M^r Patterson, laid before the Convention the plan which he said several
of the deputations wished to be substituted in place of that proposed by
M^r Randolph. After some little discussion of the most proper mode of
giving it a fair deliberation it was agreed that it should be referred
to a Committee of the Whole, and that in order to place the two plans in
due comparison, the other should be recommitted. At the earnest request
of M^r Lansing[84] & some other gentlemen, it was also agreed that the
Convention should not go into Co[~m]ittee of the whole on the subject
till tomorrow, by which delay the friends of the plan proposed by M^r
Patterson w^d be better prepared to explain & support it, and all would
have an opportu^y of taking copies.[85]
[84] "Mr. Lansing is a practising Attorney at Albany, and Mayor
of that Corporation. He has a hisitation in his speech, that
will prevent his being an Orator of any eminence;--his legal
knowledge I am told is not extensive, nor his education a
good one. He is however a Man of good sense, plain in his
manners, and sincere in his friendships. He is about 32
years of age."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 327.
[85] (This plan had been concerted among the deputations or
members thereof, from Con^t N. Y. N. J. Del. and perhaps M^r
Martin from Mary^d who made with them a common cause though
on different principles. Con^t & N. Y. were ag^{st} a
departure from the principle of the Confederation, wishing
rather to add a few new powers to Cong^s than to substitute,
a National Gov^t. The States of N. J. & Del. were opposed to
a National Gov^t because its patrons considered a
proportional representation of the States as the basis of
it. The eagerness displayed by the members opposed to a
Nat^l Gov^t from these different motives began now to
produce serious anxiety for the result of the Convention.
M^r Dickenson said to M^r Madison You see the consequence of
pushing things too far. Some of the members from the small
States wish for two branches in the General Legislature, and
are friends to a good National Government; but we would
sooner submit to foreign power, than submit to be deprived
of an equality of suffrage in both branches of the
legislature, and thereby be thrown under the domination of
the large States.)--Madison Note.
"Mr. Madison moved for the report of the committee, and the
question may then come on whether the convention will
postpone it in order to take into consideration the system
now offered.
"Mr. Lansing is of opinion that the two systems are fairly
contrasted. The one now offered is on the basis of amending
the federal government, and the other to be reported as a
national government, on propositions which exclude the
propriety of amendment. Considering therefore its
importance, and that justice may be done to its weighty
consideration, he is for postponing it a day.
"Col. Hamilton cannot say he is in sentiment with either
plan--supposes both might again be considered as federal
plans, and by this means they will be fairly in committee,
and be contrasted so as to make a comparative estimate of
the two."--Yates, _Secret Proceedings_, etc., 121, 122.
The propositions from N. Jersey moved by M^r Patterson were in the words
following.
1. Res^d that the articles of Confederation ought to be so
revised, corrected, & enlarged, as to render the federal
Constitution adequate to the exigencies of Government, & the
preservation of the Union.
2. Res^d that in addition to the powers vested in the U. States
in Congress, by the present existing articles of Confederation,
they be authorized to pass acts for raising a revenue, by
levying a duty or duties on all goods or merchandizes of foreign
growth or manufacture, imported into any part of the U. States,
by Stamps on paper, vellum or parchment, and by a postage on all
letters or packages passing through the general post-office, to
be applied to such federal purposes as they shall deem proper &
expedient; to make rules & regulations for the collection
thereof; and the same from time to time, to alter & amend in
such manner as they shall think proper, to pass Acts for the
regulation of trade & commerce as well with foreign Nations as
with each other: provided that all punishments, fines,
forfeitures & penalties to be incurred for contravening such
acts rules and regulations shall be adjudged by the Common law
Judiciaries of the State in which any Offence contrary to the
true intent & meaning of such Acts rules & regulations shall
have been committed or perpetrated, with liberty of commencing
in the first instance all suits & prosecutions for that purpose
in the Superior Common law Judiciary in such State, subject
nevertheless, for the correction of all errors, both in law &
fact in rendering Judgment, to an appeal to the Judiciary of the
U. States.
3. Res^d that whenever requisitions shall be necessary, instead
of the rule for making requisitions mentioned in the articles of
Confederation, the United States in Cong^s be authorized to make
such requisitions in proportion to the whole number of white &
other free citizens & inhabitants of every age Sex and condition
including those bound to servitude for a term of years & three
fifths of all other persons not comprehended in the foregoing
description, except Indians not paying taxes; that if such
requisitions be not complied with, in the time specified
therein, to direct the collection thereof in the non complying
States & for that purpose to devise and pass acts directing &
authorizing the same; provided that none of the powers hereby
vested in the U. States in Cong^s shall be exercised without the
consent of at least ---- States, and in that proportion if the
number of Confederated States should hereafter be increased or
diminished.
4. Res^d that the U. States in Cong^s be authorized to elect a
federal Executive to consist of ---- persons, to continue in
office for the term of ---- years, to receive punctually at
stated times a fixed compensation for their services, in which
no increase nor diminution shall be made so as to affect the
persons composing the Executive at the time of such increase or
diminution, to be paid out of the federal treasury; to be
incapable of holding any other office or appointment during
their time of service and for ---- years thereafter: to be
ineligible a second time, & removeable by Cong^s on application
by a majority of the Executives of the several States; that the
Executives besides their general authority to execute the
federal acts ought to appoint all federal officers not otherwise
provided for, & to direct all military operations; provided that
none of the persons composing the federal Executive shall on any
occasion take command of any troops, so as personally to conduct
any enterprise as General or in any other capacity.
