[41] Rufus King kept a few notes of the proceedings of the
convention from May 31st to August 8th. They are meagre, but
corroborate Madison's report. See King's _Life and
Correspondence of Rufus King_, i., 587.
Pierce also kept a few rough notes of the proceedings which
were printed in the _Savannah Georgian_, April 19, 21, 22,
23, 24, 25, 26, and 28, 1828, and reprinted in _The American
Historical Review_, iii., 317 _et seq._ They throw little
additional light on the debates, but wherever they do are
quoted here, as are King's.
In Committee of the whole on Mr. Randolph's propositions.
The 3^d Resolution "that the national Legislature ought to consist of
two branches" was agreed to without debate or dissent, except that of
Pennsylvania, given probably from complaisance to Doc^r Franklin who was
understood to be partial to a single House of Legislation.
Resol: 4. first clause, "that the members of the first branch of the
National Legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several
States," being taken up,
M^r Sherman opposed the election by the people, insisting that it ought
to be by the State Legislatures. The people he said, immediately should
have as little to do as may be about the Government. They want
information and are constantly liable to be misled.
M^r Gerry. The evils we experience flow from the excess of democracy.
The people do not want virtue, but are the dupes of pretended patriots.
In Mass^{ts} it had been fully confirmed by experience that they are
daily misled into the most baneful measures and opinions by the false
reports circulated by designing men, and which no one on the spot can
refute. One principal evil arises from the want of due provision for
those employed in the administration of Governm^t. It would seem to be a
maxim of democracy to starve the public servants. He mentioned the
popular clamour in Mass^{ts} for the reduction of salaries and the
attack made on that of the Gov^r though secured by the spirit of the
Constitution itself. He had he said been too republican heretofore: he
was still however republican, but had been taught by experience the
danger of the levelling spirit.
M^r Mason argued strongly for an election of the larger branch by the
people. It was to be the grand depository of the democratic principle of
the Gov^t. It was, so to speak, to be our House of Commons--It ought to
know & sympathize with every part of the community; and ought therefore
to be taken not only from different parts of the whole republic, but
also from different districts of the larger members of it, which had in
several instances particularly in Virg^a, different interests and views
arising from difference of produce, of habits &c &c. He admitted that we
had been too democratic but was afraid we s^d incautiously run into the
opposite extreme. We ought to attend to the rights of every class of the
people. He had often wondered at the indifference of the superior
classes of society to this dictate of humanity & policy, considering
that however affluent their circumstances, or elevated their situations,
might be, the course of a few years, not only might but certainly would,
distribute their posterity throughout the lowest classes of Society.
Every selfish motive therefore, every family attachment, ought to
recommend such a system of policy as would provide no less carefully for
the rights and happiness of the lowest than of the highest orders of
Citizens.
M^r Wilson contended strenuously for drawing the most numerous branch of
the Legislature immediately from the people. He was for raising the
federal pyramid to a considerable altitude, and for that reason wished
to give it as broad a basis as possible. No government could long
subsist without the confidence of the people. In a republican Government
this confidence was peculiarly essential. He also thought it wrong to
increase the weight of the State Legislatures by making them the
electors of the national Legislature. All interference between the
general and local Governm^{ts} should be obviated as much as possible.
On examination it would be found that the opposition of States to
federal measures had proceeded much more from the officers of the
States, than from the people at large.
M^r Madison considered the popular election of one branch of the
national Legislature as essential to every plan of free Government. He
observed that in some of the States one branch of the Legislature was
composed of men already removed from the people by an intervening body
of electors. That if the first branch of the general legislature should
be elected by the State Legislatures, the second branch elected by the
first--the Executive by the second together with the first; and other
appointments again made for subordinate purposes by the Executive, the
people would be lost sight of altogether; and the necessary sympathy
between them and their rulers and officers, too little felt. He was an
advocate for the policy of refining the popular appointments by
successive filtrations, but thought it might be pushed too far. He
wished the expedient to be resorted to only in the appointment of the
second branch of the Legislature, and in the Executive & judiciary
branches of the Government. He thought too that the great fabric to be
raised would be more stable and durable, if it should rest on the solid
foundation of the people themselves, than if it should stand merely on
the pillars of the Legislatures.
M^r Gerry did not like the election by the people. The maxims taken from
the British Constitution were often fallacious when applied to our
situation which was extremely different. Experience he said had shewn
that the State legislatures drawn immediately from the people did not
always possess their confidence. He had no objection however to an
election by the people if it were so qualified that men of honor &
character might not be unwilling to be joined in the appointments. He
seemed to think the people might nominate a certain number out of which
the State legislatures should be bound to choose.[42]
[42] "Mr. Strong would agree to the principle, provided it would
undergo a certain modification, but pointed out
nothing."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 318.
