William Houston from Georgia took his seat.
The Committee of the whole proceeded to Resolution 7. "that a national
Executive be instituted, to be chosen by the national Legislature for
the term of ---- years &c. to be ineligible thereafter, to possess the
Executive powers of Congress &c."
M^r Pinkney was for a vigorous Executive but was afraid the Executive
powers of the existing Congress might extend to peace & war &c. which
would render the Executive a monarchy, of the worst kind, to wit an
elective one.
M^r Wilson moved that the Executive consist of a single person. M^r C.
Pinkney seconded the motion, so as to read "that a National Ex. to
consist of a single person, be instituted."
A considerable pause ensuing and the Chairman asking if he should put
the question, Doc^r Franklin[51] observed that it was a point of great
importance and wished that the gentlemen would deliver their sentiments
on it before the question was put.
[51] "D^r Franklin is well known to be the greatest phylosopher
of the present age;--all the operations of nature he seems
to understand,--the very heavens obey him, and the Clouds
yield up their Lightning to be imprisoned in his rod. But
what claim he has to the politician, posterity must
determine. It is certain that he does not shine much in
public Council,--he is no Speaker, nor does he seem to let
politics engage his attention. He is, however, a most
extraordinary Man, and he tells a story in a style more
engaging than anything I ever heard. Let his Biographer
finish his character. He is 82 years old, and possesses an
activity of mind equal to a youth of 25 years of
age."--Pierce's Notes, _Amer. Hist. Rev._, iii., 328.
M^r Rutlidge animadverted on the shyness of gentlemen on this and other
subjects. He said it looked as if they supposed themselves precluded by
having frankly disclosed their opinions from afterwards changing them,
which he did not take to be at all the case. He said he was for vesting
the Executive power in a single person, tho' he was not for giving him
the power of war and peace. A single man would feel the greatest
responsibility and administer the public affairs best.
M^r Sherman said he considered the Executive magistracy as nothing more
than an institution for carrying the will of the Legislature into
effect, that the person or persons ought to be appointed by and
accountable to the Legislature only, which was the depository of the
supreme will of the Society. As they were the best judges of the
business which ought to be done by the Executive department, and
consequently of the number necessary from time to time for doing it, he
wished the number might not be fixed, but that the legislature should be
at liberty to appoint one or more as experience might dictate.
M^r Wilson preferred a single magistrate, as giving most energy dispatch
and responsibility to the office. He did not consider the Prerogatives
of the British Monarch as a proper guide in defining the Executive
powers. Some of these prerogatives were of a Legislative nature. Among
others that of war & peace &c. The only powers he considered strictly
Executive were those of executing the laws, and appointing officers, not
appertaining to and appointed by the Legislature.[52]
[52] According to King, Madison followed Wilson: "Madison agreed
with Wilson in the Definition of Executive power. _Ex vi
termini._ Executive power does not include the Power of War
and Peace. Executive Power shd. be limited and defined. If
large, we shall have the Evils of Elective Monarchies.
Perhaps the best plan will be a single Executive of long
duration, with a Council and with Liberty to dissent on his
personal Responsibility."--King's _Life and Correspondence
of Rufus King_, i., 588.
According to Pierce:
"M^r Madison was of opinion that an Executive formed of one
Man would answer the purpose when aided by a Council, who
should have the right to advise and record their
proceedings, but not to control his authority."--Pierce's
Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 320.
M^r Gerry favored the policy of annexing a Council to the Executive in
order to give weight & inspire confidence.[53]
[53] King gives Gerry's remarks: "_Gerry._ I am in favor of a
Council to advise the Executive: they will be organs of
information respecting Persons qualified for various
offices. Their opinions may be recorded, so as to be liable
to be called to account & impeached--in this way, their
Responsibility will be certain, and for misconduct their
Punishment sure."
Dickinson followed Gerry: "_Dickinson._ A limited yet
vigorous Executive is not republican, but peculiar to
monarchy--the royal Executive has vigour, not only by power,
but by popular Attachment & Report--an Equivalent to popular
Attachment may be derived from the Veto on the Legislative
acts. We cannot have a limited monarchy--our condition does
not permit it. Republics are in the beginning and for a time
industrious, but they finally destroy themselves because
they are badly constituted. I dread the consolidation of the
States, & hope for a good national Govt. from the present
Division of the States with a feeble Executive.
"We are to have a Legislature of two branches, or two
Legislatures, as the sovereign of the nation--this will work
a change unless you provide that the judiciary shall aid and
correct the Executive. The first Branch of the Legislature,
the H. of Representatives, must be on another plan. The
second Branch or Senate may be on the present scheme of
representing _the States_--the Representatives to be
apportioned according to the Quotas of the States paid into
the general Treasury. The Executive to be removed from
office by the national Legislature, on the Petition of seven
States."--King's _Life and Correspondence of Rufus King_,
i., 588 _et seq._
M^r Randolph strenuously opposed a unity in the Executive magistracy. He
regarded it as the foetus of monarchy. We had he said no motive to be
governed by the British Govenm^t as our prototype. He did not mean
however to throw censure on that Excellent fabric. If we were in a
situation to copy it he did not know that he should be opposed to it;
but the fixt genius of the people of America required a different form
of Government. He could not see why the great requisites for the
Executive department, vigor, dispatch & responsibility could not be
found in three men, as well as in one man. The Executive ought to be
independent. It ought therefore in order to support its independence to
consist of more than one.
