The emperor of China, taking personal interest in affairs to greater

extent than had been his custom, insisted on a full daily report of the

warlike operations and plans. He studied special official reports of the

naval attack, and then wanted to know why his commanders allowed the

enemy’s vessels to escape. All this time the Japanese fleet was

patrolling the China sea, the Gulf of Pechili and the Corean Bay, trying

to reach a conflict with the enemy, and to prevent the tribute of rice

from going north. Torpedoes were placed in the entrance to Tokio Bay and

Nagasaki harbor, to guard against an attack by Chinese war vessels. The

war spirit in Japan lost none of its warmth. The detachments sent across

the straits into Corea in August numbered nearly fifty thousand men, and

early in September the total number of Japanese troops available for

activity in the peninsula was nearly one hundred thousand. A war loan of

$50,000,000 was desired by the government, and so anxious were Japanese

capitalists to subscribe for it that foreign subscriptions were refused

and more than $80,000,000 were offered.

Chinese efforts continued also in great degree, but the results were

scarcely as happy. Troops to the same number could not be sent into

Corea. A very long land march was required before the forces could reach

the seat of war by way of Manchooria and it was useless to attempt

transporting them by water, so carefully did the Japanese cruisers

patrol the sea routes.

[Illustration: BRINGING IN THE WOUNDED.]

Just at this time, when the lines were drawing closer and closer for a

decisive battle, the relations between Japan and Corea were more closely

defined by a formal treaty of alliance signed at Seoul on August 26. The

preamble of the treaty declared it to be the desire of the emperor of

Japan and the king of Corea to determine definitely the mutual relations

of Japan and Corea, and to elucidate the relations between Japan and

China with respect to the peninsula. The body of the treaty consisted of

three articles:

“The object of the alliance is the strengthening and perpetuation of the

independence of Corea as an autonomous state, and the promotion of the

mutual interests of Corea and Japan, by compelling the Chinese forces to

withdraw from Corea, and by obliging China to abandon her claims to the

right to dominate the affairs of Corea.

“Japan is to carry on warlike operations against China both offensive

and defensive; and the Corean government is bound to afford every

possible facility to the Japanese forces in their movements, and to

furnish supplies of provisions to them at a fair remuneration, so far as

such supplies may be needed.

“The treaty shall terminate when a treaty of peace is concluded by Japan

with China.”

At this very time, however, the feeling of the Corean people against the

Japanese was very intense and they were everywhere welcoming the Chinese

as their friends. Except the strongly guarded positions in the provinces

of Seoul and Hwanghai and the country around the treaty ports which were

under Japanese influence, the peninsula was in the possession of armed

Coreans and Chinese. The Japanese Marquis Saionji landed at Chemulpo,

August 28, to congratulate the Corean monarch on his declaration of

independence, and the king showed every disposition to co-operate with

the Japanese in their efforts to introduce reforms into his country. His

Majesty appointed a commissioner to visit Japan and thank the mikado for

his promises to restore peace, and to establish a stable government in

Corea. He further issued a decree introducing several reforms, including

religious freedom, the establishment of a diplomatic service, the

abolition of slavery, economies in the public service, the abrogation of

the law whereby the whole family of a criminal is punished, and the

granting of permission to widows to marry again.

Early in September the mikado established headquarters in Hiroshima with

the ministers of war and marines and the general staff, deciding to

direct the war operations from that city in the future. This had already

been the place of assembly and embarkation for the troops ordered to the

seat of war. At the same time Field Marshal Count Yamagata left for

Corea to assume sole command of the Japanese army, which had now been

augmented till its numbers were approximately one hundred thousand.

Lines were drawing about the Chinese forces nearer and nearer. The

indecisive battle which they had fought with the Japanese on August 16

had availed them nothing, and all their available troops were now massed

together in Hwang-ju and Sing-chuen.

As the three advancing columns of Japanese drew nearer to the lines of

the enemy, engagements multiplied and scarcely a day passed without some

sort of a skirmish. The three divisions struck the Chinese

simultaneously on September 5 and 6. The troops from Chemulpo struck the

Chinese center at Chung-Hwa; those from Gensan came up with their

enemies at Sing-chuen, where the left flank of the Chinese was strongly

intrenched; and the detachment from the mouth of the Tatong struck the

right flank of the Chinese at Hwang-ju. The results from all of these

engagements were favorable to the Japanese, and the Chinese were forced

back in confusion upon Ping-Yang where they united to give final battle.

In the retreat, the column advancing from the Tatong again caught up

with the Chinese on the 7th and another stubborn engagement was fought.

The Chinese did not give way until they were in danger of being

surrounded, when they fled in redoubled haste towards Ping-Yang.

[Illustration: THE MIKADO REVIEWING THE ARMY.]

With the Chinese forces in Corea thus surrounded by the Japanese, after

the sharp campaign; and the Chinese fleet of warships in perfect

fighting trim collected at Wei-hai-wei, the time was now at hand for the

two important conflicts, one on land and one at sea, which resulted in

mid-September in the entire victory of the Japanese.

THE FIRST GREAT BATTLES OF THE WAR.

--------------

Concentration of Japanese Troops to Threaten Ping-Yang—Plan of

Attack—Poor Defenses in the Rear of the Chinese Position—Night advance

on the Enemy—Swift and Effective Victory—Chinese Commander

Killed—Thousands of Prisoners Taken—Rejoicings in Japan—Honors for the

Dead Chinese Commander—Second Great Conflict in a Week—The Naval Battle

of the Yalu River—Another Victory for the Japanese Fleet—Many War Ships

Destroyed—Hundreds of Sailors Drowned in Sinking Vessels—Carnage and

Destruction—Elation of the Japanese over two Successive

Victories—Depression in the Chinese Capital and Criticism of the Chinese

Viceroy, Li Hung Chang.

[Illustration: COREAN POLICE AGENT.]

The first serious engagement between the Chinese and the Japanese forces

in Corea resulted, as competent judges foresaw all along, in the

complete victory of the latter. The great battle was fought and won. The

Chinese were utterly routed. The strong position of Ping-Yang lying just

north of the Tatong river, on the road from Seoul to the frontier at the

mouth of the Yalu river, was carried by assault in the small hours of

Sunday morning, September 16. The Chinese troops who held it were

utterly defeated, with a loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners,

estimated at nearly four-fifths of their entire force.

On Thursday morning, September 13, began the attacks which resulted two

days later in the brilliant victory. Three columns of Japanese troops

had been centering for this attack for some weeks. The first of these

came from Gensan, threatening a flank attack. The column marched from

this port on the Sea of Japan almost directly west, approaching

Ping-Yang by way of the mountain passes. The center column came from

Pongsan almost directly south of Ping-Yang. The third column landed at

Hwang-ju near the mouth of the Tatong river, and occupied a position to

the westward of Ping-Yang on the right flank of the Chinese troops.

[Illustration: JAPANESE KITCHEN IN CAMP.]

The infantry and artillery of the Japanese were in a high state of

efficiency. The men themselves were hardy, active, brave and

intelligent. Their drill and discipline had been carefully adapted from

the best European models. Their arms were of the latest and most

destructive patterns that science has been able to devise, and every

detail in their equipment and accoutrements had been thoroughly thought

out and carefully provided. The officers who had the skill and the

energy to create such a force were of course worthy to lead it. All of

them had made scientific study of their profession, and some of them had

spent years in close investigation of the more famous European military

systems, under the guidance of distinguished strategists. But while it

was generally anticipated that such an army, so led, would have an easy

task in defeating and dispersing any force which the Chinese were likely

to assemble against it at short notice in Corea, it was by no means

certain that the Japanese could force an engagement before the Corean

winter made serious operations impracticable. The Japanese commander

showed that he had mastered the great secret of modern warfare. He knew

how to move his troops with rapidity and with decision, and doing so he

succeeded in dealing a heavy blow to China with trifling loss to

himself.

The position held by the Chinese was one of great natural strength.

Doubtless on this account it was protected by old works, which the

Chinese had supplemented by new defenses. True, however, to the

extraordinary practice so often adopted by the Chinese armies, they

neglected to secure their rear to any adequate degree. The Japanese, who

had fought the Chinese before, foresaw that this would be the case, and

planned their measures accordingly.

Thursday the Japanese column from Pongsan, the centre, made a

reconnoissance in force, drawing the fire from the Chinese fort, and

ascertaining accurately the location of the defenses and the disposition

of the troops. This having been accomplished, the Japanese forces fell

back in good order and with very little loss, none of the other troops

having entered the engagement.

Friday was spent by the Japanese in taking up their final position, and

by that evening all the Japanese forces were in position for the

combined attack, the Pongsan column facing the Chinese centre to bear

the brunt, as in the preliminary fighting, and the others arranged as

heretofore described. The Hwang-ju column had been re-enforced the day

before by marines and blue jackets from the fleet at the mouth of the

Tatong river.

The battle opened Saturday morning at daybreak by a direct cannonade

upon the Chinese works. This continued without cessation until the

afternoon, the Chinese fighting their guns well and making good

execution. At two o’clock in the afternoon a body of infantry was thrown

forward, and these troops kept up a rifle fire upon the Chinese until

dusk. The Japanese gained some advanced positions, but they mainly

occupied the same ground as when the attack opened. Firing continued at

intervals throughout the night.

[Illustration: JAPANESE SOLDIER SALUTING A FIELD CEMETERY.]

Neither of the flanking columns took any part in the heavy fighting

during Saturday, and thus no opportunity was given to the Chinese of

measuring the real number of the forces opposed to them or of

ascertaining the real plans of the enemy. Throughout the day the Chinese

held their own without much loss except to their defenses, and they

retired to rest with the satisfied feeling of men who have not

unsuccessfully opposed a formidable adversary.

They had a rude awakening. During the night the two flanking columns

drew a cordon around the Chinese forces, and at three o’clock on Sunday

morning the attack was delivered simultaneously and with admirable

precision. The Gensan and Hwang-ju columns were the ones who devoted

themselves to the rear of the Chinese position, and the entrenched

troops suddenly found themselves exposed to attacks from the force they

had fought during the day and from new forces of fresh troops of unknown

numbers.

The Chinese lines which were so strong in front, were found

comparatively weak in the rear. The unsuspicious soldiers, taken

completely by surprise, fell into panic and were cut down by hundreds.

They were surrounded and at every point where they sought safety in

flight they met the foe. It was of course a disgrace to the Chinese

leaders to be completely outmanœuvred and surprised, but it was no

disgrace to the Chinese soldiers to flee with but slight resistance when

the surprise had been accomplished by an enemy outnumbering them nearly

three to one.

[Illustration: CROWD IN TOKIO LOOKING AT PICTURES OF THE WAR.]

[Illustration: JAPANESE AMBULANCE OFFICER.]

The greatest Manchoo general, and some of the troops disciplined under

Li Hung Chang’s directions on the European system, fought stoutly, stood

their ground to the last, and were cut down to a man. But their stand

was useless. The Pongsan column, swarming over the damaged defenses in

the front, completed the discomfiture of the Chinese. Half an hour after

the night attack opened, the splendid position of Ping-Yang was in the

possession of the Japanese.

The Japanese victory was brilliant and complete. They captured the whole

of the immense quantities of stores, provisions, arms and ammunition in

the camp, besides hundreds of battle flags. The Chinese loss was about

two thousand seven hundred killed and more than fourteen thousand

wounded and prisoners. Less than a fourth of the Chinese army succeeded

in escaping. The Japanese loss was thirty killed and two hundred and

sixty-nine wounded, including eleven officers.

Among the officers of the Chinese killed was General Tso-pao-kwei,

Manchoorian commander-in-chief of the army, who fought desperately to

the last and was wounded twice. In this battle also, General Wei

Jink-woi, and General Sei Kinlin were captured and these practically

comprise the effective Chinese staff.

Within ten hours of the great battles of Ping-Yang, the engineers had

completed the military field telegraph between that place and Pongsan,

and had messages on the wires to Seoul. The number of troops engaged in

the battle on the side of the Japanese was about sixty thousand, and of

the Chinese about twenty thousand, which in a measure explains and

justifies the result of the conquest.