M^r Butler thought an election by the people an impracticable mode.
On the question for an election of the first branch of the national
Legislature, by the people,
Mass^{ts} ay. Connec^t div^d. N. York ay. N. Jersey no. Pen^a ay.
Delaw^r div^d. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Georg^a ay.
The remaiñg Clauses of Resolution 4^{th} relating to the qualifications
of members of the National Legislature, being posp^d nem. con., as
entering too much into detail for general propositions.
The Committee proceeded to Resolution 5. "that the second, (or
senatorial) branch of the National Legislature ought to be chosen by the
first branch out of persons nominated by the State Legislatures."
M^r Spaight contended that the 2^d branch ought to be chosen by the
State Legislatures and moved an amendment to that effect.[43]
[43] "M^r King observed that the Question called for was
premature, and out of order,--that unless we go on regularly
from one principle to the other we shall draw out our
proceedings to an endless length."--Pierce's Notes, _Am.
Hist. Rev._, iii., 318.
M^r Butler apprehended that the taking so many powers out of the hands
of the States as was proposed, tended to destroy all that balance and
security of interests among the States which it was necessary to
preserve; and called on M^r Randolph the mover of the propositions, to
explain the extent of his ideas, and particularly the number of members
he meant to assign to this second branch.
M^r Rand^f observed that he had at the time of offering his propositions
stated his ideas as far as the nature of general propositions required;
that details made no part of the plan, and could not perhaps with
propriety have been introduced. If he was to give an opinion as to the
number of the second branch, he should say that it ought to be much
smaller than that of the first; so small as to be exempt from the
passionate proceedings to which numerous assemblies are liable. He
observed that the general object was to provide a cure for the evils
under which the U. S. laboured; that in tracing these evils to their
origin every man had found it in the turbulance and follies of
democracy: that some check therefore was to be sought for ag^{st} this
tendency of our Governments: and that a good Senate seemed most likely
to answer the purpose.[44]
[44] "Butler said that until the number of the Senate could be
known it would be impossible for him to give a vote on
it."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 318.
M^r King reminded the Committee that the choice of the second branch as
proposed (by M^r Spaight) viz. by the State Legislatures would be
impracticable, unless it was to be very numerous, or _the idea of
proportion_ among the States was to be disregarded. According to this
_idea_, there must be 80 or 100 members to entitle Delaware to the
choice of one of them.--M^r Spaight withdrew his motion.
M^r Wilson opposed both a nomination by the State Legislatures, and an
election by the first branch of the national Legislature, because the
second branch of the latter, ought to be independent of both. He thought
both branches of the National Legislature ought to be chosen by the
people, but was not prepared with a specific proposition. He suggested
the mode of chusing the Senate of N. York to wit of uniting several
election districts for one branch, in chusing members for the other
branch, as a good model.
M^r Madison observed that such a mode would destroy the influence of the
smaller States associated with larger ones in the same district; as the
latter would chuse from within themselves, altho' better men might be
found in the former. The election of Senators in Virg^a where large &
small counties were often formed into one district for the purpose, had
illustrated this consequence. Local partiality, would often prefer a
resident within the County or State, to a candidate of superior merit
residing out of it. Less merit also in a resident would be more known
throughout his own State.[45]
[45] "M^r Butler moved to have the proposition relating to the
first branch postponed, in order to take up another,--which
was that the second branch of the Legislature consist of
blank.
"M^r King objected to the postponement for the reasons which he had
offered before."--Pierce's Notes, _Id._, iii., 319.
M^r Sherman favored an election of one member by each of the State
Legislatures.[46]
[46] According to Pierce, Mason spoke after Sherman, and
Pinckney's motion is given more fully by Pierce than by
Madison.
"M^r Mason was of opinion that it would be highly improper to draw the
Senate out of the first branch; that it would occasion vacancies which
would cost much time, trouble, and expense to have filled up,--besides
which it would make the members too dependent on the first branch.
"M^r Ch^s Pinckney said he meant to propose to divide the Continent into
four Divisions, out of which a certain number of persons sh^d be
nominated, and out of that nomination to appoint a senate."--Pierce's
Notes, _Amer. Hist. Rev._, iii., 319.
M^r Pinkney moved to strike out the "nomination by the State
Legislatures;" on this question.
[47]Mass^{ts} no. Con^t no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pen^a no. Del.
div^d V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Georg no.
[47] This question is omitted in the printed Journal,
& the votes applied to the succeeding one, instead
of the votes as here stated.--Madison's Note.
