That will make a total of 113 millions a_The Framework of Home Rule

the purchase of 11 million acres under all Acts up to and including that

of 1909. Now, how much more will be required? We have only one recent

official estimate--that made by the Land Commission in 1908 for the

Treasury Committee which sat to consider the crisis in Land Purchase. It

did not pretend to give an accurate forecast, but only to estimate the

maximum amount which would be needed, on the assumption that all unsold

land would eventually be sold at the average price reached under the Act

of 1903.[159] It is certain that the amount so calculated, covering as

it does all classes and descriptions of agricultural land, and including

land farmed by the landlord himself, as well as short-term pasture

tenancies,[160] will considerably exceed the actual requirements. Some

of the unsold land, especially of the pasture land, will never need to

be sold; nor is the average purchase price likely to remain permanently

as high as that obtained under the Act of 1903.

Still, this speculative estimate gives us an outside figure which is

useful. The conclusion from it is that 95 millions may be required to

finance all future sales initiated under the Act of 1909.

But if we want to know how much cash may be wanted, dating from March,

1911, onwards, to finance Land Purchase, we must add the 461/2 millions

needed for sales now agreed upon, and waiting to be carried through, but

not yet completed. That brings the total to 1411/2 millions.

For the reasons given above, I think we might very well strike off 20

from the 95 millions of future sales, and so reduce the total to 1211/2

millions.

Two further questions remain to be considered: (1) Can we assume that in

the future purchase will proceed smoothly? (2) Who pays for the

machinery of Land Purchase, and what is the security for the money

advanced?

1. The Act of 1909 is still young. At the end of March, 1911,

applications had been lodged for the direct sale of 5,477 holdings at a

price of £1,623,526, representing an average of 20-8 years' purchase,

and negotiations were in progress for the purchase by the Congested

Districts Board of estates worth another 11/2 millions. Total, a little

over 3 millions--a substantial amount of business in view of the

artificial acceleration caused by events in 1907 and 1908, the

subsequent reaction, and the enormous arrears of business still

remaining to be cleared up.

We should naturally expect a slight check to purchase under the Act of

1909, since the inducement both to landlord and tenant is less. The

tenant would be inclined to hold out for a lower price because his

annuity is higher (though signs of this check are not yet apparent), and

the landlord is paid in a stock whose market price seems to be slowly

but steadily falling. It is now (November, 1911) at 861/4. On the other

hand, the wise change in the allocation of the bonus places a

much-needed premium on sales of poor land at low prices, and reverses

the process by which a wealthy landlord of good land sometimes obtained

the largest reward for submission to sale.[161] Moreover, there is

constant pressure towards purchase owing to the better financial

position of the purchasing tenant over the non-purchasing or judicial

tenant, while the fear in the landlord's mind of further periodical

reductions in the judicial rents tends to induce him to meet this

pressure halfway.

Still, there is a point beyond which such pressure might not be strong

enough to carry on voluntary Purchase, especially if the 3 per cent,

stock continued to fall. Wide powers of compulsion,[162] covering

considerably more than a third of Ireland, and including the poorest

areas, where purchase is most needed, already exist under the Act of

1909. Some think that general compulsion will be needed. Other

well-informed men count with confidence on completing all the necessary

part of the purchase of Irish land in from twelve to fifteen years under

the existing system. On the other hand, it is necessary to contemplate

the possible need for universal compulsion.

2. Cost of the working of Land Purchase, and security for the money

advanced. It is just as well to make these points perfectly clear, in

view of the legends which obtain circulation about the "giving" of

British money for the purchase of Irish land.

The cost of the Land Purchase machinery falls at present on the

taxpayers of the whole United Kingdom, including, of course, those of

Ireland. It amounted in 1909-10, as I showed in the last chapter, to

£414,500, and for 1911 the estimate is £544,395. This sum includes the

administrative cost of the Land Commission and Estates Commissioners,

the temporary losses on flotation caused in financing, under the Act of

1909, the balance of agreements made under the Act of 1903, and the

bonus to landlords.

The Treasury, in their returns estimating the revenue and expenditure of

various parts of the United Kingdom, debit the whole of this sum against

Ireland, and, moral responsibility apart, I regard it as necessary that,

under Home Rule, Ireland should assume both the cost and the management

of Purchase.

Apart from the annual vote I have mentioned, Land Purchase pays for

itself. The security for the individual holders of the Guaranteed Land

Stock by means of which the purchase money is raised is the Consolidated

Fund of the United Kingdom, but the Consolidated Fund has never been

called upon for a penny, either for interest or capital, and never will

be.

At present the initial security of the Government which controls the

Consolidated Fund--in other words, the initial security of the United

Kingdom taxpayers--is the Irish rates; for the grants in aid of Irish

local taxation still form a guarantee fund chargeable with the unpaid

annuities of defaulting tenants, though they have escaped the liability

for losses on the notation of stock at a discount. The ultimate security

is the purchased land itself; for, in the last resort, a defaulting

tenant who, it must be remembered, is a State tenant, can be sold up.

But the really important security is the tenant himself. The Irish

tenants, treated properly, pay their debts as honestly and punctually as

any other class of men in the world. Annuities in arrear are negligible.

The last Report of the Land Commission shows that out of two million

pounds of annuities due from 165,133 purchasing tenants, and close upon

another two millions of interest (in lieu of rent) upon holdings agreed

to be purchased by 150,490 tenants--a total of nearly four million

pounds--only £28,084 were uncollected on March 31 last. The cases of

hopeless default, leading to a sale of the land, were only fifty-four.

Not a penny has actually been lost.

The State, then, or, if we choose so to put it, the United Kingdom

taxpayers, are safe from loss, and make a good investment. There has

never been the faintest symptom of a strike against annuities, and the

only cause which could conceivably ever suggest such a strike would be

the irritation provoked by a persistent refusal to grant Home Rule. Even

that possibility I regard as out of the question, because there is a

sanctity attaching to annuities which it would be hard to impair. Still,

to speak broadly, it is true that Home Rule will improve a security

already good, and that Home Rule, with financial independence, will make

it absolutely impregnable.

Let me sum up.

More than half the agricultural land of Ireland is sold to the tenants,

or agreed to be sold. Eleven million acres out of 183/4 million acres have

changed hands, or will soon change hands; 315,623 out of 554,060

occupiers now pay annuities or interest in lieu of rent, to the amount

of nearly 4 million pounds. In regard to value, out of a total value of

208 millions for the whole agricultural land of Ireland, 661/2 millions

have actually been advanced for purchase, 461/2 millions are due to be

advanced under signed agreements; and, on the extreme estimate of the

Land Commission, based on the supposition that all the remaining land

will ultimately be sold, 95 millions more will have to be advanced.

Total future liability on the extreme estimate, 1411/2 millions; or, if we

take the more moderate and reasonable figure I suggested, 1211/2 millions.

Now, two conditions must be laid down--

1. Purchase ought to continue.

2. Cheap Imperial credit is necessary for it.

These conditions ought not to entail, beyond a strictly limited point,

the continued control of Purchase by the Imperial Government. That step,

as I suggested at p. 221, might involve Imperial control over (1) the

Congested Districts Board; (2) the whole work of the Land Commission,

outside Purchase, and all Irish land legislation; (3) the Irish police;

because the power of distraint for annuities, the last resource of the

creditor Government, rests, of course, with the arm of the law.

Any one of these consequences, as I have urged, would be inconsistent

with responsible government in Ireland.

What are the objections to Irish control over Purchase, with its

corollary, Irish payment of the running costs of Purchase? Two distinct

interests have to be considered: (1) That of the British taxpayer; (2)

that of the landlord.

1. If we carry out the plan I have advocated, the British taxpayer, as

soon as he ceases to contribute to the diminishing subsidy suggested at

p. 284 in order to meet the initial deficit in the national Irish

balance-sheet, will cease to contribute anything towards the running

costs, landlord's bonus, and flotation losses of a Purchase operation

for the necessity of which Great Britain, in the past, was in reality

responsible. Great Britain is under a moral obligation to continue to

support Land Purchase with her national credit, which is indispensable.