The news of this battle was welcomed most enthusiastically in Japan, and

rejoicings were held in Tokio and the other large cities. Bells were

rung and salutes fired. Field Marshal Count Yamagata, in command of the

Japanese troops, received congratulations by telegraph from the emperor

of Japan.

[Illustration: CHINAMAN MUTILATING REMAINS OF JAPANESE SOLDIERS.]

The emperor of China had occasion to take different measures. An

imperial edict was promulgated in which he expressed his profound regret

at the death of General Tso, who was killed while gallantly leading the

Chinese troops. The emperor ordered that posthumous orders should be

paid to the deceased, befitting his rank as a provincial commander of

the Chinese Empire. The edict bestowed imperial favors upon the sons and

family of the late general. After he had been severely wounded in the

shoulder by a bullet, General Tso persisted in remaining at the head of

his troops, and it was while leading his men in an unsuccessful charge

that he was struck by another bullet and killed.

Just one day after the rout of the Chinese from their defenses at

Ping-Yang, another meeting between Japanese and Chinese took place not

may miles from the same point, but the second battle was on sea instead

of land, and its results were not as definitive as those of the battle

of Ping-Yang. There remained room for each contestant to lay claim to

certain phases of the victory. But the opinion of independent and

impartial authorities, naval and military, has been that in the indirect

results as well as the immediate lesson, Japan was well justified in

claiming the contest to be hers.

[Illustration: THE PING-YUEN.]

Admiral Ting and his fleet were at Tien-tsin awaiting the orders of the

Chinese war council which was sitting at that place. He was instructed

to convoy a fleet of six transports to the Yalu river and protect them

while landing troops, guns and stores at Wi-ju, from which base China

intended to renew operations in Corea. The transports were ready Friday,

September 14, and the following vessels escorted them to sea: Chen-Yuen

and Ting-Yuen, speed fourteen knots, tonnage seven thousand four hundred

and thirty; King-Yuen and Lai-Yuen, sixteen and one-half knots, two

thousand eight hundred and fifty tons; Ping-Yuen, ten and one-half

knots, two thousand eight hundred and fifty tons; Chih-Yuen and

Ching-Yuen, eighteen knots, two thousand three hundred tons; Tsi-Yuen,

fifteen knots, two thousand three hundred and fifty-five tons; Chao Yung

and Yang Wei, sixteen and one-half knots, one thousand three hundred and

fifty tons; Kwang Kai and Kwang Ting, sixteen and one-half knots, one

thousand and thirty tons. The first five vessels named were armored

battle ships, the first two built in 1881.2, the third and fourth in

1887, and the fifth in 1890. The seven following were cruisers with

outside armor, all of them built since 1881 and some as late as 1890.

There were also in the fleet six torpedo boats and two gun boats. It is

evident that the fleet was of modern construction, and without going

into details as to the armament it may be said that the guns were

equally modern in pattern.

This splendid fleet arrived off the eastern entrance to the Yalu river

on the afternoon of Sunday, September 16, and remained ten miles outside

while the transports were to be unloaded. There were about seven

thousand troops to be disembarked, composing the second Chinese army

corps, which consisted almost entirely of Hunanese. The war council had

realized that it was impossible to get the necessary re-enforcements to

Corea with sufficient promptitude if they were marched overland, so the

risk of sending them by transports was assumed.

The work of disembarking troops and discharging stores proceeded rapidly

until about ten o’clock Monday morning, September 17. Very soon after

that hour, the sight of a cloud of smoke upon the horizon indicated the

approach of a large fleet. The enemy was at hand, and the battle was

impending. Admiral Ting immediately weighed anchor and placed his ships

in battle array. His position was a difficult one. If he remained near

the shore, his movements were cramped. If he steamed out for sea room he

ran the risk of a Japanese cruiser or torpedo boat running in amongst

his transports. He chose the least of two evils and decided to remain

near the shore.

By noon it was possible to distinguish twelve ships in the approaching

Japanese squadron. The Chinese fleet steamed in the direction of the

enemy and at a distance of five miles was able to distinguish the ships

according to their types. Admiral Ting signalled his ships to clear for

action and then brought them into a V-shaped formation, with the

flagship at the apex of the angle. The Japanese had at first approached

in double line, but when Admiral Ito saw the formation adopted by his

opponent he changed his fleet into single line and so went into action.

The Ting-Yuen opened firing about twelve thirty P.M. at a range of five

thousand seven hundred yards. The concussion of the first discharge

threw every one off the bridge. As they came nearer, the Japanese

appeared to form in quarter lines, to which the Chinese replied by

turning two points to starboard, thus keeping their bows directed

towards the enemy. Approaching within four thousand four hundred yards,

the whole Japanese fleet seemed to turn eight points to port, thereby

forming a single line ahead, and steaming across the Chinese line they

turned its starboard wing.

The Japanese manœuvred swiftly throughout the battle, and the Chinese

scarcely had a chance for effective firing from beginning to end. When

the Japanese were firing at the starboard section of the Chinese

squadron, the ships of the port section were practically useless, and

could not fire without risk of hitting their own ships. The Japanese

cruisers attacked first one section and then the other. As soon as the

Chinese on the port side had brought their guns to bear and had attained

the range accurately, the Japanese would work around and attack the

starboard side. At times as many as five Japanese vessels would bring

the whole weight of their armament to bear upon one Chinese ship, their

consorts keeping the attention of the other vessels of that line fully

engaged, while the ships of the diverging line lay looking on almost as

useless as hulks in the water.

As compared with that of the Japanese, the fire of the Chinese was very

feeble and ineffective. The men fought bravely, however, and there

appeared to be no thought of surrendering on either side, but a constant

intention to fight to the end.

While the fleet was getting into its formation the Chao Yung and Yang

Wei, which were slow in taking up stations, were disastrously exposed to

the Japanese fire, and one of them in consequence began to burn. On the

port wing the Tsi-Yuen and Kwang Kai, occupied a similar position behind

the Chinese line. The Japanese steamed around by the stern at a distance

of five thousand yards and cut off the Tsi-Yuen. The Kwang Kai, which

was as yet keeping touch with the fleet, soon fell back. Nothing more

was seen of these two during the action, and they escaped unhurt.

The Chinese, unable to keep pace with the enemy, endeavored to follow

their movements by keeping bow on to them, as they circled around,

maintaining a heavy bombardment. The Chinese fleet that kept in the

thick of the fight consisted of six ships of the Yuen class, including

the ironclads. The Japanese, having completed one circle, hauled off to

a distance of eight thousand yards, and went through an evolution with

the object of separating in two divisions, the first consisting of the

seven best known cruisers, and the second of five inferior ships which

stood off to some distance.

The Japanese gunners were making much better practice than their enemy.

Very few of the Chinese shots reached their mark, while the Japanese

were constantly hitting the opposing vessels most effectively. After a

time the Chinese admiral apparently became desperate. His formation was

broken, and two or three of his ships advanced at full speed. The

fighting became furious, but the weight of metal told and one of his

ships, the Lai-Yuen, was crippled in this venture. Then for some unknown

reason the Japanese ceased firing and cleared off, while the Chinese

retired nearer the shore. The respite was a brief one, for the Japanese

returned in about fifteen minutes, renewing the battle with great vigor

and upon the same effective plan.

Late in the afternoon the Chinese cruiser Chih-Yuen, the captain of

which had several times shown a disposition to disregard the admiral’s

signals, deliberately steamed out of line and, although again ordered to

remain in the place assigned to her, went full speed at a Japanese

cruiser. The latter received a slanting blow which ripped her up below

the water line and it was believed she would founder. She succeeded

however, in pouring several broadsides into her enemy at close quarters,

and the Chih-Yuen was so injured by her fire and by the effects of the

collision that she herself sank.

When the Chinese resumed their line formation, the Japanese guns were

directed upon the disabled ships, particularly the Lai-Yuen. She had

been riddled by shot and shell, and it was evident that she was sinking.

The Chinese gunners worked their weapons to the last. Finally she went

down slowly, stern first. Her bows rose clear out of the water and she

remained in this position for a minute and a half before she disappeared

in one last plunge. The Japanese had used no torpedoes upon her, but

sunk her by fair shot and shell fire. It spurred all the men to

additional effort, and the officers were naturally exultant. They

regarded the sinking of a double bottomed ship like the Lai-Yuen by gun

fire alone as no mean achievement.

The battle then arranged itself into two great groups, the four Chinese

cruisers becoming engaged with the second division, while the ironclads

attacked the first division. The fighting of the second division was

irregular and difficult to follow, and ended in the Japanese

disappearing in the direction of the island of Hai-yung-tao.

The first Japanese division carried on the fighting with the Chinese

ironclads by circling round at a distance of four thousand five hundred

yards. The Ping-Yuen and Chen-Yuen keeping together, followed the

enemies’ movements in a smaller circle, the whole evolution taking a

spiral form. Occasionally the distance between the opposing ships was

reduced to two thousand yards, and once to one thousand two hundred

yards. The Japanese aimed at keeping a long distance away, so as to

avail themselves of their superior speed, and make the most of their

quick firing guns, in which armament they vastly excelled the Chinese.

The object of the Chinese was to come into close quarters, so as to use

their slow firing guns of large caliber with full effect.

Other Chinese vessels endangered were the King-Yuen, which was badly

injured by fire, the Chao Yung, which foundered in shallow water, and

the Yang Wei, which was partially burned, and afterwards destroyed by a

torpedo.

[Illustration: THE YOSHINO.]

On the Japanese side, in addition to the vessel which was rammed by the

Chih-Yuen, the Yoshino and the Matsusima were badly injured by fire. The

former of these two, after receiving a series of volleys from two

Chinese vessels, was enveloped in a cloud of white smoke which lay

heavily on the water and completely covered the ship. The Chinese

vessels waited for the cloud to clear away and got their port guns

ready, but before the Yoshino became visible their fire was diverted by

a Japanese ship of the Matsusima type which came on the port quarter.

The guns which had been laid for the Yoshino were fired at this newcomer

with the result that she too began to burn.

In the latter part of the battle the Chinese ironclads ran short of

common shell, and continued the action with steel shot, which proved

ineffective.

[Illustration: JAPANESE ADVANCE AT THE CROSSING OF THE YALU RIVER.]

An officer of the Japanese navy who was on one of the vessels in the

engagement, was sent to make a verbal report to the mikado, and related

some interesting details of the battle. He says that the fleet consisted

of eleven war ships and a steam packet, Saikio Maru, which had been

fitted up with guns as a cruiser, conveying Admiral Kabayama, the head

of the naval command bureau, on a tour of inspection. Here is what he

says about the latter boat: “It was our own turn next to suffer. The

Saikio Maru had worked her deck guns to the best of her ability, but she

was scarcely adapted for fighting in line against ironclads. Frequently

she was in imminent danger, the Chinese quickly perceiving that she was

a weak ship. A well placed shell from the Ting-Yuen pierced her side,

and exploding made a complete wreck of the steering gear as well as

doing other damage. She was put out of action, and pointed the best

course she could by means of her screws. But this was a poor makeshift,

and in trying to get away, she ran to within eighty metres distance of

the Ting-Yuen and Chen-Yuen, both these ships having starred in pursuit

of her at full speed. The two Chinese commanders evidently thought that

the Saikio Maru intended to ram them, for they sheered off and thus left

her room to escape. She went away southward at her best speed. The

Chinese discharged two fish torpedoes after her, but the projectiles

either passed underneath the ship’s keel or missed their direction. The

fire which had slackened during this incident, recommenced with

redoubled energy, but we still made better practice with our guns. The

Chao Yung was partially disabled, though she still fought on against two

of our cruisers who were closing upon her. The doomed vessel went astern

and settled down in shallow water. She was covered, but two-thirds of

her masts were visible, and the rigging was soon crowded with scores of

Chinese crying loudly to be saved. It was a pitiful sight, but the

fighting was too hot to allow us to help them. At the same moment the

Yang Wei was reported disabled. She retired slowly from the fighting

line rolling heavily, masses of dense smoke emerging from her. We had

suffered on our side, but not nearly to such an extent. A shell had

burst upon the flagship Matsusima, dismounting the forward quickfiring

gun, and killing a number of men. The gun too was flung violently

against the ship, doing considerable damage. The Matsusima had received

a great part of the Chinese fire throughout and this last disaster had

rendered her useless for further fighting. Her commander and first

lieutenant had been killed. One hundred and twenty of her men had been

killed or wounded; but the ship still floated. Admiral Ito and his staff

were transferred to the Hasidate and in a few minutes they were again in

the thick of the fight.