M^r Wilson said that unity in the Executive instead of being the fetus
of monarchy would be the best safeguard against tyranny. He repeated
that he was not governed by the British Model which was inapplicable to
the situation of this Country; the extent of which was so great, and the
manners so republican, that nothing but a great confederated Republic
would do for it.
M^r Wilson's motion for a single magistrate was postponed by common
consent, the Committee seeming unprepared for any decision on it; and
the first part of the clause agreed to, viz--"that a National Executive
be instituted."[54]
[54] Williamson followed Wilson, according to King:
"_Williamson_--There is no true difference between an
Executive composed of a single person, with a Council, and
an Executive composed of three or more persons."--King's
_Life and Correspondence of Rufus King_, i., 590.
M^r Madison thought it would be proper, before a choice sh^d be made
between a unity and a plurality in the Executive, to fix the extent of
the Executive authority; that as certain powers were in their nature
Executive, and must be given to that departm^t whether administered by
one or more persons, a definition of their extent would assist the
judgment in determining how far they might be safely entrusted to a
single officer. He accordingly moved that so much of the clause before
the Committee as related to the powers of the Executive sh^d be struck
out & that after the words "that a national Executive ought to be
instituted" there be inserted the words following viz. "with power to
carry into effect the national laws, to appoint to offices in cases
not otherwise provided for, and to execute such other powers "not
Legislative nor Judiciary in their nature," as may from time to time be
delegated by the national Legislature." The words "not legislative nor
judiciary in their nature" were added to the proposed amendment, in
consequence of a suggestion by Gen^l Pinkney that improper powers might
otherwise be delegated.
M^r Wilson seconded this motion.
M^r Pinkney moved to amend the amendment by striking out the last member
of it; viz: "and to execute such other powers not Legislative nor
Judiciary in their nature as may from time to time be delegated." He
said they were unnecessary, the object of them being included in the
"power to carry into effect the national laws."
M^r Randolph seconded the motion.
M^r Madison did not know that the words were absolutely necessary, or
even the preceding words, "to appoint to offices &c. the whole being
perhaps included in the first member of the proposition. He did not
however see any inconveniency in retaining them, and cases might happen
in which they might serve to prevent doubts and misconstructions.
In consequence of the motion of M^r Pinkney, the question on M^r
Madison's motion was divided; and the words objected to by M^r Pinkney
struck out; by the votes of Connecticut, N. Y., N. J., Pen^a, Del.,
N. C., & Geo. ag^{st} Mass., Virg^a & S. Carolina the preceding part of
the motion being first agreed to; Connecticut divided all the other
States in the affirmative.
The next clause in Resolution 7, relating to the mode of appointing, &
the duration of, the Executive being under consideration,
M^r Wilson said he was almost unwilling to declare the mode which
he wished to take place, being apprehensive that it might appear
chimerical. He would say however at least that in theory he was for an
election by the people. Experience, particularly in N. York & Mass^{ts},
shewed that an election of the first magistrate by the people at large,
was both a convenient & successful mode. The objects of choice in such
cases must be persons whose merits have general notoriety.
M^r Sherman was for the appointment by the Legislature, and for making
him absolutely dependent on that body, as it was the will of that which
was to be executed. An independence of the Executive on the supreme
Legislature, was in his opinion the very essence of tyranny if there was
any such thing.
M^r Wilson moves that the blank for the term of duration should be
filled with three years, observing at the same time that he preferred
this short period, on the supposition that a re-eligibility would be
provided for.
M^r Pinkney moves for seven years.
M^r Sherman was for three years, and ag^{st} the doctrine of rotation as
throwing out of office the men best qualified to execute its duties.
M^r Mason was for seven years at least, and for prohibiting a
re-eligibility as the best expedient both for preventing the effect of a
false complaisance on the side of the Legislature towards unfit
characters; and a temptation on the side of the Executive to intrigue
with the Legislature for a re-appointment.
M^r Bedford[55] was strongly opposed to so long a term as seven years.
He begged the Committee to consider what the situation of the Country
would be, in case the first magistrate should be saddled on it for
such a period and it should be found on trial that he did not possess
the qualifications ascribed to him, or should lose them after his
appointment. An impeachment he said would be no cure for this evil, as
an impeachment would reach misfeasance only, not incapacity. He was for
a triennial election, and for an ineligibility after a period of nine
years.
[55] "Mr. Bedford was educated for the Bar, and in his
profession I am told, has merit. He is a bold and nervous
Speaker, and has a very commanding and striking manner;--but
he is warm and impetuous in his temper, and precipitate in
his judgment. Mr. Bedford is about 32 years old, and very
corpulent."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 330.
On the question for seven years,
Mass^{ts} divid^{d.} Con^t no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pen^a ay.
Del. ay. Virg^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geor. no.
There being 5 ays, 4 noes, & 1 div^d, a question was asked whether a
majority had voted in the Affirmative? The President decided that it was
an affirmative vote.
The _mode of appointing_ the Executive was the next question.
M^r Wilson renewed his declarations in favor of an appointment by the
people. He wished to derive not only both branches of the Legislature
from the people, without the intervention of the State Legislatures but
the Executive also; in order to make them as independent as possible of
each other, as well as of the States;
Col. Mason favors the idea, but thinks it impracticable. He wishes
however that M^r Wilson might have time to digest it into his own
form.--the clause, "to be chosen by the National Legislature"--was
accordingly postponed.--
M^r Rutlidge suggests an election of the Executive by the second branch
only of the national Legislature.