M^r William Blount from N. Carolina took his seat.
1^{st} propos: of the Report of Com^e of the whole, before the House.
M^r Elseworth 2^{ded} by M^r Gorham, moves to alter it so as to run
"that the Government of the United States ought to consist of a supreme
legislative, Executive and Judiciary." This alteration he said would
drop the word _national_, and retain the proper title "the United
States." He could not admit the doctrine that a breach of any of the
federal articles could dissolve the whole. It would be highly dangerous
not to consider the Confederation as still subsisting. He wished also
the plan of the Convention to go forth as an amendment of the articles
of the Confederation, since under this idea the authority of the
Legislatures could ratify it. If they are unwilling, the people will be
so too. If the plan goes forth to the people for ratification several
succeeding Conventions within the States would be unavoidable. He did
not like these conventions. They were better fitted to pull down than to
build up Constitutions.
M^r Randolph. did not object to the change of expression, but apprised
the gentleman who wished for it that he did not admit it for the reasons
assigned; particularly that of getting rid of a reference to the people
for ratification. The motion of M^r Elsew^{th} was acquiesced in nem:
con:
The 2^d Resol: "that the National Legislature ought to consist of two
branches" taken up, the word "national" struck out as of course.
_M^r Lansing._ observed that the true question here was, whether the
Convention would adhere to or depart from the foundation of the present
Confederacy; and moved instead of the 2^d Resolution, "that the powers
of Legislation be vested in the U. States in Congress." He had already
assigned two reasons ag^{st} such an innovation as was proposed: 1. the
want of competent powers in the Convention.--2. the state of the public
mind. It had been observed by (M^r Madison) in discussing the first
point, that in two States the Delegates to Cong^s were chosen by the
people. Notwithstanding the first appearance of this remark, it had in
fact no weight, as the Delegates however chosen, did not represent the
people merely as so many individuals; but as forming a Sovereign State.
(Mr. Randolph) put it, he said, on its true footing namely that the
public safety superseded the scruple arising from the review of our
powers. But in order to feel the force of this consideration, the same
impression must be had of the public danger. He had not himself the same
impression, and could not therefore dismiss his scruple. (M^r Wilson)
contended that as the Convention were only to recommend, they might
recommend what they pleased. He differed much from him. Any act whatever
of so respectable a body must have a great effect, and if it does not
succeed, will be a source of great dissentions. He admitted that there
was no certain criterion of the Public mind on the subject. He therefore
recurred to the evidence of it given by the opposition in the States to
the scheme of an Impost. It could not be expected that those possessing
Sovereignty could ever voluntarily part with it. It was not to be
expected from any one State, much less from thirteen. He proceeded to
make some observations on the plan itself and the argum^{ts} urged in
support of it. The point of Representation could receive no elucidation
from the case of England. The corruption of the boroughs did not proceed
from their comparative smallness; but from the actual fewness of the
inhabitants, some of them not having more than one or two. A great
inequality existed in the Counties of England. Yet the like complaint of
peculiar corruption in the small ones had not been made. It had been
said that Congress represent the State Prejudices: will not any other
body whether chosen by the Legislatures or people of the States, also
represent their prejudices? It had been asserted by his colleague (Col.
Hamilton) that there was no coincidence of interests among the large
States that ought to excite fears of oppression in the smaller. If it
were true that such a uniformity of interests existed among the States,
there was equal safety for all of them, whether the representation
remained as heretofore, or were proportioned as now proposed. It is
proposed that the Gen^l Legislature shall have a negative on the laws of
the States. Is it conceivable that there will be leisure for such a
task? There will on the most moderate calculation, be as many Acts sent
up from the States as there are days in the year. Will the members of
the General Legislature be competent Judges? Will a gentleman from
Georgia be a judge of the expediency of a law which is to operate in N.
Hampshire. Such a Negative would be more injurious than that of Great
Britain heretofore was. It is said that the National Gov^t must have the
influence arising from the grant of offices and honors. In order to
render such a Government effectual he believed such an influence to be
necessary. But if the States will not agree to it, it is in vain, worse
than in vain to make the proposition. If this influence is to be
attained, the States must be entirely abolished. Will any one say this
would ever be agreed to? He doubted whether any Gen^l Government equally
beneficial to all can be attained. That now under consideration he is
sure, must be utterly unattainable. He had another objection. The system
was too novel & complex. No man could foresee what its operation will be
either with respect to the Gen^l Gov^t or the State Gov^{ts}. One or
other it has been surmised must absorb the whole.
Col. Mason. did not expect this point would have been reagitated. The
essential differences between the two plans, had been clearly stated.
The principal objections ag^{st} that of M^r R. were the _want of
power_ & the _want of practicability_. There can be no weight in the
first as the fiat is not to be _here_, but in the people. He thought
with his colleague M^r R. that there were besides certain crisises, in
which all the ordinary cautions yielded to public necessity. He gave
as an example, the eventual Treaty with G. B. in forming which the
Co[~m]^{srs} of the U. S. had boldly disregarded the improvident
shackles of Cong^s had given to their Country an honorable & happy
peace, and instead of being censured for the transgression of their
powers, had raised to themselves a monument more durable than brass. The
_impracticability_ of gaining the public concurrence he thought was
still more groundless. (M^r Lansing) had cited the attempts of Congress
to gain an enlargement of their powers, and had inferred from the
miscarriage of these attempts, the hopelessness of the plan which he
(M^r L) opposed. He thought a very different inference ought to have
been drawn; viz that the plan which (M^r L) espoused, and which proposed
to augment the powers of Congress, never could be expected to succeed.
