M^r Dayton. The smaller States can never give up their equality. For
himself he would in no event yield that security for their rights.
M^r Sherman, urged the equality of votes not so much as a Security for
the small States; as for the State Gov^{ts} which could not be preserved
unless they were represented & had a negative in the Gen^l Government.
He had no objection to the members in the 2^d b. voting per capita, as
had been suggested by (M^r Gerry).
M^r Madison concurred in this motion of M^r Pinkney as a reasonable
compromise.
M^r Gerry said he should like the motion, but could see no hope of
success. An accommodation must take place, and it was apparent from what
had been seen that it could not do so on the ground of the motion. He
was utterly against a partial confederacy, leaving other States to
accede or not accede, as had been intimated.
M^r King said it was always with regret that he differed from his
colleagues, but it was his duty to differ from (M^r Gerry) on this
occasion. He considered the proposed Government as substantially and
formally, a General and National Government over the people of America.
There never will be a case in which it will act as a federal Government
on the States and not on the individual Citizens. And is it not a clear
principle that in a free Gov^t those who are to be the objects of a
Gov^t ought to influence the operations of it? What reason can be
assigned why the same rule of representation s^d not prevail in the 2^d
branch as in the 1^{st}.? He could conceive none. On the contrary, every
view of the subject that presented itself, seemed to require it. Two
objections had been raised ag^{st} it, drawn 1. from the terms of the
existing compact. 2. from a supposed danger to the smaller States.--As
to the first objection he thought it inapplicable. According to the
existing Confederation, the rule by which the public burdens is to be
apportioned is _fixed_, and must be pursued. In the proposed Govern^t it
cannot be fixed, because indirect taxation is to be substituted. The
Legislature therefore will have full discretion to impose taxes in such
modes & proportions as they may judge expedient. As to the 2^d
objection, he thought it of as little weight. The Gen^l Govern^t can
never wish to intrude on the State Govern^{ts}. There could be no
temptation. None had been pointed out. In order to prevent the
interference of measures which seemed most likely to happen, he would
have no objection to throwing all the State debts into the federal debt,
making one aggregate debt of about 70,000,000 of dollars, and leaving it
to be discharged by the Gen^l Gov^t. According to the idea of securing
the State Gov^{ts} there ought to be three distinct legislative
branches. The 2^d was admitted to be necessary, and was actually meant,
to check the 1^{st} branch, to give more wisdom, system, & stability to
the Gov^t and ought clearly as it was to operate on the people, to be
proportioned to them. For the third purpose of securing the States,
there ought then to be a 3^d branch, representing the States as such,
and guarding by equal votes their rights & dignities. He would not
pretend to be as thoroughly acquainted with his immediate Constituents
as his colleagues, but it was his firm belief that Mas^{ts} would never
be prevailed on to yield to an equality of votes. In N. York, (he was
sorry to be obliged to say any thing relative to that State in the
absence of its representatives, but the occasion required it), in N.
York he had seen that the most powerful argument used by the considerate
opponents to the grant of the Impost to Congress, was pointed ag^{st}
the vicious constitution of Cong^s with regard to representation &
suffrage. He was sure that no Gov^t could last that was not founded on
just principles. He preferred the doing of nothing, to an allowance of
an equal vote to all the States. It would be better he thought to submit
to a little more confusion & convulsion, than to submit to such an evil.
It was difficult to say what the views of different Gentlemen might be.
Perhaps there might be some who thought no Governm^t co-extensive with
the U. States could be established with a hope of its answering the
purpose. Perhaps there might be other fixed opinions incompatible with
the object we are pursuing. If there were, he thought it but candid that
Gentlemen should speak out that we might understand one another.
M^r Strong. The Convention had been much divided in opinion. In order to
avoid the consequences of it, an accommodation had been proposed. A
Committee had been appointed: and though some of the members of it were
averse to an equality of votes, a Report had been made in favor of it.
It is agreed on all hands that Congress are nearly at an end. If no
Accommodation takes place, the Union itself must soon be dissolved. It
has been suggested that if we cannot come to any general agreement, the
principal States may form & recommend a Scheme of Government. But will
the small States in that case ever accede it. Is it probable that the
large States themselves will under such circumstances embrace and ratify
it. He thought the small States had made a considerable concession in
the article of money bills, and that they might naturally expect some
concessions on the other side. From this view of the matter he was
compelled to give his vote for the Report taken altogether.
M^r Madison expressed his apprehensions that if the proper foundation of
Governm^t was destroyed, by substituting an equality in place of a
proportional Representation, no proper superstructure would be raised.
