_PART II._
We come now to the beginning of the present stage in the development of
constitutional government in Prussia. It will have been noticed that the
promises of Frederick William III. were not that he would grant a
strictly popular constitution. His intention was that the different
estates of the realm should be represented in the proposed national
diet, the constitution recognizing a difference in the dignity of the
different classes of inhabitants, and giving to each a share in the
national government proportionate to its dignity. His son, at his
coronation, promised to maintain the efficiency of the ordinances of
June 5, 1823, and to secure a further development of the principles of
this (so-called) constitution. Encouraged by this assurance, the
Liberals labored to secure from him the full realization of their hopes.
Frederick William IV. was just the man with whom such exertions could be
used with good hope of success. He was intelligent enough to be fully
conscious of the fact and the significance of the popular request for a
constitution, and, though of course personally disinclined to reduce his
power to a nullity, he had yet not a strong will, and had no wish to
involve himself in a conflict with his subjects. Accordingly, in 1841,
he convoked a diet in each province, and proposed the appointment of
committees from the estates, who should act as counsel to the king when
the provincial diets were not in session. These diets in subsequent
sessions discussed the subject of a national diet, and proposed to the
king the execution of the order issued in 1815. At length, February 8,
1847, he issued a royal charter, introducing, in fact, what had so often
and so long before been promised, a constitution. The substance of the
charter was that, as often as the Government should need to contract a
loan, or introduce new taxes, or increase existing taxes, the diets of
the provinces should be convoked to a national diet; that the committees
of the provincial diets (as appointed in 1842) should be henceforth
periodically, as one body, convoked; that to the diet, and, when it was
not in session, to the committee, should be conveyed the right to have a
_deciding_ voice in the above-mentioned cases. April 11, 1847, the diet
assembled for the first time; January 17, 1848, the united committee of
the estates.
How long the nation would have remained contented with this concession
to the request for a national representation under ordinary
circumstances, is quite uncertain. In point of fact, this constitution
hardly lived long enough to be christened with the name. Early in 1848
the French Revolution startled all Europe--most of all, the monarchs.
They knew how inflammable the masses were; they soon saw that the masses
were inflamed, and that nothing but the most vigorous measures would
secure their thrones from overthrow. Frederick William Was not slow to
see the danger, and take steps to guard Prussia against an imitation of
the Parisian insurrection. On the 14th of March he issued an order
summoning the diet to meet at Berlin on the 27th of April. Four days
later he issued another edict ordering the diet to convene still
earlier, on the 2d of April. This proclamation is a characteristic
document. It was issued on the day of the Berlin revolution. It was an
hour of the most critical moment. There was no time for long
deliberation, and little hope for the preservation of royalty, unless
something decided was done at once. He might have tried the experiment
of violently resisting the insurgents; but this was not in accordance
with his character. He preferred rather to resign something than to run
the risk of losing all. Accordingly he yielded. In this proclamation,
after alluding to the occasion of it, he publishes his earnest desire
for the union of Germany against the common danger. 'First of all,' he
says, 'we desire that Germany be transformed from a confederation of
states (_Staatenbund_) to one federal state (_Bundesstaat_).' He
proposes a reorganization of the articles of union in which other
representatives besides the princes should take part; a common army;
freedom of trade; freedom of emigration from one state to another;
common weights, measures, and coins; freedom of the press--in short, all
that the most enthusiastic advocate of German unity could have asked. At
the same time was published a law repealing the censorship of the press.
On the 21st of the same month he put forth an address, entitled 'To my
people and to the German nation.' In this, after saying that there was
no security against the threatening dangers except in the closest union
of the German princes and peoples, under one head, he adds: 'I assume
to-day this leadership for this time of danger. My people, undismayed by
the danger, will not abandon me, and Germany will confidingly attach
itself to me. I have to-day adopted the old German colors, and put
myself and my people under the venerable banner of the German Empire.
Henceforth Prussia passes over into Germany.' But all this was more
easily said than done. Whatever the German people may have wished, the
other German rulers could not so easily overcome their jealousies. The
extreme of the danger passed by, and with it this urgent demand for a
united Germany.
But the diet came together. The king laid before it the outline of a
constitution, the most important provisions of which were that there
should be guaranteed to all the right to hold meetings without first
securing consent from the police; civil rights to all, irrespective of
religious belief; a national parliament, whose assent should be
essential to the making of all laws. These propositions were approved by
the diet, which now advised the king to call together a national
assembly of delegates, elected by the people, to agree with him upon a
constitution. This was done; the assembly met on the 22d of May, and was
opened by the king in person. He laid before the delegates the draught
of a constitution, which they referred to a committee, by whom it was
elaborated, and on the 26th of July reported to the assembly. The
deliberation which followed had, by the 9th of November, resulted only
in fixing the preamble and the first four articles. At this time an
order came to the assembly from the king, requiring the members to
adjourn to the 27th, and then come together, not at Berlin, but
Brandenburg. The reason of this was that the assembly manifested too
much of an inclination to infringe on the royal prerogatives, and that
its place of meeting was surrounded by people who sought by threats,
and, in some cases, by violence, to intimidate the members. The king was
now the less inclined to be, or seem to be, controlled by such
terrorism, as the fury of the revolutionary storm was now spent; the
militia had been summoned to arms; and had not hesitated to obey the
call. The troops, under the lead of Field-Marshal Wrangel, were
collected about Berlin. The majority of the National Assembly, which had
refused to obey the royal order to adjourn to Brandenburg, and was
proceeding independently in the prosecution of its deliberations
respecting the constitution, was compelled, by military force, to
dissolve. Part of them then went to Brandenburg, and, not succeeding in
carrying a motion to adjourn till December 4, went out in a body,
leaving the assembly without a quorum. The king now thought himself
justified in concluding that nothing was to be hoped from the labors of
this body, and therefore, on the 5th of December, dissolved it.
