William Sam^l Johnson from Connecticut, Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer,
from Mary^d, & John Lansing J^r from N. York, took their seats.
It was mov^d & 2^{ded} to postpone ye Resol: of M^r Randolph respecting
the Executive, in order to take up the 2^d branch of the Legislature;
which being negatived by Mas: Con: Del: Virg: N. C. S. C. Geo: ag^{st}
N. Y. Pen^a Mary^d. The mode of appointing the Executive was resumed.
M^r Wilson made the following motion, to be substituted for the mode
proposed by Mr. Randolph's resolution, "that the Executive Magistracy
shall be elected in the following manner: That the States be divided
into ---- districts: & that the persons qualified to vote in each
district for members of the first branch of the national Legislature
elect ---- members for their respective districts to be electors of the
Executive Magistracy, that the said Electors of the Executive magistracy
meet at ---- and they or any ---- of them so met shall proceed to elect
by ballot, but not out of their own body ---- person-- in whom the
Executive authority of the national Government shall be vested."
M^r Wilson repeated his arguments in favor of an election without the
intervention of the States. He supposed too that this mode would produce
more confidence among the people in the first magistrate, than an
election by the national Legislature.
M^r Gerry, opposed the election by the National legislature. There would
be a constant intrigue kept up for the appointment. The Legislature &
the candidates w^d bargain & play into one another's hands, votes would
be given by the former under promises or expectations from the latter,
of recompensing them by services to members of the Legislature or to
their friends. He liked the principle of M^r Wilson's motion, but fears
it would alarm & give a handle to the State partizans, as tending to
supersede altogether the State authorities. He thought the Community not
yet ripe for stripping the States of their powers, even such as might
not be requisite for local purposes. He was for waiting till the people
should feel more the necessity of it. He seemed to prefer the taking
the suffrages of the States, instead of Electors, or letting the
Legislatures nominate, and the electors appoint. He was not clear that
the people ought to act directly even in the choice of electors, being
too little informed of personal characters in large districts, and
liable to deceptions.
M^r Williamson[56] could see no advantage in the introduction of
Electors chosen by the people who would stand in the same relation to
them as the State Legislatures, whilst the expedient would be attended
with great trouble and expence.
[56] "Mr. Williamson is a Gentleman of education and talents. He
enters freely into public debate from his close attention to
most subjects, but he is no Orator. There is a great degree
of good humour and pleasantry in his character; and in his
manners there is a strong trait of the Gentleman. He is
about 48 years of age."--Pierce's Notes, _Amer. Hist. Rev._,
iii., 332.
On the question for agreeing to M^r Wilson's substitute, it was
negatived: Mass^{ts} no. Con^t no. N. Y.[57] no. P^a ay. Del. no.
Mar^d ay. Virg^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo^a no.
[57] New York, in the printed Journal, divided.--Madison's Note.
On the question for electing the Executive by the national Legislature
for the term of seven years, it was agreed to, Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t ay.
N. Y. ay. Pen^a no. Del. ay. Mary^d no. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.
Doc^r Franklin moved that what related to the compensation for the
services of the Executive be postponed, in order to substitute--"whose
necessary expences shall be defrayed, but who shall receive no salary,
stipend fee or reward whatsoever for their services." He said that being
very sensible of the effect of age on his memory, he had been unwilling
to trust to that for the observations which seemed to support his motion
and had reduced them to writing, that he might with the permission of
the Committee read instead of speaking them. M^r Wilson made an offer to
read the paper, which was accepted. The following is a literal copy of
the paper:
Sir,
It is with reluctance that I rise to express a disapprobation of
any one article of the plan for which we are so much obliged to
the honorable gentleman who laid it before us. From its first
reading I have borne a good will to it, and in general wished it
success. In this particular of salaries to the Executive branch
I happen to differ; and as my opinion may appear new and
chimerical, it is only from a persuasion that it is right, and
from a sense of duty that I hazard it. The Committee will judge
of my reasons when they have heard them, and their judgment may
possibly change mine.--I think I see inconveniences in the
appointment of salaries; I see none in refusing them, but on the
contrary, great advantages.
Sir, there are two passions which have a powerful influence on
the affairs of men. These are ambition and avarice; the love of
power, and the love of money. Separately each of these has great
force in prompting men to action; but when united in view of the
same object, they have in many minds the most violent effects.
