JAPAN, [_Continued from volume XV slice II._]

Japan's Claim for Judicial Autonomy.

After the abolition of the shogunate and the resumption of

administrative functions by the Throne, one of the first acts of the

newly organized government was to invite the foreign representatives to

Kioto, where they had audience of the mikado. Subsequently a decree was

issued, announcing the emperor's resolve to establish amicable relations

with foreign countries, and "declaring that any Japanese subject

thereafter guilty of violent behaviour towards a foreigner would not

only act in opposition to the Imperial command, but would also be guilty

of impairing the dignity and good faith of the nation in the eyes of the

powers with which his majesty had pledged himself to maintain

friendship." From that time the relations between Japan and foreign

states grew yearly more amicable; the nation adopted the products of

Western civilization with notable thoroughness, and the provisions of

the treaties were carefully observed. Those treaties, however, presented

one feature which very soon became exceedingly irksome to Japan. They

exempted foreigners residing within her borders from the operation of

her criminal laws, and secured to them the privilege of being arraigned

solely before tribunals of their own nationality. That system had always

been considered necessary where the subjects of Christian states visited

or sojourned in non-Christian countries, and, for the purpose of giving

effect to it, consular courts were established. This necessitated the

confinement of foreign residents to settlements in the neighbourhood of

the consular courts, since it would have been imprudent to allow

foreigners to have free access to districts remote from the only

tribunals competent to control them. The Japanese raised no objection to

the embodiment of this system in the treaties. They recognized its

necessity and even its expediency, for if, on the one hand, it infringed

their country's sovereign rights, on the other, it prevented

complications which must have ensued had they been entrusted with

jurisdiction which they were not prepared to discharge satisfactorily.

But the consular courts were not free from defects. A few of the powers

organized competent tribunals presided over by judicial experts, but a

majority of the treaty states, not having sufficiently large interests

at stake, were content to delegate consular duties to merchants, not

only deficient in legal training, but also themselves engaged in the

very commercial transactions upon which they might at any moment be

required to adjudicate in a magisterial capacity. In any circumstances

the dual functions of consul and judge could not be discharged without

anomaly by the same official, for he was obliged to act as advocate in

the preliminary stages of complications about which, in his position as

judge, he might ultimately have to deliver an impartial verdict. In

practice, however, the system worked with tolerable smoothness, and

might have remained long in force had not the patriotism of the Japanese

rebelled bitterly against the implication that their country was unfit

to exercise one of the fundamental attributes of every sovereign state,

judicial autonomy. From the very outset they spared no effort to qualify

for the recovery of this attribute. Revision of the country's laws and

reorganization of its law courts would necessarily have been an

essential feature of the general reforms suggested by contact with the

Occident, but the question of consular jurisdiction certainly

constituted a special incentive. Expert assistance was obtained from

France and Germany; the best features of European jurisprudence were

adapted to the conditions and usages of Japan; the law courts were

remodelled, and steps were taken to educate a competent judiciary. In

criminal law the example of France was chiefly followed; in commercial

law that of Germany; and in civil law that of the Occident generally,

with due regard to the customs of the country. The jury system was not

adopted, collegiate courts being regarded as more conducive to justice,

and the order of procedure went from tribunals of first instance to

appeal courts and finally to the court of cassation. Schools of law were

quickly opened, and a well-equipped bar soon came into existence. Twelve

years after the inception of these great works, Japan made formal

application for revision of the treaties on the basis of abolishing

consular jurisdiction. She had asked for revision in 1871, sending to

Europe and America an important embassy to raise the question. But at

that time the conditions originally calling for consular jurisdiction

had not undergone any change such as would have justified its abolition,

and the Japanese government, though very anxious to recover tariff

autonomy as well as judicial, shrank from separating the two questions,

lest by prematurely solving one the solution of the other might be

unduly deferred. Thus the embassy failed, and though the problem

attracted great academical interest from the first, it did not re-enter

the field of practical politics until 1883. The negotiations were long

protracted. Never previously had an Oriental state received at the hands

of the Occident recognition such as that now demanded by Japan, and the

West naturally felt deep reluctance to try a wholly novel experiment.

The United States had set a generous example by concluding a new treaty

(1878) on the lines desired by Japan. But its operation was conditional

on a similar act of compliance by the other treaty powers. Ill-informed

European publicists ridiculed the Washington statesmen's attitude on

this occasion, claiming that what had been given with one hand was taken

back with the other. The truth is that the conditional provision was

inserted at the request of Japan herself, who appreciated her own

unpreparedness for the concession. From 1883, however, she was ready to

accept full responsibility, and she therefore asked that all foreigners

within her borders should thenceforth be subject to her laws and

judiciable by her law-courts, supplementing her application by

promising that its favourable reception should be followed by the

complete opening of the country and the removal of all restrictions

hitherto imposed on foreign trade, travel and residence in her realm.

"From the first it had been the habit of Occidental peoples to upbraid

Japan on account of the barriers opposed by her to full and free foreign

intercourse, and she was now able to claim that these barriers were no

longer maintained by her desire, but that they existed because of a

system which theoretically proclaimed her unfitness for free association

with Western nations, and practically made it impossible for her to

throw open her territories completely for the ingress of foreigners."

She had a strong case, but on the side of the European powers extreme

reluctance was manifested to try the unprecedented experiment of placing

their people under the jurisdiction of an Oriental country. Still

greater was the reluctance of those upon whom the experiment would be

tried. Foreigners residing in Japan naturally clung to consular

jurisdiction as a privilege of inestimable value. They saw, indeed, that

such a system could not be permanently imposed on a country where the

conditions justifying it had nominally disappeared. But they saw, also,

that the legal and judicial reforms effected by Japan had been crowded

into an extraordinarily brief period, and that, as tyros experimenting

with alien systems, the Japanese might be betrayed into many errors.

Recognition by the Powers.

The negotiations lasted for eleven years. They were begun in 1883 and a

solution was not reached until 1894. Finally European governments

conceded the justice of Japan's case, and it was agreed that from July

1899 Japanese tribunals should assume jurisdiction over every person, of

whatever nationality, within the confines of Japan, and the whole

country should be thrown open to foreigners, all limitations upon trade,

travel and residence being removed. Great Britain took the lead in thus

releasing Japan from the fetters of the old system. The initiative came

from her with special grace, for the system and all its irksome

consequences had been originally imposed on Japan by a combination of

powers with Great Britain in the van. As a matter of historical sequence

the United States dictated the terms of the first treaty providing for

consular jurisdiction. But from a very early period the Washington

government showed its willingness to remove all limitations of Japan's

sovereignty, whereas Europe, headed by Great Britain, whose

preponderating interests entitled her to lead, resolutely refused to

make any substantial concession. In Japanese eyes, therefore, British

conservatism seemed to be the one serious obstacle, and since the

British residents in the settlements far outnumbered all other

nationalities, and since they alone had newspaper organs to ventilate

their grievances--it was certainly fortunate for the popularity of her

people in the Far East that Great Britain saw her way finally to set a

liberal example. Nearly five years were required to bring the other

Occidental powers into line with Great Britain and America. It should be

stated, however, that neither reluctance to make the necessary

concessions nor want of sympathy with Japan caused the delay. The

explanation is, first, that each set of negotiators sought to improve

either the terms or the terminology of the treaties already concluded,

and, secondly, that the tariff arrangements for the different countries

required elaborate discussion.

Reception given to the Revised Treaties.

Until the last of the revised treaties was ratified, voices of protest

against revision continued to be vehemently raised by a large section of

the foreign community in the settlements. Some were honestly

apprehensive as to the issue of the experiment. Others were swayed by

racial prejudice. A few had fallen into an insuperable habit of

grumbling, or found their account in advocating conservatism under

pretence of championing foreign interests; and all were naturally

reluctant to forfeit the immunity from taxation hitherto enjoyed. It

seemed as though the inauguration of the new system would find the

foreign community in a mood which must greatly diminish the chances of a

happy result, for where a captious and aggrieved disposition exists,

opportunities to discover causes of complaint cannot be wanting. But at

the eleventh hour this unfavourable demeanour underwent a marked change.

So soon as it became evident that the old system was hopelessly doomed,

the sound common sense of the European and American business man

asserted itself. The foreign residents let it be seen that they intended

to bow cheerfully to the inevitable, and that no obstacles would be

willingly placed by them in the path of Japanese jurisdiction. The

Japanese, on their side, took some promising steps. An Imperial rescript

declared in unequivocal terms that it was the sovereign's policy and

desire to abolish all distinctions between natives and foreigners, and

that by fully carrying out the friendly purpose of the treaties his

people would best consult his wishes, maintain the character of the

nation, and promote its prestige. The premier and other ministers of

state issued instructions to the effect that the responsibility now

devolved on the government, and the duty on the people, of enabling

foreigners to reside confidently and contentedly in every part of the

country. Even the chief Buddhist prelates addressed to the priests and

parishioners in their dioceses injunctions pointing out that, freedom of

conscience being now guaranteed by the constitution, men professing

alien creeds must be treated as courteously as the followers of

Buddhism, and must enjoy the same rights and privileges.

Thus the great change was effected in circumstances of happy augury. Its

results were successful on the whole. Foreigners residing in Japan now

enjoy immunity of domicile, personal and religious liberty, freedom from

official interference, and security of life and property as fully as

though they were living in their own countries, and they have gradually

learned to look with greatly increased respect upon Japanese law and its

administrators.