Some kings, under these circumstances, might have been inclined to have
nothing more to do with constitution making. If we mistake not, the
present king, with his present spirit, would have thought it right to
make the turbulent character of the convention and of the masses a
pretext for withholding from them the power to stamp their character on
the national institutions. Such a course might probably have been
pursued. The king had control of the army. The excesses of the Liberals
began to produce a reaction. The National Assembly, during its session
in Berlin, after it had been adjourned by the king, had resolved that
the royal ministry had no right to impose taxes so long as the assembly
was unable peaceably to pursue its deliberations, and designed, by
giving this resolution the form of a law, to lead the people in this
manner to break loose from the Government. This attempt to usurp
authority was doomed to be disappointed. The assembly, having
overstepped its prerogatives, lost its influence. The king found himself
again in possession of the reins of power. It rested with him to punish
the temerity of the people by tightening the reins, or on his own
authority, without the cooeperation of any assembly, to give the nation a
constitution. To take the former course he had not the courage, even if
he had wished to do so; besides, he doubtless saw clearly enough that,
though such a policy might succeed for a time, it would ultimately lead
to another outbreak. He had, too, no great confidence in his power to
win toward his person the popular favor. With all his talents and
amiable traits, he had not the princely faculty of knowing how to
inspire the people with a sense of his excellences, and was conscious of
this defect. He chose not unnecessarily to increase an estrangement
which had already been to him a source of such deep mortification. He
therefore issued, on the 5th of December, immediately after dissolving
the National Assembly, a constitution substantially the same as that
which still exists, with the statement prefixed that it should not go
into operation until after being revised. This revision was to be made
at the first session of the two chambers, to be elected in accordance
with an election law issued on the next day.
The two chambers met February 26, 1849. After a session of two months,
during which the lower chamber showed a disposition to modify the
constitution more than was agreeable to the king, the upper chamber was
ordered to adjourn, the lower was dissolved, and a new election ordered.
The new Parliament met August 7. The revision was completed on the last
of January, 1850. On the 6th of February, the king, in the presence of
his ministers and of both chambers, swore to observe the constitution.
Before doing so, he made an address, in which he explained his position,
alluding in a regretful strain to the scenes of violence in the midst of
which the constitution had been drawn up, expressing his gratitude to
the chambers for their assistance in perfecting the hastily executed
work, calling upon them to stand by him in opposition to all who might
be disposed to make the liberty granted by the king a screen for hiding
their wicked designs against the king, and declaring: 'In Prussia, the
king must rule; and I do not rule because it is a pleasure, God knows,
but because it is God's ordinance; therefore, I _will reign_. A free
people under a free king--that was my watchword ten years ago; it is the
same to-day, and shall be the same as long as I live.' The ministers and
the members of the two chambers, after the king had sworn to support
the constitution, took the same oath, and in addition one of loyalty to
the king. The new government was inaugurated. Prussia had become a
limited monarchy.
It is at this point appropriate to take a general view of the Prussian
constitution itself. It has been variously amended since 1850, but not
changed in any essential features; without dwelling on these amendments,
therefore, we consider it as it now stands.
As to the king: he is, as such, wholly irresponsible. He cannot be
called to account for any act which he does in his capacity as monarch.
But his ministers may be impeached. They have to assume and bear the
responsibility of all royal acts. None of these acts are valid unless
signed by one or more of the ministers. To the king is intrusted all
executive power; the command of the army; the unconditioned right of
appointing and dismissing his ministers, of declaring war and concluding
peace, of conferring honors and titles, of convoking the national diet,
closing its sessions, proroguing and dissolving it. He _must_, however,
annually call the Houses together between November 1 and the middle of
January, and cannot adjourn them for a longer period than thirty days,
nor more than once during a session, except with their own consent.
Without the assent of the diet he cannot make treaties with foreign
countries nor rule over foreign territory. He has no independent
legislative power, except so far as this is implied in his right to
provide for the execution of the laws, and, when the diet is not in
session, in case the preservation of the public safety or any uncommon
exigency urgently demands immediate action. All such acts, however,
must, at the next session of the Houses, be laid before them for
approval.
The ministry consists of nine members, under the presidency of the
minister of foreign affairs; besides him are the ministers of finance,
of war, of justice, of worship (religious, educational, and medicinal
affairs), of the interior (police and statistical affairs), of trade and
public works (post office, railroad affairs, etc.), of agricultural
affairs, and of the royal house (matters relating to the private
property of the royal family). The supervision exercised by the ministry
over the various interests of the land is much more immediate and
general than that of the President's cabinet in the United States. Now,
however, their authority in these matters is of course conditioned by
the constitution and the laws. The ministers are allowed to enter either
House at pleasure, and must always be heard when they wish to speak. On
the other hand, either House can demand the presence of the ministers.
The legislative power is vested in the king and the two Houses of
Parliament. The consent of all is necessary to the passing of every law.
These Houses (at first called First and Second Chambers, now House of
Lords and House of Delegates--_Herrenhaus_ and _Abgeordnetenhaus_) must
both be convoked or prorogued at the same time. In general a law may be
first proposed by the king or by either of the Houses. But financial
laws must first be discussed by the House of Delegates; and the budget,
as it comes from the lower to the upper House, cannot be amended by the
latter, but must be adopted or rejected as a whole.
The House of Lords is made up of various classes of persons, all
originally designated by the king, though in the case of some the office
is hereditary. They represent the nobility, the cities, the wealth, and
the learning of the land. Each of the five universities furnishes a
member. The king has the right to honor any one at pleasure, as a reward
for distinguished services, with a seat in this body. Of course, as the
members hold office for life, and hold their office by the royal favor,
it may generally be expected to be a tolerably conservative body, and to
vote in accordance with the wishes of the king.
