Two letters from Russian officials, very different in contents but
both of historical significance, were brought to the outside world
by Herman Bernstein, who had been sent to Petrograd by The New York
Herald. One is a confidential letter from Trotzky to Lenine, written at
Brest-Litovsk at the end of the peace conference, as follows:
It is impossible to sign their peace. They have already agreed
with fictitious Governments of Poland, Lithuania, Courland, and
others concerning territorial concessions, military and customs
treaties, in view of self-determination. These provinces,
according to the German interpretation, are already independent
German States, and as independent States have already concluded
territorial and other agreements with Germany and Austria-Hungary.
Today I put these questions squarely and received a reply leaving
no room for misunderstandings. Everything was stenographed.
Tomorrow we shall present the same questions in writing. We cannot
sign their peace.
My plan is this: We announce the termination of the war and
demobilization without signing any peace. We declare we cannot
participate in the looting war of the Allies nor a looting
peace. Poland's, Lithuania's, Courland's fate we place upon the
responsibility of the German working people. The Germans will be
unable to attack us after we declare the war ended. At any rate,
it would be very difficult for Germany to attack us because of
her internal conditions. The Scheidemannists adopted a formal
resolution to break with a Government that makes annexationist
demands of the Russian revolution. The Berliner Tageblatt and
the Vossische Zeitung demand an understanding with Russia by
all means; Centrists favor an agreement. Internal strife is
demoralizing the Government, a bitter controversy is raging in the
press about the struggle on the western front; we declare that we
end the war, but do not sign peace.
They will be unable to make an offensive against us.
Verteidigungskrieg. If they attack us our position will be no
worse than now, when they have the opportunity to declare us
agents of England and Wilson, after his speech and comments on
attack. I must have your decision. We could well drag negotiations
one, two, three, or four days; afterward they must be broken off.
I see no other solution than that proposed.