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Next to the revision of the treaties and to the result of the great wars

waged by Japan since the resumption of foreign intercourse, the most

memorable incident in her modern career was the conclusion, first, of an

_entente_, and, secondly, of an offensive and defensive alliance with

Great Britain in January 1902 and September 1905, respectively. The

_entente_ set out by disavowing on the part of each of the contracting

parties any aggressive tendency in either China or Korea, the

independence of which two countries was explicitly recognized; and went

on to declare that Great Britain in China and Japan in China and Korea

might take indispensable means to safeguard their interests; while, if

such measures involved one of the signatories in war with a third power,

the other signatory would not only remain neutral but would also

endeavour to prevent other powers from joining in hostilities against

its ally, and would come to the assistance of the latter in the event of

its being faced by two or more powers. The _entente_ further recognized

that Japan possessed, in a peculiar degree, political, commercial and

industrial interests in Korea. This agreement, equally novel for each of

the contracting parties, evidently tended to the benefit of Japan more

than to that of Great Britain, inasmuch as the interests in question

were vital from the former power's point of view but merely local from

the latter's. The inequality was corrected by an offensive and defensive

alliance in 1905. For the scope of the agreement was then extended to

India and eastern Asia generally, and while the signatories pledged

themselves, on the one hand, to preserve the common interests of all

powers in China by insuring her integrity and independence as well as

the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of

all nations within her borders, they agreed, on the other, to maintain

their own territorial rights in eastern Asia and India, and to come to

each other's armed assistance in the event of those rights being

assailed by any other power or powers. These agreements have, of course,

a close relation to the events which accompanied or immediately preceded

them, but they also present a vivid and radical contrast between a

country which, less than half a century previously, had struggled

vehemently to remain secluded from the world, and a country which now

allied itself with one of the most liberal and progressive nations for

the purposes of a policy extending over the whole of eastern Asia and

India. This contrast was accentuated two years later (1907) when France

and Russia concluded _ententes_ with Japan, recognizing the independence

and integrity of the Chinese Empire, as well as the principle of equal

opportunity for all nations in that country, and engaging to support

each other for assuring peace and security there. Japan thus became a

world power in the most unequivocal sense.

War with Korea.

_Japan's Foreign Wars and Complications._--The earliest foreign war

conducted by Japan is said to have taken place at the beginning of the

3rd century, when the empress Jingo led an army to the conquest of

Korea. But as the event is supposed to have happened more than 500 years

before the first Japanese record was written, its traditional details

cannot be seriously discussed. There is, however, no room to doubt that

from time to time in early ages Japanese troops were seen in Korea,

though they made no permanent impression on the country. It was reserved

for Hideyoshi, the taiko, to make the Korean peninsula the scene of a

great over-sea campaign. Hideyoshi, the Napoleon of Japan, having

brought the whole empire under his sway as the sequel of many years of

incomparable generalship and statecraft, conceived the project of

subjugating China. By some historians his motive has been described as a

desire to find employment for the immense mob of armed men whom four

centuries of almost continuous fighting had called into existence in

Japan: he felt that domestic peace could not be permanently restored

unless these restless spirits were occupied abroad. But although that

object may have reinforced his purpose, his ambition aimed at nothing

less than the conquest of China, and he regarded Korea merely as a

stepping-stone to that aim. Had Korea consented to be put to such a use,

she need not have fought or suffered. The Koreans, however, counted

China invincible. They considered that Japan would be shattered by the

first contact with the great empire, and therefore although, in the 13th

century, they had given the use of their harbours to the Mongol invaders

of Japan, they flatly refused in the 16th to allow their territory to be

used for a Japanese invasion of China. On the 24th of May 1592 the wave

of invasion rolled against Korea's southern coast. Hideyoshi had chosen

Nagoya in the province of Hizen as the home-base of his operations.

There the sea separating Japan from the Korean peninsula narrows to a

strait divided into two channels of almost equal width by the island of

Tsushima. To reach this island from the Japanese side was an easy and

safe task, but in the 56-mile channel that separated Tsushima from the

peninsula an invading flotilla had to run the risk of attack by Korean

war-ships. At Nagoya Hideyoshi assembled an army of over 300,000 men, of

whom some 70,000 constituted the first fighting line, 87,000 the second,

and the remainder formed a reserve to be subsequently drawn on as

occasion demanded. The question of transport presented some difficulty,

but it was solved by the simple expedient of ordering every feudatory to

furnish two ships for each 100,000 _koku_ of his fief's revenue. These

were not fighting vessels but mere transports. As for the plan of

campaign, it was precisely in accord with modern principles of strategy,

and bore witness to the daring genius of Hideyoshi. The van, consisting

of three army corps and mustering in all 51,000 men, was to cross

rapidly to Fusan, on the south coast of the peninsula, and immediately

commence a movement northward towards the capital, Seoul, one corps

moving by the eastern coast-road, one by the central route, and one by

the western coast-line. Thereafter the other four corps, which formed

the first fighting line, together with the corps under the direct orders

of the commander-in-chief, Ukida Hideiye, were to cross, for the purpose

of effectually subduing the regions through which the van had passed;

and, finally, the two remaining corps of the second line were to be

transported by sea up the west coast of the peninsula, to form a

junction with the van which, by that time, should be preparing to pass

into China over the northern boundary of Korea, namely, the Yalu River.

For the landing place of these reinforcements the town of Phyong-yang

was adopted, being easily accessible by the Taidong River from the

coast. In later ages Japanese armies were destined to move twice over

these same regions, once to the invasion of China, once to the attack of

Russia, and they adopted almost the same strategical plan as that mapped

out by Hideyoshi in the year 1592. The forecast was that the Koreans

would offer their chief resistance, first, at the capital, Seoul; next

at Phyong-yang, and finally at the Yalu, as the approaches to all these

places offered positions capable of being utilized to great advantage

for defensive purposes.

Landing In Korea and Advance of the Invaders.

On the 24th of May 1592 the first army corps, under the command of

Konishi Yukinaga, crossed unmolested to the peninsula; next day the

castle of Fusan was carried by storm, which same fate befell, on the

27th, another and stronger fortress lying 3 miles inland and garrisoned

by 20,000 picked soldiers. The invaders were irresistible. From the

landing-place at Fusan to the gates of Seoul the distance is 267 miles.

Konishi's corps covered that interval in 19 days, storming two forts,

carrying two positions and fighting one pitched battle _en route_. On

the 12th of June the Korean capital was in Japanese hands, and by the

16th four army corps had assembled there, while four others had effected

a landing at Fusan. After a rest of 15 days the northward advance was

resumed, and July 15th saw Phyong-yang in Japanese possession. The

distance of 130 miles from Seoul to the Taidong had been traversed in 18

days, 10 having been occupied in forcing the passage of a river which,

if held with moderate resolution and skill, should have stopped the

Japanese altogether. At this point, however, the invasion suffered a

check owing to a cause which in modern times has received much

attention, though in Hideyoshi's days it had been little considered; the

Japanese lost the command of the sea.

Fighting at Sea.

The Japanese idea of sea-fighting in those times was to use open boats

propelled chiefly by oars. They closed as quickly as possible with the

enemy, and then fell on with the trenchant swords which they used so

skilfully. Now during the 15th century and part of the 16th the Chinese

had been so harassed by Japanese piratical raids that their inventive

genius, quickened by suffering, suggested a device for coping with these

formidable adversaries. Once allow the Japanese swordsman to come to

close quarters and he carried all before him. To keep him at a distance,

then, was the great desideratum, and the Chinese compassed this in

maritime warfare by completely covering their boats with roofs of solid

timber, so that those within were protected against missiles, while

loop-holes and ports enabled them to pour bullets and arrows on a foe.

The Koreans learned this device from the Chinese and were the first to

employ it in actual warfare. Their own history alleges that they

improved upon the Chinese model by nailing sheet iron over the roofs and

sides of the "turtle-shell" craft and studding the whole surface with

_chevaux de frise_, but Japanese annals indicate that in the great

majority of cases solid timber alone was used. It seems strange that the

Japanese should have been without any clear perception of the immense

fighting superiority possessed by such protected war-vessels over small

open boats. But certainly they were either ignorant or indifferent. The

fleet which they provided to hold the command of Korean waters did not

include one vessel of any magnitude; it consisted simply of some

hundreds of row-boats manned by 7000 men. Hideyoshi himself was perhaps

not without misgivings. Six years previously he had endeavoured to

obtain two war-galleons from the Portuguese, and had he succeeded, the

history of the Far East might have been radically different. Evidently,

however, he committed a blunder which his countrymen in modern times

have conspicuously avoided; he drew the sword without having fully

investigated his adversary's resources. Just about the time when the van

of the Japanese army was entering Seoul, the Korean admiral, Yi Sun-sin,

at the head of a fleet of 80 vessels, attacked the Japanese squadron

which lay at anchor near the entrance to Fusan harbour, set 26 of the

vessels on fire and dispersed the rest. Four other engagements ensued in

rapid succession. The last and most important took place shortly after

the Japanese troops had seized Phyong-yang. It resulted in the sinking

of over 70 Japanese vessels, transports and fighting ships combined,

which formed the main part of a flotilla carrying reinforcements by sea

to the van of the invading army. This despatch of troops and supplies by

water had been a leading feature of Hideyoshi's plan of campaign, and

the destruction of the flotilla to which the duty was entrusted may be

said to have sealed the fate of the war by isolating the army in Korea

from its home base. It is true that Konishi Yukinaga, who commanded the

first division, would have continued his northward march from

Phyong-yang without delay. He argued that China was wholly unprepared,

and that the best hope of ultimate victory lay in not giving her time to

collect her forces. But the commander-in-chief, Ukida Hideiye, refused

to endorse this plan. He took the view that since the Korean provinces

were still offering desperate resistance, supplies could not be drawn

from them, neither could the troops engaged in subjugating them be freed

for service at the front. Therefore it was essential to await the

consummation of the second phase of Hideyoshi's plan, namely, the

despatch of reinforcements and munitions by water to Phyong-yang. The

reader has seen how that second phase fared. The Japanese commander at

Phyong-yang never received any accession of strength. His force suffered

constant diminution from casualties, and the question of commissariat

became daily more difficult. It is further plain to any reader of

history--and Japanese historians themselves admit the fact--that no wise

effort was made to conciliate the Korean people. They were treated so

harshly that even the humble peasant took up arms, and thus the

peninsula, instead of serving as a basis of supplies, had to be

garrisoned perpetually by a strong army.

Chinese Intervention.

The Koreans, having suffered for their loyalty to China, naturally

looked to her for succour. Again and again appeals were made to Peking,

and at length a force of 5000 men, which had been mobilized in the

Liaotung peninsula, crossed the Yalu and moved south to Phyong-yang,

where the Japanese van had been lying idle for over two months. This was

early in October 1592. Memorable as the first encounter between Japanese

and Chinese, the incident also illustrated China's supreme confidence in

her own ineffable superiority. The whole of the Korean forces had been

driven northward throughout the entire length of the peninsula by the

Japanese armies, yet Peking considered that 5000 Chinese "braves" would

suffice to roll back this tide of invasion. Three thousand of the

Chinese were killed and the remainder fled pell-mell across the Yalu.