The House of Delegates consists of three hundred and fifty-two members,
elected by the people, but not directly. They are chosen, like our
Presidents, by electors, who are directly chosen by the people. Two
hundred and fifty inhabitants are entitled to one elector. Every man
from the age of twenty-five is allowed to vote unless prohibited for
specific reasons. But strict equality in the right of suffrage is not
granted. The voters of each district are divided into three classes, the
first of which is made up of so many of the largest taxpayers as
together pay a third of the taxes; the second, of so many of the next
richest as pay another third; the last class, of the remainder. Each of
these divisions votes separately, and each elects a third part of the
electors. The House of Delegates is chosen once in three years, unless
in the mean time the king dissolves it, in which case a new election
must take place at once.
As to the rights of Prussians in general, the constitution provides that
all in the eye of the law are equal. The old distinctions of classes
still exists: there are still nobles, with the titles prince, count, and
baron; but the special privileges which they formerly enjoyed are not
secured to them by the constitution. The king can honor any one with the
rank of nobility; but the name is the most that can be conferred. In
most cases the right of primogeniture does not prevail, so that the
aristocracy of Prussia is of much less consequence than that of England.
The poverty which so often results from the division of the estates of
nobles has led to the establishment of numerous so-called
_Fraeuleinstifter_--charitable foundations for such a support of poor
female members of noble families as becomes their rank. Many of these
institutions were formerly nunneries. It is further provided by the
constitution that public offices shall be open to all; that personal
freedom and the inviolability of private property and dwellings shall be
secured; that all shall enjoy the right of petition, perfect freedom of
speech, the liberty of forming organizations for the accomplishment of
any legal object; that a censorship of the press can in no case be
exercised, and that no limitation of the freedom of the press can be
introduced except by due process of law; that civil and political rights
shall not be affected by religious belief, and that the right of filling
ecclesiastical offices shall not belong to the state. Only 'in case of
war or insurrection, and of consequent imminent danger,' has the
Government a right to infringe on the above specified immunities of the
citizens and the press.
The foregoing is all that need be given in order to convey a general
idea of what the Prussian constitution is. It is in its provisions so
specific and clear, that one would hardly expect that disputes
respecting its meaning could have reached the height of bitterness which
has characterized discussions of its most fundamental principles. The
explanation of this fact is to be sought in the mode of the introduction
of the constitution itself. The English constitution has been the growth
of centuries; the Prussian, of a day. The latter, moreover, was not,
like ours, the fundamental law of a new nation, but a constitution
designed to introduce a radical change in the form of a government
which, during many centuries, had been acquiring a fixed character. It
undertook to remodel at one stroke the whole political system. Not
indeed as though there had been no sort of preparation for this change.
The general advance in national culture, the general anticipation of the
change, as well as the actual approaches toward it in the administrative
measures of Frederick the Great and Frederick William III., paved the
way for the introduction of a popular element in the Government.
Nevertheless, the actual, formal introduction itself was sudden. The
constitution was not, in the specific form which it took, the result of
experience and experiment. And, as all history shows, attempts to fix or
reconstruct social systems on merely theoretical principles are liable
to fail, because they cannot foresee and provide for all the
contingencies which may interfere with the application of the theories.
Moreover, in the case of Prussia, as not in that of the United States,
the constitution was not made by the people for themselves, but given to
them by a power standing over against them. There was, therefore, not
only a possibility, as in any case there might be, that the instrument
could be variously interpreted on account of the different modes of
thinking and difference of personal interests, which always affect men's
opinions; but there was here almost a certainty that this would be the
case on account of the gulf of separation which, in spite of all the
bridges which often are built over it, divides a monarch, especially an
absolute, hereditary monarch, from his subjects. In the case before us,
it is certain that the king conceded more than he wished to concede, and
that the people received less than they wished to receive. That they
should agree in their understanding of the constitution is therefore not
at all to be expected. The most that the well wishers of the land could
have hoped was that the misunderstandings would not be radical, and that
in the way of practical experience the defects of the constitution might
be detected and remedied, and the mutual relations of the rulers and the
ruled become mutually understood and peacefully acquiesced in.
What the Prussian Conservatives so often insist on, viz., that a
constitutional government should have been gradually developed, not
suddenly substituted for a form of government radically different, is
therefore by no means without truth. Whether we are to conclude that the
fault has been in the process not beginning sooner, or merely in its
being too rapid, is perhaps a question in which we and they might
disagree. On the supposition that the present state of intelligence
furnishes a sufficient basis for a constitutional government, it would
seem as though the last fifty years has been a period long enough in
which to put it into successful operation. All that the present
generation know of politics has certainly been learned within that time:
if the mere practical exercise of political rights is all that is needed
in order to develop the new system, there might at least an excellent
beginning have been made long before 1850. When we consider, therefore,
that the Government, after taking the initiatory steps in promoting this
development, stopped short, and rather showed a disposition to
discourage it entirely, these clamors of the Conservatives must seem
somewhat out of taste. To Americans especially, who can accommodate
themselves to changes, even though they may be somewhat sudden, such
pleas for more time and a more gradual process may appear affected, if
not puerile. It must be remembered, however, that to a genuine German
nothing is more precious than a process of development. Whatever is not
the result of a due course of _Entwickelung_, is a suspicious object.