Place before the eyes of such men, a post of _honour_ that shall
be at the same time a place of _profit_, and they will move
heaven and earth to obtain it. The vast number of such places it
is that renders the British Government so tempestuous. The
struggles for them are the true sources of all those factions
which are perpetually dividing the Nation, distracting its
Councils, hurrying sometimes into fruitless & mischievous wars,
and often compelling a submission to dishonorable terms of
peace.
And of what kind are the men that will strive for this
profitable pre-eminence, through all the bustle of cabal, the
heat of contention, the infinite mutual abuse of parties,
tearing to pieces the best of characters? It will not be the
wise and moderate, the lovers of peace and good order, the men
fittest for the trust. It will be the bold and the violent, the
men of strong passions and indefatigable activity in their
selfish pursuits. These will thrust themselves into your
Government and be your rulers.--And these too will be mistaken
in the expected happiness of their situation: For their
vanquished competitors of the same spirit, and from the same
motives will perpetually be endeavouring to distress their
administration, thwart their measures, and render them odious to
the people.
Besides these evils, Sir, tho' we may set out in the beginning
with moderate salaries, we shall find that such will not be of
long continuance. Reasons will never be wanting for proposed
augmentations. And there will always be a party for giving more
to the rulers, that the rulers may be able in return to give
more to them. Hence as all history informs us, there has been in
every State & Kingdom a constant kind of warfare between the
Governing & Governed; the one striving to obtain more for its
support, and the other to pay less. And this has alone
occasioned great convulsions, actual civil wars, ending either
in dethroning of the Princes, or enslaving of the people.
Generally indeed the ruling power carries its point, the
revenues of princes constantly increasing, and we see that they
are never satisfied, but always in want of more. The more the
people are discontented with the oppression of taxes; the
greater need the prince has of money to distribute among his
partizans and pay the troops that are to suppress all
resistance, and enable him to plunder at pleasure. There is
scarce a king in an hundred who would not, if he could, follow
the example of Pharoah, get first all the people's money, then
all their lands, and then make them and their children servants
for ever. It will be said, that we don't propose to establish
Kings. I know it. But there is a natural inclination in mankind
to Kingly Government. It sometimes relieves them from
Aristocratic domination. They had rather have one tyrant than
five hundred. It gives more of the appearance of equality among
Citizens, and that they like. I am apprehensive therefore,
perhaps too apprehensive, that the Government of these States,
may in future times, end in a Monarchy. But this Catastrophe I
think may be long delayed, if in our proposed System we do not
sow the seeds of contention, faction & tumult, by making our
posts of honor, places of profit. If we do, I fear that tho' we
do employ at first a number, and not a single person, the number
will in time be set aside, it will only nourish the foetus of a
King, as the honorable gentleman from Virginia very aptly
expressed it, and a King will the sooner be set over us.
It may be imagined by some that this is an Utopian Idea, and
that we can never find men to serve us in the Executive
department, without paying them well for their services. I
conceive this to be a mistake. Some existing facts present
themselves to me, which incline me to a contrary opinion. The
high Sheriff of a County in England is an honorable office, but
it is not a profitable one. It is rather expensive and therefore
not sought for. But yet, it is executed and well executed, and
usually by some of the principal Gentlemen of the County. In
France, the office of Counsellor, or Member of their Judiciary
Parliaments is more honorable. It is therefore purchased at a
high price: There are indeed fees on the law proceedings, which
are divided among them, but these fees do not amount to more
than three Per Cent on the sum paid for the place. Therefore as
legal interest is there at five PerC^t they in fact pay two
PerC^t for being allowed to do the Judiciary business of the
Nation, which is at the same time entirely exempt from the
burden of paying them any salaries for their services. I do not
however mean to recommend this as an eligible mode for our
Judiciary department. I only bring the instance to shew that the
pleasure of doing good & serving their Country and the respect
such conduct entitles them to, are sufficient motives with some
minds to give up a great portion of their time to the Public,
without the mean inducement of pecuniary satisfaction.
Another instance is that of a respectable Society who have made
the experiment, and practised it with success more than one
hundred years. I mean the Quakers. It is an established rule
with them, that they are not to go to law; but in their
controversies they must apply to their monthly, quarterly and
yearly meetings. Committees of these sit with patience to hear
the parties, and spend much time in composing their differences.