China now began to be seriously alarmed. She collected an army variously

estimated at from 51,000 to 200,000 men, and marching it across

Manchuria in the dead of winter, hurled it against Phyong-yang during

the first week of February 1593. The Japanese garrison did not exceed

20,000, nearly one-half of its original number having been detached to

hold a line of forts which guarded the communications with Seoul.

Moreover, the Chinese, though their swords were much inferior to the

Japanese weapon, possessed great superiority in artillery and cavalry,

as well as in the fact that their troopers wore iron mail which defied

the keenest blade. Thus, after a severe fight, the Japanese had to

evacuate Phyong-yang and fall back upon Seoul. But this one victory

alone stands to China's credit. In all subsequent encounters of any

magnitude her army suffered heavy defeats, losing on one occasion some

10,000 men, on another 4000, and on a third 39,000. But the presence of

her forces and the determined resistance offered by the Koreans

effectually saved China from invasion. Indeed, after the evacuation of

Seoul, on the 9th of May 1593, Hideyoshi abandoned all idea of carrying

the war into Chinese territory, and devoted his attention to obtaining

honourable terms of peace, the Japanese troops meanwhile holding a line

of forts along the southern coast of Korea. He died before that end had

been accomplished. Had he lived a few days longer, he would have learned

of a crushing defeat inflicted on the Chinese forces (at Sö-chhön,

October 30, 1598), when the Satsuma men under Shimazu Yoshihiro took

38,700 Chinese heads and sent the noses and ears to Japan, where they

now lie buried under a tumulus (_mimizuka_, ear-mound) near the temple

of Daibutsu in Kioto. Thereafter the statesmen to whom the regent on his

death-bed had entrusted the duty of terminating the struggle and

recalling the troops, intimated to the enemy that the evacuation of the

peninsula might be obtained if a Korean prince repaired to Japan as

envoy, and if some tiger-skins and _ginseng_ were sent to Kioto in token

of amity. So ended one of the greatest over-sea campaigns recorded in

history. It had lasted 6½ years, had seen 200,000 Japanese troops at one

time on Korean soil, and had cost something like a quarter of a million

lives.

Contrast between Foreign Relations in Medieval and Modern Times.

From the recall of the Korea expedition in 1598 to the resumption of

intercourse with the Occident in modern times, Japan enjoyed

uninterrupted peace with foreign nations. Thereafter she had to engage

in four wars. It is a striking contrast. During the first eleven

centuries of her historical existence she was involved in only one

contest abroad; during the next half century she fought four times

beyond the sea and was confronted by many complications. Whatever

material or moral advantages her association with the West conferred on

her, it did not bring peace.

The "Maria Luz" Complication.

The first menacing foreign complication with which the Japanese

government of the Meiji era had to deal was connected with the traffic

in Chinese labour, an abuse not yet wholly eradicated. In 1872, a

Peruvian ship, the "Maria Luz," put into port at Yokohama, carrying 200

contract labourers. One of the unfortunate men succeeded in reaching the

shore and made a piteous appeal to the Japanese authorities, who at once

seized the vessel and released her freight of slaves, for they were

little better. The Japanese had not always been so particular. In the

days of early foreign intercourse, before England's attitude towards

slavery had established a new code of ethics, Portuguese ships had been

permitted to carry away from Hirado, as they did from Macao, cargoes of

men and women, doomed to a life of enforced toil if they survived the

horrors of the voyage. But modern Japan followed the tenets of modern

morality in such matters. Of course the Peruvian government protested,

and for a time relations were strained almost to the point of rupture;

but it was finally agreed that the question should be submitted to the

arbitration of the tsar, who decided in Japan's favour. Japan's attitude

in this affair elicited applause, not merely from the point of view of

humanity, but also because of the confidence she showed in Occidental

justice.

The Sakhalin Complication.

Another complication which occupied the attention of the Tokyo

government from the beginning of the Meiji era was in truth a legacy

from the days of feudalism. In those days the island of Yezo, as well as

Sakhalin on its north-west and the Kurile group on its north, could

scarcely be said to be in effective Japanese occupation. It is true that

the feudal chief of Matsumae (now Fuku-yama), the remains of whose

castle may still be seen on the coast at the southern extremity of the

island of Yezo, exercised nominal jurisdiction; but his functions did

not greatly exceed the levying of taxes on the aboriginal inhabitants of

Yezo, the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. Thus from the beginning of the

18th century Russian fishermen began to settle in the Kuriles and

Russian ships menaced Sakhalin. There can be no doubt that the first

explorers of Sakhalin were Japanese. As early as 1620, some vassals of

the feudal chief of Matsumae visited the place and passed a winter

there. It was then supposed to be a peninsula forming part of the

Asiatic mainland, but in 1806 a daring Japanese traveller, by name

Mamiya Rinzo, made his way to Manchuria, voyaged up and down the Amur,

and, crossing to Sakhalin, discovered that a narrow strait separated it

from the mainland. There still prevails in the minds of many Occidentals

a belief that the discovery of Sakhalin's insular character was reserved

for Captain Nevelskoy, a Russian, who visited the place in 1849, but in

Japan the fact had then been known for 43 years. Muravief, the great

Russian empire-builder in East Asia, under whose orders Nevelskoy acted,

quickly appreciated the necessity of acquiring Sakhalin, which commands

the estuary of the Amur. After the conclusion of the treaty of Aigun

(1857) he visited Japan with a squadron, and required that the strait of

La Pérouse, which separates Sakhalin from Yezo, should be regarded as

the frontier between Russia and Japan. This would have given the whole

of Sakhalin to Russia. Japan refused, and Muravief immediately resorted

to the policy he had already pursued with signal success in the Usuri

region: he sent emigrants to settle in Sakhalin. Twice the shogunate

attempted to frustrate this process of gradual absorption by proposing a

division of the island along the 50th parallel of north latitude, and

finally, in 1872, the Meiji government offered to purchase the Russian

portion for 2,000,000 dollars (then equivalent to about £400,000). St

Petersburg, having by that time discovered the comparative worthlessness

of the island as a wealth-earning possession, showed some signs of

acquiescence, and possibly an agreement might have been reached had not

a leading Japanese statesman--afterwards Count Kuroda--opposed the

bargain as disadvantageous to Japan. Finally St Petersburg's

perseverance won the day. In 1875 Japan agreed to recognize Russia's

title to the whole island on condition that Russia similarly recognized

Japan's title to the Kuriles. It was a singular compact. Russia

purchased a Japanese property and paid for it with a part of Japan's

belongings. These details form a curious preface to the fact that

Sakhalin was destined, 30 years later, to be the scene of a Japanese

invasion, in the sequel of which it was divided along the 50th parallel

as the shogun's administration had originally proposed.

Military Expedition to Formosa.

The first of Japan's four conflicts was an expedition to Formosa in

1874. Insignificant from a military point of view, this affair derives

vicarious interest from its effect upon the relations between China and

Japan, and upon the question of the ownership of the Riukiu islands.

These islands, which lie at a little distance south of Japan, had for

centuries been regarded as an apanage of the Satsuma fief. The language

and customs of their inhabitants showed unmistakable traces of

relationship to the Japanese, and the possibility of the islands being

included among the dominions of China had probably never occurred to any

Japanese statesman. When therefore, in 1873, the crew of a wrecked

Riukiuan junk were barbarously treated by the inhabitants of northern

Formosa, the Japanese government unhesitatingly assumed the

responsibility of seeking redress for their outrage. Formosa being a

part of the Chinese Empire, complaint was duly preferred in Peking. But

the Chinese authorities showed such resolute indifference to Japan's

representations that the latter finally took the law into her own hands,

and sent a small force to punish the Formosan murderers, who, of course,

were found quite unable to offer any serious resistance. The Chinese

government, now recognizing the fact that its territories had been

invaded, lodged a protest which, but for the intervention of the British

minister in Peking, might have involved the two empires in war. The

final terms of arrangement were that, in consideration of Japan

withdrawing her troops from Formosa, China should indemnify her to the

extent of the expenses of the expedition. In sending this expedition to

Formosa the government sought to placate the Satsuma samurai, who were

beginning to show much opposition to certain features of the

administrative reforms just inaugurated, and who claimed special

interest in the affairs of the Riukiu islands.

The Riukiu Complication.

Had Japan needed any confirmation of her belief that the Riukiu islands

belonged to her, the incidents and settlement of the Formosan

complication would have constituted conclusive evidence. Thus in 1876

she did not hesitate to extend her newly organized system of prefectural

government to Riukiu, which thenceforth became the Okinawa prefecture,

the former ruler of the islands being pensioned, according to the system

followed in the case of the feudal chiefs in Japan proper. China at once

entered an objection. She claimed that Riukiu had always been a

tributary of her empire, and she was doubtless perfectly sincere in the

contention. But China's interpretation of tribute did not seem

reducible to a working theory. So long as her own advantage could be

promoted, she regarded as a token of vassalage the presents periodically

carried to her court from neighbouring states. So soon, however, as

there arose any question of discharging a suzerain's duties, she classed

these offerings as insignificant interchanges of neighbourly courtesy.

It was true that Riukiu had followed the custom of despatching

gift-bearing envoys to China from time to time, just as Japan herself

had done, though with less regularity. But it was also true that Riukiu

had been subdued by Satsuma without China stretching out a hand to help

her; that for two centuries the islands had been included in the Satsuma

fief, and that China, in the sequel to the Formosan affair, had made a

practical acknowledgment of Japan's superior title to protect the

islanders. Each empire positively asserted its claims; but whereas Japan

put hers into practice, China confined herself to remonstrances. Things

remained in that state until 1880, when General Grant, visiting the

East, suggested the advisability of a compromise. A conference met in

Peking, and the plenipotentiaries agreed that the islands should be

divided, Japan taking the northern group, China the southern. But on the

eve of signature the Chinese plenipotentiary drew back, pleading that he

had no authority to conclude an agreement without previously referring

it to certain other dignitaries. Japan, sensible that she had been

flouted, retired from the discussion and retained the islands, China's

share in them being reduced to a grievance.

The Korean Complication.