Anything which seems to break abruptly in upon the prescribed course is
abnormal. Whatever is produced before the embryonic process is complete
is necessarily a monster, from which nothing good can be hoped. The same
idea is often advanced by the Conservatives in another form. The
Liberals, they say, are trying to break loose from _history_. A
prominent professor, in an address before an assembly of clergymen in
Berlin, defined the principle of democracy to be this: 'The majority is
subject to no law but its own will; it is therefore limited by no
historically acquired rights; history has no rights over against the
sovereign will of the present generation.' By historically acquired
rights is meant in particular the right of William I. to rule
independently because his predecessors did so. By what right the great
elector robbed the nobles of their prerogatives, and how, in case he did
wrong in thus disregarding _their_ 'historically acquired rights,' this
wrong itself, by being continued two hundred years, becomes, in its
turn, an acquired right, is not explained in the address to which we
allude. The principal fault to be found with such reasoning as this of
the Prussian Conservatives, is that it is altogether too vague and
abstract. There can be no development without something new; there can
be, in social affairs, nothing new without some sort of innovation.
Innovation, as such, can therefore not be condemned without condemning
development. Moreover, development, as the organic growth of a political
body, is something which takes care of itself, or rather is cared for by
a higher wisdom than man's. To object to a proposed measure nothing more
weighty than that it will not tend to develop the national history, has
little meaning, and should have no force. The only question in such a
case which men have to consider is whether the change is justified by
the fundamental principles of right, be it that those principles have
hitherto been observed or not.
What makes the arguments of the Conservatives all the more impertinent,
however, is the fact that the question is no longer whether the
constitution ought to be introduced, but whether, being introduced, it
shall be observed. This is for the stiff royalists not so pleasant a
question. Prussia _is_ a constitutional monarchy; the king has taken an
oath to rule in accordance with the constitution. It may be, undoubtedly
is, true that none of the kings have wished the existence of just such a
limit to their power; but shall they therefore try to evade the
obligation which they have assumed? The Conservatives dare not say that
the constitution ought to be violated, for that would look too much like
the abandonment of their fundamental principle; they also hardly venture
to say that they would prefer to have the king again strictly absolute,
for that would look like favoring regression more than conservatism. Yet
many have the conviction that an absolute monarchy would be preferable
to the present, while the arguments of all have little force except as
they tend to the same conclusion. The point of controversy between them
and their opponents is often represented as being essentially this:
Shall the king of Prussia be made as powerless as the queen of England?
Against such a degradation of the dignity of the house of Hohenzollern
all the convictions and prejudices of the royalists revolt. Such a
surrender of all personal power, they say, and say truly, was not
designed by Frederick William IV. when he gave the constitution; to ask
the king, therefore, in all his measures to be determined by the House
of Delegates, is an unconstitutional demand. It is specially provided
that the _king_ shall appoint and dismiss his own ministers; to ask him,
therefore, to remove them simply because they are unacceptable to the
House of Delegates, is to interfere with the royal prerogatives. The
command of the army and the declaration of war belong only to the king;
to binder him, therefore, in his efforts to maintain the efficiency of
the army, or in his purposes to wage war or abstain from it, is an
overstepping of the limits prescribed to the people's representatives.
We have here hinted at the principal elements in the controversy between
the opposing political parties of Prussia. It is not our object to enter
into the details of the various strifes which have agitated the land
during the last sis years, but only to sketch their general character.
The query naturally arises, when one takes a view of the whole period,
which has elapsed since the constitution was introduced, why the contest
did not begin sooner. The explanation is to be found in the fact that
until the present king began to rule, the Liberals in general did not
vote at the elections. It will be remembered that the previous king
absolutely refused to deal with the assembly which met early in 1849 to
consider the constitution, and ordered a new election. At this election
the Liberals saw that, if they reflected the old members, another
dissolution would follow, and they therefore mostly staid away from the
polls. Afterward, when the constitution had been formally adopted, the
Government showed a determination to put down all liberal movements;
consequently the Liberals made no special attempts to move. The
Parliament was conservative, and so there was no occasion for strife
between it and the king. Not till William I. became regent in place of
his incapacitated brother, in 1859, did the struggle begin. The policy
of the previous prime minister Manteuffel had produced general
discontent. The people were ready to move, if an occasion was offered.
It is therefore not to be wondered at that, when the new sovereign
announced his purpose to pursue a more liberal course than his brother,
the Liberal party raised its head, and sought to make itself felt. The
new ministry was liberal, and for a while it seemed as though a new
order of things had begun. But this was of short duration. The House of
Delegates, consisting in great part of Liberals (or, to speak more
strictly, of _Fortschrittsmaenner_--Progress men--_Liberal_ being the
designation of a third party holding a middle course between the two
extremes, a party, however, naturally tending to resolve itself into the
others, and now nearly extinct) urged the Government to adopt its
radical measures. The king began to fear that, if he yielded to all the
wishes of the House, he would lose his proper dignity and authority. He
therefore began to pursue a different policy: the more urgently the
delegates insisted on liberal measures, the less inclined was the king
to regard their wishes. He had wished himself to take the lead in
inaugurating the new era; as soon as others, more ambitious, went ahead
of him, he took the lead again, by turning around and pulling in the
opposite direction. The principal topics on which the difference was
most decided were the ecclesiastical and the financial relations of the
Government. Although the constitution provides for the perfect freedom
of the church from the state, the union still existed, and indeed still
exists. The House of Delegates attempted to induce the Government to
carry out this provision of the constitution. There is no doubt that the
motive of many of these attempts to divide church and state is a
positive hostility to Christianity. The partial success which has
followed them, viz., the securing of charter rights for other religious
denominations than the Evangelical Church (_i.e._, the Union Church,
consisting of what were formerly Lutheran and Reformed churches, but in
1817 united, and forming now together the established church), has given
some prominence to the so-called _Freiegemeinden_, organizations of
freethinkers, who, though so destitute of positive religious belief that
in one case, when an attempt was made to adopt a creed, an insuperable
obstacle was met in discussing the first article, viz., on the existence
of God, yet meet periodically and call themselves religious
congregations. There are, moreover, many others, regular members of the
established church, who have no interest in religious matters, and would
for that reason like to be freed from the fetters which now hold them.