She is also entitled to demand whatever reasonable conditions she thinks

fit, for example, a share in the nomination of Land and Estates

Commissioners; while any new legislation will, in the ordinary course,

need her assent. The security, as I said above, will be impregnable. The

purchasing tenant would become the tenant of the Irish State. The Irish

Government, as a whole, instead of the individual annuitants, would, of

course, be responsible to the Imperial Government, would collect the

annuities itself, and bear any contingent loss by their non-payment. To

repudiate a public obligation of that sort would be as ruinous to

Ireland as the repudiation of a public debt is to any State in the

world.

In point of fact, the Irish Government would find it good policy to

popularize Irish Land Stock in Ireland. At present prices the 3 per

cent, stock is among the cheapest and safest in the world, and would

return to the farmer thrice as much interest as the average bank deposit

which he now favours.

Mercifully, there is no exact historical precedent for such a case as

Ireland, though, on a small scale, Prince Edward Island is an

instructive parallel.[163] But if precedents, in the shape of guaranteed

loans to self-governing Colonies, are needed, they exist. The most

relevant and recent is the Imperial guaranteed loan of 35 millions made

to the Transvaal by Mr. Balfour's Government in 1903 after the great

war. Why it should be a heresy to do for Ireland what we did for the

Transvaal, I am at a loss to conceive. The loan became, of course, an

obligation of the Colony when it received Home Rule, and in 1907 a

further guaranteed loan of 5 millions was authorized, of which 4

millions has been issued. Like Irish Land Stock, these loans are secured

on the Consolidated Fund; but I do not think a fear is now suggested

that the Consolidated Fund is in danger on that account. Prophecies of

that sort were common enough in the mouths of those who opposed

Transvaal Home Rule, but they did not long survive its enactment.

Another precedent is a guaranteed railway loan to Canada in 1873 of

£3,600,000, which is just now becoming redeemable, while the Crown

Colony of Mauritius received a guaranteed loan of £600,000 in 1892. The

British and Irish taxpayers have also made themselves responsible for

£9,424,000 on account of Egypt; £6,023,700 on account of Greece; and

£5,000,000 on account of Turkey. The total nominal amount of the

guaranteed loans to countries, colonial or foreign, outside the United

Kingdom is £63,647,700. The total amount outstanding on March 31, 1911,

was £59,474,200, and the Government holds securities only to the value

of £4,800,556 against these liabilities, leaving the net liability of

the taxpayer at £54,673,644.

The net liability of the taxpayer at the same date on account of Irish

Guaranteed Land Stocks of all descriptions was £65,764,054.[164] Ireland

has a claim to Imperial credit far superior to any of the Colonies,

dependencies, or foreign Powers mentioned, and the credit should not

entail control, or the representation of Ireland at Westminster.

Incidentally, it goes without saying that Ireland, in common with the

Colonies, should receive the very valuable privilege of having

independent loans raised by herself inscribed at the Bank of England,

and made trustee securities.

2. It may be argued that the Congested Districts Board and the Land

Commission, and through them Irish statesmen, may be subjected to local

pressure hostile to the landlord's interests, and that the Irish

Government would feel itself more free for social and other reforms if

the land question were placed legally outside their purview. My answer

is, in the first place, that Great Britain would cease to lend if her

conditions were unfulfilled; in the second place, that in this, as in

all matters, we are bound to place faith in the self-respect and sense

of justice of a free Ireland--in its common prudence, too; for it would

be a disaster whose magnitude is universally recognized in Ireland if

any course were to be taken which prevented the landlord class from

joining in the great work of making a new Ireland. Fair treatment of the

landlords by a free Ireland, as distinguished from fair treatment at the

hands of an external authority, would do more than anything else to

bring about a reconciliation. That is human nature all the world over.

II. MINOR LOANS TO IRELAND.

It remains only to refer briefly to two other cases where Ireland

benefits from Imperial credit.

(1) The Labourers (Ireland) Act of 1906 sanctioned the advance of money

through the Land Commission to Rural Councils for building labourers'

cottages--a class of loans previously made by the Public Works

Commissioners of Ireland. £3,111,816 had been advanced under this head

on March 31, 1911, and £1,138,184 had been applied for. The money is

raised by guaranteed 23/4 per cent, stock in the same way as the money for

Land Purchase.

(2) In addition, there are the loans granted by the Irish Commissioners

of Public Works. In their capacity as lenders, which is only one of a

multitude of capacities, the Commissioners are really a subordinate

branch of the Treasury, and fulfil the same function as the Public Works

Loans Commissioners in Great Britain. They lend principally to local

authorities for all manner of public works and public health

requirements, also to private individuals, mainly for the improvement of

land, and, to a small extent, to Arterial Drainage Boards and to

railways. They get their money from the National Debt Commissioners, and

in 1909-10 issued loans to the amount of £293,233--a figure which shows

a considerable reduction on that of the previous two years.[165] The

total amount of 35,000 outstanding loans on March 31, 1910, was

£9,608,110, of which between two-thirds and three-quarters were due from

local authorities. The interest varies, as in Great Britain, from 23/4 to

5 per cent., according to the nature of the security, and in 1909-10

averaged £3 10s. 6d. Most of the loans are secured on local rates, where

the interest payable is either 31/2 or 33/4 per cent., according to the

period of the loan; others on undertakings such as harbours; and others

on the land for the improvement of which the money is borrowed.

Here, then, are two small and secondary problems. Under Home Rule

Ireland will have no claim to further Imperial credit for loans of

either of the above classes. On the other hand, there is no reason why

the Treasury, if it pleases, and on its own terms, should not lend as

before, though not directly, as it virtually does now, but indirectly,

by loan to the Irish Government. The security will be just as good, and

probably better. If a negligent Local Government Board under Irish

control sanctions reckless loans by local authorities, and a negligent

Irish Government advances for such loans money borrowed from Great

Britain, the Irish Treasury will suffer. Such eventualities need not

seriously be considered. The analogy with the Transvaal and Canada

loans, which were mainly for public works, is very close.

FOOTNOTES:

[152] Parts of this chapter have appeared in a paper by the Author in

"Home Rule Problems."

[153] Agricultural Statistics of Ireland, 1909.

[154] See pp. 10-17, 66-71.

[155] See p. 270-271.

[156] See p. 267.

[157] Cd. 4005, 1908.

[158] This and subsequent figures are taken from an answer to question

in the House of Commons, July 25, 1911, and from the current Exports of

the Land Commission and Estates Commissioners.

[159] Cd. 4412, 1908. The basis taken was the Poor Law valuation of the

lands unsold, multiplied by the number of years purchase of the lands

sold under the Act of 1903. On this basis the value of the land neither

sold nor agreed to be sold in 1908 was £103,931,848. On the basis of

acreage, the estimate worked out at £102,078,448, and on the basis of

holdings (regarded as unreliable by the Commissioners) at £92,660,694.

The total sum required from first to last, including sums already

advanced under all the various Acts, was £208,366,175.

[160] Pasture land let on eleven months' tenancies (a common form of

tenure) counts as untenanted land, and is subject to purchase by the

Land Commissioners, compulsorily, if necessary.

[161] But not always. Heavily mortgaged landlords profited most,

perhaps, under the Act of 1903.

[162] Only once exercised up to October, 1911: over Lord Inchiquin's

estate in Clare, to be acquired for the relief of congestion.

[163] See p. 75. There the loan for compulsory Land Purchase was

ultimately raised by the Dominion of Canada, as one of the conditions

upon which Prince Edward Island entered the Federation in 1873. Under

the Land Purchase Act, passed in 1875 by the Island Legislature, with

the assent of the Dominion, three Commissioners adjudicated upon the

sales; representing the Island Government, the Landlords, and the

Dominion Government respectively.

[164] Finance accounts of the United Kingdom, 1911.