From the 16th century, when the Korean peninsula was overrun by Japanese

troops, its rulers made a habit of sending a present-bearing embassy to

Japan to felicitate the accession of each shogun. But after the fall of

the Tokugawa shogunate, the Korean court desisted from this custom,

declared a determination to have no further relations with a country

embracing Western civilization, and refused even to receive a Japanese

embassy. This conduct caused deep umbrage in Japan. Several prominent

politicians cast their votes for war, and undoubtedly the sword would

have been drawn had not the leading statesmen felt that a struggle with

Korea, involving probably a rupture with China, must fatally check the

progress of the administrative reforms then (1873) in their infancy. Two

years later, however, the Koreans crowned their defiance by firing on

the boats of a Japanese war-vessel engaged in the operation of

coast-surveying. No choice now remained except to despatch an armed

expedition against the truculent kingdom. But Japan did not want to

fight. In this matter she showed herself an apt pupil of Occidental

methods such as had been practised against herself in former years. She

assembled an imposing force of war-ships and transports, but instead of

proceeding to extremities, she employed the squadron--which was by no

means so strong as it seemed--to intimidate Korea into signing a treaty

of amity and commerce, and opening three ports to foreign trade (1876).

That was the beginning of Korea's friendly relations with the outer

world, and Japan naturally took credit for the fact that, thus early in

her new career, she had become an instrument for extending the principle

of universal intercourse opposed so strenuously by herself in the past.

War with China.

From time immemorial China's policy towards the petty states on her

frontiers had been to utilize them as buffers for softening the shock of

foreign contact, while contriving, at the same time, that her relations

with them should involve no inconvenient responsibilities for herself.

The aggressive impulses of the outside world were to be checked by an

unproclaimed understanding that the territories of these states partook

of the inviolability of China, while the states, on their side, must

never expect their suzerain to bear the consequences of their acts. This

arrangement, depending largely on sentiment and prestige, retained its

validity in the atmosphere of Oriental seclusion, but quickly failed to

endure the test of modern Occidental practicality. Tongking, Annam, Siam

and Burma were withdrawn, one by one, from the fiction of dependence on

China and independence towards all other countries. But with regard to

Korea, China proved more tenacious. The possession of the peninsula by

a foreign power would have threatened the maritime route to the Chinese

capital and given easy access to Manchuria, the cradle of the dynasty

which ruled China. Therefore Peking statesmen endeavoured to preserve

the old-time relations with the little kingdom. But they could never

persuade themselves to modify the indirect methods sanctioned by

tradition. Instead of boldly declaring Korea a dependency of China, they

sought to keep up the romance of ultimate dependency and intermediate

sovereignty. Thus in 1876 Korea was suffered to conclude with Japan a

treaty of which the first article declared her "an independent state

enjoying the same rights as Japan," and subsequently to make with the

United States (1882), Great Britain (1883) and other powers, treaties in

which her independence was constructively admitted. China, however, did

not intend that Korea should exercise the independence thus

conventionally recognized. A Chinese resident was placed in Seoul, and a

system of steady though covert interference in Korea's affairs was

inaugurated. The chief sufferer from these anomalous conditions was

Japan. In all her dealings with Korea, in all complications that arose

out of her comparatively large trade with the peninsula, in all

questions connected with her numerous settlers there, she found herself

negotiating with a dependency of China, and with officials who took

their orders from the Chinese representative. China had long entertained

a rooted apprehension of Japanese aggression in Korea--an apprehension

not unwarranted by history--and that distrust tinged all the influence

exerted by her agents there. On many occasions Japan was made sensible

of the discrimination thus exercised against her. Little by little the

consciousness roused her indignation, and although no single instance

constituted a ground for strong international protest, the Japanese

people gradually acquired a sense of being perpetually baffled, thwarted

and humiliated by China's interference in Korean affairs. For thirty

years China had treated Japan as a contemptible deserter from the

Oriental standard, and had regarded her progressive efforts with openly

disdainful aversion; while Japan, on her side, had chafed more and more

to furnish some striking evidence of the wisdom of her preference for

Western civilization. Even more serious were the consequences of Chinese

interference from the point of view of Korean administration. The rulers

of the country lost all sense of national responsibility, and gave

unrestrained sway to selfish ambition. The functions of the judiciary

and of the executive alike came to be discharged by bribery only. Family

interests predominated over those of the state. Taxes were imposed in

proportion to the greed of local officials. No thought whatever was

taken for the welfare of the people or for the development of the

country's resources. Personal responsibility was unknown among

officials. To be a member of the Min family, to which the queen

belonged, was to possess a passport to office and an indemnity against

the consequences of abuse of power. From time to time the advocates of

progress or the victims of oppression rose in arms. They effected

nothing except to recall to the world's recollection the miserable

condition into which Korea had fallen. Chinese military aid was always

furnished readily for the suppression of these risings, and thus the Min

family learned to base its tenure of power on ability to conciliate

China and on readiness to obey Chinese dictation, while the people at

large fell into the apathetic condition of men who possess neither

security of property nor national ambition.

As a matter of state policy the Korean problem caused much anxiety to

Japan. Her own security being deeply concerned in preserving Korea from

the grasp of a Western power, she could not suffer the little kingdom to

drift into a condition of such administrative incompetence and national

debility that a strong aggressor might find at any moment a pretext for

interference. On two occasions (1882 and 1884) when China's armed

intervention was employed in the interests of the Min to suppress

movements of reform, the partisans of the victors, regarding Japan as

the fountain of progressive tendencies, destroyed her legation in Seoul

and compelled its inmates to fly from the city. Japan behaved with

forbearance at these crises, but in the consequent negotiations she

acquired conventional titles that touched the core of China's alleged

suzerainty. In 1882 her right to maintain troops in Seoul for the

protection of her legation was admitted; in 1885 she concluded with

China a convention by which each power pledged itself not to send troops

to Korea without notifying the other.

The Rupture with China.

In the spring of 1894 a serious insurrection broke out in Korea, and the

Min family appealed for China's aid. On the 6th of July 2500 Chinese

troops embarked at Tientsin and were transported to the peninsula, where

they went into camp at Ya-shan (Asan), on the south-west coast, notice

of the measure being given by the Chinese government to the Japanese

representative at Peking, according to treaty. During the interval

immediately preceding these events, Japan had been rendered acutely

sensible of China's arbitrary and unfriendly interference in Korea.

Twice the efforts of the Japanese government to obtain redress for

unlawful and ruinous commercial prohibitions had been thwarted by the

Chinese representative in Seoul; and an ultimatum addressed from Tokyo

to the Korean government had elicited from the viceroy Li in Tientsin a

thinly veiled threat of Chinese armed opposition. Still more provocative

of national indignation was China's procedure with regard to the murder

of Kim Ok-kyun, the leader of progress in Korea, who had been for some

years a refugee in Japan. Inveigled from Japan to China by a

fellow-countryman sent from Seoul to assassinate him, Kim was shot in a

Japanese hotel in Shanghai; and China, instead of punishing the

murderer, conveyed him in a war-ship of her own to Korea to be publicly

honoured. When, therefore, the Korean insurrection of 1894 induced the

Min family again to solicit China's armed intervention, the Tokyo

government concluded that, in the interests of Japan's security and of

civilization in the Orient, steps must be taken to put an end to the

misrule which offered incessant invitations to foreign aggression, and

checked Korea's capacity to maintain its own independence. Japan did not

claim for herself any rights or interests in the peninsula superior to

those possessed there by China. But there was not the remotest

probability that China, whose face had been contemptuously set against

all the progressive measures adopted by Japan during the preceding

twenty-five years, would join in forcing upon a neighbouring kingdom the

very reforms she herself despised, were her co-operation invited through

ordinary diplomatic channels only. It was necessary to contrive a

situation which would not only furnish clear proof of Japan's

resolution, but also enable her to pursue her programme independently of

Chinese endorsement, should the latter be finally unobtainable. She

therefore met China's notice of a despatch of troops with a

corresponding notice of her own, and the month of July 1894 found a

Chinese force assembled at Asan and a Japanese force occupying positions

in the neighbourhood of Seoul. China's motive for sending troops was

nominally to quell the Tonghak insurrection, but really to re-affirm her

own domination in the peninsula. Japan's motive was to secure such a

position as would enable her to insist upon the radically curative

treatment of Korea's malady. Up to this point the two empires were

strictly within their conventional rights. Each was entitled by treaty

to send troops to Korea, provided that notice was given to the other.

But China, in giving notice, described Korea as her "tributary state,"

thus thrusting into the forefront of the discussion a contention which

Japan, from conciliatory motives, would have kept out of sight. Once

formally advanced, however, the claim had to be challenged. In the

treaty of amity and commerce concluded in 1876 between Japan and Korea,

the two high contracting parties were explicitly declared to possess the

same national status. Japan could not agree that a power which for

nearly two decades she had acknowledged and treated as her equal should

be openly classed as a tributary of China. She protested, but the

Chinese statesmen took no notice of her protest. They continued to apply

the disputed appellation to Korea, and they further asserted their

assumption of sovereignty in the peninsula by seeking to set limits to

the number of troops sent by Japan, as well as to the sphere of their

employment. Japan then proposed that the two empires should unite their

efforts for the suppression of disturbances in Korea, and for the

subsequent improvement of that kingdom's administration, the latter

purpose to be pursued by the despatch of a joint commission of

investigation. But China refused everything. Ready at all times to

interfere by force of arms between the Korean people and the dominant

political faction, she declined to interfere in any way for the

promotion of reform. She even expressed supercilious surprise that

Japan, while asserting Korea's independence, should suggest the idea of

peremptorily reforming its administration. In short, for Chinese

purposes the Peking statesmen openly declared Korea a tributary state;

but for Japanese purposes they insisted that it must be held

independent. They believed that their island neighbour aimed at the

absorption of Korea into the Japanese empire. Viewed in the light of

that suspicion, China's attitude became comprehensible, but her

procedure was inconsistent, illogical and unpractical. The Tokyo cabinet

now declared its resolve not to withdraw the Japanese troops without

"some understanding that would guarantee the future peace, order, and

good government of Korea," and since China still declined to come to

such an understanding, Japan undertook the work of reform single-handed.

Outbreak of Hostilities.

The Chinese representative in Seoul threw his whole weight into the

scale against the success of these reforms. But the determining cause of

rupture was in itself a belligerent operation. China's troops had been

sent originally for the purpose of quelling the Tonghak rebellion. But

the rebellion having died of inanition before the landing of the troops,

their services were not required. Nevertheless China kept them in Korea,

her declared reason for doing so being the presence of a Japanese

military force. Throughout the subsequent negotiations the Chinese

forces lay in an entrenched camp at Asan, while the Japanese occupied

Seoul. An attempt on China's part to send reinforcements could be

construed only as an unequivocal declaration of resolve to oppose

Japan's proceedings by force of arms. Nevertheless China not only

despatched troops by sea to strengthen the camp at Asan, but also sent

an army overland across Korea's northern frontier. At this stage an act

of war occurred. Three Chinese men-of-war, convoying a transport with

1200 men encountered and fired on three Japanese cruisers. One of the

Chinese ships was taken; another was so shattered that she had to be

beached and abandoned; the third escaped in a dilapidated condition; and

the transport, refusing to surrender, was sunk. This happened on the

25th of July 1894, and an open declaration of war was made by each

empire six days later.