[Illustration: THE MATSUSIMA.]

[Illustration: H. SAKOMOTO, _Commander of the Akagi_.]

“The Hiyei in the mean time had been receiving the fire of two powerful

Chinese vessels. She was manœuvered skillfully and returned their

fire, until a shell bursting within her set the woodwork in flames. A

second shell exploded in the sick-bay, killing a surgeon and his

assistant, and some of those who had been wounded earlier. The captain

was compelled to run her out of action, to extinguish the flames, and

this having been accomplished his wounded men were transferred to

another ship, and he steamed once more into line. The Yoshino had been

fought throughout in a magnificent manner. She steamed in advance of the

Hiyei when the latter was disabled and was backing out of line. She took

the enemy’s fire, and replied with the greatest spirit. She was hit

frequently, and her forward barbette was damaged, but her injuries can

soon be repaired. The Chinese used their torpedo boats at times and

incessant care was necessary to avoid their projectiles. On our war

ship, the Akagi, the captain was aloft in the tops watching especially

for torpedo movements and signalling by flags directly they were

detected. He was in this position when the mast was shot away, and the

top-hamper fell with a crash upon the deck. The captain and two lookout

men were killed. The first lieutenant took command and fought the ship

till darkness stopped the action. Towards the close of the day dense

smoke was seen issuing from the war ships Ting-Yuen, King-Yuen, and

Ping-Yuen, and it was believed by us that all were on fire. Great

confusion prevailed on board them, but they did not retire from action.

Firing was still kept up intermittently on the Chinese side, though the

guns of many of their ships were silenced. At sundown the Chinese

squadron was in full retreat. We took a parallel course intending to

renew the battle in the morning. The night was dark, the speed was only

equal to that of our slowest damaged ship, and we were compelled to keep

at some distance from their course on account of their torpedo flotilla,

which might have attempted a night attack. We lost sight of the enemy

during the night. At dawn we endeavored to discover their position, but

failed. The Chinese squadron must have reached protected shelter. Then

we returned to the scene of the action, and found that the war ship Yang

Wei, which had been disabled when the battle was half over, had been run

ashore. Her crew had abandoned her. We fired one fish torpedo and

completed her destruction. This was the only torpedo fired by the

Japanese either in the action or after it.”

From a concensus of the opinions of eye witnesses, it appears that the

Chinese were at least as anxious to continue the fight as were the

Japanese. Before five o’clock the Japanese ceased firing. It was

observed that the distance between the fleets was rapidly increasing and

the Chinese failed to diminish it. The Chinese then saw the Japanese

change course in a westerly direction towards the islands of Yang-tao

and Hai-yung-tao. The Celestials followed them for an hour, and saw the

course changed again to a southerly direction, while some of the ships

of the second Japanese division that had vanished earlier in the fight

now joined those of the first. By this time nothing but the smoke of the

withdrawing fleet was visible and the Chinese returned. They were joined

by the ships which had been partially disabled but were still in

condition to proceed, and altogether withdrew towards Port Arthur. A

message was sent to the transports from which the troops had disembarked

on the banks of the Yalu river, ordering them to weigh anchor and follow

the fleet.

It is evident that there remained room for each side to claim the

victory in this naval battle. The Chinese succeeded in disembarking the

troops, which was the avowed object of their expedition. They fought

brilliantly, inflicting considerable damage upon their opponents, and

assert that the battle was terminated against their will by the

withdrawal of the Japanese vessels.

The Mikado’s men on the other hand, destroyed several of the best battle

ships in the Chinese navy with great loss of life to the crews, and

plead that the Chinese withdrew from them. The truth probably is that

each fleet was so damaged and the men so exhausted with the long contest

that they were mutually willing to quit. Inasmuch as casual spectators

of impartial mind are not in a position to observe the details of a

battle royal of this sort, it seems that the decision must be left

unsettled except as the destruction of so many Chinese vessels may be

certainly credited as a victory for the Japanese. The withdrawal of the

Chinese fleet towards Port Arthur, and its previous inactivity seem to

be partially responsible for the handing over of Corea to the Japanese,

giving them first the advantage of possession in the invaded country.

The peculiar constitution of the Chinese navy is partially an

explanation of the discipline prevailing. The navy is not properly an

imperial or even a national force. The four fleets are provincial

squadrons raised, equipped, and maintained by the viceroys or governors

of the maritime provinces to which they are attached. No arrangement

could possibly be more unsuited for the purpose of naval war, and to it

may be partially attributed the previous inaction of the Chinese fleet

while their numerically inferior antagonists were using the sea at will.

Stirred up at length, doubtless by peremptory orders from Peking, the

Chinese admiral, in place of throwing his whole strength into a decisive

operation, seems to have committed himself to a subsidiary objective.

Naval history teems with examples of the drawbacks that inevitably

result from being thus led away. To have attacked the Japanese when

convoying troops to Chemulpo, or to have fought a naval battle at

Chemulpo or Ping-Yang inlet might have led to important results. In

place of adopting such a course, the Chinese utilized their fleet for

the first time in convoying troops to the mouth of the Yalu river in the

north-east corner of the bay of Corea. The great difficulty experienced

in advancing overland from Manchooria doubtless suggested this plan, but

the object at best was purely secondary. And with the fleet scattered

and partially destroyed it would seem that the troops, both artillery

and infantry, with their stores landed at the mouth of the Yalu river,

would be practically helpless so far from support or a base of supplies.

The Japanese fleet which met that of China in the battle of the Yalu

river was composed as follows: The Matsusima, Itsukusima and the

Hasidate, each of four thousand two hundred and seventy-seven tons

displacement and seventeen and one-half knots; the Takachiho and the

Naniwa, each of three thousand six hundred and fifty tons, and eighteen

and seven-tenths knots; the Akitsushima, of three thousand one hundred

and fifty tons, and Chiyoda, of two thousand four hundred and fifty

tons, and each nineteen knots; the Yoshino, of four thousand one hundred

and fifty tons and twenty-three knots; the Fuso, three thousand seven

hundred and eighteen tons, and the Hiyei, two thousand two hundred tons,

each thirteen knots; the Akagi six hundred and fifteen tons, and twelve

knots; beside the Saikio Maru, a steam packet fitted as a cruiser and

four torpedo boats. It will be seen that in numbers the fleets were

about equal. But in tonnage the Chinese fleet was superior, having

several vessels larger than any of the Japanese, while on the other hand

the speed of the Japanese vessels averaged very much above that of the

Chinese. The armament too of the Japanese fleet was superior to that of

the Chinese, being composed more largely of quickfiring guns. In type

the vessels of the opposing squadrons differed considerably. While six

of the Chinese ships had side armor, only one Japanese vessel was thus

protected; and while ten Chinese ships had protection of some form, only

eight Japanese carried any armor.

The Japanese had the advantage of their opponents in speed, but to a

less extent than might be expected. The number of knots shown for each

ship in the lists was of course the best possible, and is equally

delusive for both sides. Notwithstanding, the Japanese had so much the

greater speed that they were able to steam around their opponents to

some extent. There are some lessons to be drawn from this battle by

those who have wondered what the result of a contest between the modern

war ships would be. The Chinese made one attempt to ram, and discharged

one torpedo from a ship and three from a boat. The attempt to ram

resulted in desperate damage, though not in destruction to the ship

attacked. The rammer herself was afterwards sunk, it was believed by gun

fire. All the torpedoes discharged were ineffective. The Japanese tried

to use neither the ram nor the torpedo. Beside the Chih-Yuen, the

Lai-Yuen and Chao Yung were sunk by shot and the Yang Wei was run

aground to avoid foundering in deep water. The Japanese flag ship

Matsusima was so severely injured that Admiral Ito had to shift his flag

to the Hasidate. The Hiyei was forced out of action for a time, and the

armed packet steamer Saikio Maru had to go out of action altogether. The

mast of the Akagi was shot away, and by the fall killed the captain and

two men, all of whom were on the top. Such being the variety of the

ships engaged, important lessons are forthcoming from this first great

modern naval battle. Many theories fondly beloved and eagerly proclaimed

have had to be abandoned for their holders to fall back upon the old and

well tested principles of naval war. The gun has maintained its position

as a weapon to which all others are merely accessories. The best

protection, as Farragut pointed out, is a powerful and well directed

fire. Stupendous losses, unimaginable destruction, have been confidently

predicted as a necessary result of a naval battle fought with modern

weapons. This did not prove to be the case, and the damage inflicted in

the five or six hours’ fighting at the mouth of the Yalu might have

occurred in the days of the '74s. Allowance must be made for the

probable defects in the Chinese gunnery practice, but their seamen

fought like heroes, and greater endurance than was shown on either side

can never be expected. The accuracy of naval fire is always

over-estimated in time of peace. The disablement of the heavy guns of

the Chen-Yuen and her continued fighting with her light armament are a

useful object lesson. This vessel like many others was built solely with

a view to carry her four thirty-seven ton guns. The remaining armament

was doubtless distributed promiscuously as space offered. Both barbettes

were quickly disabled, and machinery gave place to man power. On board

ship, as on land, it is the man who ultimately counts, even though in

time of peace he is often forgotten.

From this survey of the characteristics of the two fleets, it may be

perceived that each fairly represented a different principle. The

principle represented by the Chinese was that advocated by the school

which puts matter above mind, for their fleet contained the biggest

ships, the less numerous but heaviest guns, and the most extensive

torpedo armament. The principle of which the Japanese may be taken as

the representative is that of a school which appeals to history and

experience, and not to theories evolved out of the inner consciousness

of people without practical knowledge of the sea, and which maintains

that the human factor is both the most important and the unchanging

factor in war, which must in its broader features remain much what it

has always been.

Whatever the claims of victory made by the opposing forces, the fact

remains that Admiral Ito stayed at sea with the Japanese fleet and that

the damages were repaired as fast as possible on board the ships; while

the Chinese went into port, where their repairs could be made in safety

and at leisure. Japan unquestionably had command of the sea. The menace

which operated successfully in the early stages of the war was changed

for the prestige of a great moral and material victory.

[Illustration: JAPANESE INFANTRY ATTACKING A CHINESE POSITION.]

JAPAN'S FORWARD MOVEMENT IN COREA.

--------------

Effects of the Battles of Ping-Yang and the Yalu River—How the Two

Nations Received the News—Withdrawal of the Chinese Fleet—Armies Moving

North to the Boundary—Li Hung Chang Losing His Rank and

Influence—Possible Destination of the New Japanese Army—Prince

Kung—Chinese Driven out of Several Positions in the North of

Corea—Abandoning the Peninsula—Danger to Foreigners in China—Captain Von

Hannecken—The Japanese Advance into Manchooria.

The effects of the battles of Ping-Yang and the Yalu River upon the

governments and peoples of the two belligerent nations were

characteristic. Japan was the scene of rejoicings most hearty in every

city and village of the empire. Congratulations were sent from the

emperor to the commanders of the military and naval forces, and

memorials complimentary to them were voted by the Japanese parliament.

Additional levies of troops were made and hurried into Corea, with the

intention that the war should be prosecuted with renewed vigor.

In China, on the other hand, the dazed government was scarcely able to

realize what had happened. Reports were made to the emperor which caused

him to declare that the defeat was merely the result of the cowardice of

his commanders, and that they must be punished for the losses. The

emperor at once began to contemplate a change of counsellors, and the

dismissal of all mandarins and others who had been concerned in the

conduct of the war. Li Hung Chang’s position in imperial favor began to

waver. The captain of the cruiser Kwang Kai was beheaded for cowardice.