5. Res^d that a federal Judiciary be established to consist of a
supreme Tribunal the Judges of which to be appointed by the
Executive, & to hold their offices during good behaviour, to
receive punctually at stated times a fixed compensation for
their services in which no increase nor diminution shall be
made, so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time
of such increase or diminution: that the Judiciary so
established shall have authority to hear & determine in the
first instance on all impeachments of federal Officers, & by way
of appeal in the dernier resort in all cases touching the rights
of Ambassadors, in all cases of captures from an enemy, in all
cases of piracies & felonies on the high Seas, in all cases in
which foreigners may be interested, in the construction of any
treaty or treaties, or which may arise on any of the Acts for
the regulation of trade, or the collection of the federal
Revenue: that none of the Judiciary shall during the time they
remain in office be capable of receiving or holding any other
office or appointment during their term of service, or for ----
thereafter.
6. Res^d that all Acts of the U. States in Cong^s made by virtue
& in pursuance of the powers hereby & by the Articles of
Confederation vested in them, and all Treaties made & ratified
under the authority of the U. States shall be the supreme law of
the respective States so far forth as those Acts or Treaties
shall relate to the said States or their Citizens, and that the
Judiciary of the several States shall be bound thereby in their
decisions any thing in the respective laws of the Individual
States to the Contrary notwithstanding: and that if any State,
or any body of men in any State shall oppose or prevent y^e
carrying into execution such acts or treaties, the federal
Executive shall be authorized to call forth y^e power of the
Confederated States, or so much thereof as may be necessary to
enforce and compel an Obedience to such Acts, or an observance
of such Treaties.
7. Res^d that provision be made for the admission of new States
into the Union.
8. Res^d that the rule for naturalization ought to be same in
every State.
9. Res^d that a Citizen of one State committing an offence in
another State of the Union, shall be deemed guilty of the same
offence as if it had been committed by a Citizen of the State in
which the offence was committed.[86]
[86] This copy of M^r Patterson's propositions varies in
a few clauses from that in the printed Journal
furnished from the papers of M^r Brearley a
colleague of M^r Patterson. A confidence is felt,
notwithstanding, in its accuracy. That the copy in
the Journal is not entirely correct is shewn by the
ensuing speech of M^r Wilson (June 16) in which he
refers to the mode of removing the Executive by
impeachment & conviction as a feature in the Virg^a
plan forming one of its contrasts to that of M^r
Patterson, which proposed a removal on the
application of a majority of the Executives of the
States. In the copy printed in the Journal, the two
modes are combined in the same clause; whether
through inadvertence, or as a contemplated
amendment, does not appear.--Madison's Note.
The Journal contains: "6. Resolved, that the
legislative, executive, and judiciary powers within
the several states, ought to be bound, by oath, to
support the articles of union," and "9. Resolved,
that provision ought to be made for hearing and
deciding upon all disputes arising between the
United States and an individual state, respecting
territory."--_Journal of the Federal Convention_,
126.
Adjourned.
SATURDAY JUNE 16. IN COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE
on Resolutions propos^d by M^r P. & M^r R.
M^r Lansing called for the reading of the 1^{st} resolution of each
plan, which he considered as involving principles directly in contrast;
that of M^r Patterson says he sustains the sovereignty of the respective
States, that of M^r Randolph destroys it: the latter requires a negative
on all the laws of the particular States; the former, only certain
general powers for the general good. The plan of M^r R. in short absorbs
all power except what may be exercised in the little local matters of
the States which are not objects worthy of the supreme cognizance. He
grounded his preference of M^r P's plan, chiefly on two objections
ag^{st} that of M^r R. 1. want of power in the Convention to discuss &
propose it. 2. the improbability of its being adopted, 1. He was
decidedly of opinion that the power of the Convention was restrained
to amendments of a federal nature, and having for their basis the
Confederacy in being. The Act of Congress The tenor of the Acts of the
States, the Co[~m]issions produced by the several deputations all
proved this. And this limitation of the power to an amendment of the
Confederacy, marked the opinion of the States, that it was unnecessary &
improper to go farther. He was sure that this was the case with his
State. N. York would never have concurred in sending deputies to the
Convention, if she had supposed the deliberations were to turn on a
consolidation of the States, and a National Government.
2. was it probable that the States would adopt & ratify a scheme, which
they had never authorized us to propose? and which so far exceeded what
they regarded as sufficient? We see by their several Acts particularly
in relation to the plan of revenue proposed by Cong. in 1783, not
authorized by the Articles of Confederation, what were the ideas they
then entertained. Can so great a change be supposed to have already
taken place. To rely on any change which is hereafter to take place in
the sentiments of the people would be trusting to too great an
uncertainty. We know only what their present sentiments are. And it is
in vain to propose what will not accord with these. The States will
never feel a sufficient confidence in a general Government to give it a
negative on their laws. The Scheme is itself totally novel. There is no
parallel to it to be found. The Authority of Congress is familiar to the
people, and an augmentation of the powers of Congress will be readily
approved by them.