There are, however, many among the best and most discreet Christians
who, for the good of the church, wish to see it weaned from the breast
of the state. But the great majority of the clergy, especially of the
consistories (the members of which are appointed by the Government,
mediately, however, now, through the _Oberkirchenrath_), are decidedly
opposed to the separation; and, as they speak for the churches, the
provision of the constitution allowing the separation is a dead letter.
There is no denying that, if it were now to be fully carried out, the
consequences to the church might be, for a time at least, disastrous.
The people have always been used to the present system; they would
hardly know how to act on any other. Moreover, a large majority of the
church members are destitute of active piety; to put the interests of
religion into the hands of such men would seem to be a dangerous
experiment. Especially is it true of the mercantile classes, of those
who are pecuniarily best able to maintain religious institutions, that
they are in general indifferent to religious things. This being the
case, one cannot be surprised at the reluctance of those in
ecclesiastical authority to desire the support of the state to be
withdrawn. Neverheless it cannot but widen the chasm between the
established church and the freethinkers, that the former urges upon the
Government to continue a policy which is plainly inconsistent with the
constitution, and that the Government yields to the urging.
A more vital point in the controversy between the king and the Liberals
was the disposition of the finances. The House of Delegates, in the
session lasting from January 14 to March 11, 1862, insisted on a more
minute specification than the ministry had given of the use to be made
of the moneys to be appropriated. The king at length, wearied with their
importunity, dissolved the House, upon which a new election followed in
the next month. The excitement was great. The Government seems to have
hoped for a favorable result, at least for a diminution of the Liberal
majority. The Minister of the Interior issued a communication to all
officials, announcing that they would be expected to vote in favor of
the Government. A similar notification was made to the universities, but
was protested against. Most of the consistories summoned the clergymen
to labor to secure a vote in favor of the king. But in spite of all
these exertions, the new House, like the other, contained an
overwhelming majority of Progress men. At the beginning of the new
session in May, however, both parties seemed more yielding than before.
Attention was given less to questions of general character, more to
matters of practical concern. But at last the schism developed itself
again. The king had determined to reorganize and enlarge the army, to
which end larger appropriations were needed than usual. The military
budget put the requisite sum at 37,779,043 thalers (about twenty-five
million dollars); the House voted 31,932,940, rejecting the proposition
of the minister by a vote of three hundred and eight to eleven. A change
in the ministry followed, but not a change such as would be expected in
England--just the opposite. At the dissolution of the previous House the
Liberal ministry had given place to a more conservative one; now this
conservative one gave place to one still more conservative, Herr von
Bismarck became Minister of State. The House then voted that the
appropriations must be determined by the House, else every use made by
the Government of the national funds would be unconstitutional. The
king's answer to this was an order closing the session. A new session
began early in 1863. The same controversy was renewed. The king had
introduced his new military scheme; he had used, under the plea of stern
necessity, money not voted by Parliament. He declared that the good of
the country required it, and demanded anew that the House make the
requisite appropriation. But the House was not to be moved. So far from
wishing an increase of the military expenses, the Liberal party favored
a reduction of the term of service from three to two years. The king
affirmed that he knew better what the interests of the nation required,
and, as the head of the army, he must do what his best judgment dictated
respecting its condition. Thus the session passed without anything of
consequence being accomplished. The House of Lords rejected the budget
as it came from the other chamber, and the delegates would not retreat.
Consequently another dead lock was the result. The mutual bitterness
increased. Minister von Bismarck, a man of considerable talent, but not
of spotless character, and exceedingly offensive in his bearing toward
his opponents, became so odious that the delegates seemed ready to
reject any proposition coming from him, whether good or bad. They tried
to induce the king to remove him. But this was like the wind trying to
blow off the traveller's coat. Instead of being moved by such
demonstrations to dismiss the premier, the king manifested in the most
express manner his dissatisfaction with such attempts of the House to
interfere with his prerogatives. One might think that he had resolved to
retain Bismarck out of pure spite, though he might personally be ever so
much inclined to drop him. The controversy became more and more one of
opposing wills. May 22, the House voted an address to the king, stating
its views of the state of the country, the rights of the House, etc.,
and expressing the conviction that this majesty had been misinformed by
his counsellors of the true state of public feeling. The king replied to
the address a few days later, stating that he knew what he was doing and
what was for the good of the people; that the House was to blame for the
fruitlessness of the session; that the House had unconstitutionally
attempted to control him in respect to the ministry and foreign affairs;
that he did not need to be informed by the House what public sentiment
was, since Prussia's kings were accustomed to live among and for the
people; and that, a further continuance of the session being manifestly
useless, it should close on the next day. Accordingly it was closed
without the passage of any sort of appropriation bill, and the
Government, as before, ruled practically without a diet.
We do not propose to arbitrate between the affirmations of the
Conservatives, on the one hand, that the _animus_ of the opposition was
a spirit of disloyalty toward the Government, an unprincipled and
unconstitutional striving to subvert the foundations of royalty, and
introduce a substantially democratic form of government, and the
complaints of the opposition, on the other hand, that the ministry was
trying to domineer over the House of Delegates, and reduce its practical
power to a nullity. We may safely assume that there is some truth in
both statements. Where the dispute is chiefly respecting motives, it
must always be difficult to find the exact truth. In behalf of the
Conservatives, however, it may be said that the Liberals have
undoubtedly been aiming at a greater limitation of the royal power than
the constitution was designed by its author to establish. Frederick
William IV. proposed to rule _in connection with_ the representatives of
the people. The idea of becoming a mere instrument for the execution of
their wishes, was odious to him, and is odious to his successor. That
such a reduction of the kingly office, however, is desired and designed
by many of the Progress party, is hardly to be questioned. But, on the
other hand, it is hard to see, in case the present policy of the
Government is carried through, what other function the diet will
eventually have than simply that of advising the king and acting as his
mere instrument, whenever he lays his plans and asks for the money
necessary for their execution. This certainly cannot accord with the
article of the constitution which declares that the legislative power
shall be 'jointly' (_gemeinschaftlich_) exercised by the king and the
two Houses.
