"Shall the clause allowing each State one vote in the 2^d branch, stand
as part of the Report,"? being taken up--
M^r Gerry. This is the critical question. He had rather agree to it than
have no accommodation. A Govern^t short of a proper national plan, if
generally acceptable, would be preferable to a proper one which if it
could be carried at all, would operate on discontented States. He
thought it would be best to suspend the question till the Comm^e
yesterday appointed, should make report.
M^r Sherman Supposed that it was the wish of every one that some Gen^l
Gov^t should be established. An equal vote in the 2^d branch would, he
thought, be most likely to give it the necessary vigor. The small States
have more vigor in their Gov^{ts} than the large ones, the more
influence therefore the large ones have, the weaker will be the Gov^t.
In the large States it will be most difficult to collect the real & fair
sense of the people. Fallacy & undue influence will be practised with
most success; and improper men will most easily get into office. If they
vote by States in the 2^d branch, and each State has an equal vote,
there must be always a majority of States as well as a majority of the
people on the side of public measures, & the Gov^t will have decision
and efficacy. If this be not the case in the 2^d branch there may be a
majority of States ag^{st} public measures, and the difficulty of
compelling them to abide by the public determination, will render the
Government feebler than it has ever yet been.
M^r Wilson was not deficient in a conciliating temper, but firmness was
sometimes a duty of higher obligation. Conciliation was also misapplied
in this instance. It was pursued here rather among the Representatives,
than among the Constituents; and it w^d be of little consequence if not
established among the latter; and there could be little hope of its
being established among them if the foundation should not be laid in
justice and right.
On Question shall the words stand as part of the Report?
Mass^{ts} div^d. Con^t ay. N. Y. ay. N. J, ay. P^a no. Del. ay.
M^d ay. V^a no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. div^d
(Note. several votes were given here in the affirmative or were div^d
because another final question was to be taken on the whole report.)
M^r Gerry[127] thought it would be proper to proceed to enumerate &
define the powers to be vested in the Gen^l Gov^t before a question on
the report should be taken as to the rule of representation in the 2^d
branch.
[127] King gives the three speeches of Gerry, Madison and
Patterson as follows:
"_Gerry._ I agree to the measure, provided that the first
Br. (H. of Reps.) shall originate money bills and money
appropriations. The prejudices as well as the interest of
our Constituents must be regarded--two or three thousand men
are in office in the States--their influence will be in
favor of an Equality of votes among the States.
"_Madison._ Equality in the Senate will enable a minority to
hold a majority, and to oblige them to submit to their
interests, or they will withdraw their assent to measures
essential and necessary to the general Good. I have known
one man, when the State was represented by only two, and
they were divided, oppose six States in Congress on an
important occasion for three days, and finally compel them
to gratify his caprice in order to obtain his suffrage. The
Senate will possess certain exclusive Powers, such as the
appointments to office, if the States have equal votes; a
minority of People will appoint the Great Offices. Besides
the small States may be near the Seat of Govt.--a bare
Quorum of the H. of R. may be easily assembled, and carry a
bill against the sense of a majority if all were present,
and the Senate, tho' all were present, might confirm such
Bill. Virginia has objected to every addition of the powers
of Congress, because she has only 1/13 of the Power when she
ought to have one sixth.
"_Paterson._ I hope the question will be taken: if we do not
give equal votes in the Senate to the States, the small
States agreeing that money Bills and appropriations shall
originate in the H. of Reps., elected according to numbers,
it must not be expected that the small States will agree to
the amendments of the Confederation. Let us decide this
question and lose no more time. I think that I shall vote
against the provision, because I think that the exclusive
originating of money Bills & appropriations by the H. of
Reps. is giving up too much on the part of the small
States."--King's _Life and Correspondence of Rufus King_,
I., 613.