[165] Report of the Commissioners of Public Works, 1910. The amount in

1907-08 was £434,796; in 1908-09, £361,282. The Commissioners have been

lending since 1819, and have lent since that date £48,792,319.

CHAPTER XV

THE IRISH CONSTITUTION[166]

I have dealt with the major issues of Home Rule. The exclusion or

retention of Irish Members at Westminster, and the powers--above all,

the financial powers--of the Irish State, are the two points of cardinal

importance. As I have shown, they are inseparably connected, and form,

in reality, one great question.

I have endeavoured to prove that from whatever angle we approach that

central issue, whether we argue from representation to powers, or from

powers to representation, and whether the particular powers we argue

from be financial, legislative, or executive; whether we place Irish,

British, or Imperial interests in the forefront of our exposition--we

are led irresistibly to the colonial solution--that is, to the cessation

of Irish representation at Westminster, coupled with a concession to

Ireland of the full legislative and executive authority appropriate to

that measure of independence, and, above all, with fiscal autonomy.

All the other provisions of the Bill are secondary. They may be divided

into two categories, which necessarily overlap:

1. Provisions concerning Ireland only.

2. Provisions defining the Imperial authority over Ireland.

The structure of the Irish Legislature, the position of the Irish

Judiciary, the safeguards for minorities, the provision made for

existing servants of the State, the statutory arrangements, if any, for

the future reorganization of the Irish Police--these and other questions

are of great intrinsic importance, and need the most careful discussion;

but they are altogether subordinate to those we have already considered.

If it be over-sanguine to hope, in Ireland's interest, that they will be

discussed in a calm and dispassionate way, we can at least demand that

those provisions belonging to the second category, which present no

appreciable difficulty, will not excite bitter and barren disputes like

those of 1893.

It is not within the scope of this volume to discuss exhaustively the

secondary provisions of the Bill, or to suggest the exact statutory form

which those provisions, major or minor, should take. In this chapter I

shall deal briefly with matters which I have hitherto left aside, and

incidentally give more precision to the points upon which I have already

suggested a conclusion, in both cases indicating, so far as possible,

the most useful precedents and parallels from other Constitutions. The

result will be the rough sketch of a Home Rule Bill.

PREAMBLE.

"Whereas it is expedient that _without impairing or restricting the

supreme authority of Parliament_, an Irish Legislature should be

created, etc." So ran the opening sentence of the Home Rule Bill of

1893. The words I have italicized are harmless but superfluous. They

have never appeared in the Constitutions granted to Colonies, even at

periods when the Colonies were most distrusted. Nothing can impair the

supreme authority of Parliament.

EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY.

In all parts of the Empire, power emanates from the Sovereign, and is

wielded locally in his name.

Section 9 of the British North America Act of 1867 runs as follows: "The

Executive Government and authority of and over Canada is hereby declared

to continue and be vested in the Queen." Similar words are used in the

South Africa Act of 1909, and in the Commonwealth of Australia

Constitution Act of 1900. Curiously enough, these were Acts to legalize

the Federation, or Union, of separate Colonies, and were passed at a

time when the principle embodied needed no affirmation. In earlier Acts

for granting Colonial Constitutions, the principle was taken for

granted, and implied in numerous provisions, but not stated explicitly.

The most recent unitary Constitution, that of the Transvaal (Section

47), was even more reticent, though the principle was none the less

clear. The point is unimportant, and the words used in the Home Rule

Bills of 1886 and 1893 (Clauses 5 and 7 respectively), modified to meet

a change of Sovereign, will serve very well: "The Executive power in

Ireland (or the Executive Government of Ireland) shall continue vested

in His Majesty...."

Thereon follow the provisions for delegation of the Royal authority,

first to the Sovereign's personal Representative in Ireland, and then

through him to the members of the Irish Executive. The simpler these

provisions are, the better. What we know as responsible government has

never been defined in any Act of Parliament. The phrase "responsible

government" has only once appeared in any Constitution--namely, in the

preamble of the Transvaal Constitution granted in 1906, and even then no

attempt was made at definition, though certain sections, like certain

sections in the Australian Constitutions of 1855 and in the later

Federal Acts, inferentially suggested features of responsible

government.

The system is two-sided. Ministers are responsible on the one hand to

the King direct, as in Great Britain, or to the King's Representative,

as in the Colonies, and, on the other hand, to the elected Legislature.

Ireland will resemble a Colony in being a dependent State under a

Representative of the King--namely, the Lord-Lieutenant. This personage,

corresponding to the Colonial Governor, will also have to act in a dual

capacity. On the one hand he will be responsible to the King, or,

virtually, to the British Cabinet, and, on the other hand, he will be

bound by an unwritten law to nominate for the Government of Ireland

persons acceptable to the elected Legislature, and in Irish matters to

act by their advice in all normal circumstances.

Let us dispose first of the relation of the Ministers and of other

public officials to the Legislature. There will be no question,

presumably, of giving statutory power to this relation. It is an

unwritten custom--(1) that Ministers must be members of one branch of

the Legislature; (2) that they must hold the confidence of the elected

branch; (3) that, as a Cabinet, they stand or fall together; and,

lastly, (4) that all non-political officials are excluded from the

Legislature. The first and the last of these conventions have taken

legal form in some isolated cases;[167] the other two appear in no

statute that has yet been framed.[168]

Neither have the functions in practice exercised by the Ministry or

Cabinet, nor the relations which in practice exist between it and the

King's Representative, ever had statutory definition. Whatever form the

Home Rule Bill takes, it cannot give legal precision to these things.

The King's Representative always nominates an Executive Council--that

is, a Cabinet to "advise" him in the Government, and whether, as in the

Bill of 1893, that Council is called an Executive Committee of the Privy

Council of Ireland by analogy with the Dominion of Canada, where it is

the "King's Privy Council for Canada," or whether it is merely an

Executive Council is immaterial. That it is, nominally, the

constitutional duty of the King's Representative (like that of the King

himself) to perform executive acts on the advice of his Ministers is

never stated expressly. He is always, and generally in the text of the

Constitution, vested with the power of summoning, proroguing, and

dissolving the Legislature, and of giving or withholding the Royal

Assent to Bills. He also, by unwritten law, wields the prerogative of

Pardon, and appoints all public servants; and in all these cases, except

in the case of appointing non-political officials, he occasionally has

to act on his own personal responsibility.

This personal responsibility cannot be distinguished in practice from

his responsibility to the Crown, which appoints and can remove him.

Cases have arisen where the Governor of a self-governing Colony has

written home for special guidance on some specific point, and where the

answer given has been that he must act on his own responsibility, or

follow the advice of his Ministers. All Colonial Governors, however,

whether or not their powers are defined in the Constitution, are

appointed by Commission from the Crown with powers defined in Letters

Patent and Instructions as to their exercise. These Letters Patent and

Instructions are not of much importance in the case of a self-governing

Colony where responsible advice so largely controls the action of the

Governor. Sometimes the executive powers given by Instructions to the

Governor are indirectly alluded to in the Constitution, as in the South

Africa Act of 1909, where, by Clause 9, under the head of "Executive

Government," the Governor-General is "to exercise such powers and

functions of the King as His Majesty may be pleased to assign to him."

In the Australian and Canadian Acts of 1900 and 1867 respectively, the

words do not appear. I name this point because in Clause 5 of the Home

Rule Bill of 1893, and Clause 7 of the Bill of 1886, a similar course

was taken in providing that the Lord-Lieutenant should "exercise any

prerogatives, or other executive power of the Queen, the exercise of

which may be delegated to him by Her Majesty." The words are not

strictly necessary. The Lord-Lieutenant will, of course, have his

Letters Patent and Instructions, but the powers of the Crown are

theoretically absolute. If the Crown, acting under responsible British

advice, should wish to defy the Irish Legislature, it could do so

whatever the terms of the Bill.