M^r Patterson, said as he had on a former occasion given his sentiments
on the plan proposed by M^r R. he would now avoiding repetition as much
as possible give his reasons in favor of that proposed by himself. He
preferred it because it accorded 1. with the powers of the Convention, 2
with the sentiments of the people. If the confederacy was radically
wrong, let us return to our States, and obtain larger powers, not assume
them ourselves. I came here not to speak my own sentiments, but the
sentiments of those who sent me. Our object is not such a Governm^t as
may be best in itself, but such a one as our Constituents have
authorized us to prepare, and as they will approve. If we argue the
matter on the supposition that no Confederacy at present exists, it can
not be denied that all the States stand on the footing of equal
sovereignty. All therefore must concur before any can be bound. If a
proportional representation be right, why do we not vote so here? If we
argue on the fact that a federal compact actually exists, and consult
the articles of it we still find an equal Sovereignty to be the basis of
it. He reads the 5^{th} art: of Confederation giving each State a
vote--& the 13^{th} declaring that no alteration shall be made without
unanimous consent. This is the nature of all treaties. What is
unanimously done, must be unanimously undone. It was observed (by M^r
Wilson) that the larger State gave up the point, not because it was
right, but because the circumstances of the moment urged the concession.
Be it so. Are they for that reason at liberty to take it back. Can the
donor resume his gift without the consent of the donee. This doctrine
may be convenient, but it is a doctrine that will sacrifice the lesser
States. The larger States acceded readily to the confederacy. It was the
small ones that came in reluctantly and slowly. N. Jersey & Maryland
were the two last, the former objecting to the want of power in Congress
over trade: both of them to the want of power to appropriate the vacant
territory to the benefit of the whole.--If the sovereignty of the States
is to be maintained, the Representatives must be drawn immediately from
the States, not from the people: and we have no power to vary the idea
of equal sovereignty. The only expedient that will cure the difficulty,
is that of throwing the States into Hotchpot. To say that this is
impracticable, will not make it so. Let it be tried, and we shall see
whether the Citizens of Mass^{ts} Pen^a & V^a accede to it. It will be
objected that Coercion will be impracticable. But will it be more so in
one plan than the other? Its efficacy will depend on the quantum of
power collected, not on its being drawn from the States, or from the
individuals; and according to his plan it may be exerted on individuals
as well as according that of M^r R. A distinct executive & Judiciary
also were equally provided by his plan. It is urged that two branches in
the Legislature are necessary. Why? for the purpose of a check. But the
reason of the precaution is not applicable to this case. Within a
particular State, where party heats prevail, such a check may be
necessary. In such a body as Congress it is less necessary, and besides,
the delegations of the different States are checks on each other. Do the
people at large complain of Cong^s? No, what they wish is that Cong^s
may have more power. If the power now proposed be not eno', the people
hereafter will make additions to it. With proper powers Cong^s will act
with more energy & wisdom than the proposed Nat^l Legislature; being
fewer in number, and more secreted & refined by the mode of election.
The plan of M^r R. will also be enormously expensive. Allowing Georgia &
Del. two representatives each in the popular branch the aggregate number
of that branch will be 180. Add to it half as many for the other branch
and you have 270, coming once at least a year from the most distant as
well as the most central parts of the republic. In the present deranged
State of our finances can so expensive a System be seriously thought of?
By enlarging the powers of Cong^s the greatest part of this expence will
be saved, and all purposes will be answered. At least a trial ought to
be made.
M^r Wilson entered into a contrast of the principal points of the two
plans so far he said as there had been time to examine the one last
proposed. These points were 1. in the Virg^a plan there are 2 & in some
degree 3 branches in the Legislature: in the plan from N. J. there is to
be a _single_ legislature only--2. Representation of the people at large
is the basis of one: the State Legislatures, the pillars of the
other--3. proportional representation prevails in one;--equality of
suffrage in the other--4. A single Executive Magistrate is at the head
of the one:--a plurality is held out in the other.--5. in the one the
majority of the people of the U. S. must prevail:--in the other a
minority may prevail. 6. the Nat^l Legislature is to make laws in all
cases to which the separate States are incompetent &:--in place of
this Cong^s are to have additional power in a few cases only--7. A
negative on the laws of the States:--in place of this coertion to be
substituted--8. The Executive to be removable on impeachment &
conviction;--in one plan: in the other to be removable at the instance
of a majority of the Executives of the States--9. Revision of the laws
provided for in one:--no such check in the other--10. inferior national
tribunals in one:--none such in the other. 11. In one y^e jurisdiction
of Nat^l tribunals to extend &c.--; an appellate jurisdiction only
allowed in the other. 12. Here the jurisdiction is to extend to all
cases affecting the Nation^l peace & harmony; _there_ a few cases only
are marked out. 13. finally y^e ratification is in this to be by the
people themselves:--in that by the legislative authorities according to
the 13 art: of the Confederation.
With regard to the _power of the Convention_, he conceived himself
authorized to _conclude nothing_, but to be at liberty to _propose any
thing_. In this particular he felt himself perfectly indifferent to the
two plans.
With _regard to the sentiments of the people_, he conceived it difficult
to know precisely what they are. Those of the particular circle in which
one moved, were commonly mistaken for the general voice. He could not
persuade himself that the State Gov^{ts} & Sovereignties were so much
the idols of the people, nor a Nat^l Gov^t so obnoxious to them, as some
supposed. Why s^d a Nat^l Gov^t be unpopular? Has it less dignity? will
each Citizen enjoy under it less liberty or protection? Will a Citizen
of _Deleware_ be degraded by becoming a Citizen of the _United States_?