In doing this, they are supported by a sense of duty, and the
respect paid to usefulness. It is honorable to be so employed,
but it is never made profitable by salaries, fees or
perquisites. And indeed in all cases of Public service the less
the profit the greater the honor.
To bring the matter nearer home, have we not seen, the great and
most important of our offices, that of General of our armies
executed for eight years together without the smallest salary,
by a Patriot whom I will not now offend by any other praise; and
this through fatigues and distresses in common with the other
brave men his military friends & companions, and the constant
anxieties peculiar to his station? And shall we doubt finding
three or four men in all the U. States, with public spirit
enough to bear sitting in peaceful Council for perhaps an equal
term, merely to preside over our civil concerns, and see that
our laws are duly executed. Sir, I have a better opinion of our
Country. I think we shall never be without a sufficient number
of wise and good men to undertake and execute well and
faithfully the office in question.
Sir. The saving of the salaries that may at first be proposed is
not an object with me. The subsequent mischiefs of proposing
them are what I apprehend. And therefore it is, that I move the
amendment. If it is not seconded or accepted I must be contented
with the satisfaction of having delivered my opinion frankly and
done my duty.
The motion was seconded by Col. Hamilton, with the view he said merely
of bringing so respectable a proposition before the Committee, and
which was besides enforced by arguments that had a certain degree of
weight. No debate ensued, and the proposition was postponed for the
consideration of the members. It was treated with great respect, but
rather for the author of it, than from any apparent conviction of its
expediency or practicability.
M^r Dickinson moved,[58] "that the Executive be made removable by the
National Legislature on the request of a majority of the Legislatures of
individual States." It was necessary he said to place the power of
removing somewhere. He did not like the plan of impeaching the Great
officers of State. He did not know how provision could be made for
removal of them in a better mode than that which he had proposed. He had
no idea of abolishing the State Governments as some gentlemen seemed
inclined to do. The happiness of this Country in his opinion required
considerable powers to be left in the hands of the States.
[58] "Mr. Dickinson has been famed through all America for his
Farmers Letters; he is a Scholar, and said to be a Man of
very extensive information. When I saw him in the Convention
I was induced to pay the greatest attention to him whenever
he spoke. I had often heard that he was a great Orator, but
I found him an indifferent Speaker. With an affected air of
wisdom he labors to produce a trifle,--his language is
irregular and incorrect,--his flourishes, (for he sometimes
attempts them,) are like expiring flames, they just shew
themselves and go out;--no traces of them are left on the
mind to chear or animate it. He is, however, a good writer
and will be ever considered one of the most important
characters in the United States. He is about 55 years old,
and was bred a Quaker."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._,
iii., 329.
M^r Bedford seconded the motion.
M^r Sherman contended that the national Legislature should have power to
remove the Executive at pleasure.
M^r Mason. Some mode of displacing an unfit magistrate is rendered
indispensable by the fallibility of those who choose, as well as by the
corruptibility of the man chosen. He opposed decidedly the making the
Executive the mere creature of the Legislature as a violation of the
fundamental principle of good Government.
M^r Madison & M^r Wilson observed that it would leave an equality of
agency in the small with the great States; that it would enable a
minority of the people to prevent y^e removal of an officer who had
rendered himself justly criminal in the eyes of a majority; that it
would open a door for intrigues ag^{st} him in States where his
administration tho' just might be unpopular, and might tempt him to pay
court to particular States whose leading partizans he might fear, or
wish to engage as his partizans. They both thought it bad policy to
introduce such a mixture of the State authorities, where their agency
could be otherwise supplied.