At the battle of the Yalu River he saw one of the enemy’s ships

approaching to attack him, and immediately turned and fled with his

vessel as rapidly as possible. He intended to escape to Port Arthur, but

as he was endeavoring to shape a course thither which would keep him out

of range of the enemy’s guns, he ran the vessel ashore and she became a

total wreck.

The Coreans, except those under the immediate influence of the home

government, were not yet willing to accept the Japanese influence for

that of China, which had been so strong throughout their lives. A body

of two thousand Japanese left Fusan just before the battle of Ping-Yang,

to march to Seoul. Their advance was, however, opposed by the Coreans,

who harassed them continually by a guerilla warfare. The Japanese lost

heavily, and were compelled to return to Fusan, having lost nearly half

of their number. Two thousand fresh troops were immediately sent to that

port from Japan to guard the neighboring settlements, where some three

thousand Japanese permanently resided. Another uprising of the armed

Tonghaks, whose rebellion had been one of the first features of the war,

was apprehended.

The remnant of the Chinese fleet sought refuge after the battle of the

Yalu river under the protection of the Port Arthur forts, where they

were soon locked up by Japanese ships which patrolled the neighboring

waters, preventing the exit of Chinese vessels. The Chinese army

defeated at Ping-Yang fled to Wi-ju, at the apex of the most northerly

angle of the Bay of Corea, on the Corean side of the mouth of the Yalu

River. About seven thousand Chinese troops had been landed there from

the transports which were escorted by the Chinese squadron engaged in

the battle at the mouth of the river. The governor of Manchooria began

to concentrate all the troops raised in that province upon Mukden and

the route between that city and Wi-ju, and extensive earthworks were

thrown up along the road.

It was believed by the Chinese that Mukden would be the scene of the

next great battle of the war. This famous Manchoo city possessed a

political and dynastic importance, which might easily render its

downfall decisive for the war, irrespective of all strategic

considerations. It was the sacred city of the royal house, the ancestral

home of the reigning family of China. It contained the tomb of many of

the emperor’s august ancestors, and accordingly was invested in the eyes

of all good Chinamen with a halo of sanctity reflected on the Lord of

the Dragon Throne himself. The capture of the city in which so many sons

of heaven had found sepulchres would be accepted throughout the empire

as an omen that the present occupant of the royal seat was not worthy of

divine protection, and such omens, in days of disastrous wars, are often

fulfilled with remarkable celerity. As the politicians about the court

were perfectly aware of what the consequences of the fall of Mukden

would be, it was natural that they should take every precaution to

prevent such a catastrophe. Furthermore, in Mukden the Chinese emperor

was supposed to have gold and silver accumulated in the course of two

centuries, to the amount of $1,200,000,000.

Mukden is only one hundred and fifty miles from Wi-ju, with which place

the Manchoo city was connected by a road, comparatively good for China,

as it had been the main route to Peking, and even the Chinese recognized

its strategic importance by running telegraph wires along it. It is easy

to see why the Chinese began to increase the fortifications of the

sacred city, and why they made a stand at Wi-ju in the hope of

interrupting the Japanese advance.

[Illustration: PRINCIPAL STREET OF MUKDEN.]

The levies of troops concentrating upon Wi-ju, Mukden, and the

intervening territory were hardy men from the north, of excellent

material to be worked into soldiers, but they were badly armed. Only

about four thousand had good rifles, but further supplies were being

hurried up from the southern arsenals. The Chinese force intrenched upon

the Yalu River was about thirty-eight thousand, including the troops

that had escaped from the Ping-Yang defeat to fall back upon Wi-ju. Many

of the forces which they found there were also raw levies, badly armed.

The loss of field guns, rifles, and ammunition at Ping-Yang greatly

embarrassed the Chinese war department. It was recognized that a battle

must be fought at the river, and it was earnestly desired to retrieve

the disaster of Ping-Yang.

It was immediately after the series of defeats in Corea that the effort

began to be made by the enemies of Li Hung Chang to find a means for his

degradation. Even two weeks before the battle of Ping-Yang, the

government at Peking appointed two officers to act as censors of his

proceedings, and especially of his conduct of the war. One of these

officials was a notorious enemy of the viceroy. The censors at first

contented themselves with taking note of Li Hung Chang’s actions and

movements. Immediately after the news of the disaster at Ping-Yang

reached Peking, the emperor was persuaded that the defeat of his army

was due to the mismanagement of the viceroy. The intrigue was completely

successful, and on the morning of September 18, an imperial edict was

issued depriving Li Hung Chang of his three-eyed peacock feather, the

reason assigned for the disgrace being incapacity and negligence in

making preparations for the war. Much sympathy was expressed for the

viceroy, who was thus made the scapegoat for the disasters. The real

responsibility rested with the Tsung-li Yamen, which had been making war

with an inadequate force inefficiently organized and hampered by

tradition. Li was not a member of the Grand Council, but it was sought

to make him responsible for its blunders.

[Illustration: CHINESE TROOPS FLYING TO SAVE THEIR ARTILLERY.]

Within a few days after the Corean engagements, another Japanese army

was mobilized at Hiroshima for service in the field. The destination of

this fresh expeditionary force of thirty thousand men was kept a secret,

nothing being known except that another effective blow was contemplated

by General Kawakami, the Von Moltke of Japan. The sea-going fleet of

China was practically paralyzed for the time, and the Japanese were free

to transport a force in any direction. The island of Hai-yung-tao, in

Corea Bay, had been made a coaling station for the Japanese fleet, thus

enabling the Japanese torpedo boats to keep a constant watch at the

mouth of the Gulf of Pechili and secure advance warning of offensive or

defensive operations. It was believed that Count Yamagata favored an

attack upon Niuchwang from the sea. This city in the possession of the

Japanese would form a base for a movement upon Mukden or upon Peking

itself, and the forces landed there could co-operate with the army

advancing from Corea. A second possible destination for the new force

was Peking itself. It was believed that an army of that size could reach

the capital by disembarking at a point on the coast about half way

between Taku, the city at the mouth of the Peiho River, on which Peking

is situated, and Niu-chwang.

[Illustration: TRANSPORTING CHINESE TROOPS.]

The third alternative was an expedition to Formosa. The island had

hitherto remained outside the sphere of operations, and Chinese troops

from the southern provinces had been transported there in considerable

number. This movement of forces had been interrupted only by the wreck

of one steamer, and the necessary caution required to avoid a collision

with Japanese cruisers, which at times patrolled that portion of the

China sea. There were probably fifteen thousand men in the island, drawn

in part from the Black Flags, and excellent in quality, but lacking in

military training and even arms and equipment. The natural wealth of

Formosa was known to be considerable, and its geographical position from

a commercial point of view immensely important, so that there were good

reasons to believe this a possible destination for the forces.

It is interesting to note the general order issued by the Japanese

minister of war September 22, to the troops which were about to take the

field, and to the others which were already in active service. It went

far to prove to the civilized world, whose eyes were upon the operations

of the war, that it was the desire of the Japanese authorities to

conduct their hostilities with as much consideration for the humanities

as is ever possible in war. The order was as follows:

“Belligerent operations being properly confined to the military and

naval forces actually engaged, and there being no reason whatever for

enmity between individuals because their countries are at war, the

common principles of humanity dictate that succor and rescue should be

extended, even to those of the enemy’s forces who are disabled either by

wounds or disease. In obedience to these principles, civilized nations

in time of peace enter into conventions to mutually assist disabled

persons in time of war, without distinction of friend or foe. This human

union is called the Geneva convention, or more commonly the Red Cross

association. Japan became a party to it in June, 1886, and her soldiers

have already been instructed that they are bound to treat with kindness

and helpfulness such of their enemies as may be disabled by wounds or

disease. China not having joined any such convention, it is possible

that her soldiers, ignorant of these enlightened principles, may subject

diseased or wounded Japanese to merciless treatment. Against such

contingencies, the Japanese troops must be on their guard. But at the

same time they must never forget that however cruel and vindictive the

foe may show himself, he must nevertheless be treated in accordance with

the acknowledged rules of civilization, his disabled succored, his

captured kindly and considerately protected. It is not alone to those

disabled by wounds or sickness that merciful and gentle treatment should

be extended. Similar treatment is also due to those who offer no

resistance to our arms; even the body of a dead enemy should be treated

with respect. We cannot too much admire the course pursued by a certain

western nation which in handing over the body of an enemy’s general,

complied with all the rites and ceremonies suitable to the rank of the

dead man. Japanese soldiers should always bear in mind the gracious

benevolence of their august sovereign, and should not be more anxious to

display courage than to exercise charity. They have now an opportunity

to afford practical proof of the value they attach to these principles.”

[Illustration: JAPANESE MILITARY HOSPITAL.]

At the very time that these actions were occurring in Japan, measures of

increased severity were being taken in China to punish those who were

supposed to be responsible for the defeat. The emperor and his

counsellors were in a state of alternate terror and indignation, at the

break down of the war arrangements and the possibility of a Japanese

invasion. The emperor declared that the recent defeats could only have

been caused by incompetence, or corruption, or both, among those charged

with the conduct of the war, and the enemies of Li Hung Chang sedulously

encouraged this mood. The viceroy himself remained to all appearances

entirely unmoved. He made no preparation to proceed to the headquarters

of the army in the field as it had been reported he would do, and it was

believed that he would not leave Tien-tsin as long as his enemy had the

ear of the emperor.

As Chinese fortunes went down, and admirals and generals and princes

lost their high standing in the good graces of the emperor, other

officials rose in favor to take their place. The personality of some of

these men is peculiarly interesting because of the intimate connection

and high authority they had from this time in the conduct of the war.

On the 30th of September an imperial decree was issued, appointing

Prince Kung, the emperor’s uncle, and the presidents of the Tsung-li

Yamen and the Admiralty, as a special committee to conduct the war

operations in co-operation with Li Hung Chang.

Prince Kung, whose proper title was Kung-tsin-wang, or the Reverend

Kindred Prince, whom the emperor of China brought back to honor from

retirement and disgrace by appointing him co-director with Li Hung Chang

of the war arrangements, was a man who in the past had played a very

important part in the history of China. At the outbreak of the war he

was some sixty-three years of age, having been born about 1831. He was a

man of great vigor and determination of character, and was possessed of

abilities of a very high order. Prince Kung was the sixth son of Emperor

Tankwang, who died in 1850. His personal name, which was used only by

his family, was Yih-hu, while the people called him Wu-ako, or the Fifth

Elder Brother. Prince Kung came to the front first in 1860, when Emperor

Hien Feng the son of Tankwang fled from Peking, on the advance of the

allied armies of Great Britain and France. At this critical moment the

former returned to the capital, assumed the reins of government, and

entered into negotiations with the allies. Having accepted their

ultimatum, he surrendered the northeast gate, which commanded the city,

on October 13, and eleven days later the treaty of Peking was signed by

him and Lord Elgin.

[Illustration: REVIEW OF CHINESE TROOPS AT PORT ARTHUR.]

The following year Emperor Hien Feng died, leaving a son as heir, whose

age was only five years. Four of Prince Kung’s elder brothers were

already dead, and the fifth had lost his position in Emperor Tankwang’s

household by being adopted into the family of another emperor. There was

thus no one to claim precedence of him as the first prince of blood

royal, during the minority of Tung-chi, the new emperor. A conspiracy

had, however, been formed against him, with which he found it necessary

to grapple immediately. The late emperor had left the administration of

affairs practically in the hands of a council of eight, of whom Prince I

was at the head. This council had decided upon a plan of action for

seizing the reins of power. They proposed to obtain possession of the

emperor’s person, to put the empress-regents out of the way, and to kill

Prince Kung and his two surviving brothers. Prince Kung, however, was

not to be found napping. Having received news of the plot, he at once

took measures to prevent its successful accomplishment, by carrying off

the young emperor to Peking. The conspirators were then arrested and

brought to trial. The Princes I and Chin, being of the blood royal, were

permitted to take the “happy dispatch.” The rest of the conspirators

were either beheaded or banished. Thus did Prince Kung save from

destruction the reigning dynasty of China.