Naturally, there will be certain Imperial and non-Irish matters in which

the Lord-Lieutenant will act primarily under the orders of the British

Cabinet, and the Departmental British Minister primarily responsible for

Irish-Imperial matters would be the Home Secretary.[169]

The question may be raised, as in 1893 (July 3, Hansard), whether a

staff of Imperial officials ought not to be set up to conduct any

Imperial business which has to be done in Ireland, on the analogy of the

Federal staff in the United States. I hope Mr. Gladstone's answer will

still hold good--that no such staff is needed; that the Irish officials

will be responsible, and ought, on the Home Rule principle, to be

trusted, as they are trusted in the Colonies.

The Royal Assent to Bills is always a matter for express enactment in

the Constitution, but here the "instructions" of the Governor, and even

his personal "discretion," have generally been alluded to in recent

Constitutions, whether conferred by Act or Letters Patent. The typical

form of words is that the Governor "shall declare his Assent according

to his discretion, but subject to His Majesty's instructions."[170] The

Home Rule Bill of 1893 left out reference to "discretion," and, on the

other hand, is, I think, the only document of the kind in which the

"advice of the Executive Council" has ever been expressly alluded to,

although the practice, of course, is that the Assent, normally, is given

or withheld on that advice. The Transvaal Constitution of 1906 (Section

39) was unique in prescribing that special instructions must be received

by the Governor in the case of each proposed law, before the Assent is

given. I hope that will not be made a precedent for Ireland. Such

precautions only irritate the law-makers, and serve no useful purpose.

Colonial Governors, besides the power of Assent and Veto, may "reserve"

Bills for the Royal pleasure, which is to be signified within two years.

Moreover, Bills which have received the Governor's Assent may be

disallowed within one or two years.[171] Neither of these provisions

appeared in the Home Rule Bills of 1886 and 1893, and neither appear to

be strictly necessary, owing to the proximity of Ireland. Whatever is

done, we may hope that the practice now established in Canada, where the

Federal Government never disallows a provincial law on any other ground

than that it is _ultra vires_, and, _a fortiori_, the similar practice

as between Great Britain and the Dominions, may be imitated in the case

of Ireland.

To sum up, the terse and simple words of the Bill of 1886 really

enunciate all that is necessary:

[Sidenote: Constitution of the Executive Authority.]

"7.--(1) The Executive Government of Ireland shall continue vested in

(Her) Majesty, and shall be carried on by the Lord-Lieutenant on behalf

of (Her) Majesty with the aid of such officers and such council as to

Her Majesty may from time to time seem fit.

"(2) Subject to any instructions which may from time to time be

given by (Her) Majesty, the Lord-Lieutenant shall give or withhold

the assent of (Her) Majesty to Bills passed by the Irish

Legislative Body, and shall exercise the prerogatives of (Her)

Majesty in respect of the summoning, proroguing, and dissolving of

the Irish Legislative Body, and any prerogatives the exercise of

which may be delegated to him by (Her) Majesty."

LORD-LIEUTENANT AND CIVIL LIST.

The restriction as to the religion of the Lord-Lieutenant will, of

course, be removed. There is no reason why his term of office should be

limited by law. His salary, payable by Ireland, should perhaps be stated

in the Act, as in the case of Canada and South Africa, though not in

that of Australia. Australia, on the other hand, has a statutory Civil

List, and a fixed Civil List was an invariable feature of the old

Constitutions given to self-governing Colonies. Canada and South Africa

are under no such restrictions, and it would be very inexpedient to

impose them upon Ireland.

LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY.

The Irish Legislature will be given power, according to the historic

phrase, "to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of

Ireland," subject to restrictions afterwards named. That the laws should

be only "in respect of matters exclusively relating to Ireland or some

part thereof" goes without saying, and need not be copied from the Bill

of 1893 (Clause 2). Nor need the superfluous proviso in the same clause

be reproduced, asserting the "supreme power and authority of the

Parliament of the United Kingdom." The supreme power becomes none the

more supreme for such assertions. Clause 2 of the Bill of 1886 is simple

and decisive:

"2. With the exceptions of and subject to the restrictions in this

Act mentioned, it shall be lawful for (Her) Majesty (the Queen), by

and with the advice of the Irish Legislative Body, to make laws for

the peace, order, and good government of Ireland, and by any such

law to alter and repeal any law in Ireland."

With the restrictions on the powers of the Legislature I dealt fully

enough in Chapter X.,[172] and I need only summarize my conclusions:

1. _Reservations of Imperial Authority._--The Irish Legislature should

_not_ have power to make laws upon--

{The Crown or a Regency.

{Making of War or Peace.

{Prize and Booty of War.

{Army or Navy.

{Foreign Relations and Treaties (excepting Commercial Treaties).

{Conduct as Neutrals.

{Titles and Dignities.

{Extradition.

{Treason.

Coinage.

Naturalization and Alienage.

Reservation of the nine subjects included in the bracket is implied,

without enactment, in all colonial Constitutions, but in the Irish Bill

it is no doubt necessary that all reserved powers should be formally

specified.

All powers not specifically reserved will belong to the Irish

Legislature, subject to those restrictions, constitutional or statutory,

which in matters like Trade and Navigation, Copyright, Patents, etc.,

bind the whole Empire.

Section 32 of the Bill of 1893, borrowed from the Colonial Laws Validity

Act, will no doubt be applied.

2. _Minority Safeguards_.--This point, too, I dealt with in Chapter

X.[173] Let the Nationalist Members come forward and frankly accept any

prohibitory clauses which the fears of the minority may suggest,

provided that they do not impair the ordinary legislative power which

every efficient Legislature must enjoy. Almost every conceivable

safeguard for the protection of religion, denominational education, and

civil rights was inserted in the Bill of 1893, including even some of

the "slavery" Amendments to the United States Constitution. The list may

require revision--(_a_) in view of the recent establishment of the

National University, and the disappearances of all apprehension about

the status of Trinity College, Dublin; (_b_) in regard to an

extraordinarily wide Sub-clause (No. 9) about interference with

Corporations; (_c_) in regard to the words, "in accordance with settled

principles and precedents," which appeared in Sub-clause (No. 8)

(Legislature to make no law "Whereby any person may be deprived of life,

liberty, or property without due process of law[174] _in accordance with

settled principles and precedents_," etc.). A debate on this question

may be found in Hansard, May 30, 1893. The words italicized were added

in Committee on the motion of Mr. Gerald Balfour, though the

Attorney-General declared that they gave no additional strength to the

phrase "due process of law," while they certainly appear calculated to

provoke litigation. Sir Henry James appeared to think that they made the

suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act _ultra vires._ If that is their

effect, there is no reason why they should be inserted. Even a Canadian

Province, whose powers are more limited than those of the subordinate

States in any other Federation, has "exclusive" powers within its own

borders over "property and civil rights,"[175] and can, beyond any

doubt, suspend the Habeas Corpus Act, if it pleases.

The same superfluous words appeared in Sub-clause (No. 9) about

Corporations.

THE IRISH LEGISLATURE.[176]

As I urged in Chapter X., this is a subject in which large powers of

constitutional revision--much larger than those contained in either of

the Home Rule Bills--should be given to the Irish Legislature itself,

corresponding to the powers given by statute to the self-governing

Colonies, and to the powers always held by the constituent States of a

Federation. In the Bill itself it would be wisest to follow beaten

tracks as far as possible, and not to embark on experiments. Present

conditions are, unhappily, very unfavourable for the elaboration of any

scheme ideally fit for Ireland.

_A Bi-Cameral Legislature._--Working on this principle, we must affirm

that Ireland's position, without representation in the Imperial

Parliament, would certainly make a Second Chamber requisite. Three of

the Provinces within the Federation of Canada (Manitoba, British

Columbia, and Ontario) prefer to do without Second Chambers--so do most

of the Swiss Cantons--but all the Federal Legislatures of the world are

bi-cameral, and all the unitary Constitutions of self-governing Colonies

have been, or are, bi-cameral.