It is all the less necessary to consider particularly the character of
the measures proposed and opposed, and the personal motives of the
prominent actors in the present strife, inasmuch as the parties
themselves are fighting no longer respecting special, subordinate
questions, but respecting the fundamental principle of the Government,
the mutual relation which, under the constitution, king and people are
to sustain to each other. From this point of view it is not difficult to
pass judgment on the general merits of the case. If we inquire where, if
at all, the constitution has been formally violated, there can be no
doubt that the breach has been on the side of the Government. That the
consent of the diet is necessary to the validity act fixing the use of
the public moneys, is expressly stated in the constitution. That the
Government, for a series of years, has appropriated the funds according
to its own will, without obtaining that consent, is an undeniable matter
of fact. It is true that the king and his ministers do not acknowledge
that this is a violation of the constitution, claiming that the duty of
the king to provide in cases of exigency for the maintenance of the
public weal, authorizes him, in the exigency which the obstinacy of the
delegates has brought about, to act on his own responsibility. The
Government must exist, they say, and to this end money must be had; if
the House will not grant it, we must take it. That this is a mere
quibble, especially as the exigency can be as easily ascribed to the
obstinacy of the king as to that of the delegates, may be affirmed by
Liberals with perfect confidence, when, as is actually the case, all
candid Conservatives, even those of the strictest kind, confess that
_formally_, at least, the king has acted unconstitutionally. And, though
in respect to the financial question, they may justify this course while
confessing its illegality, it is not so easy to do so in reference to
the press law made by the king four days after closing the session of
the diet. This law established a censorship of the press, which was
aimed especially against all attacks in the newspapers on the policy
of the Government, the plea being that the Liberal papers were
disturbing the public peace and exciting a democratic spirit. The
unconstitutionality of this act was as palpable as its folly. Only in
case of war or insurrection is any such restriction allowed at all; the
wildest imagination could hardly have declared either war or
insurrection to be then existing. Moreover, even in case of such an
exigency, the king has a right to limit the freedom of the press only
when the diet is not in session and the urgency is too great to make it
safe to wait for it to assemble. But in this call it is manifest not
only that the king was not anxious to have the cooeperation of the
Houses, but that he positively wished _not_ to have it. No one imagines
that he conceived the whole idea of enacting the law _after_ he had
prorogued the diet; certainly nothing new in the line of public danger
had arisen in those four days to justify the measure. Besides, he knew
that the House of Delegates would not have approved it. It was, in fact,
directly aimed at their supporters. A plainer attack on their
constitutional rights could hardly have been made.
But the delegates were sent home, so that they were now not able to
disturb the country by their debates. The Conservatives rejoiced in
this, seeming to think that the only real evil under which the country
was suffering was the 'gabbling' of the members of the diet. Moreover,
the press law, unwise and unconstitutional as many of the Conservatives
themselves considered and pronounced it, was in force, so that the
editorial demagogues also were under bit and bridle. It was hoped that
now quiet would be restored. The German diet at Frankfort-on-the-Maine
turned public attention for a time from the more purely internal
Prussian politics. But this was a very insufficient diversion. In fact,
the course of William I., in utterly refusing to have anything to do
with the proposed remodelling of the articles of confederation, the
object of which was to effect a firmer union of the German States,
although no Prussian had the utmost confidence in the sincerity of the
Austrian emperor, yet ran counter to the wishes of the Liberals, and
even of many Conservatives. The same feeling which fifty years ago gave
rise to the _Burschenschaft_ displayed itself unmistakably in the
enthusiasm with which Francis Joseph's invitation was welcomed by the
Germans in general. The king of Prussia did not dare to declare against
the proposed measure itself. Acknowledging the need of a revision of the
articles, he yet declined to take part in the diet, simply because, as
he said, before the princes themselves came together for so important a
deliberation, some preliminary negotiations should have taken place.
There is little reason to doubt, however, that his real motive was a
fear lest, if he should commit himself to the cause of German union, he
would seem to be working in the interests of the Liberals. For, as of
old, so now, the most enthusiastic advocates of a consolidation of the
German States are the most inclined to anti-monarchical principles;
naturally enough, since a firm union of states, utterly distinct from
each other, save as their rulers choose to unite themselves, while yet
each ruler in his own land is independent of the others, and each has
always reason to be jealous of the other, is an impossibility. This
jealousy was conspicuous in the case of Prussia and Austria during the
session of this special diet, in the summer of 1863. It was shared in
Prussia not only by the king and his special political friends, but by
many of the Liberals. It was perhaps in the hope that the national
feeling had received a healthful impulse by the developments of
Austria's ambition to obtain once more the hegemony of Germany, that the
king soon after _dissolved_ the House of Delegates, which in June he had
prorogued. A new election was appointed for October 20. Most strenuous
efforts were made by the Government to secure as favorable a result as
possible. Clergymen were enjoined by the Minister of Instruction to use
their influence in behalf of the Government. Officials were notified
that they would be expected to vote for Conservative candidates, a hint
which in Prussia cannot be so lightly regarded as here, since voting
there is done _viva voce_. But, in spite of all these exertions, the
Progress men in the new House were as overwhelmingly in the majority as
before. On assembling, they reelected the former president, Grabow, by a
vote of two hundred and twenty-four to forty. And the same old strife
began anew.