For his great services he was at once proclaimed “Regent Prince,” and in

conjunction with the two empress-regents assumed the government of

China. He immediately adopted a vigorous policy in dealing with the

Tai-Ping rebels, which was crowned with success. After Colonel Gordon’s

capture of Suchow, at the head of his ever victorious army, Prince Kung

bestowed upon him a medal and ten thousand taels, which were refused.

Prince Kung also successfully put down the Mohammedan rising in Yun-nan

and Kan-pu, and opened up diplomatic intercourse with European powers.

Prince Kung’s determination not to accept the gunboats purchased in 1861

nearly led to serious results, and cost England $5,000,000. This crucial

period was followed by another in 1870 when the Tien-tsin massacre

occurred. In all these events Prince Kung showed that he possessed the

gifts of a great statesman. When Emperor Tung-chi died childless in

1875, the choice of a successor to the dragon throne lay between

Tsai-ching, the son of Prince Kung, and Tsai-tien, the son of Prince

Chun, his younger brother. As the election of the former would have

compelled the retirement of Prince Kung from active participation in the

government of China, and as a continuance of his services was a matter

of absolute necessity for his country, Tsai-ching was passed over in

favor of Tsai-tien, a child of only four years of age, who adopted the

name of Kwang-Su, or illustrious successor. Prince Kung, however,

continued to act as regent of the country. The present emperor assumed

the reigns of power in 1887, and subsequently he dismissed with disgrace

the man whom he was afterwards pleased to honor, and who had rendered to

China and the reigning dynasty such services as ought never to be

forgotten.

When the Chinese fled from Ping-Yang towards Wi-ju they left behind them

nearly a million dollars in treasure, thirty-six guns, two thousand

tents, one thousand three hundred horses, and a considerable quantity of

rice and other stores. Hard pressed by the pursuing Japanese, they

abandoned their remaining four guns at An-ju, a town some seventy-five

miles north of Ping-Yang. Thirty miles farther on, at Chong-ju, an

important provincial town, they made a temporary halt, having received

orders to hold the place pending the arrival of large reinforcements

from the north. But the pursuit was too hot, and Chong-ju was evacuated

without fighting. The next stand attempted to be made was at Ngan, where

the troops were reinforced by orders from Shin-King, the province in

which Mukden is situated. For a few days it was prophesied that the

decisive battle of the war would be fought there, but the Chinese again

abandoned their position and fell back upon Kaichan.

The Japanese army, while pushing forward towards Manchooria, showed the

greatest consideration in their dealings with the Coreans, and any

attempt at robbery or outrage on the part of the soldiery was most

severely punished. The private soldiers were under the strictest orders

to pay cash for everything that they obtained from the natives, and

pains were taken to see that they should carry out their instructions.

The result was that the Coreans began to appreciate that the Japanese

were better friends to them than were the Chinese. The latter had been

very severe in their exactions of supplies from the populace, and even

though the Corean sympathies had been with the Chinese, the common

people objected to the expense of quartering the army without

recompense.

[Illustration: JAPANESE SOLDIERS DIGGING A WELL.]

On the 4th of October the main portion of the advance Japanese column

reached Yong-chon, a little to the south of Wi-ju, after the difficult

march from Ping-Yang, retarded by an extensive commissariat department

and many guns. No sign of the enemy was reported at this place. Four

days later, scouts reported that a small Chinese force still occupied

Wi-ju, and a detachment of Japanese infantry and cavalry was thrown

forward, supported by light artillery, to dislodge them. The Chinese

offered but a slight resistance and fled precipitately before the smart

attack, finally succeeding in getting across the Yalu. The larger body

of Chinese troops had withdrawn across the river before this time, so

that the forces remaining in Corea numbered not more than two thousand.

Their loss in killed and wounded probably did not exceed one hundred.

Wi-ju was occupied by the Japanese on the same day, and on the day after

they began a reconnoissance which revealed the fact that the Chinese

were still in force in the northern bank of the river. Eight intrenched

batteries were discovered, and the enemy were rapidly throwing up fresh

earthworks and building new batteries. Obviously the next fight was to

be expected at this place, and if the Chinese held their grounds it

would be a sanguinary one.

Marshal Yamagata still maintained his base at Ping-Yang, as being more

convenient for securing his supplies by sea, while General Nodzu

remained in advance with the forces. The Japanese line of communication

was now complete throughout Corea, a sufficient number of troops being

scattered through the peninsula at Fusan, Asan, Chemulpo, Seoul, Gensan,

and Ping-Yang to guard against any hostilities on the part of the

natives, and to make reinforcement by land safe. The government of Wi-ju

was placed in the hands of a Japanese officer acting as special

commissioner. The field telegraph was established in working order

within two days after the capture of the place, and a regular courier

service to the rear was inaugurated at once.

At the same time two or three detached revolts were in progress, the

most important one being that of the Togakuto rebels in the province of

Kiung-sang. These rebels were still in arms and in the mountain

fastnesses it was hard to get near them. They had with them fifty

Chinese soldiers who escaped when the Chinese were defeated at Asan and

then joined the rebels. Those who had taken up arms against the corrupt

Corean officials in the Province of Chung-chong had been dispersed,

however, and the more formidable ones were now being gradually hemmed

in.

When the middle of October came, the two armies were still facing each

other on the banks of the Yalu. The Chinese had not yet fired a shot but

kept at work night and day improving the natural advantages of their

position. On the Japanese side there was no desire unduly to hurry the

fighting, Marshal Yamagata choosing to wait for his heavier artillery

and supplies before attacking. Spies kept him admirably informed as to

the movements of the enemy, their defenses, and their artillery. They

estimated the total strength of the Chinese massed along the north bank

of the Yalu as between twenty-five and thirty thousand.

While the two armies are thus facing one another across the Yalu River,

the Chinese having been driven from their last foothold in Corea, let us

turn to the condition of affairs in the capitals of the two nations. The

enemies of Li Hung Chang in Peking were busy in their efforts to cast

disgrace upon him. Sheng, the taotai or chief magistrate of Tien-tsin,

fell into disgrace and it was immediately alleged that he was a nephew

of Li Hung Chang’s and that the latter was probably a sharer in the

results of his dishonesty. Just before the war broke out Sheng was

commissioned to purchase arms and ammunition for the imperial troops, to

be distributed to them as they arrived from the interior on the way to

Corea. Rifles and cartridges were duly purchased, and nearly all were

served out to the troops. As soon as they were put to the test of actual

service they were found to be almost worthless, and strong complaints

were sent to Peking and Tien-tsin. Li Hung Chang himself conducted an

inquiry, and learned therefrom that Sheng bought from German agents

three hundred thousand rifles of obsolete pattern, part of the discarded

weapons, in fact, of more than one European army. The contract price of

these rifles as between Sheng and the German sellers was two taels each,

but the price charged by Sheng to the imperial treasury was nine taels

each. The cartridges were of very inferior quality and of various

pattern, and Sheng made a large profit on them also. After Sheng’s guilt

was proven upon him by the viceroy, he retired to his palace and for a

time was seen no more in public. It was stated semi-officially that he

applied for and was granted leave of absence on the ground of ill

health. But a few days later it was reported that he was again enjoying

the authority of his office, having been sustained against Li’s wishes

by some of the viceroy’s enemies. Li’s enemies became bolder and bolder.

Placards denouncing him as the cause of China’s troubles were posted on

the walls of Tien-tsin and children in the streets sang doggerel songs

ridiculing and insulting the great viceroy.

The foreigners resident in Peking and Tien-tsin became very restless

under the impending invasion of China by the Japanese. Assaults on

foreigners in Peking and its environs, which have been of constant

occurrence during the last ten years, increased in frequency and

gravity. Several English and American families withdrew to Shanghai

because of the prevalence of street rowdyism. Tien-tsin was full of

troops from the interior, but nearly all of them were the merest rabble,

wretchedly clad, mutinous through lack of pay and insufficient rations,

and useless for real war because of their antiquated weapons. Their

continued presence in Tien-tsin was a distinct danger alike to Chinese

and Europeans. An imperial edict published in Peking assumed full

responsibility for the protection of foreign residents, denounced

rowdyism, and ordered the punishment of certain culprits who had

assaulted travelers. It assured the strangers the protection of their

persons and their property, and was especially favorable to

missionaries. The whole tone of the edict was considered highly

satisfactory, and yet the government had failed to punish those who were

responsible for the assaults and had taken no cognizance of the murder

of a missionary, except to permit the governor of the province where the

crime was committed to retain his high position.

A rebellion broke out in the district of Jeho, in the province of Chihli

early in October, consequent on the rumored invasion of the Japanese.

The imperial summer residence was in this city. Another Chinese

rebellion broke out in the province of Hoopih about one hundred miles

from Hankow. The local authorities attempted to quell the first rising

but failed. Some of their soldiers were killed and others joined the

rebels. Two mandarins lost their lives. In consequence of the urgent

demands of the imperial authorities the province had been quite denuded

of troops and there was practically no means at the command of the

authorities to keep them in check. The Europeans at Hankow were

seriously alarmed and many of them withdrew to Shanghai.

The emperor of China, early in October, began to take the initiative,

attempting to infuse new energy into the national defense. It was indeed

reported that he had disguised himself, and in person visited Tien-tsin,

accompanied only by a few trusted servants, in order to see for himself

what was going on, and particularly to learn the truth as to the alleged

incapacity of Li Hung Chang to carry on the arrangements for the war. It

was not, however, the emperor who made the journey in disguise, but his

former tutor and trusted adviser Weng Toung Ho, the President of the

Board of Revenue, or Finance Department. He also went to Port Arthur,

Wei-hai-wei, and other places, and thoroughly informed himself of the

state of affairs, civil, naval, and military. On returning to Peking he

made an exhaustive report to the emperor, upon which the latter

immediately began to take more interest in public affairs. He declined

to sign documents until they had been previously read and explained to

him, and called for special reports from the naval and military

commanders. His next act was to summon to Peking the viceroys and

governors of provinces, to receive from them accounts of the steps taken

to comply with the demands of the imperial government, and to obtain

from them their views as to the state of affairs. It was believed

however by foreigners most able to judge that throughout all these

actions the dowager empress of China was the active power in control. It

was also believed that she was really a friend to Li Hung Chang, and

that he would not suffer ultimate destruction unless she turned against

him.

[Illustration: CONSTANTINE VON HANNECKEN.]

Another important action taken by the emperor was to confer the highest

grade of the Order of the Double Dragon upon Captain Von Hannecken for

his services at the naval battle of the Yalu River and to place him

under practically sole control of the naval forces of China.

Constantine von Hannecken, the German officer who was put in supreme

control of what was left of the Chinese navy, had already seen a great

deal of service in the war with Japan before his promotion to that post.

He was on board the Kow-shing when she was overhauled and sunk by the

Japanese cruiser Naniwa-Kan, with a loss of more than a thousand Chinese

soldiers. Von Hannecken was left struggling in the water when the

Kow-shing sank, but had the rare good fortune to be picked up by a boat.

Still more recently he was high in command of the Chinese fleet at the

disastrous battle of the Yalu River. He was slightly wounded but was

soon ready for action again. This brave man was born in Wiesbaden,

Germany, in 1854, and was a son of the late Lieutenant-General von

Hannecken. He served the usual term in the German army, and in 1879 went

to China, where he was soon high in favor with Li Hung Chang. He

mastered the Chinese language in a single year. His technical military

knowledge, amiability, and tact, gained for him the position of personal

adjutant to Li Hung Chang, with a large salary. He devoted much of his

time to the construction of bridges and forts, and the fortifications at

Port Arthur and Wei-hai-wei were built under his personal direction. He

was rapidly promoted to the highest military places within the gift of

Li Hung Chang and the government, and received buttons, feathers, and

jackets galore.

About a year before the outbreak of the war, having grown rich in the

service of the dragon throne, he resigned from the Chinese army and

returned to his home in Germany. After a stay of a few months he sailed

again for China with the intention of settling his affairs there and

retiring to Germany. The war with Japan changed this plan, and he

promptly reëntered the service of China.

[Illustration:

THE ATTACK ON PORT ARTHUR.

