years have been, at entrance, deficient in

serious aims. But from this fact I draw a conclusion quite opposite to

the one suggested. It is election, systematized election, which these

boys need; for when we say a young student has no definite aims, we

imply that he has never become sufficiently interested in any given

intellectual line to have acquired the wish to follow that line farther.

Such a state of things is lamentable, and certainly shows that

prescribed methods--the proper methods, in my judgment, for the school

years--have in his case proved inadequate. It is useless to continue

them into years confessedly less suited to their exercise. Perhaps it is

about equally useless to abandon the ill-formed boy to unguided choice.

Prescription says, "This person is unfit to choose, keep him so";

_laissez-faire_ says, "If he is unfit to choose, let him perish"; but a

watchful elective system must say, "Granting him to be unfit, if he is

not spoiled, I will fit him." And can we fit him? I know well enough

that indifferent teachers incline to shirk the task. They like to divide

pupils into the deceptive classes of good and bad, meaning by the former

those who intend to work, and by the latter those who intend not to. But

we must get rid of indifferent teachers. Teachers with enthusiasm in

them soon discover that the two classes of pupils I have named may as

well be dismissed from consideration. Where aims have become definite, a

teacher has little more to do. The boy who means to work will get

learning under the poorest teacher and the worst system; while the boy

who means not to work may be forced up to the Pierian spring, but will

hardly be made to drink. A vigorous teacher does not assume intention to

be ready-made. He counts it his continual office to help in making it.

On the middle two quarters of a class he spends his hardest efforts, on

students who are friendly to learning but not impassioned for it, on

those who like the results of study but like tennis also, and

popularity, and cigars, and slackness. The culture of these weak wills

is the problem of every college. Here are unintentional boys waiting to

be turned into intentional men. What limitations on intellectual and

moral vagrancy will help them forward?

The chief limitation, the one underlying all others, the one which no

clever contrivance can ever supersede, is vitalized teaching. Suitable

subjects, attractively taught, awake lethargic intention as nothing else

can. An elective system, as even its enemies confess, enormously

stimulates the zeal of teachers. It consequently brings to bear on

unawakened boys influences of a strangely quickening character. When I

hear a man trained under the old methods of prescription say, "At the

time I was in college I could not have chosen studies for myself, and I

do not believe my son can," I see, and am not surprised to see, that he

does not understand what forces the elective system sets astir. So

powerful an influence have these forces over both teachers and pupils,

that questions of hard and easy studies do not, as outsiders are apt to

suppose, seriously disturb the formation of sound intentions. The many

leaders in education whose opinions on election I quoted in my previous

paper agree that the new modes tend to sobriety and intentionality of

aim. When Professor Ladd speaks of "the unexpected wisdom and manliness

of the choices already made" in the first year of election at New Haven,

he well expresses the gratified surprise which every one experiences on

perceiving in the very constitution of the elective system a sort of

limitation on wayward choice. This limitation seems to me, as Professor

Ladd says he found it,[8] a tolerable preventive of choices directly

aimed at ease. In a community devoted to athletics, baseball is not

played because it is "soft," and football avoided on account of its

difficulty. A similar state of things must be brought about in studies.

In a certain low degree it has come about already. As election breeds

new life in teaching, the old slovenly habit of liking best what costs

least begins to disappear. Easy courses will exist and ought to exist.

Prescribed colleges, it is often forgotten, have more of them than

elective colleges. The important matter is, to see that they fall to the

right persons. Where everything is prescribed, students who do not wish

easy studies are still obliged to take them. Under election, soft

courses may often be pursued with advantage. A student whose other

courses largely depend for their profit on the amount of private

reading or of laboratory practice accomplished in connection with them

is wise in choosing one or more in which the bulk of the work is taken

by the teacher. I do not say that soft courses are always selected with

these wise aims in view. Many I know are not. We have our proper share

of hardened loafers--"tares in our sustaining corn"--who have an

unerring instinct as to where they can most safely settle. But large

numbers of the men in soft courses are there to good purpose; and I

maintain that the superficial study of a subject, acquainting one with

broad outlines, is not necessarily a worthless study. At Harvard to-day

I believe we have too few such superficial courses. As I look over the

Elective Pamphlet, and note the necessarily varying degrees of

difficulty in the studies announced there, I count but six which can,

with any justice, be entitled soft courses; and several of these must be

reckoned by anybody an inspiration to the students who pursue them.

There is a tendency in the elective system, as I have shown elsewhere,

to reduce the number of soft courses somewhat below the desirable

number.

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