Remote Origin of the Conflict.

From the moment when Japan applied herself to break away from Oriental

traditions, and to remove from her limbs the fetters of Eastern

conservatism, it was inevitable that a widening gulf should gradually

grow between herself and China. The war of 1894 was really a contest

between Japanese progress and Chinese stagnation. To secure Korean

immunity from foreign--especially Russian--aggression was of capital

importance to both empires. Japan believed that such security could be

attained by introducing into Korea the civilization which had

contributed so signally to the development of her own strength and

resources. China thought that she could guarantee it without any

departure from old-fashioned methods, and by the same process of

capricious protection which had failed so signally in the cases of

Annam, Tongking, Burma and Siam. The issue really at stake was whether

Japan should be suffered to act as the Eastern propagandist of Western

progress, or whether her efforts in that cause should be held in check

by Chinese conservatism.

Events of the War.

The war itself was a succession of triumphs for Japan. Four days after

the first naval encounter she sent from Seoul a column of troops who

routed the Chinese entrenched at Asan. Many of the fugitives effected

their escape to Phyong-yang, a town on the Taidong River, offering

excellent facilities for defence, and historically interesting as the

place where a Japanese army of invasion had its first encounter with

Chinese troops in 1592. There the Chinese assembled a force of 17,000

men, and made leisurely preparations for a decisive contest. Forty days

elapsed before the Japanese columns converged upon Phyong-yang, and that

interval was utilized by the Chinese to throw up parapets, mount Krupp

guns and otherwise strengthen their position. Moreover, they were armed

with repeating rifles, whereas the Japanese had only single-loaders, and

the ground offered little cover for an attacking force. In such

circumstances, the advantages possessed by the defence ought to have

been well-nigh insuperable; yet a day's fighting sufficed to carry all

the positions, the assailants' casualties amounting to less than 700 and

the defenders losing 6000 in killed and wounded. This brilliant victory

was the prelude to an equally conspicuous success at sea. For on the

17th of September, the very day after the battle at Phyong-yang, a great

naval fight took place near the mouth of the Yalu River, which forms the

northern boundary of Korea. Fourteen Chinese war-ships and six

torpedo-boats were returning to home ports after convoying a fleet of

transports to the Yalu, when they encountered eleven Japanese men-of-war

cruising in the Yellow Sea. Hitherto the Chinese had sedulously avoided

a contest at sea. Their fleet included two armoured battleships of over

7000 tons displacement, whereas the biggest vessels on the Japanese side

were belted cruisers of only 4000 tons. In the hands of an admiral

appreciating the value of sea power, China's naval force would certainly

have been led against Japan's maritime communications, for a successful

blow struck there must have put an end to the Korean campaign. The

Chinese, however, failed to read history. They employed their

war-vessels as convoys only, and, when not using them for that purpose,

hid them in port. Everything goes to show that they would have avoided

the battle off the Yalu had choice been possible, though when forced to

fight they fought bravely. Four of their ships were sunk, and the

remainder escaped to Wei-hai-wei, the vigour of the Japanese pursuit

being greatly impaired by the presence of torpedo-boats in the

retreating squadron.

The Yalu victory opened the over-sea route to China. Japan could now

strike at Talien, Port Arthur, and Wei-hai-wei, naval stations on the

Liaotung and Shantung peninsulas, where powerful permanent

fortifications, built after plans prepared by European experts and armed

with the best modern weapons, were regarded as almost impregnable; They

fell before the assaults of the Japanese troops as easily as the

comparatively rude fortifications at Phyong-yang had fallen. The only

resistance of a stubborn character was made by the Chinese fleet at

Wei-hai-wei; but after the whole squadron of torpedo-craft had been

destroyed or captured as they attempted to escape, and after three of

the largest vessels had been sunk at their moorings by Japanese

torpedoes, and one by gun-fire, the remaining ships surrendered, and

their brave commander, Admiral Ting, committed suicide. This ended the

war. It had lasted seven and a half months, during which time Japan put

into the field five columns, aggregating about 120,000 of all arms. One

of these columns marched northward from Seoul, won the battle of

Phyong-yang, advanced to the Yalu, forced its way into Manchuria, and

moved towards Mukden by Feng-hwang, fighting several minor engagements,

and conducting the greater part of its operations amid deep snow in

midwinter. The second column diverged westwards from the Yalu, and,

marching through southern Manchuria, reached Hai-cheng, whence it

advanced to the capture of Niuchwang and Ying-tse-kow. The third landed

on the Liaotung peninsula, and, turning southwards, carried Talien and

Port Arthur by assault. The fourth moved up the Liaotung peninsula, and,

having seized Kaiping, advanced against Ying-tse-kow, where it joined

hands with the second column. The fifth crossed from Port Arthur to

Wei-hai-wei, and captured the latter. In all these operations the total

Japanese casualties were 1005 killed and 4922 wounded--figures which

sufficiently indicate the inefficiency of the Chinese fighting. The

deaths from disease totalled 16,866, and the total monetary expenditure

was £20,000,000 sterling.

Conclusion of Peace.

The Chinese government sent Li Hung-chang, viceroy of Pechili and senior

grand secretary of state, and Li Ching-fong, to discuss terms of peace

with Japan, the latter being represented by Marquis (afterwards Prince)

Ito and Count Mutsu, prime minister and minister for foreign affairs,

respectively. A treaty was signed at Shimonoseki on the 17th of April

1895, and subsequently ratified by the sovereigns of the two empires. It

declared the absolute independence of Korea; ceded to Japan the part of

Manchuria lying south of a line drawn from the mouth of the river Anping

to the mouth of the Liao, through Feng-hwang, Hai-cheng and

Ying-tse-kow, as well as the islands of Formosa and the Pescadores;

pledged China to pay an indemnity of 200,000,000 taels; provided for the

occupation of Wei-hai-wei by Japan pending payment of the indemnity;

secured some additional commercial privileges, such as the opening of

four new places to foreign trade and the right of foreigners to engage

in manufacturing enterprises in China, and provided for the conclusion

of a treaty of commerce and amity between the two empires, based on the

lines of China's treaties with Occidental powers.

Foreign Interference.

No sooner was this agreement ratified than Russia, Germany and France

presented a joint note to the Tokyo government, recommending that the

territories ceded to Japan on the mainland of China should not be

permanently occupied, as such a proceeding would be detrimental to

peace. The recommendation was couched in the usual terms of diplomatic

courtesy, but everything indicated that its signatories were prepared to

enforce their advice by an appeal to arms. Japan found herself compelled

to comply. Exhausted by the Chinese campaign, which had drained her

treasury, consumed her supplies of warlike material, and kept her

squadrons constantly at sea for eight months, she had no residue of

strength to oppose such a coalition. Her resolve was quickly taken. The

day that saw the publication of the ratified treaty saw also the issue

of an Imperial rescript in which the mikado, avowing his unalterable

devotion to the cause of peace, and recognizing that the counsel offered

by the European states was prompted by the same sentiment, "yielded to

the dictates of magnanimity, and accepted the advice of the three

Powers." The Japanese people were shocked by this incident. They could

understand the motives influencing Russia and France, for it was

evidently natural that the former should desire to exclude warlike and

progressive people like the Japanese from territories contiguous to her

borders, and it was also natural that France should remain true to her

alliance with Russia. But Germany, wholly uninterested in the ownership

of Manchuria, and by profession a warm friend of Japan, seemed to have

joined in robbing the latter of the fruits of her victory simply for the

sake of establishing some shadowy title to Russia's goodwill. It was not

known until a later period that the German emperor entertained profound

apprehensions about the "yellow peril," an irruption of Oriental hordes

into the Occident, and held it a sacred duty to prevent Japan from

gaining a position which might enable her to construct an immense

military machine out of the countless millions of China.

Chinese Crisis of 1900.

Japan's third expedition over-sea in the Meiji era had its origin in

causes which belong to the history of China (q.v.). In the second half

of 1900 an anti-foreign and anti-dynastic rebellion, breaking out in

Shantung, spread to the metropolitan province of Pechili, and resulted

in a situation of extreme peril for the foreign communities of Tientsin

and Peking. It was impossible for any European power, or for the United

States, to organize sufficiently prompt measures of relief. Thus the

eyes of the world turned to Japan, whose proximity to the scene of

disturbance rendered intervention comparatively easy for her. But Japan

hesitated. Knowing now with what suspicion and distrust the development

of her resources and the growth of her military strength were regarded

by some European peoples, and aware that she had been admitted to the

comity of Western nations on sufferance, she shrank, on the one hand,

from seeming to grasp at an opportunity for armed display, and, on the

other, from the solecism of obtrusiveness in the society of strangers.

Not until Europe and America made it quite plain that they needed and

desired her aid did she send a division (21,000) men to Pechili. Her

troops played a fine part in the subsequent expedition for the relief of

Peking, which had to be approached in midsummer under very trying

conditions. Fighting side by side with European and American soldiers,

and under the eyes of competent military critics, the Japanese acquitted

themselves in such a manner as to establish a high military reputation.

Further, after the relief of Peking they withdrew a moiety of their

forces, and that step, as well as their unequivocal co-operation with

Western powers in the subsequent negotiations, helped to show the

injustice of the suspicions with which they had been regarded.

War with Russia.

From the time (1895) when Russia, with the co-operation of Germany and

France, dictated to Japan a cardinal alteration of the Shimonoseki

treaty, Japanese statesmen seem to have concluded that their country

must one day cross swords with the great northern power. Not a few

European and American publicists shared that view. But the vast

majority, arguing that the little Eastern empire would never invite

annihilation by such an encounter, believed that sufficient forbearance

to avert serious trouble would always be forthcoming on Japan's side.

Yet when the geographical and historical situation was carefully

considered, little hope of an ultimately peaceful settlement presented

itself.