So little, then, had been accomplished by attempts forcibly to put down
the opposition party. Many newspapers had received the third and last
warning for publishing articles of an incendiary character, though none,
so far as we know, were actually suspended; a professor in Koenigsberg
had been deposed for presiding at a meeting of Liberals; a professor in
Berlin had been imprisoned for publishing a pamphlet against the policy
of the Government. There were even intimations that, unless the
opposition yielded, the king would suspend the constitution, and
dispense entirely with the cooeperation of the Parliament. But whether or
not this was ever thought of, he showed none of this disposition at the
opening of the session. His speech, though containing no concessions,
was mild and conciliatory in tone. Perhaps he saw that a threatening
course could not succeed, and was intending to pursue another. He
declared his purpose to suggest an amendment to the constitution
providing for such cases of disagreement between the two Houses as had
hitherto obstructed the legislation. This was afterward done. It was
proposed that, whenever no agreement could be secured respecting the
appropriations, the amount should be the same as that of the foregoing
year. This, however, was not approved by the House of Delegates. The
same disagreement occurred as at the previous sessions, intensified now
by the increased demands of the Government on account of the threatened
war in Schleswig-Holstein. A loan of twelve million thalers was
proposed; but the House refused utterly to authorize it unless it could
be known what was the use to be made of it. This information Minister
Bismarck would not give. The dispute grew more and more sharp. The old
causes of discussion were increased by the fact that Prussia, in
reference to the disputed succession in Schleswig-Holstein, set itself
against the popular wish to have the duchy absolutely separated from
Denmark and put under the rule of the prince of Augustenburg. In fact,
in this particular, whatever may be thought elsewhere respecting the
merits of the war which soon after broke out, the policy of the
Government was nearly as odious to most Conservatives as to the
Liberals. They said, the king should have put himself at the head of the
national, the German demand for the permanent relief of their fellow
Germans in Schleswig-Holstein; he should have taken the cause out of the
sphere of party politics; thus he might have regained his popularity and
united his people. This is quite possible; but it is certain that he did
not take this course. He seemed to regard the movement in favor of
Prince Frederick's claims to the duchy as a democratic movement. It was
so called by the more violent Conservatives. The king, after failing to
take the lead, could not now, consistently with his determination to be
independent, fall in with the crowd; this would seem like yielding to
pressure. Besides, he felt probably more than the Prussian people in
general the binding force of the London treaty. Yet, as a German, he
could not be content to ignore the claims of the German inhabitants of
the duchy; there was, therefore, no course left but to make hostile
demonstrations against Denmark. The pretext was not an unfair one. The
November constitution, by which Denmark, immediately after the accession
of the protocol prince, the present king, Christian IX., proposed to
incorporate Schleswig, was a violation of treaty obligations. The Danish
Government was required to retract its course. It refused, and war
followed. What will be the result of it, what even the Prussian
Government wishes to be the result of it, is a matter of uncertainty.
Suspicions of a secret treaty between it and Austria find easy credence,
according to which, as is supposed, nothing but their mutual
aggrandizement is aimed at. Certain it is that none even of the best
informed pretend to know definitely what is designed, nor be confident
that the design, whatever it is, will be executed. Yet for the time a
certain degree of enthusiasm has been of course awakened in all by the
successful advance of Prussian troops through Schleswig, and the
indefinite hope is cherished that somehow, even in spite of the apparent
policy of the Government, the war will result in rescuing the duchy
entirely from the Danish grasp. Thus, temporarily at least, the popular
mind is again diverted from internal politics; and perhaps the
Government was moved as much by a desire to effect this diversion as by
any other motive. The decided schism between Prussia and Austria on the
one hand, and the smaller German States on the other, a schism in which
the majority of the people even in Prussia and Austria side with the
smaller states, favors the notion that these two powers dislike heartily
to enter into a movement whose motive and end is mainly the promotion of
German unity at the expense of monarchical principles. For, however much
of subtlety may be exhibited in proving that the prince of Augustenburg
is the rightful heir to the duchy, the real source of the German
interest in the matter is sympathy with their fellow Germans, who, as is
not to be doubted, have been in various ways, especially in respect to
the use of the German language in schools and churches, abused and
irritated by the Danish Government. The death of the late king of
Denmark was only made the occasion for seeking the desired relief.
Fifteen years ago the same thing was done without any such occasion. But
it would be the extreme of inconsistency for the Prussian Government to
help directly and ostensibly a movement which, whatever name it may
bear, is essentially a rebellion: if there are Germans in
Schleswig-Holstein, so are there Poles in Poland.
But, although, for the time being, the excitement of actual war silences
the murmurs of the Progress party, the substantial occasion for them is
not removed. On the contrary, there is reason to expect that the contest
will become still more earnest. Only one turn of events can avert this:
the separation of Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark in consequence of the
present war. If this is not the result, if nothing more is accomplished
than the restoration of the duchy to its former condition, the king will
lose the support of many Conservatives, and be still more bitterly
opposed by the Liberals. In addition to this is to be considered that
the war is carried on in spite of the refusal of the diet to authorize
the requisite loan; that, moreover, after vainly seeking to secure this
vote from the delegates, Minister Bismarck, in the name of the king,
prorogued the diet on the 25th of January, 1864, telling the Delegates
plainly that the money must be had, and accordingly that, if its use
were not regularly authorized, it must be taken by the Government
without such authority. His spirit may be gathered from a single remark
among the many bitter things which he had to say in the closing days of
the session: 'In order to gain your confidence, one must give one's self
up to you; what then would the ministers in future be but Parliamentary
ministers? To this condition, please God, we shall not be reduced.' The
spirit of the delegates is expressed in the question of one of their
number: 'Why does the Minister of State ask us to authorize the loan, if
he has no need of our consent--if we have not the right to say _No_?'