_The Upper Chamber._--One simple course would be to constitute the Upper

Chamber of a limited number of Irish Peers, chosen by the whole of their

number, as they are chosen at present for representation in the House of

Lords. Historical and practical considerations render this course out of

the question, though some people would be fairly sanguine about the

success of such a body in commanding confidence, on the indispensable

condition that all representation at Westminster were to cease. It has

been membership, before the Union of an ascendency Parliament, and after

the Union of an absentee Parliament, which has kept the bulk of the

Irish peerage in violent hostility to the bulk of the Irish people.

Those Peers who seek and obtain a career in an Irish popular

Legislature--to both branches of which they will, of course, be

eligible--will be able to do valuable service to their country. The same

applies to all landlords. Now that land reform is converting Ireland

itself into a nation of small landholders, who, in most countries, are

very Conservative in tendency, the ancient cleavage is likely to

disappear. Indeed, an ideal Second Chamber ought perhaps to give special

weight to urban and industrial interests, while aiming, not at an

obstructive, but at a revising body of steady, moderate, highly-educated

business men.

We have to choose one of two alternatives: a nominated or an elective

chamber. The choice is difficult, for second chambers all over the world

may be said to be on their trial. On the other hand, nothing vital

depends upon the choice, for experience proves that countries can

flourish equally under every imaginable variety of second chamber,

provided that means exist for enabling popular wishes, in the long-run,

to prevail. The European and American examples are of little use to us,

and the widely varied types within the Empire admit of no sure

inferences. Allowance must be made for the effect of the Referendum

wherever it exists (as in Australia and Switzerland), as a force tending

to weaken both Chambers, but especially the Upper Chamber of a

Legislature. It does, indeed, seem to be generally admitted, even by

Canadians, that the nominated Senate of the Dominion of Canada, which is

added to on strict party principles by successive Governments, is not a

success, and it was so regarded by the Australian Colonies when they

entered upon Federation, and set up an elective Senate. The South

African statesmen, who had to reckon with racial divisions similar to

those in Ireland, compromised with a Senate partly nominated, partly

elected, but made the whole arrangement revisable in ten years.[177]

It would be desirable, perhaps, on similar grounds of immediate policy,

to let those who now represent the minority in Ireland have a deciding

voice in the matter. No arrangement made otherwise than by a free

Ireland herself can be regarded as final, and I suggest only that a

nominated Chamber would be the best expedient at the outset, or in the

alternative a partly nominated, partly elected Chamber.

If and in so far as the Upper Chamber is elective, should election be

direct or indirect? There is a somewhat attractive Irish precedent for

indirect election, namely, the present highly successful Department of

Agriculture, whose Council and Boards the County Councils have a share

in constituting,[178] and I have seen and admired a most ingenious

scheme of Irish manufacture for constructing the whole Irish Legislature

and Ministry on this principle. But the objections appear to be

considerable. Local bodies in the future should not be mixed up in

national politics. That has been their bane in the past. Besides, the

principle of indirect election is under a cloud everywhere, most of all

in the United States. Australia rejected it in 1900, and the South

Africans, while giving it partial recognition in the Senate, made the

expedient provisional.

_The Lower House_.--The Lower House might very well be elected on the

same franchise and from the same constituencies as at present, subject

to any small redistributional modifications necessitated by changes of

population. This is certainly a matter which Ireland should have full

power to settle for itself subsequently.

Lord Courtney's proposals for Proportional Representation[179] merit

close consideration and possess great attractions, especially in view of

their very favourable reception from Nationalists in Ireland. My own

feeling is that such novel proposals may overload a Bill which, however

simply it be framed, will provoke very long and very warm discussion. If

the system were to be regarded by the present minority as a real

safeguard for their interests, its establishment, on tactical grounds

alone, would be worth any expenditure of time and trouble; but, if they

accept the assumption that existing parties in Ireland are going to be

stereotyped under Home Rule, and then point to the paucity of Unionists

in all parts of Ireland but the north-east of Ulster, they can

demonstrate that no _practicable_ enlargement of constituencies could

seriously influence the results of an election. My own view, already

expressed, is that, provided we give Ireland sufficient freedom, wholly

new parties must, within a short time, inevitably be formed in Ireland,

and the old barriers of race and religion be broken down, and,

therefore, that all expedients devised on the contrary hypothesis will

eventually prove to be needless and might even prove unpopular and

inconvenient. On the other hand, merits are claimed, with a great show

of reason, for Proportional Representation, which are altogether

independent of the protection of minorities from oppression. It is

claimed that the system brings forward moderate men of all shades of

opinion, checks party animus, and steadies the policy of the State. But

I think that a free Ireland should be the judge of these merits. At

present the bulk of the people do not understand the subject, and need

much education before they can appreciate the issue.

Meanwhile, the conventional party system, based on conventional

constituencies, will, to say the least, do no more harm to Ireland than

to any other State in the Empire. Any minor defects will be

infinitesimal beside the vast and beneficial change wrought by

responsible government.

DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO HOUSES.

It is essential to provide for this, and it would be difficult to better

the proposal in the Bill of 1893: that after two years, or an

intervening dissolution, the question should be decided by a joint vote

in joint session.

MONEY BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS.

To originate in the Lower House on the motion of a Minister.

POLICE.

The Royal Irish Constabulary and Dublin Metropolitan Police should be

under Irish control from the first. The former force will undoubtedly

have to be reconstituted, and its reconstitution, as an ordinary Civil

Police, ought to be undertaken by the Irish Government, but the

financial interests of "retrenched" officers and men should be

safeguarded in the Bill itself.

JUDGES.

All future appointments should be made by the Irish Government, without

the suspensory period of six years named in the Bill of 1893. Present

Irish Judges should retain their appointments, as in both previous

Bills. The precedent of Canada, where provincial Judges, unlike the

State Judges of Australia, are appointed and paid by the Federal

Government, is certainly not relevant.

LAW COURTS.

The Federal analogy, except in one particular noticed under the next

heading, has no application to Ireland. Only one provision of any

importance is needed, namely, that Appeals, in the last resort, should

be to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council instead of to the

House of Lords. The Judicial Committee is the final Court of Appeal for

the whole Empire, and, strengthened by one or more Irish Judges, should

hear Irish Appeals. It is true that the tribunal has been subjected to

some criticism lately, especially from Australia. Federal States

naturally wish to secure pre-eminent authority for their own Supreme

Courts. But the tribunal is, on the whole, popular with the colonial

democracies, and the argument from distance and expense does not apply

to Ireland. At the end of an interesting discussion at the last Imperial

Conference, in which suggestions were put forward for strengthening the

Judicial Committee by Colonial Judges, it was agreed that new proposals

should be made by the Imperial Government for an Imperial Final Court of

Appeal in two divisions, one for the United Kingdom, another for the

Colonies. If that step is taken, the position of Ireland will need fresh

consideration.[180]

DECISION OF CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.[181]

The validity of an Irish Act which has received the Royal Assent will,

like that of a Colonial Act which has received the Royal Assent, be

determined in the ordinary course by the Irish Courts, with an ultimate

appeal to the Judicial Committee, which should be strengthened for the

occasion by one or more Irish Judges. But both the previous Home Rule

Bills made the convenient provision that the Lord-Lieutenant should have

the power of referring questions of validity arising on a Bill, before

its enactment, to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council for final

decision. There is a useful Canadian precedent for this provision, in

the Imperial Act passed in 1891, for giving the Governor-General in

Council power, in the widest terms, to refer, _inter alia_, questions

touching provincial legislation to the Supreme Court of Canada, with an

appeal from it to the Judicial Committee.[182] To follow this precedent

would not involve any Federal complications.

EXCHEQUER JUDGES.

If Ireland controls her own Customs and Excise, no provision for this

tribunal appears to be necessary, unless it be that some counterpart is

needed for the Colonial Courts of Admiralty.[183] The Bill of 1886

(Clause 20) limited the jurisdiction to revenue questions. The Bill of

1893 (Clause 19) widened it to include "any matter not within the power

of the Irish Legislature," or "any matter affected by a law which the

Irish Legislature have not power to repeal or alter." The minds of the

authors of this clause were evidently affected by the Federal principle

which involves two judicial authorities--one for Federal, one for

provincial matters. There seems to be no reason for embarking on any

such complications in the case of Ireland.