Japan along its western shore, Korea along its southern and eastern, and

Russia along the eastern coast of its maritime province, are washed by

the Sea of Japan. The communications between the sea and the Pacific

Ocean are practically two only. One is on the north-east, namely,

Tsugaru Strait; the other is on the south, namely, the channel between

the extremity of the Korean peninsula and the Japanese island of the

nine provinces. Tsugaru Strait is entirely under Japan's control. It is

between her main island and her island of Yezo, and in case of need she

can close it with mines. The channel between the southern extremity of

Korea and Japan has a width of 102 m. and would therefore be a fine open

sea-way were it free from islands. But almost mid-way in this channel

lie the twin islands of Tsushima, and the space of 56 m. that separates

them from Japan is narrowed by another island, Iki. Tsushima and Iki

belong to the Japanese empire. The former has some exceptionally good

harbours, constituting a naval base from which the channel on either

side could easily be sealed. Thus the avenues from the Pacific Ocean to

the Sea of Japan are controlled by the Japanese empire. In other words,

access to the Pacific from Korea's eastern and southern coasts and

access to the Pacific from Russia's maritime province depend upon

Japan's goodwill. So far as Korea was concerned this question mattered

little, it being her fate to depend upon the goodwill of Japan in

affairs of much greater importance. But with Russia the case was

different. Vladivostok, which until recent times was her principal port

in the Far East, lies at the southern extremity of the maritime

province; that is to say, on the north-western shore of the Japan Sea.

It was therefore necessary for Russia that freedom of passage by the

Tsushima channel should be secured, and to secure it one of two things

was essential, namely, either that she herself should possess a

fortified port on the Korean side, or that Japan should be bound neither

to acquire such a port nor to impose any restriction upon the navigation

of the strait. To put the matter briefly, Russia must either acquire a

strong foothold for herself in southern Korea, or contrive that Japan

should not acquire one. There was here a strong inducement for Russian

aggression in Korea.

Russia's eastward movement through Asia has been strikingly illustrative

of her strong craving for free access to southern seas and of the

impediments she had experienced in gratifying that wish. An irresistible

impulse had driven her oceanward. Checked again and again in her attempts

to reach the Mediterranean, she set out on a five-thousand-miles march of

conquest right across the vast Asiatic continent towards the Pacific.

Eastward of Lake Baikal she found her line of least resistance along the

Amur, and when, owing to the restless perseverance of Muravief, she

reached the mouth of that great river, the acquisition of Nikolayevsk for

a naval basis was her immediate reward. But Nikolayevsk could not

possibly satisfy her. Situated in an inhospitable region far away from

all the main routes of the world's commerce, it offered itself only as a

stepping-stone to further acquisitions. To push southward from this new

port became an immediate object to Russia. There lay an obstacle in the

way, however; the long strip of sea-coast from the mouth of the Amur to

the Korean frontier--an area then called the Usuri region because the

Usuri forms its western boundary--belonged to China, and she, having

conceded much to Russia in the matter of the Amur, showed no disposition

to make further concessions in the matter of the Usuri. In the presence

of menaces, however, she agreed that the region should be regarded as

common property pending a convenient opportunity for clear delimitation.

That opportunity came very soon. Seizing the moment (1860) when China had

been beaten to her knees by England and France, Russia secured final

cession of the Usuri region, which now became the maritime province of

Siberia. Then Russia shifted her naval base on the Pacific from

Nikolayevsk to Vladivostok. She gained ten degrees in a southerly

direction.

From the mouth of the Amur, where Nikolayevsk is situated, to the

southern shore of Korea there rests on the coast of eastern Asia an arch

of islands having at its northern point Sakhalin and at its southern

Tsushima, the keystone of the arch being the main island of Japan. This

arch embraces the Sea of Japan and is washed on its convex side by the

Pacific Ocean. Immediately after the transfer of Russia's naval base

from Nikolayevsk to Vladivostok, an attempt was made to obtain

possession of the southern point of the arch, namely, Tsushima. A

Russian man-of-war proceeded thither and quietly began to establish a

settlement, which would soon have constituted a title of ownership had

not Great Britain interfered. The Russians saw that Vladivostok,

acquired at the cost of so much toil, would be comparatively useless

unless from the sea on whose shore it was situated an avenue to the

Pacific could be opened, and they therefore tried to obtain command of

the Tsushima channel. Immediately after reaching the mouth of the Amur

the same instinct had led them to begin the colonization of Sakhalin.

The axis of this long narrow island is inclined at a very acute angle to

the Usuri region, which its northern extremity almost touches, while its

southern is separated from Yezo by the strait of La Pérouse. But in

Sakhalin the Russians found Japanese subjects. In fact the island was a

part of the Japanese empire. Resorting, however, to the Usuri fiction of

joint occupation, they succeeded by 1875 in transferring the whole of

Sakhalin to Russia's dominion. Further encroachments upon Japanese

territory could not be lightly essayed, and the Russians held their

hands. They had been trebly checked: checked in trying to push southward

along the coast of the mainland; checked in trying to secure an avenue

from Vladivostok to the Pacific; and checked in their search for an

ice-free port, which definition Vladivostok did not fulfil. Enterprise

in the direction of Korea seemed to be the only hope of saving the

maritime results of the great Trans-Asian march.

Was Korea within safe range of such enterprises? Everything seemed to

answer in the affirmative. Korea had all the qualifications desired by

an aggressor. Her people were unprogressive, her resources undeveloped,

her self-defensive capacities insignificant, her government corrupt. But

she was a tributary of China, and China had begun to show some tenacity

in protecting the integrity of her buffer states. Besides, Japan was

understood to have pretensions with regard to Korea. On the whole,

therefore, the problem of carrying to full fruition the work of Muravief

and his lieutenants demanded strength greater than Russia could exercise

without some line of communications supplementing the Amur waterway and

the long ocean route. Therefore she set about the construction of a

railway across Asia.

The Amur being the boundary of Russia's east Asian territory, this

railway had to be carried along its northern bank where many

engineering and economic obstacles presented themselves. Besides, the

river, from an early stage in its course, makes a huge semicircular

sweep northward, and a railway following its bank to Vladivostok must

make the same détour. If, on the contrary, the road could be carried

over the diameter of the semicircle, it would be a straight and

therefore shorter line, technically easier and economically better. The

diameter, however, passed through Chinese territory, and an excuse for

extorting China's permission was not in sight. Russia therefore

proceeded to build each end of the road, deferring the construction of

the Amur section for the moment. She had not waited long when, in 1894,

war broke out between China and Japan, and the latter, completely

victorious, demanded as the price of peace the southern littoral of

Manchuria from the Korean boundary to the Liaotung peninsula at the

entrance to the Gulf of Pechili. This was a crisis in Russia's career.

She saw that her maritime extension could never get nearer to the

Pacific than Vladivostok were this claim of Japan's established. For the

proposed arrangement would place the littoral of Manchuria in Japan's

direct occupation and the littoral of Korea in her constructive control,

since not only had she fought to rescue Korea from Chinese suzerainty,

but also her object in demanding a slice of the Manchurian coast-line

was to protect Korea against aggression from the north; that is to say,

against aggression from Russia. Muravief's enterprise had carried his

country first to the mouth of the Amur and thence southward along the

coast to Vladivostok and to Possiet Bay at the north-eastern extremity

of Korea. But it had not given to Russia free access to the Pacific, and

now she was menaced with a perpetual barrier to that access, since the

whole remaining coast of east Asia as far as the Gulf of Pechili was

about to pass into Japan's possession or under her domination.

Then Russia took an extraordinary step. She persuaded Germany and France

to force Japan out of Manchuria. It is not to be supposed that she

frankly exposed her own aggressive designs and asked for assistance to

prosecute them. Neither is it to be supposed that France and Germany

were so curiously deficient in perspicacity as to overlook those

designs. At all events these three great powers served on Japan a notice

to quit, and Japan, exhausted by her struggle with China, had no choice

but to obey.

The notice was accompanied by an _exposé_ of reasons. Its signatories

said that Japan's tenure of the Manchurian littoral would menace the

security of the Chinese capital, would render the independence of Korea

illusory, and would constitute an obstacle to the peace of the Orient.

By way of saving the situation in some slight degree Japan sought from

China a guarantee that no portion of Manchuria should thereafter be

leased or ceded to a foreign state. But France warned Japan that to

press such a demand would offend Russia, and Russia declared that, for

her part, she had no intention of trespassing in Manchuria. Japan, had

she been in a position to insist on the guarantee, would also have been

in a position to disobey the mandate of the three powers. Unable to do

either the one or the other, she quietly stepped out of Manchuria, and

proceeded to double her army and treble her navy.

As a reward for the assistance nominally rendered to China in this

matter, Russia obtained permission in Peking to divert her Trans-Asian

railway from the huge bend of the Amur to the straight line through

Manchuria. Neither Germany nor France received any immediate recompense.

Three years later, by way of indemnity for the murder of two

missionaries by a mob, Germany seized a portion of the province of

Shantung. Immediately, on the principle that two wrongs make a right,

Russia obtained a lease of the Liaotung peninsula, from which she had

driven Japan in 1895. This act she followed by extorting from China

permission to construct a branch of the Trans-Asian railway through

Manchuria from north to south.

Russia's maritime aspirations had now assumed a radically altered phase.

Instead of pushing southward from Vladivostok and Possiet Bay along the

coast of Korea, she had suddenly leaped the Korean peninsula and found

access to the Pacific in Liaotung. Nothing was wanting to establish her

as practical mistress of Manchuria except a plausible excuse for

garrisoning the place. Such an excuse was furnished by the Boxer rising

in 1900. Its conclusion saw her in military occupation of the whole

region, and she might easily have made her occupation permanent by

prolonging it until peace and order should have been fully restored. But

here she fell into an error of judgment. Imagining that the Chinese

could be persuaded or intimidated to any concession, she proposed a

convention virtually recognizing her title to Manchuria.

Japan watched all these things with profound anxiety. If there were any

reality in the dangers which Russia, Germany and France had declared to

be incidental to Japanese occupation of a part of Manchuria, the same

dangers must be doubly incidental to Russian occupation of the whole of

Manchuria--the security of the Chinese capital would be threatened, and

an obstacle would be created to the permanent peace of the East. The

independence of Korea was an object of supreme solicitude to Japan.