Where do the people look at present for relief from the evils of which
they complain? Is it from an internal reform of their Gov^{ts}? no, Sir.
It is from the Nat^l Councils that relief is expected. For these reasons
he did not fear, that the people would not follow us into a National
Gov^t and it will be a further recommendation of M^r R'^s plan that it
is to be submitted to _them_, and not to the _Legislatures_, for
ratification.
Proceeding now to the 1^{st} point on which he had contrasted the two
plans, he observed that anxious as he was for some augmentation of the
federal powers, it would be with extreme reluctance indeed that he could
ever consent to give powers to Cong^s he had two reasons either of
w^{ch} was sufficient, 1. Cong^s as a Legislative body does not stand on
the people. 2. it is a _single_ body. 1. He would not repeat the remarks
he had formerly made on the principles of Representation, he would only
say that an inequality in it, has ever been a poison contaminating every
branch of Gov^t. In G. Britain where this poison has had a full
operation, the security of private rights is owing entirely to the
purity of her tribunals of Justice, the Judges of which are neither
appointed nor paid, by a venal Parliament. The political liberty of that
Nation, owing to the inequality of representation is at the mercy of its
rulers. He means not to insinuate that there is any parallel between the
situation of that Country & ours at present. But it is a lesson we ought
not to disregard, that the smallest bodies in G. B. are notoriously the
most corrupt. Every other source of influence must also be stronger in
small than large bodies of men. When Lord Chesterfield had told us that
one of the Dutch provinces had been seduced into the views of France, he
need not have added, that it was not Holland, but one of the _smallest_
of them. There are facts among ourselves which are known to all. Passing
over others, he will only remark that the _Impost_, so anxiously wished
for by the public was defeated not by any of the _larger_ States in the
Union. 2. _Congress is a single Legislature._ Despotism comes on Mankind
in different Shapes, sometimes in an Executive, sometimes in a Military,
one. Is there no danger of a Legislative despotism? Theory & practice
both proclaim it. If the Legislative authority be not restrained, there
can be neither liberty nor stability; and it can only be restrained by
dividing it within itself, into distinct and independent branches. In a
single House there is no check, but the inadequate one, of the virtue &
good sense of those who compose it.
On another great point, the contrast was equally favorable to the plan
reported by the Committee of the whole. It vested the Executive powers
in a single Magistrate. The plan of N. Jersey, vested them in a
plurality. In order to controul the Legislative authority, you must
divide it. In order to controul the Executive you must unite it. One man
will be more responsible than three. Three will contend among themselves
till one becomes the master of his colleagues. In the triumvirates of
Rome first Cæsar, then Augustus, are witnesses of this truth. The Kings
of Sparta, & the Consuls of Rome prove also the factious consequences of
dividing the Executive Magistracy. Having already taken up so much time
he w^d not he s^d, proceed to any of the other points. Those on which he
had dwelt, are sufficient of themselves; and on the decision of them,
the fate of the others will depend.
M^r Pinkney,[87] the whole comes to this, as he conceived. Give N.
Jersey an equal vote, and she will dismiss her scruples, and concur in
the Nat^l system. He thought the Convention authorized to go any length
in recommending; which they found necessary to remedy the evils which
produced this Convention.
[87] Yates states it was C. C. Pinckney who said this.--_Secret
Proceedings_, etc., 123.
M^r Elseworth proposed as a more distinctive form of collecting the mind
of the Committee on the subject, "that the Legislative power of the
U.S. should remain in Cong^s" This was not seconded, though it seemed
better calculated for the purpose than the 1^{st} proposition of M^r
Patterson in place of which Mr. E. wished to substitute it.
M^r Randolph, was not scrupulous on the point of power. When the
Salvation of the Republic was at stake, it would be treason to our
trust, not to propose what we found necessary. He painted in strong
colours, the imbecility of the existing Confederacy, & the danger of
delaying a substantial reform. In answer to the objection drawn from the
sense of our Constituents as denoted by their acts relating to the
Convention and the objects of their deliberation, he observed that as
each State acted separately in the case, it would have been indecent for
it to have charged the existing Constitution with all the vices which it
might have perceived in it. The first State that set on foot this
experiment would not have been justified in going so far, ignorant as it
was of the opinion of others, and sensible as it must have been of the
uncertainty of a successful issue to the experiment. There are certainly
reasons of a peculiar nature where the ordinary cautions must be
dispensed with; and this is certainly one of them. He w^d not as far as
depended on him leave any thing that seemed necessary, undone. The
present moment is favorable, and is probably the last that will offer.
The true question is whether we shall adhere to the federal plan, or
introduce the national plan. The insufficiency of the former has been
fully displayed by the trial already made. There are but two modes, by
which the end of a Gen^l Gov^t can be attained: the 1^{st} is by
coercion as proposed by M^r P's plan 2. by real legislation as prop^d
by the other plan. Coercion he pronounced to be _impracticable_,
_expensive_, _cruel to individuals_. It tended also to habituate the
instruments of it to shed the blood & riot in the Spoils of their fellow
Citizens, and consequently trained them up for the service of Ambition.