M^r Madison, observed that it w^d be impossible to say what powers could
be safely & properly vested in the Gov^t before it was known, in what
manner the States were to be represented in it. He was apprehensive that
if a just representation were not the basis of the Gov^t it would
happen, as it did when the Articles of Confederation were depending,
that every effectual prerogative would be withdrawn or withheld, and the
New Gov^t w^d be rendered as impotent and as shortlived as the old.
M^r Patterson would not decide whether the privilege concerning money
bills were a valuable consideration or not: But he considered the mode &
rule of representation in the 1^{st} branch as fully so; and that after
the establishment of that point, the small States would never be able to
defend themselves without an equality of votes in the 2^d branch. There
was no other ground of accommodation. His resolution was fixt. He would
meet the large States on that ground and no other. For himself he should
vote ag^{st} the Report, because it yielded too much.
M^r Gov^r Morris. He had no resolution unalterably fixed except to do
what should finally appear to him right. He was ag^{st} the Report
because it maintained the improper constitution of the 2^d branch. It
made it another Congress, a mere whisp of straw. It had been s^d (by M^r
Gerry) that the new Govern^t would be partly national, partly federal;
that it ought in the first quality to protect individuals; in the
second, the States. But in what quality was it to protect the aggregate
interest of the whole. Among the many provisions which had been urged,
he had seen none for supporting the dignity and splendor of the American
Empire. It had been one of our greatest misfortunes that the great
objects of the nation had been sacrificed constantly to local views; in
like manner as the general interests of States had been sacrificed to
those of the Counties. What is to be the check in the Senate? none;
unless it be to keep the majority of the people from injuring particular
States. But particular States ought to be injured for the sake of a
majority of the people, in case their conduct should deserve it. Suppose
they should insist on claims evidently unjust, and pursue them in a
manner detrimental to the whole body. Suppose they should give
themselves up to foreign influence. Ought they to be protected in such
cases. They were originally nothing more than colonial corporations. On
the declaration of Independence, a Governm^t was to be formed. The small
States aware of the necessity of preventing anarchy, and taking
advantage of the moment, extorted from the large ones an equality of
votes. Standing now on that ground, they demand under the new system
greater rights as men, than their fellow Citizens of the large States.
The proper answer to them is that the same necessity of which they
formerly took advantage, does not now exist, and that the large States
are at liberty now to consider what is right, rather than what may be
expedient. We must have an efficient Gov^t and if there be an efficiency
in the local Gov^{ts} the former is impossible. Germany alone proves it.
Notwithstanding their common diet, notwithstanding the great
prerogatives of the Emperor as head of the Empire, and his vast
resources, as sovereign of his particular dominions, no union is
maintained; foreign influence disturbs every internal operation, & there
is no energy whatever in the General Governm^t. Whence does this
proceed? From the energy of the local authorities; from its being
considered of more consequence to support the Prince of Hesse, than the
Happiness of the people of Germany. Do Gentlemen wish this to be y^e
case here. Good God, Sir, is it possible they can so delude themselves.
What if all the Charters & Constitutions of the States were thrown into
the fire, and all their demagogues into the Ocean. What would it be to
the happiness of America. And will not this be the case here if we
pursue the train in w^{ch} the business lies. We shall establish an
Aulic Council without an Emperor to execute its decrees. The same
circumstances which unite the people here, unite them in Germany. They
have there a common language, a common law, common usages and manners,
and a common interest in being united; Yet their local jurisdictions
destroy every tie. The case was the same in the Grecian States. The
United Netherlands are at this time torn in factions. With these
examples before our eyes shall we form establishments which must
necessarily produce the same effects. It is of no consequence from what
districts the 2^d branch shall be drawn, if it be so constituted as to
yield an asylum ag^{st} these evils. As it is now constituted he must be
ag^{st} its being drawn from the States in equal portions. But still he
was ready to join in devising such an amendment of the plan, as will be
most likely to secure our liberty & happiness.
M^r Sherman & M^r Elseworth moved to postpone the Question on the Report
from the Committee of a member from each State, in order to wait for the
Report from the Com^e of 5 last appointed.
Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. ay.
Maryland ay. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Adj^d.