Historically she held towards the little state a relation closely

resembling that of suzerain, and though of her ancient conquests nothing

remained except a settlement at Fusan on the southern coast, her

national sentiment would have been deeply wounded by any foreign

aggression in the peninsula. It was to establish Korean independence

that she waged war with China in 1894; and her annexation of the

Manchurian littoral adjacent to the Korean frontier, after the war, was

designed to secure that independence, not to menace it as the triple

alliance professed to think. But if Russia came into possession of all

Manchuria, her subsequent absorption of Korea would be almost

inevitable. For the consideration set forth above as to Vladivostok's

maritime avenues would then acquire absolute cogency. Manchuria is

larger than France and the United Kingdom lumped together. The addition

of such an immense area to Russia's east Asiatic dominions, together

with its littoral on the Gulf of Pechili and the Yellow Sea, would

necessitate a corresponding expansion of her naval forces in the Far

East. With the one exception of Port Arthur, however, the Manchurian

coast does not offer any convenient naval base. It is only in the

splendid harbours of southern Korea that such bases can be found.

Moreover, there would be an even stronger motive impelling Russia

towards Korea. Neither the Usuri region nor the Manchurian littoral

possesses so much as one port qualified to satisfy her perennial longing

for free access to the ocean in a temperate zone. Without Korea, then,

Russia's east Asian expansion, though it added huge blocks of territory

to her dominions, would have been commercially incomplete and

strategically defective.

If it be asked why, apart from history and national sentiment, Japan

should object to a Russian Korea, the answer is, first, because there

would thus be planted almost within cannon-shot of her shores a power of

enormous strength and insatiable ambition; secondly, because, whatever

voice in Manchuria's destiny Russia derived from her railway, the same

voice in Korea's destiny was possessed by Japan as the sole owner of

railways in the peninsula; thirdly, that whereas Russia had an

altogether insignificant share in the foreign commerce of Korea and

scarcely ten bona-fide settlers, Japan did the greater part of the

over-sea trade and had tens of thousands of settlers; fourthly, that if

Russia's dominions stretched uninterruptedly from the Sea of Okhotsk to

the Gulf of Pechili, her ultimate absorption of north China would be as

certain as sunrise; and fifthly, that such domination and such

absorption would involve the practical closure of all that immense

region to Japanese commerce and industry as well as to the commerce and

industry of every Western nation except Russia. This last proposition

did not rest solely on the fact that to oppose artificial barriers to

free competition is Russia's sole hope of utilizing to her own benefit

any commercial opportunities brought within her reach. It rested also on

the fact that Russia had objected to foreign settlements at the marts

recently opened by treaty with China to American and Japanese subjects.

Without settlements, trade at those marts would be impossible, and thus

Russia had constructively announced that there should be no trade but

Russian, if she could prevent it.

Against such dangers Japan would have been justified in adopting any

measure of self-protection. She had foreseen them for six years, and had

been strengthening herself to avert them. But she wanted peace. She

wanted to develop her material resources and to accumulate some measure

of wealth, without which she must remain insignificant among the

nations. Two pacific devices offered, and she adopted them both. Russia,

instead of trusting time to consolidate her tenure of Manchuria, had

made the mistake of pragmatically importuning China for a conventional

title. If then Peking could be strengthened to resist this demand, some

arrangement of a distinctly terminable nature might be made. The United

States, Great Britain and Japan, joining hands for that purpose, did

succeed in so far stiffening China's backbone that her show of

resolution finally induced Russia to sign a treaty pledging herself to

withdraw her troops from Manchuria in three instalments, each step of

evacuation to be accomplished by a fixed date. That was one of the

pacific devices. The other suggested itself in connexion with the new

commercial treaties which China had promised to negotiate in the sequel

of the Boxer troubles. In these documents clauses provided for the

opening of three places in Manchuria to foreign trade. It seemed a

reasonable hope that, having secured commercial access to Manchuria by

covenant with its sovereign, China, the powers would not allow Russia

arbitrarily to restrict their privileges. It seemed also a reasonable

hope that Russia, having solemnly promised to evacuate Manchuria at

fixed dates, would fulfil her engagement.

The latter hope was signally disappointed. When the time came for

evacuation, Russia behaved as though no promise had ever been given. She

proposed wholly new conditions, which would have strengthened her grasp

of Manchuria instead of loosening it. China being powerless to offer any

practical protest, and Japan's interests ranking next in order of

importance, the Tokyo government approached Russia direct. They did not

ask for anything that could hurt her pride or injure her position.

Appreciating fully the economical status she had acquired in Manchuria

by large outlays of capital, they offered to recognize that status,

provided that Russia would extend similar recognition to Japan's status

in Korea, would promise, in common with Japan, to respect the

sovereignty and the territorial integrity of China and Korea, and would

be a party to a mutual engagement that all nations should have equal

industrial and commercial opportunities in Manchuria and the Korean

peninsula. In a word, they invited Russia to subscribe the policy

enunciated by the United States and Great Britain, the policy of the

open door and of the integrity of the Chinese and Korean empires.

Thus commenced a negotiation which lasted five and a half months. Japan

gradually reduced her demands to a minimum. Russia never made the

smallest appreciable concession. She refused to listen to Japan for one

moment about Manchuria. Eight years previously Japan had been in

military possession of Manchuria, and Russia with the assistance of

Germany and France had expelled her for reasons which concerned Japan

incomparably more than they concerned any of the three powers--the

security of the Chinese capital, the independence of Korea, the peace of

the East. Now, Russia had the splendid assurance to declare by

implication that none of these things concerned Japan at all. The utmost

she would admit was Japan's partial right to be heard about Korea. And

at the same time she herself commenced in northern Korea a series of

aggressions, partly perhaps to show her potentialities, partly by way of

counter-irritant. That was not all. Whilst she studiously deferred her

answers to Japan's proposals and protracted the negotiations to an

extent which was actually contumelious, she hastened to send eastward a

big fleet of war-ships and a new army of soldiers. It was impossible for

the dullest politician to mistake her purpose. She intended to yield

nothing, but to prepare such a parade of force that her obduracy would

command submission. The only alternatives for Japan were war or total

and permanent effacement in Asia. She chose war, and in fighting it she

fought the battle of free and equal opportunities for all without undue

encroachment upon the sovereign rights or territorial integrity of China

or Korea, against a military dictatorship, a programme of ruthless

territorial aggrandizement and a policy of selfish restrictions.

The Results of the War.

The details of the great struggle that ensued are given elsewhere (see

RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR). After the battle of Mukden the belligerents found

themselves in a position which must either prelude another stupendous

effort on both sides or be utilized for the purpose of peace

negotiations. At this point the president of the United States of

America intervened in the interests of humanity, and on the 9th of June

1905 instructed the United States' representative in Tokyo to urge that

the Japanese government should open direct negotiations with Russia, an

exactly corresponding note being simultaneously sent to the Russian

government through the United States' representative in St Petersburg.

Japan's reply was made on the 10th of June. It intimated frank

acquiescence, and Russia lost no time in taking a similar step.

Nevertheless two months elapsed before the plenipotentiaries of the

belligerents met, on the 10th of August, at Portsmouth, New Hampshire,

U.S.A. Russia sent M. (afterwards Count) de Witte and Baron Rosen;

Japan, Baron (afterwards Count) Komura, who had held the portfolio of

foreign affairs throughout the war, and Mr. (afterwards Baron) Takahira.

In entering this conference, Japanese statesmen, as was subsequently

known, saw clearly that a great part of the credit accruing to them for

their successful conduct of the war would be forfeited in the sequel of

the negotiations. For the people of Japan had accustomed themselves to

expect that Russia would assuredly recoup the expenses incurred by their

country in the contest, whereas the cabinet in Tokyo understood well

that to look for payment of indemnity by a great state whose territory

had not been invaded effectively nor its existence menaced must be

futile. Nevertheless, diplomacy required that this conviction should be

concealed, and thus Russia carried to the conference a belief that the

financial phase of the discussion would be crucial, while, at the same

time, the Japanese nation reckoned fully on an indemnity of 150 millions

sterling. Baron Komura's mandate was, however, that the only radically

essential terms were those formulated by Japan prior to the war. She

must insist on securing the ends for which she had fought, since she

believed them to be indispensable to the peace of the Far East, but she

would not demand anything more. The Japanese plenipotentiary, therefore,

judged it wise to marshal his terms in the order of their importance,

leaving his Russian colleague to imagine, as he probably would, that the

converse method had been adopted, and that everything preliminary to the

questions of finance and territory was of minor consequence. The

negotiations, commencing on the 10th of August, were not concluded until

the 5th of September, when a treaty of peace was signed. There had been

a moment when the onlooking world believed that unless Russia agreed to

ransom the island of Sakhalin by paying to Japan a sum of 120 millions

sterling, the conference would be broken off; nor did such an exchange

seem unreasonable, for were Russia expelled from the northern part of

Sakhalin, which commands the estuary of the Amur River, her position in

Siberia would have been compromised. But the statesmen who directed

Japan's affairs were not disposed to make any display of earth-hunger.