We must resort therefore to a National _Legislation over individuals_,
for which Cong^s are unfit. To vest such power in them, would be
blending the Legislative with the Executive, contrary to the rec^d maxim
on this subject: If the Union of these powers heretofore in Cong^s has
been safe, it has been owing to the general impotency of that body.
Cong^s are moreover not elected by the people, but by the Legislatures
who retain even a power of recall. They have therefore no will of their
own, they are a mere diplomatic body, and are always obsequious to the
views of the States, who are always encroaching on the authority of the
U. States. A provision for harmony among the States, as in trade,
naturalization &.--for crushing rebellion whenever it may rear its
crest--and for certain other general benefits, must be made. The powers
for these purposes can never be given to a body, inadequate as Congress
are in point of representation, elected in the mode in which they are,
and possessing no more confidence than they do: for notwithstanding what
has been said to the contrary, his own experience satisfied him that a
rooted distrust of Congress pretty generally prevailed. A Nat^l Gov^t
alone, properly constituted, will answer the purpose; and he begged it
to be considered that the present is the last moment for establing one.
After this select experiment, the people will yield to despair.
The Committee rose & the House adjourned.
MONDAY JUNE 18. IN COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE
on the propositions of M^r Patterson & M^r Randolph.
On motion of M^r Dickinson to postpone the 1^{st} Resolution in M^r
Patterson's plan, in order to take up the following viz--"that the
Articles of Confederation ought to be revised and amended, so as to
render the Government of the U. S. adequate to the exigencies, the
preservation and the prosperity of the Union" the postponement was
agreed to by 10 States, Pen: divided.
Mr. Hamilton,[88] had been hitherto silent on the business before the
Convention, partly from respect to others whose superior abilities age &
experience rendered him unwilling to bring forward ideas dissimilar to
theirs, and partly from his delicate situation with respect to his own
State, to whose sentiments as expressed by his Colleages, he could by no
means accede. This crisis however which now marked our affairs, was too
serious to permit any scruples whatever to prevail over the duty imposed
on every man to contribute his efforts for the public safety &
happiness. He was obliged therefore to declare himself unfriendly to
both plans. He was particularly opposed to that from N. Jersey, being
fully convinced, that no amendment of the Confederation, leaving the
States in possession of their Sovereignty could possibly answer the
purpose. On the other hand he confessed he was much discouraged by the
amazing extent of Country in expecting the desired blessings from any
general sovereignty that could be substituted.--As to the powers of the
Convention, he thought the doubts started on that subject had arisen
from distinctions & reasonings too subtle. A _federal_ Gov^t he
conceived to mean an association of independent Communities into one.
Different Confederacies have different powers, and exercise them in
different ways. In some instances the powers are exercised over
collective bodies; in others over individuals, as in the German Diet--&
among ourselves in cases of piracy. Great latitude therefore must be
given to the signification of the term. The plan last proposed departs
itself from the _federal_ idea, as understood by some, since it is to
operate eventually on individuals. He agreed moreover with the Honble
gentleman from V^a (M^r R.) that we owed it to our Country, to do on
this emergency whatever we should deem essential to its happiness. The
States sent us here to provide for the exigencies of the Union. To rely
on & propose any plan not adequate to these exigencies, merely because
it was not clearly within our powers, would be to sacrifice the means
to the end. It may be said that the _States_ cannot _ratify_ a plan
not within the purview of the article of the Confederation providing
for alterations & amendments. But may not the States themselves in
which no constitutional authority equal to this purpose exists in the
Legislatures, have had in view a reference to the people at large. In
the Senate of N. York, a proviso was moved, that no act of the
Convention should be binding untill it should be referred to the
people & ratified; and the motion was lost by a single voice only, the
reason assigned ag^{st} it being, that it might possibly be found an
inconvenient shackle.
[88] Hamilton happened to call upon Madison while the latter was
putting the last touches to this speech and "acknowledged
its fidelity, without suggesting more than a few verbal
alterations which were made."--(Cf. _Madison's Writings_,
vol. ii.). A brief of the speech from the Hamilton Papers is
given in Lodge's _Works of Hamilton_, i., 353, where (i.,
375) Yates's report also is quoted.
[Illustration: HAMILTON'S PRINCIPAL SPEECH.
(Reduced.)]
The great question is what provision shall we make for the happiness of
our Country? He would first make a comparative examination of the two
plans--prove that there were essential defects in both--and point out
such changes as might render a _national one_, efficacious.--The great &
essential principles necessary for the support of Government are 1. an
active & constant interest in supporting it. This principle does not
exist in the States in favor of the federal Gov^t. They have evidently
in a high degree, the esprit de corps. They constantly pursue internal
interests adverse to those of the whole. They have their particular
debts--their particular plans of finance &c. All these when opposed to,
invariably prevail over the requisitions & plans of Congress. 2. The
love of power. Men love power. The same remarks are applicable to this
principle. The States have constantly shewn a disposition rather to
regain the powers delegated by them than to part with more, or to give
effect to what they had parted with. The ambition of their demagogues is
known to hate the controul of the Gen^l Government. It may be remarked
too that the Citizens have not that anxiety to prevent a dissolution of
the Gen^l Gov^t as of the particular Gov^{ts}. A dissolution of the
latter would be fatal; of the former would still leave the purposes of
Gov^t attainable to a considerable degree. Consider what such a State as
Virg^a will be in a few years, a few compared with the life of nations.