Japanese Drawing.

]

Admiral Ting and Captain Von Hannecken visited Wei-hai-wei to examine

its defenses, and satisfied themselves that the harbor was practically

impregnable from the sea. Japanese war vessels continually patrolled all

parts of the Gulf of Pechili, and were frequently seen from Port Arthur,

Chefoo and Wei-hai-wei. The Japanese fleet was also sighted several

times ten miles off Shan-hai-kwan, less than two hundred miles from

Peking.

The main body of the Chinese army was now entrenched in a strong

position protected by a line of rectangular forts newly constructed

across the northeast border of the province of Chihli. The Manchoos were

held in reserve nearer Tien-tsin than Peking. Sung Kwei, the emperor’s

father-in-law, was in command of five thousand picked Manchoo soldiers

at Shan-hai-kwan, which was a city of great strategic importance, the

starting point of a great highroad to Peking from the coast.

General Sung, formerly commander of Port Arthur, was appointed to be

Generalissimo of the Pei-Yang army corps in manchooria and Chief

Commander of the Manchoo levies, with the exception of the Kirin

division, which remained under the command of the Tartar general. The

Chinese headquarters were established at Chiu-lien-tcheng. Generals Yeh

and Wei were degraded by imperial edict.

On the 15th of October the newly-elected Japanese Diet met for a short

preliminary session at Hiroshima, where the mikado had established his

headquarters. The election of officers was immediately proceeded with,

Mr. Kusumoto being chosen president, and Mr. Shimada vice-president. The

formal opening of the Parliament took place two days later. The mikado

in his speech announced that he had decided to convene an extraordinary

session, and had given direction to his ministers to submit for the

deliberation of the Diet a bill providing for increased expenditure for

the army and navy, which was an important matter. His Majesty declared

that he was greatly pained that China should have forgotten her duties

in regard to the maintenance of peace in the east in conjunction with

Japan, she having brought about the present state of affairs. “However,”

proceeded the emperor, “as hostilities have begun we shall not stop

until we have obtained our utmost objects.” In conclusion, His Majesty

expressed the hope that all subjects of the empire would co-operate with

the government, in order to promote the restoration of peace by means of

the great triumph of the Japanese arms.

The president of the two chambers of the Diet presented an address in

reply to the speech from the throne, thanking the mikado for advancing

the imperial standard and for personally assuming the direction of the

war. The victories which had been secured by the Japanese arms by land

and sea were the natural result. The address in conclusion said: “His

Majesty rightly considers China the enemy of civilization. We will

comply with the imperial desire to destroy the barbarous obstinacy of

that power.”

In the House of Peers, on October 19, Count Ito, the premier, made an

elaborate speech in support of the government measures for meeting the

expenses of the war, and defended Japan against the charge of having

precipitated the hostilities. He narrated in detail the circumstances

which had led up to the war, and read the correspondence which had

passed between the mikado’s government and the authorities at Peking,

before the rupture of diplomatic relations. The premier’s statement made

a great impression, and intensified the keenly patriotic feeling

manifested by the members of the Diet, not a dissenting voice being

raised against the ministerial bills. The following day the war budget

of 150,000,000 yen passed both houses unanimously. This was the most

important part of the proceedings of Parliament. The two houses fully

demonstrated that they desired to hold up the hands of the government,

and grant everything which might be asked to insure the success of the

Japanese arms.

Simultaneously with the opening of Parliament an important diplomatic

move was made by the Japanese. Now that Japan was practically in

undisputed possession of Corea, the moment was considered opportune for

the carrying out of those thorough reforms in the internal government of

the country, to which Japanese statesmen looked forward as the best

guarantee against foreign influence in the future. In order to

strengthen the hands of Mr. Otori, the Japanese minister at Seoul, the

emperor selected Count Inouye, minister of the interior, to proceed to

the Corean capital to act as special adviser to Mr. Otori.

The Japanese Parliament had occasion to welcome an important Corean

messenger. The second son of the peninsular monarch left Chemulpo on the

day the session began, as a special envoy to the mikado, returning the

visit made to the king by the Marquis Sainonji. The young prince and his

embassy, consisting of eight leading nobles, were received by the mikado

and his principal ministers, being welcomed most cordially.

Just prior to the opening of the session, the British government

addressed a circular note to the ministers of the great powers,

suggesting intervention in the affairs of the east. The Chinese were in

readiness to make terms of peace, conscious of the enormous sacrifices

and risks which would have to be incurred before she could bring her

immense reserves of strength into action, and being devoid of military

ambition. The British cabinet council which decided upon this letter met

on October 4, and three days later it was generally known, in spite of

government denials, that the action had been taken. The reception of it

was not cordial. In reply to the proposals put forward by England, the

German government formally intimated that it was not prepared to join in

any measures for circumscribing the political results of the conflict

between China and Japan. The French government shared the same view, and

the United States was earnest in the same expression. Russia, too,

decided to avoid interference in connection with other nations,

preferring to retain the opportunity of individual interference. On the

part of Russia, the military commanders in the Amoor province were

ordered to hold troops in readiness, in view of the fact that the

situation in China might make intervention necessary. There seems to be

good ground for believing true the rumor, oft repeated after the battle

of the Yalu, that China had made to Japan overtures for peace, on the

basis of an acknowledgment of Corea’s independence, and payment of an

indemnity for the losses and expenses of the war. The proposal was

rejected by Japan as inadequate. Altogether it seemed that the

initiative taken by the British foreign office was premature to say the

least.

The mikado, in his address to Parliament, made no allusion to the

proposals for peace, but seemed rather to look on the prosecution of the

war to the end as the sole means of insuring lasting tranquility. With

England’s effort for European intervention in mind, Parliament adopted a

resolution that, “No foreign interference will be suffered to obstruct

the great object of the national policy, to secure a guarantee of

permanent peace in the orient.” A renewed offer of mediation in the

interest of peace was made to China and Japan in the name of some of the

European powers, after the adjournment of Parliament. China declared her

willingness to conclude an armistice or a peace on any reasonable terms;

Japan refused to consider the proposal until it should be made directly

at Hiroshima “From a quarter formally accredited and empowered to offer

it.”

The movements of troops, both Japanese and Chinese, were now multiplying

to such an extent, that except for one familiar with the geography of

eastern Asia, they were very confusing. Almost every day it was reported

that some Japanese force had made a landing on the Chinese coast, rumor

after rumor of this sort being circulated and denied. Chinese troops

massed in the vicinities already named, their numbers constantly

increasing. An army of five thousand Japanese was taken by transports

along the east coast of Corea to Possiet harbor, near the boundary of

Siberia, and five thousand Russian troops were posted on the other side,

facing them, to guard the Siberian frontier. Corea was being steadily

cleared of Chinese stragglers, deserters from the late army and others,

who if allowed to be at large might develop into bandits or spies. The

restlessness of the natives in the province of Chulla was difficult to

restrain, and a combined force of Japanese and Corean troops was

despatched to the district to quell the outbreak. Rumors of land battles

in the north of Corea, on the lower Yalu, were circulated every day, but

for a time were foundationless. Towards the end of October, troops began

to pour into Tien-tsin in large numbers daily, and were disposed for the

defense of the capital. Most of the new arrivals were infantry, the bulk

of the cavalry being sent to the Manchoorian provinces to the northeast.

[Illustration]

SURRENDER OF CHINESE GENERAL AND STAFF.

The fleets of the two nations were now again in fighting condition,

although the loss of many vessels suffered by the Chinese at the Yalu

had left them in strength far inferior to the Japanese. The Chinese

fleet was concentrated at Port Arthur and Wei-hai-wei, where it was

believed to be safe from attack or favorably situated for offensive

operations. The Japanese squadron under Admiral Ito was concentrated at

Ping-Yang. On October 18 the last of the transports carrying the second

Japanese army steamed out of the harbor of Ujina on their way to

Hiroshima, where they were held in readiness for active operations.

The extraordinary session of the Japanese diet at Hiroshima was closed

October 22, all the bills submitted by the government having passed

unanimously. Before separating, the Diet voted a memorial urgently

requesting the officers of the government to execute the desires of the

Mikado, in order that Japan might achieve a complete victory over the

Chinese, whereby peace would be restored in the east and the glory of

the Japanese nation increased. A resolution was passed unanimously,

placing upon record the thanks of the nation to the army and navy, for

the gallantry and patriotism displayed by all ranks, and for the

splendid success which had attended the Japanese arms.

[Illustration: MAP OF TERRITORY ADJACENT TO THE MOUTH OF THE YALU.]

On October 24 Count Yamagata, commander-in-chief of the Japanese forces

in Corea, threw a small force across the Yalu, thus invading Chinese

territory. In order to understand the subsequent operations, a brief

topographical explanation is here necessary. At a little distance below

Wi-ju, the Yalu, flowing west, receives a tributary, the Ai, coming from

the northeast. Chiu-lien lies in the western, or obtuse-angled corner

formed by the junction of the two rivers, some distance back from their

banks. Within the eastern, or acute-angled corner the land rises to an

eminence called Hu-shan. A traveler by the main road from Wi-ju to

Chiu-lien, having crossed the Yalu, must pass on the left or to the west

of Hu-shan, which overlooks the highway, and thus reaching the Ai must

cross it also to Chiu-lien. The Chinese had intrenched Hu-shan, and

posted there a force estimated by the Japanese at three thousand five

hundred, but subsequently alleged by prisoners to have aggregated seven

or eight thousand.

The plan pursued by Field-Marshal Count Yamagata was to occupy a long

stretch of the Yalu River, so that his point of passage would remain to

the last uncertain, and any flanking movement on the east by the

cavalry, of which the enemy possessed a large force, was rendered

impossible. Having rested his troops and completed his arrangement for a

final advance, he threw a battalion across the river under Colonel Sato,

at Shai-ken-chau, a place ten miles up stream from Wi-ju. The passage

was made by wading and was unopposed. The detachment was composed

entirely of riflemen, no cavalry or artillery accompanying them. A

Chinese earthwork had been thrown up at this point to oppose a landing,

but a slight deviation enabled the detachment to cross without

interference. An attack was immediately opened on the Chinese position,

which was garrisoned only by a few artillerymen and infantry. They fled

after the first two or three rounds had been fired, and the Japanese

captured the works with a rush. A regiment of Manchoorian cavalry

arrived as the little garrison fled, and covered their retreat. The

Chinese made for the batteries constructed lower down the river, the

infantry throwing away their arms in their flight. The Chinese loss was

about twenty killed and wounded, while on the Japanese side not a man

was hit. The Japanese force now moved down the river and captured the

Chinese fortifications at the Suckochi ferry, where they passed the

night. The Japanese engineers had pontoons in readiness for passage

across the river.

[Illustration: JAPANESE ARMY CROSSING THE YALU, ON A PONTOON BRIDGE.]

During the night of the 24th, the Japanese pontoon men threw a bridge

across the Yalu at the ferry, and at dawn the main body of the army,

having passed over unopposed, commenced an attack against Hu-shan,

Colonel Sato’s brigade coming into action simultaneously from the other

side. The battle began at 6:30 A.M., and lasted until a few minutes past

10. At first the Chinese held their ground with tolerable firmness, but

presently, finding their position swept by rifle and artillery fire from

a hill on their right flank, of which possession had been taken by a

brigade under Major-General Osako, they broke and fled across the Ai to

Chiu-lien. The reserves, however, did not join the rout. Posted

advantageously, they preserved their formation and maintained a resolute

fire, until thrown into confusion by a flanking movement, which placed a

large force under Major-General Tachimi to the rear of their left. Then

they too gave way, and retreated in confusion across the Ai, so hotly

pursued that they had to abandon ten pieces of artillery. The Japanese

had lost twenty killed and eighty-three wounded; the Chinese two hundred

and fifty killed and a somewhat large number of wounded. Two divisions

of the army then crossed the Ai and encamped on the east of Chiu-lien,

the brigades of Major-General Tachimi and Colonel Sato posting

themselves on the same side of the Ai, but further north, so as to

menace the same road from Chiu-lien northward to Feng-hwang. Field

Marshal Yamagata and Lieutenant-General Nodzu took up their quarters in

a farmer’s house to the northeast of Hu-shan. Thus with all the

advantages of elevated ground, a position fortified at leisure, and a

force ample for defensive purposes, the feebleness and faulty strategy

of the Chinese converted into a mere skirmish what ought to have been a

sanguinary battle.