The southern half of Sakhalin had originally belonged to Japan and had

passed into Russia's possession by an arrangement which the Japanese

nation strongly resented. To recover that portion of the island seemed,

therefore, a legitimate ambition. Japan did not contemplate any larger

demand, nor did she seriously insist on an indemnity. Therefore the

negotiations were never in real danger of failure. The treaty of

Portsmouth recognized Japan's "paramount political, military and

economic interests" in Korea; provided for the simultaneous evacuation

of Manchuria by the contracting parties; transferred to Japan the lease

of the Liaotung peninsula held by Russia from China together with the

Russian railways south of Kwang-Cheng-tsze and all collateral mining or

other privileges; ceded to Japan the southern half of Sakhalin, the 50th

parallel of latitude to be the boundary between the two parts; secured

fishing rights for Japanese subjects along the coasts of the seas of

Japan, Okhotsk and Bering; laid down that the expenses incurred by the

Japanese for the maintenance of the Russian prisoners during the war

should be reimbursed by Russia, less the outlays made by the latter on

account of Japanese prisoners--by which arrangement Japan obtained a

payment of some 4 millions sterling--and provided that the contracting

parties, while withdrawing their military forces from Manchuria, might

maintain guards to protect their respective railways, the number of such

guards not to exceed 15 per kilometre of line. There were other

important restrictions: first, the contracting parties were to abstain

from taking, on the Russo-Korean frontier, any military measures which

might menace the security of Russian or Korean territory; secondly, the

two powers pledged themselves not to exploit the Manchurian railways for

strategic purposes; and thirdly, they promised not to build on Sakhalin

or its adjacent islands any fortifications or other similar military

works, or to take any military measures which might impede the free

navigation of the straits of La Pérouse and the Gulf of Tartary. The

above provisions concerned the two contracting parties only. But China's

interests also were considered. Thus it was agreed to "restore entirely

and completely to her exclusive administration" all portions of

Manchuria then in the occupation, or under the control, of Japanese or

Russian troops, except the leased territory; that her consent must be

obtained for the transfer to Japan of the leases and concessions held by

the Russians in Manchuria; that the Russian government would disavow the

possession of "any territorial advantages or preferential or exclusive

concessions in impairment of Chinese sovereignty or inconsistent with

the principle of equal opportunity in Manchuria"; and that Japan and

Russia "engaged reciprocally not to obstruct any general measures common

to all countries which China might take for the development of the

commerce and industry of Manchuria." This distinction between the

special interests of the contracting parties and the interests of China

herself as well as of foreign nations generally is essential to clear

understanding of a situation which subsequently attracted much

attention. From the time of the opium war (1857) to the Boxer rising

(1900) each of the great Western powers struggled for its own hand in

China, and each sought to gain for itself exclusive concessions and

privileges with comparatively little regard for the interests of others,

and with no regard whatever for China's sovereign rights. The fruits of

this period were: permanently ceded territories (Hong-Kong and Macao);

leases temporarily establishing foreign sovereignty in various districts

(Kiaochow, Wei-hai-wei and Kwang-chow); railway and mining concessions;

and the establishment of settlements at open ports where foreign

jurisdiction was supreme. But when, in 1900, the Boxer rising forced all

the powers into a common camp, they awoke to full appreciation of a

principle which had been growing current for the past two or three

years, namely, that concerted action on the lines of maintaining China's

integrity and securing to all alike equality of opportunity and a

similarly open door, was the only feasible method of preventing the

partition of the Chinese Empire and averting a clash of rival interests

which might have disastrous results. This, of course, did not mean that

there was to be any abandonment of special privileges already acquired

or any surrender of existing concessions. The arrangement was not to be

retrospective in any sense. Vested interests were to be strictly guarded

until the lapse of the periods for which they had been granted, or until

the maturity of China's competence to be really autonomous. A curious

situation was thus created. International professions of respect for

China's sovereignty, for the integrity of her empire and for the

enforcement of the open door and equal opportunity, coexisted with

legacies from an entirely different past. Russia endorsed this new

policy, but not unnaturally declined to abate any of the advantages

previously enjoyed by her in Manchuria. Those advantages were very

substantial. They included a twenty-five years' lease--with provision

for renewal--of the Liaotung peninsula, within which area of 1220 sq. m.

Chinese troops might not penetrate, whereas Russia would not only

exercise full administrative authority, but also take military and naval

action of any kind; they included the creation of a neutral territory in

the immediate north of the former and still more extensive, which should

remain under Chinese administration, but where neither Chinese nor

Russian troops might enter, nor might China, without Russia's consent,

cede land, open trading marts or grant concessions to any third

nationality; and they included the right to build some 1600 m. of

railway (which China would have the opportunity of purchasing at cost

price in the year 1938 and would be entitled to receive gratis in 1982),

as well as the right to hold extensive zones on either side of the

railway, to administer these zones in the fullest sense, and to work all

mines lying along the lines. Under the Portsmouth treaty these

advantages were transferred to Japan by Russia, the railway, however,

being divided so that only the portion (521½ m.) to the south of

Kwang-Cheng-tsze fell to Japan's share, while the portion (1077 m.) to

the north of that place remained in Russia's hands. China's consent to

the above transfers and assignments was obtained in a treaty signed at

Peking on the 22nd of December 1905. Thus Japan came to hold in

Manchuria a position somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, she

figured as the champion of the Chinese Empire's integrity and as an

exponent of the new principle of equal opportunity and the open door. On

the other, she appeared as the legatee of many privileges more or less

inconsistent with that principle. But, at the same time, nearly all the

great powers of Europe were similarly circumstanced. In their cases also

the same incongruity was observable between the newly professed policy

and the aftermath of the old practice. It was scarcely to be expected

that Japan alone should make a large sacrifice on the altar of a theory

to which no other state thought of yielding any retrospective obedience

whatever. She did, indeed, furnish a clear proof of deference to the

open-door doctrine, for instead of reserving the railway zones to her

own exclusive use, as she was fully entitled to do, she sought and

obtained from China a pledge to open to foreign trade 16 places within

those zones. For the rest, however, the inconsistency between the past

and the present, though existing throughout the whole of China, was

nowhere so conspicuous as in the three eastern provinces (Manchuria);

not because there was any real difference of degree, but because

Manchuria had been the scene of the greatest war of modern times;

because that war had been fought by Japan in the cause of the new

policy, and because the principles of the equally open door and of

China's integrity had been the main bases of the Portsmouth treaty, of

the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and of the subsequently concluded

_ententes_ with France and Russia. In short, the world's eyes were fixed

on Manchuria and diverted from China proper, so that every act of Japan

was subjected to an exceptionally rigorous scrutiny, and the nations

behaved as though they expected her to live up to a standard of almost

ideal altitude. China's mood, too, greatly complicated the situation.

She had the choice between two moderate and natural courses: either to

wait quietly until the various concessions granted by her to foreign

powers in the evil past should lapse by maturity, or to qualify herself

by earnest reforms and industrious development for their earlier

recovery. Nominally she adopted the latter course, but in reality she

fell into a mood of much impatience. Under the name of a

"rights-recovery campaign" her people began to protest vehemently

against the continuance of any conditions which impaired her

sovereignty, and as this temper coloured her attitude towards the

various questions which inevitably grew out of the situation in

Manchuria, her relations with Japan became somewhat strained in the

early part of 1909.

Japan in Korea after the War with Russia.

Having waged two wars on account of Korea, Japan emerged from the second

conflict with the conviction that the policy of maintaining the

independence of Korea must be modified, and that since the identity of

Korean and Japanese interests in the Far East and the paramount

character of Japanese interests in Korea would not permit Japan to leave

Korea to the care of any third power, she must assume the charge

herself. Europe and America also recognized that view of the situation,

and consented to withdraw their legations from Seoul, thus leaving the

control of Korean foreign affairs entirely in the hands of Japan, who

further undertook to assume military direction in the event of

aggression from without or disturbance from within. But in the matter of

internal administration she continued to limit herself to advisory

supervision. Thus, though a Japanese resident-general in Seoul, with

subordinate residents throughout the provinces, assumed the functions

hitherto discharged by foreign representatives and consuls, the Korean

government was merely asked to employ Japanese experts in the position

of counsellors, the right to accept or reject their counsels being left

to their employers. Once again, however, the futility of looking for any

real reforms under this optional system was demonstrated. Japan sent her

most renowned statesman, Prince Ito, to discharge the duties of

resident-general; but even he, in spite of profound patience and tact,

found that some less optional methods must be resorted to. Hence on the

24th of July 1907 a new agreement was signed, by which the

resident-general acquired initiative as well as consultative competence

to enact and enforce laws and ordinances, to appoint and remove Korean

officials, and to place capable Japanese subjects in the ranks of the

administration. That this constituted a heavy blow to Korea's

independence could not be gainsaid. That it was inevitable seemed to be

equally obvious. For there existed in Korea nearly all the worst abuses

of medieval systems. The administration of justice depended solely on

favour or interest. The police contributed by corruption and

incompetence to the insecurity of life and property. The troops were a

body of useless mercenaries. Offices being allotted by sale, thousands

of incapables thronged the ranks of the executive. The emperor's court

was crowded by diviners and plotters of all kinds, male and female. The

finances of the throne and those of the state were hopelessly confused.

There was nothing like an organized judiciary. A witness was in many

cases considered _particeps criminis_; torture was commonly employed to

obtain evidence, and defendants in civil cases were placed under arrest.

Imprisonment meant death or permanent disablement for a man of small

means. Flogging so severe as to cripple, if not to kill, was a common

punishment; every major offence from robbery upward was capital, and

female criminals were frequently executed by administering shockingly

painful poisons. The currency was in a state of the utmost confusion.

Extreme corruption and extortion were practised in connexion with

taxation. Finally, while nothing showed that the average Korean lacked

the elementary virtue of patriotism, there had been repeated proofs that

the safety and independence of the empire counted for little in the

estimates of political intriguers. Japan must either step out of Korea

altogether or effect drastic reforms there. She necessarily chose the

latter alternative, and the things which she accomplished between the

beginning of 1906 and the close of 1908 may be briefly described as the

elaboration of a proper system of taxation; the organization of a staff

to administer annual budgets; the re-assessment of taxable property; the

floating of public loans for productive enterprises; the reform of the

currency; the establishment of banks of various kinds, including

agricultural and commercial; the creation of associations for putting

bank-notes into circulation; the introduction of a warehousing system to

supply capital to farmers; the lighting and buoying of the coasts; the

provision of posts, telegraphs, roads and railways; the erection of

public buildings; the starting of various industrial enterprises (such

as printing, brick-making, forestry and coal-mining); the laying out of

model farms; the beginning of cotton cultivation; the building and

equipping of an industrial training school; the inauguration of sanitary

works; the opening of hospitals and medical schools; the organization of

an excellent educational system; the construction of waterworks in

several towns; the complete remodelling of the central government; the

differentiation of the court and the executive, as well as of the

administration and the judiciary; the formation of an efficient body of

police; the organization of law courts with a majority of Japanese

jurists on the bench; the enactment of a new penal code; drastic reforms

in the taxation system. In the summer of 1907 the resident-general

advised the Throne to disband the standing army as an unserviceable and

expensive force. The measure was doubtless desirable, but the docility

of the troops had been over-rated. Some of them resisted vehemently, and

many became the nucleus of an insurrection which lasted in a desultory

manner for nearly two years; cost the lives of 21,000 insurgents and

1300 Japanese; and entailed upon Japan an outlay of nearly a million

sterling. Altogether Japan was 15 millions sterling out of pocket on

Korea's account by the end of 1909. She had also lost the veteran

statesman Prince Ito, who was assassinated at Harbin by a Korean fanatic

on the 26th of October 1909. Finally an end was put to an anomalous

situation by the annexation of Korea to Japan on the 29th of August

1910. (See further KOREA.)