First--The memorandum bears witness to the pacific spirit of the
British people. Here are some of its words:
"The commercial jealousy about which we [in Germany] hear so much is
based on a wrong conception of the circumstances. Certainly Germany's
rise as a commercial power after 1870 and during the following decades
was a menace to British commercial circles which with their industries
and export houses had held a virtual monopoly. The increasing commerce
with Germany, which was the leading country in Europe as regards
British exports, had, however, given rise to the wish to maintain
friendly relations with their best customer and business friend, and
had driven all other considerations into the background. Notably, in
commercial spirit and the effort to further our common commercial
interests."
"At the English cities to which I was invited (by the Chambers of
Commerce and municipalities) I was well received everywhere. * * *
In all other circles I also met with the most friendly reception and
co-operation--at Court, in society, and from the Government."
"On account of our fleet alone England would not have drawn the sword
any more than on account of our trade, which has been alleged to have
produced jealousy and finally war. * * * It was possible to arrive at
an understanding in spite of the fleet, and without a 'naval holiday,'
[intermission of naval shipbuilding.]"
Second--The memorandum shows that the attitude of the British
Government, and in particular of Sir Edward Grey, then Foreign
Minister, was entirely pacific. The admirable characterization of
Sir Edward it contains is too long to quote, but it testifies to
his perfect straightforwardness and constant wish to maintain good
relations with Germany, and after describing how "the simplicity and
honesty of his ways secured him the respect even of his opponents," it
adds: "This is a true picture of the man who is decried [in Germany] as
'Liar Grey' and instigator of the world war."
The memorandum goes on to show how sincerely Sir Edward had worked
for peace, first in 1913, during the Balkan troubles, when he went
hand-in-hand with Germany, "hardly ever supporting the French or
Russian claims. He conducted the negotiations with circumspection,
calm, and tact." Frequently, when appealed to by Lichnowsky to use his
influence with the Russian Government to arrange difficulties between
it and Germany, "Sir Edward gladly did this, and his intervention
contributed in no small degree to smooth the matter over."
Third--A still weightier evidence of the good-will of the British
Government is supplied by the account given of the concessions made
to German wishes in Asia and Africa. "Sir Edward Grey," says the
memorandum, "after having outstanding points of difference with
France and Russia, wished to make similar agreements with us. It was
not his object to isolate us, but to the best of his power to make us
partners in the existing association. As he had succeeded in overcoming
Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian differences, so he also wished to do
his best to eliminate the Anglo-German, and, by a network of treaties,
which would no doubt have led in the end to an agreement on the
troublesome question of naval armaments, to insure the peace of the
world."