He meant not to throw any reflections on Cong^s as a body, much less on
any particular members of it. He meant however to speak his sentiments
without reserve on this subject; it was a privilege of age, and perhaps
the only compensation which nature had given for, the privation of so
many other enjoyments: and he should not scruple to exercise it freely.
Is it to be thought that the people of America, so watchful over their
interests; so jealous of their liberties, will give up their all, will
surrender both the sword and the purse, to the same body, and that too
not chosen immediately by themselves? They never will. They never ought.
Will they trust such a body, with the regulation of their trade, with
the regulation of their taxes; with all the other great powers, which
are in contemplation? Will they give unbounded confidence to a secret
Journal--to the intrigues--to the factions which in the nature of
things appertain to such an Assembly? If any man doubts the existence
of these characters of Congress, let him consult their Journals for
the years 78, 79, & 80.--It will be said, that if the people are
averse to parting with power, why is it hoped that they will part with
it to a National Legislature. The proper answer is that in this case
they do not part with power: they only transfer it from one sett of
immediate Representatives to another sett.--Much has been said of the
unsettled state of the mind of the people, he believed the mind of the
people of America, as elsewhere, was unsettled as to some points; but
settled as to others. In two points he was sure it was well settled. 1.
in an attachment to Republican Government. 2. in an attachment to more
than one branch in the Legislature. Their constitutions accord so
generally in both these circumstances, that they seem almost to have
been preconcerted. This must either have been a miracle, or have
resulted from the genius of the people. The only exceptions to the
establishm^t of two branches in the Legislatures are the State of P^a &
Cong^s and the latter the only single one not chosen by the people
themselves. What has been the consequence? The people have been
constantly averse to giving that Body further powers--It was
acknowledged by (M^r Patterson) that his plan could not be enforced
without military coercion. Does he consider the force of this
concession. The most jarring elements of Nature; fire & water themselves
are not more incompatible that[n] such a mixture of civil liberty and
military execution. Will the militia march from one State to another, in
order to collect the arrears of taxes from the delinquent members of the
Republic? Will they maintain an army for this purpose? Will not the
Citizens of the invaded State assist one another till they rise as one
Man, and shake off the Union altogether. Rebellion is the only case, in
which the military force of the State can be properly exerted ag^{st}
its Citizens. In one point of view he was struck with horror at the
prospect of recurring to this expedient. To punish the non-payment of
taxes with death, was a severity not yet adopted by despotism itself:
yet this unexampled cruelty would be mercy compared to a military
collection of revenue, in which the bayonet could make no discrimination
between the innocent and the guilty. He took this occasion to repeat,
that notwithstanding his solicitude to establish a national Government,
he never would agree to abolish the State Gov^{ts} or render them
absolutely insignificant. They were as necessary as the Gen^l Gov^t and
he would be equally careful to preserve them. He was aware of the
difficulty of drawing the line between them, but hoped it was not
insurmountable. The Convention, tho' comprising so many distinguished
characters, could not be expected to make a faultless Gov^t. And he
would prefer trusting to Posterity the amendment of its defects, rather
than to push the experiment too far.
M^r Luther Martin agreed with (Col Mason) as to the importance of the
State Gov^{ts} he would support them at the expence of the Gen^l Gov^t
which was instituted for the purpose of that support. He saw no
necessity for two branches, and if it existed Congress might be
organized into two. He considered Cong^s as representing the people,
being chosen by the Legislatures who were chosen by the people. At any
rate, Congress represented the Legislatures; and it was the Legislatures
not the people who refused to enlarge their powers. Nor could the rule
of voting have been the ground of objection, otherwise ten of the States
must always have been ready, to place further confidence in Cong^s. The
causes of repugnance must therefore be looked for elsewhere.--At the
separation from the British Empire, the people of America preferred the
establishment of themselves into thirteen separate sovereignties instead
of incorporating themselves into one: to these they look up for the
security of their lives, liberties & properties: to these they must look
up. The federal Gov^t they formed, to defend the whole ag^{st} foreign
nations, in case of war, and to defend the lesser States ag^{st} the
ambition of the larger: they are afraid of granting power unnecessarily,
lest they should defeat the original end of the Union; lest the powers
should prove dangerous to the sovereignties of the particular States
which the Union was meant to support; and expose the lesser to being
swallowed up by the larger. He conceived also that the people of the
States having already vested their powers in their respective
Legislatures, could not resume them without a dissolution of their
Governments. He was ag^{st} Conventions in the States: was not ag^{st}
assisting States ag^{st} rebellious subjects; thought the _federal_ plan
of M^r Patterson did not require coercion more than the _National one_,
as the latter must depend for the deficiency of its revenues on
requisitions & quotas, and that a national Judiciary extended into the
States would be ineffectual, and would be viewed with a jealousy
inconsistent with its usefulness.