On the whole question for electing by the first branch out of
nominations by the State Legislatures, Mass. ay. Con^t no. N. Y. no.
N. Jersey, no. Pen^a no. Del. no. Virg^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. G^a no.
So the clause was disagreed to & a chasm left in this part of the plan.
The sixth Resolution stating the cases in which the national Legislature
ought to legislate was next taken into discussion: On the question
whether each branch sh^d originate laws, there was an unanimous
affirmative without debate. On the question for transferring all the
Legislative power of the existing Cong^s to this Assembly, there was
also a silent affirmative nem. con.
On the proposition for giving "Legislative power in all cases to which
the State Legislatures were individually incompetent,"
M^r Pinkney & M^r Rutledge[48] objected to the vagueness of the term
_incompetent_, and said they could not well decide how to vote until
they should see an exact enumeration of the powers comprehended by this
definition.[49]
[48] "Mr. Rutledge is one of those characters who was highly
mounted at the commencement of the late revolution;--his
reputation in the first Congress gave him a distinguished
rank among the American Worthies. He was bred to the Law,
and now acts as one of the Chancellors of South Carolina.
This Gentleman is much famed in his own State as an Orator,
but in my opinion he is too rapid in his public speaking to
be denominated an agreeable Orator. He is undobotedly a man
of abilities, and a Gentleman of distinction and fortune.
Mr. Rutledge was once Governor of South Carolina. He is
about 48 years of age."--Pierce's Notes, _Amer. Hist. Rev._,
iii., 333.
[49] According to Pierce: "M^r Sherman was of opinion that
it would be too indefinitely expressed,--and yet it would be
hard to define all the powers by detail. It appeared to him
that it would be improper for the national Legislature to
negative all the Laws that were connected with the States
themselves.
"M^r Madison said it was necessary to adopt some general
principles on which we should act,--that we were wandering
from one thing to another without seeming to be settled in
any one principle.
"M^r Wythe observed that it would be right to establish
general principles before we go into detail, or very shortly
Gentlemen would find themselves in confusion, and would be
obliged to have recurrence to the point from whence they sat
out.
"M^r King was of opinion that the principles ought first to
be established before we proceed to the framing of the Act.
He apprehends that the principles only go so far as to
embrace all the power that is given up by the people to the
Legislature, and to the federal Government, but no farther.
"M^r Randolph was of opinion that it would be impossible to
define the powers and the length to which the federal
Legislature ought to extend just at this time.
"M^r Wilson observed that it would be impossible to
enumerate the powers which the federal Legislature ought to
have."--Pierce's Notes, _Id._, iii., 319, 320.
M^r Butler repeated his fears that we were running into an extreme in
taking away the powers of the States, and called on Mr. Randolph for the
extent of his meaning.
M^r Randolph disclaimed any intention to give indefinite powers to the
national Legislature, declaring that he was entirely opposed to such an
inroad on the State jurisdictions, and that he did not think any
considerations whatever could ever change his determination. His opinion
was fixed on this point.
M^r Madison said that he had brought with him into the Convention a
strong bias in favor of an enumeration and definition of the powers
necessary to be exercised by the national Legislature; but had also
brought doubts concerning its practicability. His wishes remained
unaltered; but his doubts had become stronger. What his opinion might
ultimately be he could not yet tell. But he should shrink from nothing
which should be found essential to such a form of Gov^t as would
provide for the safety, liberty and happiness of the community. This
being the end of all our deliberations, all the necessary means for
attaining it must, however reluctantly, be submitted to.
On the question for giving powers, in cases to which the States are not
competent--Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t div^d. (Sherman no. Elseworth ay.)
N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. Carolina ay.
Georg^a ay.
The other clauses giving powers necessary to preserve harmony among the
States to negative all State laws contravening in the opinion of the
Nat. Leg. the articles of union, down to the last clause, (the words "or
any treaties subsisting under the authority of the Union," being added
after the words "contravening &c. the articles of the Union," on motion
of D^r Franklin) were agreed to with^t debate or dissent.
The last clause of Resolution 6, authorizing an exertion of the force of
the whole ag^{st} a delinquent State came next into consideration.
M^r Madison, observed that the more he reflected on the use of force,
the more he doubted, the practicability, the justice and the efficacy of
it when applied to people collectively and not individually.--A union of
the States containing such an ingredient seemed to provide for its own
destruction. The use of force ag^{st} a State, would look more like a
declaration of war, than an infliction of punishment, and would probably
be considered by the party attacked as a dissolution of all previous
compacts by which it might be bound. He hoped that such a system would
be framed as might render this resource unnecessary, and moved that the
clause be postponed. This motion was agreed to, nem. con.