The following morning, October, 26, before dawn, a general advance was

commenced against Chiu-lien. It was supposed that the enemy would make

an obstinate stand there, since after Feng-hwang the fortified town of

Chiu-lien ranks as a position of eminent importance in the defense of

southwestern Manchooria. Moreover, throughout the night a cannonade had

been kept up from the town against the Japanese camp, and though the

invading columns were posted so that the enemy’s missiles passed

harmlessly over them, this resolute service of guns seemed to promise

stout fighting on the following day. But in truth the artillery was

employed merely in the vain hope of intimidating the assailants, or in

order to cover the flight of the garrison. The Japanese encountered no

resistance whatever. At eight o’clock in the morning they entered

Chiu-lien. The enemy had decamped in the direction of Feng-hwang before

dawn, leaving behind him almost everything, twenty-two guns, three

hundred tents, large stores of ammunition and quantities of grain and

forage.

The series of defeats following the crossing of the Yulu River by the

Japanese seemed to complete the Chinese demoralization in that vicinity.

The defeated forces probably numbered more than twenty thousand men, the

victorious army was considerably inferior in numbers, the batteries were

well built, and the position was a strong one. The continuous loss of

artillery, and throwing away of muskets and rifles wherever the Chinese

made retreat, was gradually depleting the stores of arms possessed by

the forces in Manchooria, leaving them unable to fight even if they had

desired to. A little fighting evidently went a long way with them. Did

they carry away their artillery and stores, these precipitate retreats

might possess some strategical character, but they simply saved their

own lives, leaving all their material of war behind them. The troops at

Chiu-lien were not ill-disciplined or badly armed from a Chinese point

of view. Coming from Port Arthur, from Taku, and from Lu-tai, they

ranked among the best soldiers China could put into the field. If such

men proved themselves so conspicuously invertebrate, it was to be

questioned whether or not the addition to their number of a few thousand

Tartars would make them stand more stiffly in a subsequent conflict. It

seemed even to the friends of China that her capacity for resisting the

invasion of Manchooria in the face of well-organized and resolute

attack, was simply contemptible.

[Illustration: THE JAPANESE AT PORT ARTHUR.]

The second invasion of Chinese territory was made by the second Japanese

army corps, twenty-two thousand strong, under the command of General

Count Oyama. These forces sailed in transports from Hiroshima, and on

October 24 commenced landing in a little cove northeast of Talien-wan

Bay and protected by the Elliot islands from the open sea. Talien-wan

Bay was avoided because the Chinese were known to have made some

preparations to resist a landing there. The peninsula which juts out

southwestward between the Gulf of Liao-Tung and Corea Bay is known

variously as the Liao-Tung peninsula and the Kwang Tung peninsula. Every

yard of it was familiar to the Japanese military staff, and had been

included in their system of minute cartography, so that whatever point

they selected was well chosen. Up to the last moment it had been

supposed by the general public that Port Adams, on the west of the

peninsula, would be the port of debarkation, but as that would have

involved the passing of a great flotilla of transports into Pechili

Gulf, it was considered too hazardous an operation. The last of the

flotilla of fifty transports left Hiroshima October 18, and the fleet

having assembled at Shimonoseki, steamed westward on the morning of the

19th. A distance of eight hundred miles had to be traversed, and in this

case as in all previous operations everything worked with smoothness and

success. On the evening of the 23rd the great flotilla reached its

destination, and on the following morning the landing was commenced.

There was no resistance. The Pei-yang squadron did not show. Had there

been any ordinary exercise of vigilance on the part of Admiral Ting’s

war ships they must have sighted the Japanese flotilla in ample time to

strike at it. That they would have effected nothing in the face of the

convoying squadron may be taken for granted, but if the prospect of

failure deterred them from making any effort to protect their own

headquarters, China’s only dockyard and really important naval station

in the north, they certainly deserved the indifference with which the

Japanese treated them. From the time of the naval battle of September

17, the Pei-yang squadron played no part in the war. Many attempts were

made to prove that it had not been vitally hurt in the encounter, and

that a few days would suffice to put it in a thorough state of repair.

But whether repaired or not it disappeared from the scene, and the

Japanese cruisers thenceforth roamed at will along the Chinese coasts.

With the move towards the investment of Port Arthur, and the crossing of

the Yalu, the war entered upon a new phase. In selecting Port Arthur as

an objective point, the Japanese were well advised. By such an attack a

dockyard of the first importance was threatened, and full advantage of

naval superiority could be taken. The Kwang Tung peninsula, or “Regent’s

Sword,” was peculiarly inaccessible by land, while a power in command of

the sea could land men at pleasure at several points within a short

distance of Port Arthur, and with a small force only could isolate it

from the mainland.

Two days after the landing of troops on the peninsula, the collection of

a third army at Hiroshima commenced. This force was to number

twenty-four thousand, and be under the command of Lieutenant-General

Viscount Takashima. At the same time another revolt of some little

magnitude arose in the south of Corea, and two thousand rebels attacked

the quarters of the Japanese commissary at Anpo. The malcontents were

afterwards dispersed by a military force though not without difficulty.

We have now reached the end of October. The first Japanese army is

safely installed on the north bank of the Yalu River in Manchoorian

territory, threatening the road to Mukden, Niuchwang and the intervening

cities. The second army is safe on shore on the Kwang Tung peninsula,

threatening China’s proudest naval station. The next month will see the

fall of Port Arthur and the practical destruction of all Chinese hopes

of ultimate success.

REVIEW OF THE PROGRESS OF THE WAR TO THE

FIRST OF NOVEMBER.

--------------

Characteristics of the two Nations in War—China’s Ignorance of the

Coasts of Corea—Japan’s Knowledge of Chinese Topography and

Climate—Patriotism in the Two Countries—Bad Judgment of China in Methods

of Conducting the War—The Governmental Weather-Vane and its

Revolutions—No Commander-in-Chief for the Chinese Army—Official

Corruption in Civil as Well as Military Officials—The Battles of

Ping-Yang and the Yalu River—Handling the Forces of the Enemies.

At this period in the war, occurs a lull which makes it possible and

wise to take a glance at the whole course of affairs during the

hostilities, since the declaration three months earlier. The war has

advanced far enough to prove the mettle of both combatants, and to

furnish data for judging of the probable issue of the struggle, at least

from a purely military point of view. At the beginning of November,

prophets were quite well equipped with material for predictions that

were surely not to be disappointed, and it is from the aspect at this

date that the present chapter takes its view. On the one side there is

little but praise to be offered. The Japanese have proved themselves

assiduous students of all modern armaments, and have in many points

bettered their European instruction. They have made good their claim to

be the rising power of the Orient.

Of the Chinese a diametrically opposite account must be given. From a

military standpoint nothing favorable can be said of them, and the only

palliation of their failure is that they were wholly unprepared for an

unexpected aggression. The course of the war has brought out in strong

relief what has not always been clearly recognized, the essential

differences between the two belligerent nations. A stronger contrast is

scarcely imaginable than that between China and Japan, though they are

so near and have been nursed on a common literature. With passionate

effort the Japanese have ransacked the western world for its treasures

of knowledge, and have vigorously applied what they have learned. The

Chinese, on the other hand, have set their faces against the science of

other nations, and with an unhappy mixture of apathy and contempt have

rejected the teaching which has pressed upon them. In the same spirit

they have spurned the knowledge of their own country and of their own

forces, while the Japanese have been for years making a minute study of

both, and possess maps and details which the Chinese themselves have not

and do not care for. The Chinese have carried on a large trade with the

Yalu river, but the government knew nothing of the coast. Captain Calder

of Port Arthur made a holiday expedition to the Manchoo-Corean coast,

found the country beautiful, and recommended the naval authorities to

let the cadets go and improve themselves by surveying it. Nothing was

done, the sole reason being that the incidental expenses of the ships

would be increased by being at sea, and the captains would not save so

much of their monthly allowance. Now the only survey the Chinese admiral

possesses even of the scene of the late naval battle, is the outline

made by Captain Calder himself. The Japanese navy has complete charts

both of the Corean and the Chinese coasts. In the summer of 1893 a small

expedition of Japanese disguised as Chinese, in a native boat surveyed

the islands and coasts of the Gulf of Pechili, spending eight days in

the immediate neighborhood of Port Arthur. The topography and

physiography of North China have been their study for years.

A Japanese physician even devoted a whole year to the climate and

pathology. With his headquarters in Tien-tsin, where he plied the

foreign doctors incessantly with queries, this Japanese investigator

thoroughly explored the province of Chihli, and probably knows more of

the climatic conditions of North China than any other living man. He

pretended he had the intention of practicing among the Chinese, as

possibly he may in the not distant future. The Chinese have started

exotic medical schools, but they have not overcome the elementary

difficulty about dissection, and the enterprise is but half hearted. As

for employing competent men to gather knowledge, the whole idea is

foreign to the Chinese official mind, and they only accept ungraciously

as a gift the results of the explorations of enthusiasts for science. It

is not, therefore, the accident of being a little earlier in the field,

or quicker in movement to seize the benefit of an opportunity, that

gives the Japanese such crushing advantages over the Chinese, but rather

a deep-seated, congenital love of improvement on one side and hatred of

it on the other.

Another essential difference between the people is their exhibition of

patriotism. The Japanese are saturated with it, while the Chinese have

none. The instinct of loyalty is there, and it can be called out by any

man, native or foreign, who is worthy of it, but in the sense of

nationality the Chinese have no capacity for enthusiasm, and the people

as a whole are indifferent as to who rules them, so long as they are

left to cultivate their gardens. For want of a patriotic focus, what

would elsewhere be treachery is in China a commonplace of official

practices; every man to the limit of his small ability selling his

country for his private benefit, and no one able to cast a stone at his

neighbor. In Japan it would be impossible to get a man to betray his

fatherland; in China where is the man who would not? From the same root

springs the incredible difference between the peoples in their treatment

of soldiers and sailors. In the one country they are made heroes of, the

people at home send delicacies to the troops abroad, honor the dead, and

nurse the wounded. In the other the men are treated worse than dogs,

robbed of their small pay, deserted, discarded, or grossly neglected by

their leaders whenever they can be dispensed with and their monthly pay

saved. Attachment between men and officers in China is a rare, though

not an unknown thing, for the Chinese are, after all, human at heart, if

one can but penetrate the pile of hereditary corruption which has

covered up the divine spark.

The foregoing are but examples which might be multiplied indefinitely,

of the antitheses of Chinese and Japanese character and mode of action.

If to all this is added the fact that the Japanese are a people who

delight in war, while the Chinese abominate it, no further search is

needed for explanation of the actual result. It is simply ignorance

overcome by science, indifference by energy.

The Chinese have conducted the campaign in the manner those best

acquainted with them would have predicted, doing on most occasions the

utterly wrong thing, or stumbling on the right thing at the wrong time

in the wrong way. But the most pessimistic prophet could hardly have

predicted the utter inaptitude of the Chinese military movements. It is

not only that they have failed to learn the modern art of war, but that

they have forgotten the old methods. It was thought that Chinese troops,

though deficient in enterprise, might at least make a respectable

defense. They were advised never to risk a pitched battle, but to

retreat slowly, giving trouble to the enemy by night attacks on his

baggage, and compelling him to use up an army corps to keep open his

line of communication. They failed in every point, and allowed

themselves to be chased and caught like sheep, losing stores, guns, and

munitions. When all else failed, it was said that winter would come to

their assistance, as the Japanese could never stand the cold, while the

Chinese and Manchoos were inured to it. But when the cold came it was

found that it was not the Japanese but the Chinese who suffered, having

abandoned their warm clothing in precipitate flight. Their heart was

never in the business, and nothing therefore could go right with the

Chinese conduct of the war.

