[29] "Mr. Randolph is Governor of Virginia,--a young Gentleman in
whom unite all the accomplishments of the Scholar, and the
Statesman. He came forward with the postulata, or first
principles, on which the Convention acted, and he supported
them with a force of eloquence and reasoning that did him
great honor. He has a most harmonious voice, a fine person
and striking manners. Mr. Randolph is about 32 years of
age."--Pierce's Notes, _Id._, iii., 332.
[30] In the MS. in Randolph's hand: "[here insert his speech
including his resolutions]." The speech also is in
Randolph's hand, having been furnished by him.
He expressed his regret, that it should fall to him, rather than those,
who were of longer standing in life and political experience, to open
the great subject of their mission. But, as the convention had
originated from Virginia, and his colleagues supposed that some
proposition was expected from them, they had imposed this task on him.
He then commented on the difficulty of the crisis, and the necessity of
preventing the fulfilment of the prophecies of the American downfal.
He observed that in revising the foederal system we ought to inquire 1.
into the properties, which such a government ought to possess, 2. the
defects of the confederation, 3. the danger of our situation & 4. the
remedy.
1. The Character of such a government ought to secure 1. against foreign
invasion: 2. against dissensions between members of the Union, or
seditions in particular States: 3. to procure to the several States
various blessings, of which an isolated situation was incapable: 4. to
be able to defend itself against encroachment: & 5. to be paramount to
the state constitutions.
2. In speaking of the defects of the confederation he professed a high
respect for its authors, and considered them as having done all that
patriots could do, in the then infancy of the science, of constitutions,
& of confederacies,--when the inefficiency of requisitions was
unknown--no commercial discord had arisen among any States--no rebellion
had appeared as in Mass^{ts}--foreign debts had not become urgent--the
havoc of paper money had not been foreseen--treaties had not been
violated--and perhaps nothing better could be obtained from the jealousy
of the states with regard to their sovereignty.
He then proceeded to enumerate the defects. 1. that the confederation
produced no security against foreign invasion; congress not being
permitted to prevent a war nor to support it by their own authority--Of
this he cited many examples; most of which tended to shew, that they
could not cause infractions of treaties or of the law of nations to be
punished: that particular states might by their conduct provoke war
without controul; and that neither militia nor draughts being fit for
defence on such occasions, enlistments only could be successful, and
these could not be executed without money.
2, that the foederal government could not check the quarrels between
states, nor a rebellion in any, not having constitutional power nor
means to interpose according to the exigency.
3, that there were many advantages, which the U. S. might acquire, which
were not attainable under the confederation--such as a productive
impost--counteraction of the commercial regulations of other
nations--pushing of commerce ad libitum,--&c &c.
4, that the foederal government could not defend itself against
encroachments from the states.
5, that it was not even paramount to the state constitutions, ratified
as it was in many of the states.
3. He next reviewed the danger of our situation, appealed to the sense
of the best friends of the U. S. the prospect of anarchy from the laxity
of government every where; and to other considerations.
4. He then proceeded to the remedy; the basis of which he said must be
the republican principle.
He proposed as conformable to his ideas the following resolutions, which
he explained one by one.
1. Resolved that the articles of Confederation ought to be so corrected
& enlarged as to accomplish the objects proposed by their institution;
namely, "common defence, security of liberty, and general welfare."
2. Res^d therefore that the rights of suffrage in the National
Legislature ought to be proportioned to the Quotas of contribution, or
to the number of free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule may seem
best in different cases.