If the small States really wish for a Government armed with the powers
necessary to secure their liberties, and to enforce obedience on the
larger members as well as themselves he could not help thinking them
extremely mistaken in their means. He reminded them of the consequences
of laying the existing Confederation on improper principles. All the
principal parties to its compilation joined immediately in mutilating &
fettering the Governm^t in such a manner that it has disappointed every
hope placed in it. He appealed to the doctrine & arguments used by
themselves on a former occasion. It had been very properly observed by
(M^r Patterson) that Representation was an expedient by which the
meeting of the people themselves was rendered unnecessary; And that the
representatives ought therefore to bear a proportion to the votes which
their constituents if convened would respectively have. Was not this
remark as applicable to one branch of the Representation as to the
other? But it had been said that the Govern^t would in its operation be
partly federal, partly national; that altho' in the latter respect the
Representatives of the people ought to be in proportion to the people;
yet in the former it ought to be according to the number of States. If
there was any solidity in this distinction he was ready to abide by it,
if there was none it ought to be abandoned. In all cases where the Gen^l
Governm^t is to act on the people, let the people be represented and the
votes be proportional. In all cases where the Govern^t is to act on the
States as such in like manner as Cong^s now acts on them, let the States
be represented & the votes be equal. This was the true ground of
compromise if there was any ground at all. But he denied that there was
any ground. He called for a single instance in which the Gen^l Gov^t was
not to operate on the people individually. The practicability of making
laws, with coercive sanctions, for the States as Political bodies, had
been exploded on all hands. He observed that the people of the large
States would in some way or other secure to themselves a weight
proportioned to the importance accruing from their superior numbers. If
they could not effect it by a proportional representation in the Gov^t
they would probably accede to no Gov^t which did not in a great measure
depend for its efficacy on their voluntary cooperation; in which case
they would indirectly secure their object. The existing confederacy
proved that where the Acts of the Gen^l Gov^t were to be executed by the
particular Gov^{ts} the latter had a weight in proportion to their
importance. No one would say that either in Cong^s or out of Cong^s.
Delaware had equal weight with Pennsylv^a. If the latter was to supply
ten times as much money as the former, and no compulsion could be used,
it was of ten times more importance, that she should voluntarily furnish
the supply. In the Dutch confederacy the votes of the Provinces were
equal. But Holland which supplies about half the money, governed the
whole republic. He enumerated the objections ag^{st} an equality of
votes in the 2^d branch, notwithstanding the proportional representation
in the first. 1. the minority could negative the will of the majority of
the people. 2. they could extort measures by making them a condition of
their assent to other necessary measures. 3. they could obtrude measures
on the majority by virtue of the peculiar powers which would be vested
in the Senate. 4. the evil instead of being cured by time, would
increase with every new State that should be admitted, as they must all
be admitted on the principle of equality. 5. the perpetuity it would
give to the preponderance of the North^n ag^{st} the South^n Scale was a
serious consideration. It seemed now to be pretty well understood that
the real difference of interests lay, not between the large & small but
between the N. & South^n States. The institution of slavery & its
consequences formed the line of discrimination. There were 5 States on
the South, 8 on the North^n side of this line. Should a proport^l
representation take place it was true, the N. side would still outnumber
the other; but not in the same degree, at this time; and every day would
tend towards an equilibrium.
M^r Wilson would add a few words only. If equality in the 2^d branch was
an error that time would correct, he should be less anxious to exclude
it being sensible that perfection was unattainable in any plan; but
being a fundamental and a perpetual error, it ought by all means to be
avoided. A vice in the Representation, like an error in the first
concoction, must be followed by disease, convulsions, and finally death
itself. The justice of the general principle of proportional
representation has not in argument at least been yet contradicted. But
it is said that a departure from it so far as to give the States an
equal vote in one branch of the Legislature is essential to their
preservation. He had considered this position maturely, but could not
see its application. That the States ought to be preserved he admitted.
But does it follow that an equality of votes is necessary for the
purpose? Is there any reason to suppose that if their preservation
should depend more on the large than on the small States the security of
the States ag^{st} the Gen^l Government would be diminished? Are the
large States less attached to their existence more likely to commit
suicide, than the small? An equal vote then is not necessary as far as
he can conceive: and is liable among other objections to this
insuperable one: The great fault of the existing confederacy is its
inactivity. It has never been a complaint ag^{st} Cong^s that they
governed over much. The complaint has been that they have governed too
little. To remedy this defect we were sent here. Shall we effect the
cure by establishing an equality of votes as is proposed? no: this very
equality carries us directly to Congress; to the system which it is our
duty to rectify. The small States cannot indeed act, by virtue of this
equality, but they may controul the Gov^t as they have done in Cong^s.
This very measure is here prosecuted by a minority of the people of
America. Is then the object of the Convention likely to be accomplished
in this way? Will not our Constituents say? we sent you to form an
efficient Gov^t and you have given us one more complex indeed, but
having all the weakness of the former govern^t. He was anxious for
uniting all the States under one Govern^t. He knew there were some
respectable men who preferred three confederacies, united by offensive &
defensive alliances. Many things may be plausibly said, some things may
be justly said, in favor of such a project. He could not however concur
in it himself; but he thought nothing so pernicious as bad first
principles.
M^r Elseworth asked two questions, one of M^r Wilson, whether he had
ever seen a good measure fail in Cong^s for want of a majority of States
in its favor? He had himself never known such an instance: the other of
M^r Madison whether a negative lodged with the majority of the States
even the smallest, could be more dangerous than the qualified negative
proposed to be lodged in a single Executive Magistrate, who must be
taken from some one State?
M^r Sherman, signified that his expectation was that the Gen^l
Legislature would in some cases act on the _federal principle_, of
requiring quotas. But he thought it ought to be empowered to carry their
own plans into execution, if the States should fail to supply their
respective quotas.
On the question for agreeing to M^r Pinkney's motion for allowing N. H.
2. Mas. 4. &c.--it passed in the negative,
Mass. no. M^r King ay. M^r Ghorum absent. Con^t no. N. J. no.
P^a ay. Del. no. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no.