[BY THE COLOGNE GAZETTE EDITOR AT GERMAN HEADQUARTERS]
The task confronting us before the offensive seemed monstrous. What
the combined and many times superior armies of the Napoleonic School
and Kitchener's Army, young indeed but drawing its supplies from the
resources of a world empire had failed to accomplish against a force
of almost Frederickian inferiority in numbers, this task was to be
performed by the German Army, which, even after the absorption of the
eastern units, was scarcely equal in strength, much less superior to
the enemy. The big hammer had failed to beat down the little hammer;
it was now the turn of the little hammer to pit itself against the
big hammer. The German hinterland, diminutive in comparison with the
continents working for the coalition, was not only to hold its own,
but also to help to conquer in battle against the raw materials and
industries of half Europe, America, Africa, and Asia. The German
victory at Cambrai, which in a sense represented a transition from the
old to a new era in the history of the war in the west, had already
illuminated the difficulties that a brave and numerically superior
enemy could oppose to our attack.
In contrast with the victorious confidence of our veteran defense
troops--a confidence that at times excited the amazement of their own
leaders--the enemy continued to contemplate the German undertaking
with inveterate skepticism. British and French prisoners captured
during the Winter months indeed held out to us the prospect of
achieving an initial success similar to that which their own offensive
had achieved. But nowhere in the world did any one reckon upon more
than the customary initial success for our enterprise.
The German High Command decided from the very outset not to fight
a "battle of matériel," but to build up success upon a more ideal
foundation. Numerical inferiority was to be compensated by the warlike
and moral qualities peculiar to the German Army organism. The same
virtues that had proved the essential cause of the enemy's defeat were
to form the surest guarantees of German victory. To the undeniable
bravery of the English and French storming troops was to be opposed
the utmost bravery of the German tribes; the good quality of the enemy
leaders was to be met by better leading on the German side, and the
thorough preparation of our adversaries by one still more thorough.
As the Supreme Command could confidently reckon upon the two first as
given quantities, there remained as the chief task the preparation
of the attack. Unity of command and of forces, the latter non-German
only in respect of a valuable group of Austrian batteries that had
been placed in the line, facilitated the tremendous work. Frictions
and impediments that are inherent even in the best organized
coalition armies were spared us. It is impossible to picture what was
accomplished in the map rooms of the German staffs by experienced
specialists in defensive warfare, who worked in silence for months, at
the highest nervous pressure, in the face of the confident expectation
of the homeland and growing tension and impatience abroad. But it is
certain that an altogether enormous expenditure of organizing energy
was required in order to impart the method of attack; to ascertain and
control the situation of the enemy; to supply the striking force with
munitions and provisions; and finally to produce that masterpiece, the
veiled march into line.