SAFEGUARDS FOR EXISTING PUBLIC SERVANTS IN IRELAND.[184]

Retrenchment, and in some departments drastic retrenchment, will be

needed in the Irish public service, just as it was needed in the

Transvaal after the grant of Home Rule to that Colony. It is highly

desirable that statutory provision should be made safeguarding existing

interests. No such provision was made in the case of the Transvaal, and

some bad feeling resulted. The past responsibility for excessive Civil

expenditure lies, of course, on Great Britain, as it lay in the case of

the Transvaal, and on grounds of abstract justice it would have been

fair in that case for Great Britain to have assumed a limited part of

the expense of compensating retrenched public servants. The practical

objections to such a policy are, however, very great. In this, as in all

matters, Ireland will gain more by independence than by financial aid,

however strongly justified. All payments should be a direct charge upon

the Irish Exchequer, not, as in some cases under the Bill of 1893, upon

the Imperial Exchequer in the first instance, with provision for

repayment from Ireland.

FINANCE.

I summarize the conclusions already indicated in previous chapters:

1. Fiscal independence, with complete control over all Irish taxation

and expenditure.

2. Initial deficit to be supplied by a grant-in-aid, diminishing

annually and terminable in a short period, say, seven years.

3. Future contribution to Imperial services to be voluntary.

4. Remission to Ireland of her share of the National Debt, and

relinquishment by Ireland of her share of the Imperial Miscellaneous

Revenue.

5. Imperial credit for Land Purchase to be extended as before, by loans

guaranteed on the Consolidated Fund, under any conditions now or

hereafter to be made by the Imperial authorities.

Loans to the Public Works Commissioners to be optional.

REPRESENTATION AT WESTMINSTER.

To cease.

CONFERENCE BETWEEN THE IRISH AND IMPERIAL AUTHORITIES.

This is a very important point, because friendly consultation, as at

present with the Colonies, will take the place of Irish representation

in the Imperial Parliament, and will prove a far more satisfactory means

of securing harmony and co-operation. Arrangements similar to those of

the Imperial Conference, only more precise and efficient, and of a

permanent character, should be made for consultation between the Irish

and British authorities on all subjects where the interests of the two

countries touch one another. The need for more frequent consultation

with the Colonies is being felt with increasing force, and although no

permanent consultation body has yet been created, special _ad hoc_

conferences have recently been held--for Defence in 1909, and for

amount of varied topics are discussed, and the most valuable decisions

arrived at.[185]

What the precise machinery should be in the case of Anglo-Irish

relations I do not venture to say. The Ministers of the respective

countries will be so easily accessible to one another that there would

seem to be no need for the frequent attendance of a powerful personnel

at joint meetings. But a Standing Committee, with a small official

staff, would be necessary.

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT.[186]

For amendment of the Home Rule Act itself it is not possible to make any

statutory provision. Like all Constitutional Acts, it will only be

alterable by another Imperial statute, which, if it were needed, should

be promoted by Ireland. But one of the most important clauses in the Act

itself will be that defining Ireland's power to amend her own

Constitution without coming to Parliament. I venture to repeat the view

that this power should be as wide as possible, consistently with the

maintenance of the Imperial authority, and subject, of course, to

provisions prescribing--(1) a time-limit for the initial arrangements;

(2) the method of ascertaining Irish opinion; and (3) the majority in

the Legislature, or in the electorate, or in both, necessary to sanction

a constitutional change.[187] If a Home Rule Constitution, passed into

law in the heat of a party fight at Westminster, proves to be perfect, a

miracle will have been performed unparalleled in the history of the

Empire. At this moment a Committee of Ireland's ablest men of all

parties should be at work upon it, with an instructed public opinion

behind them. So only are good Constitutions made, and even the very best

need subsequent amendment.

FOOTNOTES:

[166] For details of prior Home Rule Bills, see the Appendix.

[167] The Victorian and South Australian Constitutions of 1855 state in

clear terms that the Ministry must be members of the Legislature, and

all the Australian Constitutions of the same date, except that of

Tasmania, formally exclude all other officials from the Legislature. The

Transvaal Constitution of 1906 made no reference to either point; nor do

the Federating Acts of 1867, 1900, and 1909 for Canada, Australia, and

South Africa.

[168] A fifth custom, very common, of compelling new Ministers to seek

re-election is incorporated in most of the Australian Constitutions, but

was expressly ruled out in Section 47 of the Transvaal Constitution of

1906.

[169] See Hansard, July 3, 1893, Speech of Mr. John Morley.

[170] The words "subject to this Constitution" or "subject to this Act"

are sometimes added, but have no special significance. The Australian

Commonwealth Constitution Act does not mention the Governor's

"instructions," but only his "discretion."

[171] British North America Act, 1867, Sects. 55-57; Commonwealth of

Australia Constitution Act, 1900, Sects. 58-60.

[172] See especially pp. 213-229.

[173] See pp. 223-225.

[174] Taken from Amendment XIV. to the United States Constitution,

passed July 28, 1866.

[175] British North America Act, 1867, Sect. 92 (13). But the Province

may not encroach on powers reserved to the Dominion--e.g., in bankruptcy

(Gushing v. Depuy [before Jud. Comm. of Privy Council]). See the

"Constitution of Canada," J.E.C. Munro, pp. 247-253. There has been much

litigation over points where Dominion and Federal powers overlapped.

(See "Federations and Unions of the British Empire," H.E. Egerton, pp.

151-153).

[176] For the proposals of the Bills of 1886 and 1893, see Appendix.

[177] South Africa Act, 1909, Sects. 24 and 25.

[178] See pp. 155-162.

[179] See Pamphlet No. 17, published by Proportional Representation

Society, and an excellent paper by Mr. J.F. Williams in "Home Rule

Problems."

[180] Cd. 5741, 1911, pp. 46-51.

[181] See Appendix and the Bill of 1886, Clause 25; Bill of 1893, Clause

22.

[182] 54 and 55 Vict., Ch. 25, Sect. 4.

[183] Courts of Admiralty in the Colonies are regulated by Imperial

Acts, though by an Act of 1890 large powers were conferred on the

Colonies of declaring ordinary Courts to be Courts of Admiralty (see

Moore's "Commonwealth of Australia," pp. 11 and 251).

[184] See Clauses 27-30 of the Bill of 1886, and Clauses 25-28 of the

Bill of 1893.

[185] See the Precis of Proceedings, Cd. 5741, 1911.

[186] See pp. 225-227.

[187] See Section 128 of the Australia Constitution Act, 1900, and

Section 152 of the South Africa Act, 1909.

CONCLUSION

Is it altogether idle to hope that some such body will yet come into

existence, if not in time to influence the drafting of the Bill, at any

rate to bring to bear upon its provisions the sober wisdom, not of one

party only in the State, but of all; and so, if it were possible, to

give to the charter of Ireland in her "new birth of freedom" the

sanction of a united people?

Home Rule will eventually come. Within the Empire, the utmost achieved

by the government of white men without their own consent is to weaken

their capacity to assume the sacred responsibility of self-government.

It is impossible to kill the idea of Home Rule, though it is possible,

by retarding its realization, to pervert some of its strength and

beauty, and to diminish the vital energy on which its fruition depends.

And it is possible in the case of Ireland, up to and in the very hour of

her emancipation, after a struggle more bitter and exhausting than any

in the Empire, to heap obstacles in the path of the men who have carried

her to the goal, and on whom in the first instance must fall the

extraordinarily difficult and delicate task of political reconstruction.

They will be on their mettle in the eyes of the world to prove that the

prophets of evil were wrong, to show sympathy and inspire confidence in

the very quarters where they have been most savagely traduced and least

trusted, and they will have to exhibit dauntless courage in attacking

old abuses and promoting new reforms. They will need their hands

strengthened in every possible way.

