BEFORE NGATAPA — WHO TOOK UP POSITION — NIL DESPERANDUM — WHO STORMED
THE TRENCHES — “OH! MY UNLUCKY STAR” — AS USUAL — WHITMORE LOOKS ON
WHILE THE HERO PURSUES — RESULTS — “PALMAM QUI MERUIT FERAT.”
Rapata was absent on Whitmore’s arrival before Ngatapa, and Whitmore
could do nothing unless Rapata was present, and waited accordingly.
That chief had been sick, and was slowly recovering. On his appearance
at the front, Rapata at once led the way, by advancing gallantly within
50 yards of Ngatapa, unperceived by the garrison. He immediately seized
the advantage, and entrenched a part of his men to the right of the pa
by its only approach; then hurrying to the left of Ngatapa, prepared in
like manner to fortify himself, when he was discovered by the enemy,
who rushed from the pa pell-mell to drive him off, falling over each
other in their eagerness. Extending his men in a line, he advanced
at their head with a steadiness and courage which elicited a burst
of admiration from the European force, that, by orders from Whitmore
watched the advance from a safe distance. The enemy were at length
forced to retreat into Ngatapa, and opened a heavy fire from the triple
tier of trenches. This affair occurred towards night, and is said to
have been an interesting and beautiful sight.
The siege continued until January 5th. The garrison became nearly
starved, and were driven to such desperation that some of them leaped
from the cliffs, preferring death to being taken alive. The pa was
at one time completely invested, and not a man could have escaped if
proper precautions had been taken. On the 3rd, the water supply was
cut off. Several desperate attempts had been made to break through the
encircling lines, in one or two instances with partial success, proving
that the pa was thoroughly surrounded, and that a strict watch only
was required to starve the enemy into a surrender. So well were the
garrison aware of this that they repeatedly urged our native allies to
depart, saying it ought not to be a fight between Maoris, and that they
could easily beat Whitmore if Rapata would go away.
At noon on the 4th, Rapata stormed the lower trench without European
assistance, except a covering fire, and Whitmore looking on at some
distance. That night, Colonel Whitmore was warned that the enemy would
escape. He appears to have lost his senses, repeatedly starting up with
apostrophes to his “unlucky star.” It had been arranged that Ngatapa
should be stormed on the following morning at daylight. Just before
dawn of the 5th, a woman cried from the pa that the garrison were
escaping. The pa was rushed, but the Hauhaus were gone. 200 women and
children and 7 men were taken. The men were shot. 57 dead bodies were
found. It was likewise found the enemy had escaped at the exact spot to
which Whitmore’s attention had been drawn.
Unaccompanied by Whitmore or any of the Europeans, Rapata started in
pursuit of the flying Hauhaus. For a week he chased the enemy through
one of the wildest regions in New Zealand. He overtook and killed 80
men, and captured 50 prisoners. 150 fighting men or more must have got
away with Te Kooti, half of whom were perhaps Chatham Island prisoners.
By the end of January, 1869, Whitmore and his men had left Poverty Bay.
Before their departure a meeting of Poverty Bay settlers was held, to
consider once more the state of affairs. At this time, January 9, Te
Kooti’s fires were visible by night on the inland Opotiki track, and Te
Waru was known to be not far from Puketapu. At the meeting Mr. Richmond
informed his audience that it was perfectly safe for them to return to
their estates; but the statement, like his Pipiwhakau telegram, has not
been verified by subsequent events. On the 18th a _New Zealand Gazette_
appeared, with a list of promotions for Ngatapa. Every one looked for
the name of Rapata, and found instead that of a needy relative of
Whitmore. Nothing was done for Mr. Edward Hamlin, a gentleman who,
besides laboring very hard at his avocation as an interpreter, had
worked like a cart-horse to expedite the transit of ammunition and
stores to Ngatapa; but others were mentioned who did little worth
speaking of. Previous to leaving Poverty Bay, Colonel Whitmore sold a
number of horses—the Government property—to a gentleman to whom he
was indebted, for a nominal sum (£1 per head), when those horses might
have realised £7 or £8 if offered for public competition. It is but
fair to say, however, that Mr. G. Smith, the purchaser of those horses,
was unaware that the transaction was at all irregular.
Thus ended Whitmore’s East Coast campaign of 1868-9. During its
progress a great deal of public money had been squandered, and it
appropriately ended with a sacrifice of the public property by the
commanding officer. Whitmore’s despatches, as usual, claimed the chief
merit of the success for himself, though the success was unquestionably
due to Mr. M‘Lean, in the first place, and in the next to Rapata. By
Mr. M‘Lean the native force was organised, and the campaign initiated;
by him Rapata’s sterling qualities were discovered and utilised for the
colony.
But for Rapata, Ngatapa would never have been taken. He discovered the
pa and its intricate approaches; he took up position; chiefly arranged
the plan for cutting off the retreat of its garrison; stormed the
trenches; and but for Whitmore’s incompetence, would have captured
every soul in Ngatapa. Of 230 Hauhaus killed in this campaign, 180 were
slain by Rapata and his men, assisted by half a dozen Europeans; half
the remaining 50, it may be fairly assumed, were destroyed by Rapata
and his people, leaving 25 as Whitmore’s share. All the prisoners were
captured by Rapata.
To the fall of Ngatapa we may ascribe that improvement in the _morale_
of the Constabulary which has been visible ever since that pa was
captured. Whitmore’s interminable failures, unredeemed by even a
partial gleam of success, had taught his men to look forward to defeat
as an inevitable consequence of his tactics, if they may be termed
such. It was a familiar saying amongst the men after Ngatapa, that
“they would follow Rapata anywhere.” They had been accustomed to retire
before a contemptible foe, and Rapata had shewn them how to reverse the
practice.
Injudicious friends of Colonel Whitmore have praised him for qualities
he can never possess. The best friend of that officer is he who points
out those defects which mar his efforts to serve the colony. He has
been praised for the state of efficiency to which he is said to have
brought the troops; but, notwithstanding a saying to the contrary, it
_is_ possible to have “too much of a good thing.” On some occasions,
it is well known, the men have been so worn out by the unmerciful
exactions to which they have been subjected by Whitmore’s ideas of
discipline, that they were utterly unfit to take the field. They dare
not complain; for should one of them presume to write to a newspaper
on the subject, and the name of the writer be known to Whitmore,
expulsion from the Constabulary as a “dirty bird” would be the probable
consequence. There is no doubt the colony has lost the services of good
men in this way, and no one seems inclined to put a stop to such a
state of affairs.
It must be confessed the colony has not gained much by retaining
Colonel Whitmore in command. It is said he supplanted Colonel M‘Donnell
at the very time he was writing to the newspapers in M‘Donnell’s
defence. It is further stated that documents exist to prove the
fact, and, looking at the close connection that exists between the
Defence Minister and Colonel Whitmore, it is not unlikely. Yet Colonel
M‘Donnell did much good service for the colony. He never allowed
Titokowaru to ruin an extensive district, and drive the European force
before him like a flock of sheep; nor is it probable M‘Donnell would
have permitted the fiend-like cannibal to escape with impunity had he
been in command of Whitmore’s large force.