M^r Sherman 2^{ded} & supported M^r Lansings motion. He admitted two
branches to be necessary in the State Legislatures, but saw no necessity
for them in a Confederacy of States. The examples were all, of a single
Council. Cong^s carried us thro' the war, and perhaps as well as any
Gov^t could have done. The complaints at present are not that the views
of Cong^s are unwise or unfaithful; but that their powers are
insufficient for the execution of their views. The national debt & the
want of power somewhere to draw forth the National resources, are the
great matters that press. All the States were sensible of the defect of
power in Cong^s. He thought much might be said in apology for the
failure of the State Legislatures to comply with the Confederation. They
were afraid of leaning too hard on the people, by accumulating taxes; no
_constitutional_ rule had been or could be observed in the quotas--the
Accounts also were unsettled & every State supposed itself in advance,
rather than in arrears. For want of a general system, taxes to a due
amount had not been drawn from trade which was the most convenient
resource. As almost all the States had agreed to the recommendation of
Cong^s on the subject of an impost, it appeared clearly that they were
willing to trust Cong^s with power to draw a revenue from Trade. There
is no weight therefore in the argument drawn from a distrust of Cong^s
for money matters being the most important of all, if the people will
trust them with power as to them, they will trust them with any other
necessary powers. Cong^s indeed by the confederation have in fact the
right of saying how much the people shall pay, and to what purpose it
shall be applied: and this right was granted to them in the expectation
that it would in all cases have its effect. If another branch were to be
added to Cong^s to be chosen by the people, it would serve to embarrass.
The people would not much interest themselves in the elections, a few
designing men in the large districts would carry their points, and the
people would have no more confidence in their new representatives than
in Cong^s. He saw no reason why the State Legislatures should be
unfriendly as had been suggested, to Cong^s. If they appoint Cong^s and
approve of their measures, they would be rather favourable and partial
to them. The disparity of the States in point of size he perceived was
the main difficulty. But the large States had not yet suffered from the
equality of votes enjoyed by the small ones. In all great and general
points, the interests of all the States were the same. The State of
Virg^a notwithstanding the equality of votes, ratified the Confederation
without, or even proposing, any alteration. Mass^{ts} also ratified
without any material difficulty &c. In none of the ratifications is the
want of two branches noticed or complained of. To consolidate the States
as some had proposed would dissolve our Treaties with foreign Nations,
which had been formed with us, as _Confederated_ States. He did not
however suppose that the creation of two branches in the Legislature
would have such an effect. If the difficulty on the subject of
representation can not be otherwise got over, he would agree to have two
branches, and a proportional representation in one of them, provided
each State had an equal voice in the other. This was necessary to secure
the rights of the lesser States; otherwise three or four of the large
States would rule the others as they please. Each State like each
individual had its peculiar habits usages and manners, which constituted
its happiness. It would not therefore give to others a power over this
happiness, any more than an individual would do, when he could avoid it.
M^r Wilson. urged the necessity of two branches; observed that if a
proper model were not to be found in other Confederacies it was not to
be wondered at. The number of them was small & the duration of some at
least short. The Amphyctionic and Achæan were formed in the infancy of
political Science; and appear by their History & fate, to have contained
radical defects. The Swiss & Belgic Confederacies were held together not
by any vital principle of energy but by the incumbent pressure of
formidable neighbouring nations: The German owed its continuance to the
influence of the H. of Austria. He appealed to our own experience for
the defects of our Confederacy. He had been 6 years in the 12 since the
commencement of the Revolution, a member of Congress, and had felt all
its weaknesses. He appealed to the recollection of others whether on
many important occasions, the public interest had not been obstructed by
the small members of the Union. The success of the Revolution was owing
to other causes, than the Constitution of Congress. In many instances it
went on even ag^{st} the difficulties arising from Cong^s themselves. He
admitted that the large States did accede as had been stated, to the
Confederation in its present form. But it was the effect of necessity
not of choice. There are other instances of their yielding from the same
motive to the unreasonable measures of the small States. The situation
of things is now a little altered. He insisted that a jealousy would
exist between the State Legislatures & the General Legislature:
observing that the members of the former would have views & feelings
very distinct in this respect from their constituents. A private Citizen
of a State is indifferent whether power be exercised by the Gen^l or
State Legislatures, provided it be exercised most for his happiness. His
representative has an interest in its being exercised by the body to
which he belongs. He will therefore view the National Legisl: with the
eye of a jealous rival. He observed that the addresses of Cong^s to the
people at large, had always been better received & produced greater
effect, than those made to the Legislatures.
On the question for postponing in order to take up M^r Lansing's
proposition "to vest the powers of legislation in Cong^s"
Mass^{ts} no. Con^t ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P^a no. Del. ay.
M^d div^d. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
On motion of the Deputies from Delaware, the question on the 2^d
Resolution in the Report from the Committee of the whole was postponed
till tomorrow.
Adj^d.