Brilliant successes of the Prussian arms, accomplishing substantially
the result for which the German people are all earnestly longing, may
restore the Government to temporary favor, and weaken the Progress
party; otherwise, as many Conservatives themselves confess, the king
will have paralyzed the arms of his own friends.
What is to be the end of this conflict between the Prussian Government
and the Prussian people? Without attempting to play the prophet's part,
we close by mentioning some considerations which must be taken into
account in forming a judgment. Although we have little doubt that the
present policy of the Government will not be permanently adhered to, we
do not anticipate any speedy or violent rupture. The case is in many
respects parallel to that of the quarrel between Charles I. and his
Parliaments; but the points of difference are sufficient to warrant the
expectation of a somewhat different result. Especially these: Charles
had no army of such size and efficiency that he could bid defiance to
the demands of his Parliament; on the contrary, the Prussian army is, in
times of peace, two hundred thousand strong, and can, in case of need,
be at once trebled; moreover, soldiers must take an oath of allegiance
to the king, not, however, to the constitution. Of this army the king is
the head, and with it under his control he can feel tolerably secure
against the danger of a popular outbreak. Again, the English
revolutionists had little to fear from Continental interference;
Prussia, on the contrary, is so situated that a revolution there could
hardly fail to provoke neighboring monarchies to assist in putting it
down. There is no such oppression weighing the people down that they
would be willing to run this risk in an attempt to remove it. Again, the
Liberals hope, and not without reason, that they will eventually secure
what they wish by peaceable means. There is little doubt that, if they
pursue a moderate course, neither resorting to violence nor threatening
to do so, themselves avoiding all violations of the constitution, while
compelling the Government, in case it will not yield, to commit such
violations openly, their cause will gradually grow so strong that the
king will ultimately see the hopelessness of longer resisting it. Or,
once more, even if the present king, whose self-will is such that he may
possibly persevere in his present course through his reign, does not
yield, it is understood that the heir apparent is inclined to adopt a
more liberal policy whenever he ascends the throne, an event which
cannot be very long distant. Were he supposed fully to sympathize with
his father, the danger of a violent solution of the difficulty would be
greater. But, as the case stands, it may not be considered strange if
the conflict lasts several years longer without undergoing any essential
modification.
There is no prospect that the dissension will be ended by mutual
concessions. This might be done, if mutual confidence existed between
the contending parties; but of such confidence there is a total lack. So
great is the estrangement that the original occasion of it is lost sight
of. Neither party cares so much about securing the success of its
favorite measures as about defeating the measures of its opponent.
Either the possibility of such a relation of the king to the Parliament
was not entertained when the constitution was drawn up, or it is a great
deficiency that no provision was made for it; or (as we should prefer to
say) the difficulty may have been foreseen and yet no provision have
been made for it, simply because none could have been made consistently
with Frederick William IV.'s maxim, 'A free people under a free king'--a
maxim which sounds well, but which, when the people are bent on going in
one way and the king in another, is difficult to reconcile with the
requirement of the constitution that both must go in the same way. In a
republic, where the legislature and chief magistrate are both chosen
representatives of one people, no protracted disagreement between them
is possible. In a monarchy where a ministry, which has lost the
confidence of the legislature, resigns its place to another, the danger
is hardly greater. But in a monarchy whose constitution provides that
king and people shall rule jointly, yet both act freely and
independently, nothing but the most paradisiacal state of humanity could
secure mutual satisfaction and continued harmony. Prussia is now
demonstrating to the world that, if the people of a nation are to have
in the national legislation anything more than an advisory power, they
must have a determining power. To say that the king shall have the
unrestricted right of declaring and making war, and at the same time
that no money can be used without the free consent of Parliament, is
almost fit to be called an Irish bull. Such mutual freedom is impossible
except when king and Parliament perfectly agree in reference to the war
itself. But, if this agreement exists, there is either no need of a
Parliament or no need of a king. It makes little difference how the
constitution is worded in this particular, nor even what was intended by
the author of this provision. What is in itself an intrinsic
contradiction cannot be carried out in practice. Whether any formal
change is made in the constitution or not, a different mode of
interpreting it, a different conception of the relation of monarch to
subject, must become current, if the constitution is to be a working
instrument. Prussia must become again practically an absolute monarchy
or a constitutional monarchy like England. Nor is there much doubt which
of these possibilities will be realized. And not the least among the
causes which will hasten the final triumph of Liberalism there, is the
exhibition of the strength of republicanism here, while undergoing its
present trial. When one observes how many of the more violent Prussian
Conservatives openly sympathize with the rebels, and most of the others
fail to do so only because they dislike slavery; when one sees, on the
other hand, how anxiously the Prussian Liberals are waiting and hoping
for the complete demonstration of the ability of our Government to
outride the storm which has threatened its destruction, the cause in
which we are engaged becomes invested with a new sacredness. Our success
will not only secure the blessings of a free Government to the
succeeding generations of this land, but will give a stimulus to free
principles in every part of the globe. If 'Freedom shrieked when
Kosciuszko fell' at the hands of despotism, a longer and sadder wail
would mark the fall of American republicanism, wounded and slain in the
house of its friends.
'YE KNOW NOT WHAT YE ASK.'
One morn in spring, when earth lay robed
In resurrection bloom,
I turned away my tear-veiled eyes,
Feeling the glow but gloom,
And asked my God one boon I craved,
Or earth were living tomb.
* * * * *
One autumn morn, when all the world
In ripened glory lay,
I turned to God my shining eyes,
And praised Him for that day,
When asking _curses_ with my lips,
He turned His ear away.