How strongly will it feel its importance and self-sufficiency? 3. An
habitual attachment of the people. The whole force of this tie is on
the side of the State Gov^t. Its sovereignty is immediately before
the eyes of the people: its protection is immediately enjoyed by
them. From its hand distributive justice, and all those acts which
familiarize & endear a Gov^t to a people, are dispensed to them. 4.
_Force_ by which may be understood a _coercion of laws_ or _coercion of
arms_. Cong^s have not the former except in few cases. In particular
States, this Coercion is nearly sufficient; tho' he held it in most
cases, not entirely so. A certain portion of military force is
absolutely necessary in large communities. Mass^{ts} is now feeling this
necessity & making provision for it. But how can this force be exerted
on the States collectively. It is impossible. It amounts to a war
between the parties. Foreign powers also will not be idle spectators.
They will interpose, the confusion will increase, and a dissolution of
the Union will ensue. 5. _Influence._ he did not mean corruption, but a
dispensation of those regular honors & emoluments, which produce an
attachment to the Gov^t. Almost all the weight of these is on the side
of the States; and must continue so as long as the States continue to
exist. All the passions then we see, of avarice, ambition, interest,
which govern most individuals, and all public bodies, fall into the
current of the States, and do not flow into the stream of the Gen^l
Gov^t. The former therefore will generally be an overmatch for the Gen^l
Gov^t and render any confederacy, in its very nature precarious. Theory
is in this case fully confirmed by experience. The Amphyctionic Council
had it would seem ample powers for general purposes. It had in
particular the power of fining and using force ag^{st} delinquent
members. What was the consequence. Their decrees were mere signals of
war. The Phocian war is a striking example of it. Philip at length
taking advantage of their disunion, and insinuating himself into their
councils, made himself master of their fortunes. The German Confederacy
affords another lesson. The Authority of Charlemagne seemed to be as
great as could be necessary. The great feudal chiefs however, exercising
their local sovereignties, soon felt the spirit & found the means of,
encroachments, which reduced the imperial authority to a nominal
sovereignty. The Diet has succeeded, which tho' aided by a Prince at its
head, of great authority independently of his imperial attributes, is a
striking illustration of the weakness of Confederated Governments. Other
examples instruct us in the same truth. The Swiss cantons have scarce
any union at all, and have been more than once at war with one
another.--How then are all these evils to be avoided? only by such a
compleat sovereignty in the General Goverm^t as will turn all the strong
principles & passions abovementioned on its side. Does the scheme of N.
Jersey produce this effect? does it afford any substantial remedy
whatever? On the contrary it labors under great defects, and the defect
of some of its provisions will destroy the efficacy of others. It gives
a direct revenue to Cong^s but this will not be sufficient. The balance
can only be supplied by requisitions: which experience proves cannot be
relied on. If States are to deliberate on the mode, they will also
deliberate on the object of the supplies, and will grant or not grant as
they approve or disapprove of it. The delinquency of one will invite and
countenance it in others. Quotas too must in the nature of things be so
unequal as to produce the same evil. To what standard will you resort?
Land is a fallacious one. Compare Holland with Russia; France or Eng^d
with other countries of Europe, Pen^a with N. Carol^a will the relative
pecuniary abilities in those instances, correspond with the relative
value of land. Take numbers of inhabitants for the rule and make like
comparison of different countries, and you will find it to be equally
unjust. The different degrees of industry and improvement in different
Countries render the first object a precarious measure of wealth. Much
depends too on _situation_. Con^t N. Jersey & N. Carolina, not being
commercial States & contributing to the wealth of the Commercial ones,
can never bear quotas assessed by the ordinary rules of proportion. They
will & must fail in their duty, their example will be followed, and the
union itself be dissolved. Whence then is the national revenue to be
drawn? from Commerce; even from exports which notwithstanding the
co[~m]on opinion are fit objects of moderate taxation, from excise, &c
&c. These tho' not equal, are less unequal than quotas. Another
destructive ingredient in the plan, is that equality of suffrage which
is so much desired by the small States. It is not in human nature that
V^a & the large States should consent to it, or if they did that they
sh^d long abide by it. It shocks too much all ideas of Justice, and
every human feeling. Bad principles in a Gov^t tho slow are sure in
their operation, and will gradually destroy it. A doubt has been raised
whether Cong^s at present have a right to keep Ships or troops in time
of peace. He leans to the negative. Mr. P'^s plan provides no
remedy.--If the powers proposed were adequate, the organization of
Cong^s is such that they could never be properly & effectually
exercised. The members of Cong^s being chosen by the States & subject to
recall, represent all the local prejudices. Should the powers be found
effectual, they will from time to time be heaped on them, till a
tyrannic sway shall be established. The general power whatever be its
form if it preserves itself, must swallow up the State powers. Otherwise
it will be swallowed up by them. It is ag^{st} all the principles of a
good Government to vest the requisite powers in such a body as Cong^s.
Two Sovereignties can not co-exist within the same limits. Giving powers
to Cong^s must eventuate in a bad Gov^t or in no Gov^t. The plan of N.