The help must come--and it cannot come too soon--from the working

optimists of Ireland, from the hundreds of men and women, of both

parties and creeds, who are labouring outside politics to extirpate that

stifling undergrowth of pessimism which runs riot in countries denied

the light and air of freedom. All these people agree on the axiom that

Ireland has a distinct individual existence, and that her future depends

upon herself. No one should dare to stop there. Let him who feels

impelled to stop there at any rate act with open eyes. In expecting to

realize social reconstruction without political reconstruction--however

divergent the aims may now seem to be--he expects to achieve what has

never been achieved in any country in the Empire, and to achieve this

miracle in the very country which has suffered most from political

repression, and possesses the most fantastic system of government to be

found in the King's dominions. The thing is impossible, and if at bottom

he feels it to be so, and inclines sadly to the view that political

servitude is but the least of two evils, I would only venture to suggest

this: Is it not a finer course to stake something on a risk run in every

white community but Ireland rather than to face the certainty of half

achievement? And is it not, after all, a sound risk to trust the very

men who now respond to the appeal for self-reliance, mutual tolerance,

and united effort in their private affairs, not to renounce these

qualities and abuse the rights of citizenship when the public affairs of

their country are under their own control?

As for the risk to Great Britain, I have only this last word to say: Let

her people, not for the first time, show that they can rise superior to

the philosophy, as fallacious in effect as it is base and cowardly in

purpose, which sets the safety of a great nation above the happiness and

prosperity of a small one. Within the last few weeks the wheel has

turned full circle, and the almost inexplicable contradiction which has

existed for so long between Unionism and Imperialism has been

illuminated with a frank cynicism rare in our public life. It is being

said that the freedom given to Canada cannot be given to Ireland,

because the separation from the Empire theoretically rendered possible

by such a step would be immaterial in the case of Canada, which is

distant, but perilous in the case of Ireland, which is near. If this be

Imperialism, it should stink in the nostrils of every decent citizen at

home and abroad.

It is true, to our shame, that, by little more than an accident, Canada

obtained the freedom which gave her people harmony, energy, and wealth

in the teeth of this mean and selfish doctrine. But Lord Durham took a

higher view. Let me recall the memorable words which he added to his

long and brilliant argument for liberty as a source, not only of

domestic regeneration, but of affection and loyalty to the Motherland:

"_But at any rate our first duty is to secure the well-being of our

colonial countrymen;_ and if, in the hidden decrees of that wisdom by

which this world is ruled, it is written that these countries are not

for ever to remain portions of the Empire, we owe it to our honour to

take good care that, when they separate from us, they should not be the

only countries on the American continent in which the Anglo-Saxon race

shall be found unfit to govern itself."

Lord Durham was doubly right; in his prophecy of the closer union

liberty would promote, and in elementary law which he laid down, of

moral obligation which, whatever the result, he held superior to

dynastic calculations. It is a fact of ominous significance that the

intellectual successors of the men who most hotly repudiated both these

doctrines in 1838 are being driven by pressure of their Irish views to

revive that repudiation in 1911, and to revive it in the midst of the

most effusive protestations of the need for still closer union with a

Colony which would either have undergone the fate of Ireland or have

ceased to be a member of the Empire if their philosophy had triumphed. I

do not believe there is any conscious cant in that flagrant

contradiction, but I do firmly believe that so long as their error about

Ireland poisons in them the springs of Imperial thought, some element of

fallacy lies in any Imperial policy they undertake. In common prudence,

at any rate, they should avoid telling Canada, while beckoning her

nearer to the heart of the Empire, that they only gave her freedom

because she was so far.

But I rely still on an awakening, on a fundamental change of spirit. The

Empire owes everything to those who have disputed, sometimes at the cost

of their lives, illegitimate authority. Some day the politicians who now

spend sleepless nights with paste and scissors in ransacking the ancient

files of the world's Press for proofs that Mr. Redmond once used words

signifying that he aimed at "separation"--whatever that phrase may

mean--will regret that they ever demeaned themselves by such petty

labour, and will place Mr. Redmond among the number of those who have

saved the Empire from the consequences of its own errors.

APPENDIX

COMPARATIVE TABLE, SHOWING THE PRINCIPAL PROVISIONS OF THE HOME RULE

BILLS OF 1886 AND 1893

HOME RULE BILL OF 1886. HOME RULE BILL OF 1893.

THE IRISH LEGISLATURE.

To consist of the Crown and _Two To consist of the Crown and

Orders_, sitting together, and _Two Houses_, sitting separately.

unless either Order demands a

separate vote, voting together.

1. _First Order_, to consist of 1. _Council_, of 48 Councillors

_(a)_ 75 members elected on a £25 elected on a £20 franchise from

franchise from a new set of a new set of constituencies.

constituencies. Term of office, Term of office, eight years.

ten years. _(b)_ 28 Peerage

members, to give place by

degrees to elective members as in

_(a)_.

_2. Second Order_, 204 members 2. _Assembly_ of 103 members

elected as at present. Two from each elected as at present.

constituency (with an alteration

in the case of Cork).

Dissolution at least every five Dissolution at least every five

years. years.

_Money Bills_ and votes to

originate in the Assembly.

DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN ORDERS OR HOUSES.

After three years or a After two years or a

dissolution question to be dissolution question to be

decided by joint vote. decided by joint vote in

joint session.

ESTRICTIONS ON IRISH LEGISLATURE.

1. _Imperial Matters_.

_No power to make laws about_--

_Nor_ with: the Lord-Lieutenant,

The Crown, War or Peace, Army or conduct as Neutrals, Extradition,

Navy, Volunteers or Militia, Trade-marks, nor (for six years)

Prize or Booty of War, Treaties, Post Office in or out of

Titles, Treason, Naturalization, Ireland.

Trade or Navigation,

Lighthouses, etc., Coinage, But Trade _within Ireland_ and

(except within Ireland). Ireland.

2. _Irish Matters.

No power to make laws for the purpose of_--

(1) _Establishing or endowing (1) Ditto, ditto, but more

any religion_ or imposing explicit and far-reaching.

disabilities or conferring

privileges on account of

_religion_, or affecting the

undenominational constitution

of National schools, etc.

(2) Impairing rights or property (2) Ditto, ditto, or "without

of corporations, without address for due process of law" and

both Orders and consent of Crown. compensation.

(3) Depriving anyone of _life,

liberty, or property_ without

due process of law in accordance

with settled precedents, or

denying _equal protection of

laws_, or taking property

without _just compensation_.

(4) Imposing disabilities or

conferring privileges on account

of _birth, parentage, or place

of business_.

(5) (_For three years_)

respecting relations of

_landlord and tenant_ or the

purchase and letting of _land_

generally.

IRISH REPRESENTATION IN IMPERIAL PARLIAMENT.

To cease altogether (except in Ireland to send 80 members to

the case of a proposed Westminster (instead of 103).

alteration of the Home Rule Act). Peers as before.

EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY.

The Crown, as represented by the Lord-Lieutenant, acting in Irish

affairs with the advice of an Irish Cabinet responsible to the Irish

Legislature.

POWER OF VETO ON IRISH LEGISLATION.

To be held by Lord-Lieutenant To be held by Lord-Lieutenant,

(acting normally on the advice _acting on advice of Irish

of Irish Cabinet?), but subject Cabinet_, but subject to

to instructions from Imperial instructions from Imperial

Government. Government.

FINANCE.

1. _Taxation_.

_Customs and Excise_ still to be (1) _For six years_ all existing

levied by Imperial Parliament and taxes to continue to be imposed

collected by Imperial officers. by Imperial Parliament and

All other taxes to be under Irish collected by Imperial officers.

control.

Ireland to have power to impose

additional taxes of her own.

(2) _After six years_, Customs

and Excise to remain Imperial

taxes; all others to be under

Irish control. But Excise to be

collected, though not levied,

by Ireland.