While the war was incubating, China had to make up her mind how she was

to meet the aggression of the Japanese in Corea. Candid friends, who

knew well that her inchoate forces could never be a match for any

organized army whatsoever, commended strictly defensive strategy. She

was caught in the false position—in a military sense, though it was

politically correct—of having a small force isolated in southern Corea,

while the Japanese were occupying the capital in strength. The fighting

value of the respective fleets was as yet an unknown quantity, but on

the Japanese side there was confidence in their own superiority, and on

the part of the Chinese a tacit acquiescence in that estimate. Under

such circumstances an over-sea campaign was an absurdity for China, and

the commonest prudence dictated that the small garrison at Asan be

withdrawn before the outbreak of war.

[Illustration: SINKING OF THE KOW-SHING. (_Drawn by a Chinese Artist._)]

This crisis in affairs was met, as crises usually are in China, by

divided counsels; moral cowardice on the part of those who knew, blind

rage on the part of those who did not know, and the submission of the

judgment of the informed to the arbitrary decrees and even the insidious

advice of the uninformed. To speak plainly, Li Hang Chang, on whom the

burden of the war would in all cases rest, and who knew something,

though very little, of the power of discipline and organization, and who

from the first was strongly opposed to the intervention in Corea, which

was forced on him by pressure applied from Peking, was for withdrawing

the garrison from Asan. In answer to his memorials to the throne, he had

obtained the imperial authority and had hired transports to bring the

troops over into Chinese territory. But other counsels supervened, and

Li Hung Chang refrained from giving effect to his own views. As the

Japanese were by imperial fiat to be driven out of Corea, it followed

that the garrison at Asan must be strengthened, and China committed

herself to the conditions of war dictated by the enemy, an offensive war

oversea, which was entirely beyond China’s capacity.

[Illustration: NAVAL SKIRMISH, JULY 25TH. (_Drawn by a Chinese

Artist._)]

There were still discussions and hesitations up to the moment of

dispatching troops by sea to Corea. When the expedition of troops was

seen to be inevitable, the Chinese were advised to take at least the

precaution of having the transports escorted by a strong naval squadron.

This was decided to be done, and the ill-fated Kow-shing left Taku on

the clear understanding that an escort of warships would join her

outside Wei-hai-wei, which was two hundred and twenty miles distant, and

roughly half way to Asan. But before the transport had got so far on her

voyage, the official weathercock had set in another direction. The

diplomatic Yuan-si-Kai, former resident in Corea, where he had done so

much to irritate the Japanese, now advised that the appearance of

warships with the transports might give umbrage to the Japanese, and in

deference to this opinion, before the pendulum had time to swing back,

the Kow-shing with twelve hundred men on board, was sent unprotected to

the Bay of Asan. The Japanese consular establishment, with its

wonderfully organized intelligence department, was still in Tien-tsin,

perfectly informed of everything that was being said and done in the

most secret places, and making free use of the telegraph wires.

[Illustration: ROUTED CHINESE FLYING BEFORE THE VICTORIOUS ENEMY.]

With the tragic destruction of the Kow-shing, the war was begun most

disadvantageously to the Chinese. Being by one and the same stroke

deprived of the expected re-enforcements and cut off from the sea, the

small force at Asan had either to fight to the death, surrender, or make

good their retreat by a long and dangerous flank march. This last course

was adopted, and after making sufficient stand to cover their retreat,

not without inflicting loss on the enemy, they succeeded in joining the

Chinese army which had entered Corea from the north-west. The numbers of

the retreating force were given as four thousand, but they were

certainly less.

[Illustration: SKIRMISH ON JULY, 27TH. (_Drawn by a Chinese Artist._)]

The simultaneous engagements by land and sea on the same day, July 25,

proved that the Japanese had determined to begin the war in earnest. The

naval action in which two Chinese ships were waylaid as they were

leaving the Corean coast, served to prove that the Chinese ships could

both fight and run away, and that the Japanese ships were very ably

manœuvred, but the affair had little other significance.

Enraged by the sinking of the transport in time of nominal peace, the

emperor of China ordered the fleet, over the head of Li Hung Chang, to

pursue the enemy to destruction. In obedience to the imperial mandate,

the Pei-yang squadron, in the early days of August, steamed for the

Corean coast, but before sighting it steamed back again. The viceroy Li

then interested himself to obtain a modification of the decree, and the

fleet was commanded to remain on the defensive for the special

protection of the Gulf of Pechili, which instruction held good until the

middle of September, when the fleet was forced to accept battle off the

Yalu river.

[Illustration: BEFORE THE WALL OF SEOUL. (_Drawn by a Chinese Artist._)]

August 1st, troops were ordered to enter Corean territory from the

Manchoorian side, and in the course of the month a considerable force

had filtered its way to the city of Ping-Yang, the strongest strategical

point in western Corea, and even to a considerable distance beyond. The

massing of these troops was conducted in the old rough-and-tumble,

half-hearted Chinese fashion. There was no head, but separate and rival

commands, each general looking only to the viceroy, Li Hung Chang for

orders and supplies, and receiving more of the former than of the

latter.

These Chinese generals are an old world curiosity, scarcely conceivable

in our age. They might be described as army contractors rather than

fighting agents, for like the civil mandarins they buy their posts as an

investment. The battalion or camp is farmed, as regards its expenses, by

the general, who draws from government a lump sum for the maintenance of

the force, and makes his economies according to his conscience, by

falsifying his muster roll and defrauding his men. At the battle or rout

of Ping-Yang there were soldiers who were three, four, and even five

months in arrears of pay, some generals deliberately calculating on the

casualties of war to reduce the number of eventual claimants on the pay

fund. The most notorious offender, General Wei of Ping-Yang notoriety,

who had less than half the troops he drew pay for, and these mostly

untrained coollies, hustled into the ranks to take the place of unpaid

deserters, and in whose program fighting had no place, had paid certain

influential persons liberally for his command. Desertion, it may be

observed in passing, is not regarded as a calamity by an avaricious

Chinese general.

Chinese officers are however by no means all abandoned to money making.

Some are liberal with their funds, just as some are brave and loyal, and

are backed by equally brave and loyal soldiers. The efficiency of a

force depends altogether on the personality of the general, and as in

feudal times in Europe, it is to their chief rather than to any

government or country that the troops feel the ties of allegiance. As

the leader is, therefore, so are the men. General Tso-pao-kwei for

example, who bore to his grave the honors of the fight at Ping-Yang, was

a man well known to many foreigners of different classes, missionary and

others, and the unanimity of good opinion of him is quite remarkable. He

was not only brave, but a courteous and kindly gentleman who gained the

affections of all around. A Mohammedan himself, all his soldiers were of

the same faith, and they stood shoulder to shoulder like heroes in the

face of overpowering odds.

During the month of August, while the Japanese forces were advancing

upon Ping-Yang in three columns, there were outpost skirmishes in which

the Japanese were frequently worsted. These affairs were naturally

enough reported by the Chinese commanders concerned, according to their

lights, as victories, and when it is remembered how the view of each is

bounded by the horizon of his own camp, it is easy to see how they could

deceive themselves as to the significance of such apparent success. The

truth seems to be that the Chinese commanders in and about Ping-Yang did

not realize that they were surrounded, each perhaps thinking it was the

other’s business. They had sent out no scouts, nor posted videttes to

watch the mountain passes to the north of them. These elementary

military precautions had been pressed on Li Hung Chang, who sent

repeated orders to the front to have them seen to; but nothing was done,

for according to the vicious tradition of the Chinese service, the word

is taken for the deed, and orders which are either impracticable or

inconvenient are simply ignored or forgotten, without the delinquent

being ever called to account. Spacious but wholly fictitious excuses

would in any case serve the turn in a system whose fetich is universal

sham. Perhaps, as there was no commander-in-chief, but a number of

independent commands, duties which concerned the army at large fell

within the sphere of no one in particular. But in whatever manner it

came about, the result was that the Chinese remained in comatose

ignorance of the intentions of the enemy, until the only thing left was

precipitate retreat.

The affair of Ping-Yang was observed by one military expert, a Russian,

who speaks in high terms of the precision and completeness of the

Japanese equipment and organization, but the opposition had been so

contemptible throughout the war that the military qualities of the

Japanese have not been seriously put to the proof. They remain a

theoretical quantity. So far as the campaign had gone, to November 1,

the chief obstacles encountered had been bad roads, standing crops, and

sickness.

The second day after the flight from Ping-Yang, September 17, the naval

battle off the Yalu River was fought. The collision of the fleets seems

to have been somewhat unpremeditated. The Chinese were engaged in

disembarking troops for the re-enforcement of the army at Ping-Yang, and

it is a characteristically haphazard proceeding that they should have

been landing troops one hundred and twenty miles from the front, to

strengthen a position already abandoned. The battle which ensued, and

which raged for five hours, has been described with as much fullness as

the limits of this volume permit, but the ultimate truth about it will

perhaps never be fully known except of course to the Japanese

government. From the Chinese side it will be impossible to obtain a

consistent account, not because of intentional concealment, but because

of the simple reason that no one in the Chinese fleet was able to

observe accurately what was going on, except near his own vessel.

Nevertheless the salient points of the battle stand out clear enough.

The sea fight was but a repetition of the land fight, with two important

differences. The first of these was that as the nature of the cause

rendered it impossible to sail modern ships of war at all by

two-thousand-year-old tactics, the mere possession of a fleet required a

European organization. But the organization was imperfect, and would

have been unable to sustain itself in action, but for the presence of

another element in which the Chinese land forces were entirely lacking,

competent foreign direction. This factor also was most imperfect. The

foreign officers had been extemporized hastily, the leader of them being

not even a seaman. They were of various nationalities and were enlisted

about the middle of August. Three engineers, two German, one English;

two gunnery officers, one English, one German; had been for some years

in the fleet, and volunteered for war service. One American engaged for

many years in the Chinese naval college also volunteered for active

service during the war. Captain Von Hannecken, bearing now the rank of

Chinese general, commissioned as Inspector General of Fortifications,

was entrusted with the anomalous office of adviser of the admiral, thus

giving him the real command of the fleet. An English civilian with naval

training also joined.

On entering on their duties, these officers found the fleet honeycombed

with abuses requiring patient reform, but they set themselves to make

the best of things as they were, and to get the ships as quickly as

possible into action, as the thing most needful in order to brace up

officers and men. Von Hannecken urged unceasingly an offensive policy.

He would seek out the Japanese and attack them wherever found, fall on

their convoys, and generally assert the supremacy of China in Corean

waters, from the Yalu eastward. In particular he urged the occupation of

Ping-Yang inlet, so important for the support of the army which held the

city of that name, and, if necessary, to fight to the death for the

possession of a harbor at once so valuable and so easily defended. His

prescience was indicated in the sequel, but to all such suggestions

Admiral Ting replied with the imperial edict which forbade him to move

out of Chinese waters. The convoying service for which the fleet was

eventually told off in the middle of September was a sort of compromise,

which, without transgressing too flagrantly the imperial restrictions,

yet committed the fleet to an engagement on conditions not of its own

choosing.

The handling of the respective fleets showed the great superiority of

the Japanese professional training, and critics have commented on the

weakness of the Chinese manœuvring, but the first consideration was

to get the Chinese to fight at all. The government had satisfied itself

that without foreigners to lead them, the Chinese commanders would

rather lose their ships in trying to escape than stand up to the enemy.

The man, the only man available, who possessed the requisite qualities,

personal and professional, including a competent knowledge of Chinese,

happened to be a soldier, but he at least made the fleet fight, not as a

trained admiral would have done with a trained fleet, but in a manner to

inspire the Chinese with some confidence in themselves, in which till

then they were greatly lacking. That is perhaps the most important

result of the baptism of fire of the Chinese navy.

As regards the technical bearings of the action off the Yalu, the

Chinese admiral and captains adopted the formation which they said had

been taught them by Captain Lang as the most advantageous for attack.

But obviously a plan communicated four years ago by an officer whom

these same men had intrigued out of their navy, when he had taken it

through only half its course of training, could not be considered an

infallible weapon with which to meet the thoroughly efficient navy of

Japan.