Jersey therefore will not do. What then is to be done? Here he was
embarrassed. The extent of the Country to be governed, discouraged him.
The expence of a general Gov^t was also formidable; unless there were
such a diminution of expence on the side of the State Gov^{ts} as the
case would admit. If they were extinguished, he was persuaded that great
oeconomy might be obtained by substituting a general Gov^t. He did not
mean however to shock the public opinion by proposing such a measure. On
the other hand he saw no _other_ necessity for declining it. They are
not necessary for any of the great purposes of commerce, revenue, or
agriculture. Subordinate authorities he was aware would be necessary.
There must be district tribunals; corporations for local purposes. But
cui bono, the vast & expensive apparatus now appertaining to the States.
The only difficulty of a serious nature which occurred to him, was that
of drawing representatives from the extremes to the centre of the
Community. What inducements can be offered that will suffice? The
moderate wages for the 1^{st} branch would only be a bait to little
demagogues. Three dollars or thereabouts he supposed would be the
utmost. The Senate he feared from a similar cause, would be filled by
certain undertakers who wish for particular offices under the Gov^t.
This view of the subject almost led him to despair that a Republican
Gov^t could be established over so great an extent. He was sensible at
the same time that it would be unwise to propose one of any other form.
In his private opinion he had no scruple in declaring, supported as he
was by the opinion of so many of the wise & good, that the British Gov^t
was the best in the world: and that he doubted much whether any thing
short of it would do in America. He hoped Gentlemen of different
opinions would bear with him in this, and begged them to recollect the
change of opinion on this subject which had taken place and was still
going on. It was once thought that the power of Cong^s was amply
sufficient to secure the end of their institution. The error was now
seen by every one. The members most tenacious of republicanism, he
observed, were as loud as any in declaiming ag^{st} the vices of
democracy. This progress of the public mind led him to anticipate the
time, when others as well as himself would join in the praise bestowed
by M^r Neckar on the British Constitution, namely, that it is the only
Gov^t in the world "which unites public strength with individual
security."--In every Co[~m]unity where industry is encouraged, there
will be a division of it into the few & the many. Hence separate
interests will arise. There will be debtors & Creditors &c. Give all
power to the many, they will oppress the few. Give all power to the few,
they will oppress the many. Both therefore ought to have the power, that
each may defend itself ag^{st} the other. To the want of this check we
owe our paper money, instalment laws &c. To the proper adjustment of it
the British owe the excellence of their Constitution. Their house of
Lords is a most noble institution. Having nothing to hope for by a
change, and a sufficient interest by means of their property, in being
faithful to the national interest, they form a permanent barrier ag^{st}
every pernicious innovation, whether attempted on the part of the Crown
or of the Commons. No temporary Senate will have firmness eno' to answer
the purpose. The Senate (of Maryland) which seems to be so much appealed
to, has not yet been sufficiently tried. Had the people been unanimous &
eager in the late appeal to them on the subject of a paper emission they
would have yielded to the torrent. Their acquiescing in such an appeal
is a proof of it.--Gentlemen differ in their opinions concerning the
necessary checks, from the different estimates they form of the human
passions. They suppose seven years a sufficient period to give the
senate an adequate firmness, from not duly considering the amazing
violence & turbulence of the democratic spirit. When a great object of
Gov^t is pursued, which seizes the popular passions, they spread like
wild fire, and become irresistable. He appealed to the gentlemen from
the N. England States whether experience had not there verified the
remark.--As to the Executive, it seemed to be admitted that no good one
could be established on Republican Principles. Was not this giving up
the merits of the question; for can there be a good Gov^t without a good
Executive. The English Model was the only good one on this subject. The
Hereditary interest of the King was so interwoven with that of the
Nation, and his personal emoluments so great, that he was placed above
the danger of being corrupted from abroad--and at the same time was both
sufficiently independent and sufficiently controuled, to answer the
purpose of the institution at home, one of the weak sides of Republics
was their being liable to foreign influence & corruption. Men of little
character, acquiring great power become easily the tools of
intermeddling Neibours. Sweden was a striking instance. The French &
English had each their parties during the late Revolution which was
effected by the predominant influence of the former.--What is the
inference from all these observations? That we ought to go as far in
order to attain stability and permanency, as republican principles will
admit. Let one branch of the Legislature hold their places for life or
at least during good behaviour. Let the Executive also be for life. He
appealed to the feelings of the members present whether a term of seven
years, would induce the sacrifices of private affairs which an
acceptance of public trust would require, so as to ensure the services
of the best Citizens. On this plan we should have in the Senate a
permanent will, a weighty interest, which would answer essential
purposes. But is this a Republican Gov^t, it will be asked? Yes if all
the Magistrates are appointed, and vacancies are filled, by the people,
or a process of election originating with the people. He was sensible
that an Executive constituted as he proposed would have in fact but
little of the power and independence that might be necessary. On the
other plan of appointing him for 7 years, he thought the Executive ought
to have but little power. He would be ambitious, with the means of
making creatures, and as the object of his ambition w^d be to _prolong_
his power, it is probable that in case of a war, he would avail himself
of the emergence, to evade or refuse a degradation from his place. An
Executive for life has not this motive for forgetting his fidelity, and