M^r Dickinson considered the business as so important that no man ought
to be silent or reserved. He went into a discourse of some length, the
sum of which was, that the Legislative, Executive, & Judiciary
departments ought to be made as independ^t as possible; but that such an
Executive as some seemed to have in contemplation was not consistent
with a republic: that a firm Executive could only exist in a limited
monarchy. In the British Gov^t itself the weight of the Executive arises
from the attachments which the Crown draws to itself, & not merely from
the force of its prerogatives. In place of these attachments we must
look out for something else. One source of stability is the double
branch of the Legislature. The division of the Country into distinct
States formed the other principal source of stability. This division
ought therefore to be maintained, and considerable powers to be left
with the States. This was the ground of his consolation for the future
fate of his Country. Without this, and in case of a consolidation of the
States into one great Republic, we might read its fate in the history of
smaller ones. A limited Monarchy he considered as _one_ of the best
Governments in the world. It was not _certain_ that the same blessings
were derivable from any other form. It was certain that equal blessings
had never yet been derived from any of the republican form. A limited
Monarchy however was out of the question. The spirit of the times--the
state of our affairs forbade the experiment, if it were desireable. Was
it possible moreover in the nature of things to introduce it even if
these obstacles were less insuperable. A House of Nobles was essential
to such a Gov^t could these be created by a breath, or by a stroke of
the pen? No. They were the growth of ages, and could only arise under a
complication of circumstances none of which existed in this Country. But
though a form the most perfect _perhaps_ in itself be unattainable, we
must not despair. If antient republics have been found to flourish for a
moment only & then vanish for ever, it only proves that they were badly
constituted; and that we ought to seek for every remedy for their
diseases. One of these remedies he conceived to be the accidental lucky
division of this Country into distinct States; a division which some
seemed desirous to abolish altogether.
As to the point of representation in the national Legislature as it
might affect States of different sizes, he said it must probably end in
mutual concession. He hoped that each State would retain an equal voice
at least in one branch of the National Legislature, and supposed the
sums paid within each State would form a better ratio for the other
branch than either the number of inhabitants or the quantum of
property.[59]
[59] According to Pierce: "M^r Madison said it was far from being
his wish that every executive Officer should remain in
Office, without being amenable to some Body for his
conduct."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 321.
A motion being made to strike out, "on request by a majority of the
Legislatures of the individual States," and rejected, Connecticut, S.
Carol: & Geo. being ay, the rest no: the question on M^r Dickinson's
motion for making Executive removable by Nat^l Legislature at request of
majority of State Legislatures was also rejected all the States being in
the negative Except Delaware which gave an affirmative vote.
The Question for making y^e Executive ineligible after seven years, was
next taken and agreed to: Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t no. N. Y. ay. P^a div^d.
Del. ay. Mary^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.[60]
[60] In printed Journal Geo. ay.--Madison's Note.
M^r Williamson 2^{ded} by M^r Davie[61] moved to add to the last clause,
the words--"and to be removable on impeachment & conviction of
mal-practice or neglect of duty"--which was agreed to.
[61] "Mr. Davey is a Lawyer of some eminence in his State. He is
said to have a good classical education, and is a Gentleman
of considerable literary talents. He was silent in the
Convention, but his opinion was always respected. Mr. Davy
is about 30 years of age."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist.
Rev._, iii., 332.
M^r Rutlidge & M^r C. Pinkney moved that the blank for the n^o of
persons in the Executive be filled with the words "one person." He
supposed the reasons to be so obvious & conclusive in favor of one that
no member would oppose the motion.
M^r Randolph opposed it with great earnestness, declaring that he should
not do justice to the Country which sent him if he were silently to
suffer the establishm^t of a Unity in the Executive department. He felt
an opposition to it which he believed he should continue to feel as long
as he lived. He urged 1. that the permanent temper of the people was
adverse to the very semblance of Monarchy. 2. that a unity was
unnecessary a plurality being equally competent to all the objects of
the department. 3. that the necessary confidence would never be reposed
in a single Magistrate. 4. that the appointments would generally be in
favor of some inhabitant near the center of the Community, and
consequently the remote parts would not be on an equal footing. He was
in favor of three members of the Executive to be drawn from different
portions of the country.
M^r Butler contended strongly for a single magistrate as most likely to
answer the purpose of the remote parts. If one man should be appointed
he would be responsible to the whole, and would be impartial to its
interests. If three or more should be taken from as many districts,
there would be a constant struggle for local advantages. In Military
matters this would be particularly mischievous. He said his opinion on
this point had been formed under the opportunity he had had of seeing
the manner in which a plurality of military heads distracted Holland
when threatened with invasion by the imperial troops. One man was for
directing the force to the defence of this part, another to that part of
the Country, just as he happened to be swayed by prejudice or interest.
The motion was then postp^d, the Committee rose & the House Adj^d.