2. _Ireland's Revenue_.

_Gross_ revenue collected in (1) _True_ Irish revenue from

Ireland from Imperial and Irish Imperial taxes (_i.e._, with

taxes and Crown Lands, etc.; allowance made for duties

_plus_ an Imperial grant towards collected in Ireland on

the cost of Irish Police. (Total articles consumed in Great

cost at that time £1,500,000: Britain, and _vice versa_).

Ireland to pay £1,000,000,

Treasury any surplus over (2) Revenue from Irish taxes

£1,000,000, until cost reduced and Crown Lands.

to that point.)

(3) Imperial grant of one-third

of annual cost of Irish Police

(equal in first year to

£486,000).

3. _Ireland's Contribution to Imperial Exchequer_.

(1) _For thirty years_ Ireland (1) _For six years_ Ireland to

to pay fixed annual maximum sums, pay _one-third of the "true"

representing Ireland's share of revenue raised in Ireland from

(a) Army, Navy, Civil List, etc.; Imperial taxes and Crown

(b) National Debt. Payments not Lands_. (Estimated share for

to be increased, but might be first year, £2,276,000, or

diminished. Share for Army, Navy, about one-twenty-eighth of

etc., never to exceed total Imperial expenditure.)

one-fifteenth of total cost.

Total payments under these heads

for first year, £3,242,000.

(2) _After thirty years_, (2) _After six years_, both

contribution _to be revisable_. method and amount of

Ireland's contribution to be

revised and settled afresh.

4. _Contribution to Special War Taxes_.

Optional to Ireland. For six years compulsory on

Ireland to pay her

proportional share of any

such tax levied.

_5. Post Office_.

To be taken over by Ireland For six years to remain under

under Irish Act. Imperial control. Profit or

loss on Irish posts to be

credited to or debited

_against_ Ireland.

POLICE.

Dublin Police to be under Both Dublin Police and

Imperial control for two years. Constabulary, as long as they

Constabulary, "while that force should exist, to be under

subsists," to be under Imperial Imperial control.

control, but Ireland to have

power to create a new force Meanwhile an ordinary locally

under control of local controlled civil police to be

authorities. gradually established by Irish

Government, and to take the

place of the old forces.

But _for six years_, Imperial

Government to have the power

to maintain in existence the

old forces, if considered

expedient.

JUDGES.

_Present Irish Judges to Remain_.

All future Irish Judges to be For six years future Irish

appointed by Irish Government. Supreme Court Judges (not

County Court Judges, etc.)

to be appointed by Imperial

Government. After six years

by Irish Government.

LAW COURTS.

_Constitution to Remain the Same_.

But appeals to the House of

Lords to cease; instead, to

the Judicial Committee of

the Privy Council.

CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.

_(As to Validity of Irish Laws, etc.)_.

To be decided by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (including

one or more Irish Judges).

EXCHEQUER JUDGES.

Legal proceedings in Ireland All legal proceedings in

or against Imperial revenue land Ireland _which touch any

authorities to be referred, if matter_ (financial or

either party wishes, to the otherwise) _not within the

Exchequer Division Judges of power of the Irish

the United Kingdom. Legislature_ to be referred,

if either party wishes, to

two Exchequer Judges appointed

and paid by the Imperial

Government. Appeal to be to

the Judicial Committee of the

Privy Council.

LORD-LIEUTENANT

_Might be of any Religion_.

Term of office indefinite. Term of office six years.

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT.

After the first dissolution, After six years, Legislature

Legislature to have power to to have power to reconstitute

reconstitute Second Order. Assembly.

REMARKS ON THE FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS.

The arrangements differed widely in the two Bills.

The main points of likeness were: (1) That from the first there was to

be a _separate Irish Exchequer_; (2) that for all time Ireland was to be

_denied control over the imposition of Customs and Excise_--that is to

say, over about _three-quarters of her revenue_ as then raised; (3) that

about _a third of the cost of the Irish Police_ was to be paid by the

Imperial Government; (4) that payments due from Ireland to the Imperial

Government were to be made a first charge on proceeds of Imperial taxes

in Ireland.

The principal points of difference were:

1. Under the Bill of 1886, apart from the very important restriction of

Customs and Excise, Ireland was at once to have freedom to control her

own taxation.

Under the Bill of 1893 (as amended) there was to be a suspensory period

of six years during which all existing taxes were to continue to be

imposed by the Imperial Government; but with power to Ireland to add

taxes of her own. _Amounts_ of Imperial taxes might be varied, but _no

new ones_ imposed, except specially for war. After six years, financial

freedom, except in Customs and Excise. Excise, however, was to be

_collected_, though not levied, by Ireland.

2. "_Collected" and "True" Revenue_.--In 1886, Ireland was credited with

all the revenue _collected in Ireland_ from Customs and Excise _(i.e.,_

the "gross" revenue from those taxes), but she had to pay the cost of

collection herself.

In 1893 allowance was made for duties collected in Ireland on articles

consumed in Great Britain, and _vice versa,_ Ireland being credited only

with her "true" revenue--that is, revenue from dutiable articles

_consumed in Ireland._ Similar allowances made in the Income Tax

account. A joint Anglo-Irish Committee was to settle these adjustments.

This system involved a deduction from the first year's gross Irish

revenue of nearly two millions. (In 1886 the corresponding sum, credited

to Ireland, was £1,400,000.) On the other hand, in 1893 the greater part

of the cost of collection (£235,000) was not to be borne by Ireland.

3. _Imperial Contribution by Ireland._--In 1886, a fixed annual maximum,

which might be diminished, but could not be exceeded, revisable in

thirty years.

In 1893 (for six years) an annually ascertained _quota_--namely, a third

of Ireland's "true" revenue (exclusive of taxes imposed by herself).

4. _Ireland's Budget._--Note the important point that under both Bills

three-quarters of Irish revenue was derived from Customs and Excise,

over which, in 1886, Ireland could exercise no control; in 1903 only the

control given by the presence of eighty members in the House of Commons.

In both cases Ireland was to be wholly responsible for her own civil

expenditure (except for the existing Police). Under both Bills Ireland

was intended to start with a surplus of about half a million, which may

be regarded roughly as the equivalent, in both cases, of the Imperial

share of the cost of the Irish Police. But note that, in 1886, Ireland

being pledged to pay a fixed million of the cost of Police, would obtain

no relief until the cost was reduced below a million; while in 1893,

paying two-thirds of the annually ascertained cost, she would obtain

relief from any annual reduction. The Police referred to was, of course,

the then existing Police, imperially organized and controlled. The new

civil Police eventually set up in substitution would be financed and

controlled by the Irish Government. The charges, therefore, on the

British taxpayer would, it was expected, be a rapidly diminishing one.

The loss on Irish posts in 1893, debited against Ireland, was estimated

at £52,000.

5. _Special War Taxes._--Ireland's contribution optional in 1886; in

1893, compulsory (at any rate, for six years, which would have included

the beginning of the South African War).

INDEX

Abercromby, Sir R., 57, 129

Absentee taxes, in Ireland, 23-30;

in Australasia, 116

Absenteeism,

in Ireland, 12, 51;

in Prince Edward Island, 75-76;

in Upper Canada, 80;

in Lower Canada, 85;

in Australia, 110

Acadia. See Maritime Provinces

Act of Union, 1800, 60-64, 232-233

Administrators, in South Africa, 197

Agricultural Co-operation. See Irish Agricultural Organization Society,

also 168, 177

Agricultural Grant, Ireland, 267

Agricultural Rates Act, 1896, 267

Agricultural Statistics, Ireland, 150, 306-308

Amendment of Constitution,

Ireland, 225-227, 338;

Colonies, 225-226, 338

American Colonies,

colonization of, 8-9;

land tenure in (see Land Tenure);

mercantile system, 17-18, 30;

government of, 22-23, 33;

Revolution in, 30-35, 72, 74.

That will make a total of 113 millions advanced to 315,623 tenants for