will therefore be a safer depository of power. It will be objected
probably, that such an Executive will be an _elective Monarch_, and will
give birth to the tumults which characterize that form of Gov^t. He w^d
reply that _Monarch_ is an indefinite term. It marks not either the
degree or duration of power. If this Executive Magistrate w^d be a
monarch for life--the other prop^d by the Report from the Co[~m]ittee of
the whole, w^d be a monarch for seven years. The circumstance of being
elective was also applicable to both. It had been observed by judicious
writers that elective monarchies w^d be the best if they could be
guarded ag^{st} the _tumults_ excited by the ambition and intrigues of
competitors. He was not sure that tumults were an inseparable evil. He
rather thought this character of Elective Monarchies had been taken
rather from particular cases than from general principles. The election
of Roman Emperors was made by the _Army_. In _Poland_ the election is
made by great rival _princes_ with independent power, and ample means,
of raising commotions. In the German Empire, The appointment is made by
the Electors & Princes, who have equal motives & means, for exciting
cabals & parties. Might not such a mode of election be devised among
ourselves as will defend the community ag^{st} these effects in any
dangerous degree? Having made these observations he would read to the
Committee a sketch of a plan which he sh^d prefer to either of those
under consideration. He was aware that it went beyond the ideas of most
members. But will such a plan be adopted out of doors? In return he
would ask will the people adopt the other plan? At present they will
adopt neither. But he sees the Union dissolving or already dissolved--he
sees evils operating in the States which must soon cure the people of
their fondness for democracies--he sees that a great progress has been
already made & is still going on in the public mind. He thinks therefore
that the people will in time be unshackled from their prejudices; and
whenever that happens, they will themselves not be satisfied at stopping
where the plan of M^r R. w^d place them, but be ready to go as far at
least as he proposes. He did not mean to offer the paper he had sketched
as a proposition to the Committee. It was meant only to give a more
correct view of his ideas, and to suggest the amendments which he should
probably propose to the plan of M^r R. in the proper stages of its
future discussion. He read his sketch in the words following; to wit
I. The supreme Legislative power of the United States of America
to be vested in two different bodies of men; the one to be
called the Assembly, the other the Senate who together shall
form the Legislature of the United States with power to pass all
laws whatsoever subject to the Negative hereafter mentioned.
II. The Assembly to consist of persons elected by the people to
serve for three years.
III. The Senate to consist of persons elected to serve during
good behaviour; their election to be made by electors chosen for
that purpose by the people: in order to this the States to be
divided into election districts. On the death, removal or
resignation of any Senator his place to be filled out of the
district from which he came.
IV. The supreme Executive authority of the United States to be
vested in a Governour to be elected to serve during good
behaviour--the election to be made by Electors chosen by the
people in the Election Districts aforesaid--The authorities &
functions of the Executive to be as follows: to have a negative
on all laws about to be passed, and the execution of all laws
passed; to have the direction of war when authorized or begun;
to have with the advice and approbation of the Senate the power
of making all treaties; to have the sole appointment of the
heads or chief officers of the departments of Finance, War and
Foreign Affairs; to have the nomination of all other officers
(Ambassadors to foreign Nations included) subject to the
approbation or rejection of the Senate; to have the power of
pardoning all offences except Treason; which he shall not pardon
without the approbation of the Senate.
V. On the death resignation or removal of the Governour his
authorities to be exercised by the President of the Senate till
a Successor be appointed.
VI. The Senate to have the sole power of declaring war, the
power of advising and approving all Treaties, the power of
approving or rejecting all appointments of officers except the
heads or chiefs of the departments of Finance War and foreign
affairs.
VII. The supreme Judicial authority to be vested in ---- Judges
to hold their offices during good behaviour with adequate and
permanent salaries. This Court to have original jurisdiction in
all causes of capture, and an appellative jurisdiction in all
causes in which the revenues of the General Government or the
Citizens of foreign Nations are concerned.
VIII. The Legislature of the United States to have power to
institute Courts in each State for the determination of all
matters of general concern.
IX. The Governour Senators and all officers of the United States
to be liable to impeachment for mal- and corrupt conduct; and
upon conviction to be removed from office, & disqualified for
holding any place of trust or profit--All impeachments to be
tried by a Court to consist of the Chief ---- or Judge of the
Superior Court of Law of each State, provided such Judge shall
hold his place during good behavior, and have a permanent
salary.
X. All laws of the particular States contrary to the
Constitution or laws of the United States to be utterly void;
and the better to prevent such laws being passed, the Governour
or president of each State shall be appointed by the General
Government and shall have a Negative upon the laws about to be
passed in the State of which he is the Governour or President.
XI. No State to have any forces land or Naval; and the militia
of all the States to be under the sole and exclusive direction
of the United States, the officers of which to be appointed and
commissioned by them.
On these several articles he entered into explanatory observations
corresponding with the principles of his introductory reasoning.[89]
[89] COPY OF A PAPER COMMUNICATED TO J. M. BY COL. HAMILTON,
ABOUT THE CLOSE OF THE CONVENTION IN PHILAD^A, 1787, WHICH
HE SAID DELINEATED THE CONSTITUTION WHICH HE WOULD HAVE
WISHED TO BE PROPOSED BY THE CONVENTION. HE HAD STATED THE
PRINCIPLES OF IT IN THE COURSE OF THE DELIBERATIONS.
The people of the United States of America do ordain &
establish this Constitution for the government of themselves
and their posterity.